Ebou Colly
This is a brilliant piece. I just can't wait to read
Part 2.
You have given us an accurate version of what happen
prior to and up to July 22 when Yahya and Co took the
realms of office. Your article on this subject appears
to be best, contrary to statements by the likes of
Yankuba Touray and others as to how it came about.
Your article will be stored in my archives
I have noticed that you have not mentioned the name of
Rtd Captain Yankuba Touray(Yahya Jammeh's Chief Praise
Singer) as one of the key players. Am I therefore
right to say that he merely came into prominence
through accident?
Secondly, there are conflicting reports that Sana
Sabally was never involved in a coup attempt of 28
January 1995. Is this true? If not, I promise you will
giveus some explanation as to what actually happened.
Looking forward to your thoughtful explanation
Chi Jaama
Sanusi
--- Pa Modou Jobe <[log in to unmask]> wrote: >
Well done Mr Colly. Your piece has thrown much light
> on the anatomy of the
> July 1994 coup. Jammeh certainly did not seem clever
> enough to lead a coup.
> He was however wily/crafty enough to steal the show.
> Sad.
> However, my question is: How and why was Sana
> Sabally and Sadibou Hydara
> arrested? Thanks.
>
> >From: ebou colly <[log in to unmask]>
> >Reply-To: The Gambia and related-issues mailing
> list
> ><[log in to unmask]>
> >To: [log in to unmask]
> >Subject: COUP IN GAMBIA ONE
> >Date: Sun, 22 Apr 2001 17:28:34 -0700
> >
> > COUP IN GAMBIA ONE
> >
> >A British military officer I once met in San Remo
> >Italy asked me to put the reason why there was a
> coup
> >in The Gambia in two words.
> >"Command breakdown and government complacency," I
> gave
> >it to him in five.
> >The British officer who was very interested in the
> >military history of The Gambia had been for the
> weeks
> >we worked together curiously firing me all sorts of
> >questions about what made it possible for the
> junior
> >officers of the GNA to seized power in 1994.
> >The story I explained to that gentleman is the one
> I
> >wish to share with the G-L readers in this series
> >entitled COUP IN GAMBIA. It is a story I intend to
> >tell in the simplest form based on my personal
> >experience of the coup in The Gambia on the 22nd
> July
> >1994, the accidental role I played in it and most
> >important of all the facts according to what
> exactly
> >happened. I may also in this exercise attempt to
> >periodically express my views or opinion about the
> >special situations encountered. Hearing about the
> >general misconception developed by Gambians and
> >non-Gambians alike, in the country or outside about
> >the 1994 coup, coupled with the absolute silence
> from
> >those who actually know the facts, compounded by
> >mainly the lies Yaya and his lackeys have been
> >peddling about the event, the coup in the final
> >analysis has now been reduced to one shameless BIG
> >lie. Those who should have been termed the actual
> >heroes in that mutinous and criminal operation have
> >long since been killed or reduced to subservient
> >nonentities while the cowards who should have been
> >permanently locked up behinds bars for their
> >traitorous actions stole the center stage,
> supported
> >by intellectual criminals and defended by armed
> >bandits. However regardless of how strong or deep
> they
> >may anchor their vessel of deceit in the divine sea
> of
> >life, the wind of truth will someday blow away
> these
> >floating evil doers to the shore of reality where
> the
> >crew will be exposed in their naked images. Those
> >thinking that they could disguise themselves in
> this
> >doom-bound vessel enjoying the loot of the
> >bloodthirsty pirates, encouraging them to shed more
> >blood for bigger treasure and then disappearing
> >unnoticed at the final day of reckoning ought to
> think
> >twice about that ungodly fate. If Gambians should
> >think that they could get away with killing
> innocent
> >armless children for anything in this world and
> then
> >turn it into a political issue, manipulating the
> laws
> >to exonerate the guilty murderers, some of them
> being
> >so sick to make it a laughing matter in the heart
> of
> >the nation then Gambians could as well exempt the
> >existence of god and the dynamic laws of nature
> from
> >life. These knuckleheads cannot learn from the
> common
> >saying that no condition is constant except change
> >itself.
> >Lets remember Samuel Doe, Emperor Bukasa, Mengistu
> >Haili Mariam, Edi Amin and Mobutu with their doomed
> >followers. These leaders blatantly flouted all
> kinds
> >of rules, secular and divine, with powers far
> greater
> >than the ordinary or with powers which Yayas will
> >never dream to acquire in this world; leaders who
> >thought they could get away with any crimes, lies
> and
> >deceit perpetrated towards their innocent subjects
> >until the day of divine intervention dawned on
> them.
> >Days that come without warning and often when
> things
> >are at their sweetest. Days when the predators are
> >caught happily licking their blood-dripping fingers
> >from devouring the flesh of their unfortunate
> preys.
> >Day that found them in festive moods when they the
> >least suspected that the judgement day is indeed
> here.
> >That day in the Gambia will soon come. The day Yaya
> >and his callous follows will know that children in
> the
> >kingdom of god are after all real angels and that
> no
> >hoodlum would get away with killing them out of
> share
> >madness. Call it the big time day of reckoning.
> >Having said that, I will now turn to my new topic,
> >thanks to loony Paul. Evidently, if Gambians had
> >developed the special tradition of recording and
> >referring to their history as time and events
> unfold
> >before us from period to another, we would have
> >realized that the same situation that led to the
> >abortive coup of 1981 more or less recurred in
> 1994.
> >And perhaps that would have helped in averting the
> >1994 calamity.
> >For instance by the time Kukoi lured the Field
> Force
> >into his nightmarish coup in 1981, it could be
> >remembered that there was a total breakdown of
> command
> >and control in Depot, Fajara Barracks. The late Eku
> >Mahony was strangely shot and killed by the late
> >constable Mustapha Danso the previous year 1980;
> also
> >the late Commander Bojang was suspected of
> complicity
> >in what was thought to be a deadly factional
> conflict
> >among their subordinates leading to one of his men
> >killing his command counterpart. Bojang was retired
> or
> >weeded from the force but had refused to vacate his
> >official residence when asked to do so by
> government.
> >The atmosphere was as a result charged with heavy
> >gossip of a coup planning at the depot, yet
> government
> >by its actions showed little concern about the
> >potential explosion facing the nation. Nothing was
> >more important at that critical time in
> government's
> >agenda than the security crisis in the Depot that
> >required immediate and total attention. Whether
> there
> >was even a national security crisis management
> organ
> >in the country for such unexpected emergencies was
> >another thing we may never know. However if there
> was
> >one, I don't think it was official or effective or
> >even known to the Gambians. Historians may one day
> >have to help us with this one. Anyway I still think
> >that the government was rather complacent with the
> >situation until Kukoi stuck, surprised and shocked
> the
> >whole world. A civilian taking command of the
> county's
> >major security force using its personnel in a coup
> >attempt was unimaginable and disgraceful. Thank god
> >there was foreign intervention to stop Kukoi;
> >otherwise the crisis that had erupted could have
> >pretty well degenerated into full-blown civil war.
> And
> >I still firmly believe that what The Gambia escaped
> in
> >Kukoi 's failure in 1981 was the exact leadership
> we
> >got in Yaya's success in 1994. In other words, I
> think
> >Kukoi in 1981 was going to be what we got in Yaya
> in
> >1994. But it was still possible that Kukoi might
> have
> >been a little more genuine. Nothing could be like
> >Yaya.
> >Another critical factor often neglected but very
> >important in command stability but was and is still
> >lacking in The Gambia's security institutions is
> the
>
=== message truncated ===
=====
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