Thank you Mr Sambou, for posting this report to the L.
We have all seen, how "Legal Criminals" like Jammeh have been milking and misusing the Gambia`s resources. Any reasonable mind would agree that The present administration is a failure, none is competent.
Yes Ebou, "Consequently, Jammeh applied the rule of law on this very issue, and today some admitted guilt to corruption charges in a court of law and none of them mentioned Yaya Jammeh's name in court"
This statement is a fallacy, gentleman, Didn`t Mr Andrew Sylva former SSHFC Boss, mention during the Paul Commission, when asked about the where about of the OceanBay generator, that it was "borrowed by the President an it was in Kanilai"? And what do you call this, is it vnot corruption? Why would Jammeh borrow OceanBay generator for Kanilai?
And funniest of all Mr. Sylva was charged of perjury. And Mr Jallow if you have been following the issue, you`ll find out that this man later walked a free man as the state did not produce any evidence(s) in court, to back this claim. Then it means that, Mr sylva said the truth and that Jammeh lied to the People concerning this issue.So this proves your statement wrong.
"The Gambia is a sovereign state with a democratically elected president who is accountable to the Gambian people and not the IMF".
Mr your this statement proves that you do not seem to know the role(s) of the IMF. So let me not waste time enlightening you on that, Remain stupid!!!
"Even if Jammeh steals from the Gambia Government ( which I doubt has ever happened) you fools shall never ever know about it".
Jammeh is a thief like you "BOY PULLO" it is known to the whole world, so whats youyr point here. we all are very convinced that HE milks our coffers for his own interests, and thid is still going on.
If you think supporting and singing praises for Jammeh will make him grant you amnesty, you are mistaken. We all know that deep in your heart you know Jammeh and the APRC are corrupt, but for some selfish reason you want to be defending them.... Yes you are home-sick, and want Jammeh to grant you Amnesty for you to see home once more, but this is not the way to do it. Try some other means, or even write him a private letter, or an open letter through any local newspaper.
Ebou Jallow <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
Musa Jeng,
Relax the hype...the world is not going to end tomorrow my brother. Jammeh appointed some people to run the Central Bank and they evidently failed their duties to the Gambia. Consequently, Jammeh applied the rule of law on this very issue, and today some admitted guilt to corruption charges in a court of law and none of them mentioned Yaya Jammeh's name in court. The Gambia is a sovereign state with a democratically elected president who is accountable to the Gambian people and not the IMF. The Gambian constitution grants him the rights of executive privilege on matters of national security, state secrets and the execution of the people's business which is none of the IMF's or any damn auditor's business.
Some of you simply live in Laputa and love creating a storm out of a teacup. Even if Jammeh steals from the Gambia Government ( which I doubt has ever happened) you fools shall never ever know about it.
Monsieur Dieng, I suggest you focus on raising some nickles/dimes for your desperate/dysfunctional party the PPP aka NADD. Better still you might try begging the Gambian opposition's friend Monsieur Wade for some of his loot from the Senegalese people.
Ebou Jallow
Musa Jeng wrote:
Joe:
In layman's parlance, what this report simply put is that APRC has mismanaged the Gambian economy and everything in the country. Folks, they have stolen our country's resources and anyone who really believe that the APRC can seriously develop our country, I am the owner of the Brokyln Bridge and I would not mind to sell it to you. Now, I know some of you support them for some crazy reason, but bottom line they will never be able to put it together, and I mean never.
Thanks
Musa Jeng
>
> From: Joe Sambou
> Date: 2005/09/27 Tue PM 05:44:11 EDT
> To: [log in to unmask]
> Subject: IMF on Gambia
>
> Below is the IMF report on Gambia. I wonder how they accounted for Lang and
> Jammeh's heist from the Bank.
>
> "The Executive Directors urged the authorities, during the Article IV
> consultation in 2004, to commission a reaudit of the Central Bank of The
> Gambia's (CBG's) 2001 and 2002 financial statements on terms of reference
> agreed with Fund staff. The Directors also stressed the need for a special
> audit of foreign exchange transactions between 2000 and 2003. These audits
> have now been completed and confirm the breakdown of internal controls at
> the central bank that were observed during the IMF's Safeguard Assessment
> mission conducted in November 2003. The audit reports restate general ledger
> balances for external reserves for various test dates between end-December
> 2000 and end-December 2003, which are significantly lower than the
> originally recorded balances. The auditors have issued a disclaimer
> indicating that they were unable to express an opinion on the 2001 and 2002
> accounts largely because of the lack of documentation supporting several
> foreign exchange transactions."
>
> Simply put, they cooked the books. Nothing has changed and the theft will
> continue as long as Yaya is presiding over the criminal activity. Please
> read on.
