ARMED CONFLICT IN LA COTE D'IVOIRE
A Critical Reflection
By Dr. Thomas Jaye[1]
The current armed conflict in Cote d'Ivoire started as an army mutiny but after three months, the scope of the conflict has widened and its dimension has deepened. On the other hand, the so-called international community remains asleep like a 21st century political 'Rip Van Winkle'. Yet, with the exception of the diplomatic role being played by ECOWAS under the leadership of its Executive Secretary, Dr. Mohammed Ibn Chambas in trying to resolve this conflict peacefully, the other intervention comes from France; a country many believe should be blamed as part of the problem in the first place. The rest of international community is busy with the looming crises in the Middle East as America and Britain prepare to attack the regime of the Iraqi leader, Sadam Hussein. There are voices out there reminding the world that another Rwanda is on the brink of occurring. Like Rwanda, we are all waiting for the big bang to occur before we react. Similarly, in the early 1990s Liberia suffered similar fate when the international community was busy with the Gulf War.
Impact of the War
What is worrying about the conflict in the Cote d'Ivoire is not so much about its economic impact, but more importantly, about the human suffering that awaits West Africa if something is not done immediately. Already, this war has gone from being an internal crisis to a regional one. By the look of things and given what is most likely to happen sooner or later, even the relative peace achieved in Sierra Leone is under serious threat if a concerted action is not taken very soon.
Economically, most (if not all) of the country's neighbours will suffer because they benefit from its economy. For example, about 60% of imports into French speaking West Africa originate from Cote d'Ivoire. Further, it is estimated that the Ivorian economy accounts for 40% of the GDP of the West African Economic and Monetary Union. Like in other war torn countries, the Ivorian economy itself is feeling the strains of the war already as evidenced by the loss of jobs and suspension of operations by small and medium-sized businesses. In addition, the livelihood of about 60,000 cotton farmers in the north of the country could be affected as the conflict drags on.
For a declining economy like that of Burkina Faso, which is closely tied to the Ivorian economy, the situation will deteriorate. On the annual basis Burkina nationals remit $120 million home and 80% of Burkina exports depend on Ivorian ports. The strained relationship, which has developed between the two West African States will definitely affect Burkina Faso. Already, Sitarail, the company that runs the railway between the two countries is losing $113,000 per day and it has already sent on technical leave 900 of its 1000 employees in Cote d'Ivoire and 600 in Burkina Faso.
Further, since the eruption of the Liberian civil war on 24 December 1989, South-Eastern Liberia has depended heavily on products from Cote d'Ivoire. The so-called election of 1997, which brought Charles Taylor to power in Liberia has not changed this situation. After all, Tabou and San Pedro (in Cote d'Ivoire) are closer to South-Eastern Liberia than Monrovia, the capital of Liberia. In fact, from reliable sources, the Ivorian currency is used in South-Eastern Liberia in parallel to the Liberian dollar.
We should be reminded that out of a total population of 16 million, Cote d'Ivoire is home to nearly 4.4 million migrants. Of this population, 2.2 are believed to originate from Burkina Faso; a further 20% of this figure comes from Mali and the rest from Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, Benin, Ghana, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Niger and Togo. With refugees leaving in droves across the border to neighbouring countries, the fragile economies and environment of these countries will be impinged upon immensely. The beneficiaries of such conflicts have always been unscrupulous business people from outside the regions of conflict. In the case of Cote d'Ivoire, it will come as no surprise if the Lebanese and French are already benefiting.
Politically, West Africa stands on the brink of insecurity; lack of cohesion and solidarity, something that the regional organisation, ECOWAS, needs if the region should be a major player in the peace process. Indications are that two of the country's neighbours, namely Liberia and Burkina Faso under Taylor and Blaise Compaore respectively are not helping the situation. Both leaders have been implicitly accused of having a hand in the conflict. If this is true, then Liberia and Sierra Leone are repeating themselves not just as farce but also as tragedy. In the Liberian case Cote d'Ivoire under Felix Houphouet-Boigny and Burkina Faso under Blaise were actively supporting the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). During the height of the Sierra Leonean crisis, Liberia and Burkina Faso were also accused of supporting the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). This ugly and unsavoury scenario is repeating itself all over again.
What is also worrying about the conflict is the involvement of so many interests from renowned mercenaries from South Africa to lesser-known soldiers of fortune from the region itself. According to the Institute of Security Studies based in South Africa, 10 to 20 former officers of the South African Defence Force (SADF) are allegedly operating in Cote d'Ivoire. Former fighters of Liberian armed factions are also believed to have entered the conflict supporting rival factions. One will not be surprised if RUF forces are also involved in this conflict. There is also the situation where ethnicity has been whipped up in order to falsely galvanise loyalty and support. In this light, we see a clear division between what is now referred to as the 'Muslim' north and the 'Christian' south. To what extent this is true is something that will unravel itself in the near future. Clearly, the ethnic factors will come into the picture because rival factions are selling it to their respective constituencies for their own selfish motives but this move is extremely dangerous. Being either a northerner or a southerner does not necessarily make anyone a warmonger but political charlatans whose only motive is to use it for their own personal reasons exploit these divisions.
