The following is an editorial from the Observer (the Guardian) in the UK. By
the way, this is a left-of-the-center newspaper.
Ousman
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://www.observer.co.uk/iraq/story/0,12239,877841,00.html
Iraq: the case for decisive action
Military intervention in the Middle East holds many dangers. But if we want
a lasting peace it may be the only option
Sunday January 19, 2003
The Observer
A war with Iraq has become more likely in the past week. Thursday's
discovery of undeclared poison gas shells was insufficient to trigger war
alone. But here was the first concrete, and predictable, confirmation that
Iraq's co-operation with Hans Blix's UN weapons inspectors has been less
than complete. And Saddam Hussein's defiant speech on Friday even
disappointed those who still hope that the Iraqi leader might choose
comfortable exile in Libya or Belarus.
One thing which has been stressed too little in recent weeks is that it is
Iraq's choices that have brought war closer. The debate in Britain and
Europe continues to focus largely on what America is doing and why. Too
often, it is overlooked that it is Iraq which remains, at the eleventh hour,
in defiance of the will of its region and the wider world. That will is
still to find a sensible resolution to the current crisis without war. The
coercive diplomacy that could yet lead to Saddam's disarmament or his
disposal by his own side must be pursued. Indeed, the military build-up
remains the best strategy for seeking to disarm him, short of war. Yet he
still shows signs of frustrating the demands of December's UN resolution. If
this continues, few analysts doubt that the United States will seek support
for a military attack. It is becoming equally clear that Tony Blair's
Britain would participate. Would we be right to do so?
There are good - and bad - arguments for and against military intervention.
And there are some on both sides who have relied on weak and intellectually
dishonest positions to further their own cause. It devalues debate to
belittle Tony Blair as 'President Bush's poodle' - and the crude
anti-Americanism which often accompanies this charge also overlooks the
nuanced way in which the Prime Minister has sought with some success to
influence the approach of his superpower ally. It is similarly
unilluminating when detractors dismiss the Bush presidency as 'stupid'. The
President, regardless of his own capacities, is surrounded by some brilliant
advocates of his visceral beliefs. Equally, however, it does not help
casually to conflate any threat from Saddam with that from al-Qaeda, rather
than detailing the demonstrable dangers posed by Iraq itself.
The arguments for coercive pressure may well end in war. But they combine
two laudable motivations. The first is the nature of Saddam Hussein's regime
and the call by many Iraqi exiles and dissidents for him to be overthrown.
The appalling 1980s nerve-gasing of the Kurds is well documented. Less
widely appreciated is that there are few Iraqi families which have not
suffered directly, either in the massacres which crushed the 1991 uprisings,
or by the violence routinely deployed by Iraq's secret police. Both Bush and
Blair could have emphasised more just how bad Saddam's republic of fear has
been for his people and the extent to which ending it is a desirable end in
itself.
They could also have stressed more energetically that this dispute is not
about oil. For the second motive for displacing Saddam is the danger he
poses to the wider world. Western governments must articulate the nature of
that potential threat too. The Prime Minister has made the case for the need
to deal with Saddam for some years with consistency, though with far less
public notice before 11 September 2001. Accused of becoming America's
poodle, he, in fact, sticks to a potentially unpopular course because he
believes this to be right, and that the threat from Iraqi weapons is real.
He does so with courage and clarity.
At the same time, he has thus far managed to insist, and also to persuade
the Americans, that we stick to the path of UN endorsement and the framework
of international law. This is a considerable achievement.
The world still awaits firm public evidence that Saddam has effective
weapons of mass destruction. It is only when their existence is confirmed
that the UN will have to decide whether to take substantive military action.
And that will be the point at which British public opinion is fully tested.
The Observer has repeatedly argued, and we continue to do so, that any such
military action must have multilateral legitimacy. Not only is that right,
it is the only way that military action will secure international
acceptability. But this does not necessarily mean a unanimous Security
Council vote on such action. It might be difficult for some to accept a sole
veto from Beijing autocrats, for example, on action which might restore
democracy to another nation.
However, if we contemplate war, we should be clear about the dangers. Not
only are the lives of British service personnel at risk. (As the last Gulf
War proved, even the most clinical military operation does not protect our
own soldiers from 'friendly fire'.) The lives of many Iraqi civilians are at
risk, too, and must be part of any equation balancing the benefits of an
attack, as must the danger of an exodus of refugees from Iraq. Equally,
there is a considerable risk that civilians could be targeted in Britain,
whether we are part of a UN force or not, either by agents of Saddam or by
other terrorists who choose unilaterally to take his side.
Those risks must be set against potentially huge prizes. In London last
month, Iraqi opposition groups united around a platform of a federal,
democratic state. These people deserve support from those who propound
similar values in the West. The overwhelming majority of the Iraqi people
would regard Saddam's removal as liberation, pure and simple.
Some fear that, after the current regime, Iraqis can expect nothing better
than 'Saddam lite' and a less brutal dictator. But it is easily forgotten
that Iraq is a substantially secular country, which, in the period before
its first coup in 1958, was making strides towards constitutional monarchy,
with a free press, contested elections and the region's best schools and
universities. The historic State Department and Foreign Office view, that
democracy is not for the Middle East, is faintly prejudiced. But in the
words of Bernard Lewis, the scholar of the Muslim world, the example of
Turkey proves two things. First, that establishing democracy in the Middle
East is very difficult. Second, that it is possible.
The moral and political advantages of holding to the current course of
action are overwhelming. Legitimacy is fundamental to the values of Western
powers. Wherever possible, we make law, not war, and where war is
unavoidable, we observe the law in its conduct. The prospects for any
successor Iraqi regime will be much rosier if it is seen to have come into
being through a UN mandate derived from a very substantial majority of
members, rather than bilateral Anglo-American action.
Those who demanded a multilateral route have responsibilities, too. They
must recognise that the much-maligned Bush administration has dutifully
pursued a multilateral approach over both Iraq and the war in Afghanistan.
The world asked America to work through the UN. The UN and its members must
now show that its decisions and resolutions can be effective.
Some will still argue that because the world contains other unpleasant
dictators, it would be wrong to get rid of this one. We disagree. The recent
past contains several examples of military intervention against sovereign
states where the outcome, if not ideal, has certainly been much better in
humanitarian terms than what went before: Vietnam's removal of Pol Pot from
Cambodia; Nato's Kosovo campaign, with the subsequent indictment of Slobodan
Milosevic; the removal of the Taliban from Afghanistan.
War with Iraq may yet not come, but, conscious of the potentially terrifying
responsibility resting with the British Government, we find ourselves
supporting the current commitment to a possible use of force. That is not
because we have not agonised, as have so many of our readers and those who
demonstrated across the country yesterday, about what is right. It is
because we believe that, if Saddam does not yield, military action may
eventually be the least awful necessity for Iraq, for the Middle East and
for the world.
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