>
>
> Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 05/121
> September 8, 2005 International Monetary Fund
> 700 19th Street, NW
> Washington, D.C. 20431 USA
>
>
>
> IMF Executive Board Concludes 2005 Article IV Consultation with The Gambia
> Public Information Notices (PINs) form part of the IMF's efforts to promote
> transparency of the IMF's views and analysis of economic developments and
> policies. With the consent of the country (or countries) concerned, PINs are
> issued after Executive Board discussions of Article IV consultations with
> member countries, of its surveillance of developments at the regional level,
> of post-program monitoring, and of ex post assessments of member countries
> with longer-term program engagements. PINs are also issued after Executive
> Board discussions of general policy matters, unless otherwise decided by the
> Executive Board in a particular case. The staff report for the Article IV
> consultation with The Gambia may be made available at a later stage if the
> authorities consent.
>
>
> On July 18, 2005, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund
> (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation with The Gambia.1
>
> Background
>
> The Gambia's economic performance since the mid-1980s has been uneven owing
> to exogenous shocks, macroeconomic and structural policy slippage, poor
> governance, and weak institutions. The economy's vulnerability to shocks
> stems from a lack of economic diversification. In addition, economic
> performance has been constrained by policy distortions and by recurrent
> weaknesses in fiscal policy. Expansionary policies have increased the
> government's recourse to domestic bank financing, which, in turn, has raised
> real interest rates, increased the domestic debt burden, and tended to crowd
> out private investment.
>
> In 1998, the authorities entered into a three-year program under the
> Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), which was converted into a
> Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) arrangement. In July 2002, the
> Board approved a new three-year PRGF arrangement (See News Brief No. 02/74
> and Press Release No. 02/32), but the first review was not completed because
> of weak policy implementation and governance problems. It was discovered in
> 2003 that The Gambia had misreported to the Fund net international reserves
> by US$38.8 million at end-December 2001 and failed to record US$28.5 million
> in government expenditures. The Executive Board concluded that The Gambia
> had received two noncomplying disbursements, equivalent to SDR 3.435 million
> each in July and December 2001 (See Press Release No. 04/49). The
> authorities repaid these disbursements in 2004 in four equal installments,
> with the last payment made ahead of schedule.
>
> The Executive Directors urged the authorities, during the Article IV
> consultation in 2004, to commission a reaudit of the Central Bank of The
> Gambia's (CBG's) 2001 and 2002 financial statements on terms of reference
> agreed with Fund staff. The Directors also stressed the need for a special
> audit of foreign exchange transactions between 2000 and 2003. These audits
> have now been completed and confirm the breakdown of internal controls at
> the central bank that were observed during the IMF's Safeguard Assessment
> mission conducted in November 2003. The audit reports restate general ledger
> balances for external reserves for various test dates between end-December
> 2000 and end-December 2003, which are significantly lower than the
> originally recorded balances. The auditors have issued a disclaimer
> indicating that they were unable to express an opinion on the 2001 and 2002
> accounts largely because of the lack of documentation supporting several
> foreign exchange transactions.
>
> Macroeconomic performance has strengthened over the past 18 months,
> particularly through end-2004, in response to strong financial policies.
> Despite an increase in groundnut production, real GDP growth slowed in 2004
> to 5.1 percent (from 6.9 percent in 2003) due to lower growth in industry
> and services. Inflation reached 18 percent at end-2003 and declined to 5
> percent by March 2005. The central bank's rediscount rate (policy rate) was
> reduced by 5 percentage points from September 2004 to 29 percent in March
> 2005.
>
> The overall fiscal deficit (including grants and on a commitment basis)
> increased to 5¾ percent of GDP in 2004 from 4¾ percent in 2003, mainly due
> to much higher externally-financed capital expenditures. However, the basic
> primary surplus more than doubled to 9½ percent of GDP, indicating a
> significant tightening in domestic fiscal operations. Broad money growth
> declined from a peak of 43 percent on a 12-month basis in 2003 to 18 percent
> in 2004. The nominal exchange rate has been stable since 2003 when it
> depreciated by 25 percent in U.S. dollar terms.
>
> The relatively high interest rates that were necessary to reverse the
> deterioration in the macroeconomic environment have, however, placed a heavy
> burden on domestic debt service, and on credit markets. The total domestic
> debt stock increased from around 25 percent of GDP in 2003 to 31 percent in
> 2004 and domestic interest payments have risen from 4½ percent in 2003 to 5¼
> percent of GDP in 2004. The tightening in domestic financial policies has
> also severely depressed credit to the private sector. In 2004, the stock of
> such credit is estimated to have fallen by 6 percent.