La Cote d'Ivoire as an 'Oasis' of Stability
But why this conflict in the first place? Clearly, ethnicity by itself has not caused this war nor am I inclined to believe that it is solely caused by Ivoirite - the doctrine of Ivorianness, which has now been referred to as the origins of the conflict. The denial of Allasane Ouattara the right to be elected leader of Cote d'Ivoire because people think he is not an Ivorian is hard to believe. Infact, it is unacceptable and should not be condoned nor countenanced. But wherever xenophobia appears, it has always had economic, political and social roots. First, Gbagbo did not originate Ivoirite; he inherited it. In recent times, it was Henri Konan Bedie who originated Ivoirite. As will be shown below, this ultra-nationalism emerged as far back as the first five years after independence. However, how Gbagbo manages Ivoirite today is another thing altogether, particularly at a time that the entire country is gripped by the adrenalin of Ivoirite.
Some people think that this could not have happened under Houphouet-Boigny. Historically, such position is untenable. In his book, The Wretched of the Earth, Frantz Fanon made reference to similar ultra-nationalism in Cote d'Ivoire. Riots were directed against the 'non-African nationals', mainly those from present-day Benin and Burkina Faso who controlled petty trade. As Fanon put it 'these foreigners' were called on to leave; their shops were burned, their street stalls wrecked, and in fact, the government of the Houphouet-Boigny commanded them to go, thus giving their nationals satisfaction.
It is also worth noting that thirty-three Years of personal rule and mismanagement was bound to produce what we are seeing in that country today. Under Houphouet-Boigny, there were protests and attempted coups but these were foiled with French help thanks to the Cold war. For example, between 1962 and 1993 when Boigny died, there were 6 attempted coups, mutiny and a strike by the armed forces; in 1969 the military suppressed the opposition and in 1971, French troops put down a rebellion by Gbagbo's Bete ethnic group against Houphouet-Boigny's government. In light of the above, Houphouet-Boigny must share part of the blame for what is happening in that country today.
By the time the old man left power, the country was already going through crises. Like other African countries, the country adopted the SAP recipe and as expected, it rolled back the state and strikes followed. For example, in 1990 and 1991, the country experienced mass protests and strikes by students, Police, Customs officers, university lecturers, transport workers, professional associations and climaxed by the takeover of the airport by army conscripts in 1990. In the specific case of university students, 25,000 students had to attend classes in buildings intended for 8,000 students. All of these were a direct response to the appalling and poor economic diet imposed on the country by the IMF and the World Bank. After all, by the 1980s the country's export economy was already in tatters and then the debt increased consuming 35% of export earnings.
The death of Boigny in 1993 was therefore going to lead to an ugly situation like we are experiencing in the country today. Thus, all the talk about Cote d'Ivoire being an 'oasis' of stability under Houphouet-Boigny is foolhardy and a dishonest move to mask the difficulties inherited by the Ivorian people. Even under Houphouet-Boigny, the country could have experienced crisis of this sort. What most of these 'oasis' of stability school of thought fail to realise is that Cote d'Ivoire was only stable and peaceful for the rich and their foreign friends who owned and controlled the country's economy and politics.
In fact, if Houphouet-Boigny is believed to be a champion of national unity, how come he used much needed national resources to build a Christian church, Notre Dame de la Paix, to the sum of $300 million in Yamoussoukro? What about the Muslims? Did he build a Mosque for them and what did he do for the large population of non-believers? These are critical questions that must be answered. Simply put, this amount of money could have gone a long way in providing education and health care for the Ivorian people. By spending such huge sums of money on a Catholic Church, which is believed to be the second largest to the St. Peters in Rome, Houphouet-Boigny was diverting much needed national resources towards a selfish objective and he was intensifying the structural violence unleashed upon ordinary Ivorians since independence. Ouattara, the modern-day 'guardian angel' was part of the Houphouet-Boigny political set-up that unleashed this structural violence upon the Ivorian people. He was part of a closely-knit elite that ruined the economy of the country. They monopolised politics and economics at the exclusion of the vast majority of the Ivorian people.
Like elsewhere in Africa, Ivorian 'independence' has therefore only benefited few Ivorians and their external patrons. This brings me to an anecdote a Gambian friend of mine told me few days ago. At a mass rally long after independence, a Senegalese peasant asked Leopold Sedar Senghor a serious question about Senegal's independence. The peasant said something to this effect. "Colonialism came and went; now we have independence, when will it [independence] go?" Senghor told the peasant that independence was here to stay forever. The poor peasant dropped and died of heart attack.