>
> The external current account deficit (including official transfers)
> deteriorated from 5 percent of GDP in 2003 to 12 percent in 2004, partly
> reflecting the worsening in the balance of trade, as strong import growth
> was driven by the recovery in output, the surge in donor-financed capital
> expenditures, foreign direct investment, and higher international oil
> prices. Gross international reserves rose by more than US$22 million or by
> over 30 percent in 2004 as increased foreign inflows and a stabilizing
> exchange rate allowed the central bank to increase its purchases in the
> interbank market.
>
> Policies, however, weakened in the first quarter of 2005. There have been
> significant fiscal slippages owing primarily to unbudgeted expenditures of D
> 101 million (¾ percent of GDP). These expenditures have led to a substantial
> increase in the net debt of the government. Accommodating policies by the
> central bank led to excessive growth in monetary aggregates. Prospects for
> 2005 are further jeopardized by the decision to license a monopoly
> quasi-public enterprise, the Gambian Agricultural Marketing Corporation
> (GAMCO), to market and process groundnuts. This has had a near disastrous
> effect on exports of processed groundnuts, as GAMCO has been unable to raise
> the finances to purchase what was a bumper harvest for groundnuts. The
> mission estimates that a substantial proportion of groundnut exports could
> be lost in the 2004/05 crop season.
>
> After a long delay, the authorities recently completed the first annual
> progress report of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper covering the period
> July 2002-December 2003. Progress on structural reforms has been mixed. The
> authorities have fallen behind in their schedule to privatize the Gambia
> Groundnut Corporation. On the fiscal side, the National Emergency Fiscal
> Committee (NEFCOM) had some positive effects in ensuring greater control
> over expenditures. Further, steps are being taken to strengthen the public
> expenditure management system. A new organic budget law has been passed and
> the financial regulations are currently being implemented. The authorities
> are in the process of developing a statistical strategy to be presented to
> donors. However, basic macroeconomic statistics remain weak.
>
> Executive Board Assessment
>
> Executive Directors observed that The Gambia's economic performance in
> recent years was marked by inconsistent implementation of sound
> macroeconomic policies, poor governance, exogenous and policy-induced
> shocks, and inappropriate policy responses to those shocks. Directors
> concurred that the main medium-term challenge for The Gambia is to make a
> decisive break from the past "stop-go" policies, and embark on a
> comprehensive economic program that would establish the conditions for
> sustainable growth and poverty reduction. Key elements of such a program
> should include measures to preserve macroeconomic stability and to achieve
> debt sustainability. The program should also incorporate reforms aimed at
> promoting faster growth and poverty reduction through improvements in the
> investment climate, and the strengthening of public expenditure management,
> governance, and accountability.
>
> In this context, Directors commended the authorities for their
> implementation of strong financial policies over the past 18 months, which
> has led to an improvement in the basic primary fiscal surplus, a reduction
> in inflation, the stabilization of the exchange rate, and the rebuilding of
> international reserves. Directors noted that the improved macroeconomic
> conditions had paved the way for the recent easing in interest rates.
>
> While welcoming this progress, Directors expressed disappointment with the
> fiscal slippage—stemming from extrabudgetary expenditures—that occurred in
> the first quarter of 2005. They urged the authorities to address it by fully
> implementing the proposed quarterly ceilings on nondiscretionary
> expenditure, improving cash management, and enforcing the public
> enterprises' repayment of government loans. In this process, it will be
> important to avoid adverse effects on pro-poor spending. Directors also
> urged the authorities to phase out the subsidization of petroleum products
> by adjusting prices and enforcing the terms of the petroleum price
> mechanism, bearing in mind the social implications of the adjustment. In
> addition, they recommended strengthening revenues by improving tax
> administration, and broadening the tax base by phasing out tax exemptions.
>
> Directors were encouraged by the recent implementation of reforms to promote
> enhanced fiscal transparency. They welcomed the passage of the organic
> budget law and encouraged the authorities to finalize implementation of the
> supporting financial regulations. They also noted the progress being made in
> auditing the government accounts, and urged the authorities to intensify
> efforts to bring the accounts up to date.
>
> Directors commended the progress made in reducing inflation, and stressed
> that further fiscal consolidation would provide room for easing monetary
> policy and permit further reductions in interest rates. Directors concurred
> with the use of broad money as a nominal anchor for prices. They welcomed
> the progress made to enhance the conduct of monetary policy, and encouraged
> the authorities to move ahead with the introduction of new instruments
> designed to separate monetary operations from the financing of the budget,
> and by adopting other key recommendations made by recent Fund technical
> assistance missions. Also, Directors welcomed the increased attention being
> paid to better coordination of fiscal and monetary management, and saw the
> creation of the Monetary Policy Committee and Treasury Bill Committee as
> important first steps in this regard. Efficient use of Fund technical
> assistance in public expenditure management and in the domestic and foreign
> operations of the central bank, together with the strengthening of the
> authorities' statistical capacity, should help to further improve The
> Gambia's macroeconomic management capacity.