The real fact of the matter is that 'Not Yet Uhuru!'. It is not that independence is here to stay forever, but it has not come. Neo-colonialism cannot be tantamount to independence. Of what use is political independence without economic independence? Africa's economies are strongly tied to former colonial powers and they are reduced to mere suppliers of cheap raw materials and labour. As A.M.Babu poignantly put it, 'Africa produces what it does not consume and consumes what it does not produce'. The continuous dependence and reliance on former colonial powers confirms what Frantz Fanon said that 'there is no new entity born of colonialism'. Here in lies the problem.
The imposition of SAP has not helped Africa and Cote d'Ivoire is one of the countries that are paying the price just as Liberia and Sierra Leone before it have had to pay. More importantly, the sad fate of countries like Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Cote d'Ivoire and others only verify an assumption I have held for a long time now; that the solution to internal problems cannot be imposed from outside. It has to come from within and all that external players can do is to help facilitate the solution. After all, Africa is Africa and it can never be any other continent. The people living there have their own cultural values and they had their systems of governance through which law and order was kept in society. It was evolving until being truncated by the birth of colonial rule when a totally new system was imposed. Slavery also robbed Africa of its most able bodied individuals and therefore having an adverse impact on the development of the communities comprising Africa today.
After independence, what emerged was never a marriage of the African systems of doing things and the western ways of doing things. The latter enveloped the former and therefore Africa did not only 'modernise' but it also 'westernised'. Do not get me wrong! There are good things in western culture that can be useful for the development of Africa but what is wrong is the way in which Africa has had to abandon every aspect of its ways of doing things and at the same time uncritically accepting those of others. A society that builds its solid foundation on alien values is bound to fail. This brings to mind what Basil Davidson has written in his introduction to Gerard Chailand's Armed Struggle in Africa (1969). As he put it, "many peoples today need a renewal of their civilization, but none so obviously and urgently as the colonized peoples. Whatever colonialism, imperialism, capitalism may or may not have achieved, one thing is certain about them. They have utterly failed to raise those structures - whether social or moral, political or economic - upon which deprived peoples, the abused peoples, the 'underdeveloped' peoples as they are sometimes if odiously called, can carry themselves into a new civilization capable of standing and evolving on its own foundations". How we solve this puzzle requires a lot of critical thinking and Africans themselves must take the lead. Whether NEPAD is the way forward for Africa remains to be seen.
Short and Long-term measures towards resolving the conflict
It is very difficult to simplistically prescribe a cure to any conflict situation. The situation in La Cote d'Ivoire is no exception. Clearly, the so-called 'new wars' being fought in Africa do not offer any solution to Africa's problems and La Cote d'Ivoire is also no exception. These wars are fought and led by people whose only interest is to get rich quick by looting the fragile economies; they are not motivated by ideology nor are they wars of liberation and emancipation. There is a need to build a new political culture that will borrow some of the positive things from Africa's past, which have been decried as 'backwards' and 'uncivilised' by Africa's so-called 'Modernisers'. We need a regional approach to the conflict. But any attempt to sort out this mess must be based on a realistic assessment of what is happening in the country and the capacity of the intervening actors. The resolution of the conflict will need short-term and long-term measures.
In the short-term, there is a need to create an enabling environment for alleviating human suffering. In this light, a ceasefire must be observed or if possible imposed in order to re-establish the first victim of this conflict - communication between the rival factions. A secure environment should be created to provide relief to the displaced and refugees; medicine for the wounded and sick; and food for those in need. The holding of elections in the near future is a must and the nationality issue needs to be sorted out as soon as possible. ECOWAS and the AU must have a crucial role to play in the provision of short-term security to the people of La Cote d'Ivoire. Moreover, the faith groups and other civil society bodies do also have a role to play. How they go about this is a totally different thing.
In the long-term, there is a need to address the underlying causes of the conflict. The post-conflict peace building process in the country should be seen as part and parcel of the entire process of macro-economic development. One of the critical issues to address will be the role of the Ivorian state in national development. Do you leave everything to market forces to decide or does the state come back in defiance of the dictates of the IMF and the World Bank? Can Cote d'Ivoire on its own survive the current unfavourable international climate dominated by the neo-liberal agenda or should there be a regional approach? These and many questions are important in addressing the long-term problems facing the country.
I wish to conclude by leaving you with the words of Frantz Fanon that "Each Generation, must out of relative obscurity, discover its mission, fulfil it or betray it".
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[1]Dr. Thomas Jaye writes on African regional security issues.
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