>
> Directors expressed disappointment with the continued weaknesses in internal
> controls at the Central Bank, and stressed the need for the prompt and
> effective implementation of appropriate remedial measures. In this regard,
> they welcomed the recent adoption by the Central Bank of an Action Plan to
> strengthen internal controls drawing on the report of the new external
> auditors. The establishment of an Audit Committee, drafting of guidelines
> for foreign reserves management, as well as the recent reorganization of the
> Bank were also welcomed. In addition, Directors encouraged the authorities
> to fully implement the recommendations from the recent Safeguards
> Assessment, including the passage of the revised Central Bank Act designed
> to strengthen the Bank's operational independence.
>
> Directors observed that the fundamentals of the financial sector appear
> sound with adequate capitalization and high profitability and liquidity
> ratios. They welcomed the reduction in nonperforming loans, and urged the
> authorities to pursue the further deepening of the financial sector,
> including by enhancing the legal framework and reinforcing creditor rights.
>
> Directors agreed that the current level of the real effective exchange rate
> is appropriate, and that improvements in external competitiveness should be
> addressed through the removal of structural bottlenecks, which currently
> constrain productivity.
>
> Directors concurred that The Gambia's external competitiveness and growth
> prospects would be enhanced by the adoption of a comprehensive structural
> reform strategy designed to reduce the costs and risks of doing business in
> the country, and removing key structural bottlenecks in the agricultural
> sector. They encouraged the authorities to accelerate the privatization
> program, and enhance the investment climate through fiscal, judicial, and
> legislative reforms, as recommended by the Foreign Investment Advisory
> Service and the World Bank's Diagnostic Assessment of the Investment Climate
> in The Gambia. In this connection, strengthening institutions and improving
> governance would be major priorities. In the groundnut sector, Directors
> expressed disappointment with the decision to license a public monopoly, The
> Gambia Agricultural Marketing Corporation to market and process groundnuts.
> They noted that the authorities had agreed to license firms to compete with
> the Gambia Agricultural Marketing Corporation, but emphasized that it will
> be essential to avoid further government intervention and accelerate
> implementation of the sectoral strategy agreed with major donors. including
> the privatization of the Gambia Groundnut Corporation.
>
> Directors concurred that clear steps would be needed as part of a
> staff-monitored program (SMP). Directors agreed with staff that the main
> elements of an SMP should include implementation of an action plan to
> address the external auditor's recommendations to improve internal controls,
> and in that regard they welcomed the authorities' intention to conduct
> quarterly audits of the Central Bank's foreign reserve balances. They also
> agreed that emphasis will need to be placed on public financial management
> and accountability. Successful performance under an SMP could be expected to
> lead to a new PRGF arrangement and debt relief under the HIPC Initiative.
>
> Directors welcomed the ex post assessment report and generally agreed with
> its main findings. They identified as key lessons to be learned for future
> program design the importance of structuring conditionality so as to give
> greater emphasis to the resolution of problems in public expenditure
> management and in the internal controls at the central bank. A few Directors
> noted the authorities' view that over ambitious targets may have contributed
> to program failures, and they saw a possible need for greater realism and
> streamlining of program conditionality. Directors also observed that
> governance problems and insufficient commitment to reforms had hampered
> program implementation over the course of the last two arrangements with the
> Fund and emphasized the need to continue strengthening transparency in the
> use of public resources.
>
>
>
>
> The Gambia: Selected Economic Indicators
>
>
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> 2001
> 2002
> 2003
> 2004
>
>
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> (Annual Percentage changes, unless otherwise indicated)
>
> Domestic economy
>
> Real GDP
> 5.8
> -3.2
> 6.9
> 5.1
>
> Nominal GDP
> 21.8
> 12.3
> 36.1
> 20.1
>
> GDP deflator
> 15.2
> 16.1
> 27.4
> 14.3
>
> Consumer price index (period average)
> 4.5
> 8.6
> 17.0
> 14.2
>
> Groundnut production
> (in thousands of metric tons)
> 151.0
> 71.5
> 92.9
> 120.5
>
>
> (In percent of GDP)
>
> External sector
>
> Current account balance
>
> Excluding official transfers
> -10.1
> -13.4
> -13.6
> -21.6
>
> Including official transfers
> -2.6
> -2.8
> -5.1
> -11.8
>
>
> (Annual percentage changes, unless otherwise) indicated)
>
> Exports, f.o.b. (in U.S. dollars)
> -19.4
> 7.1
> -7.6
> 25.8
>
> Imports, c.i.f. (in U.S. dollars)
> -19.9
> 12.8
> -6.2
> 46.2
>
>
> Money and credit (end-of-period stocks)
=== message truncated ===
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