African Culture And Personality: Bad Social Science, Effective Social
Activism, Or A Call To Reinvent Ethnology?
James E. Lassiter
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Abstract
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BACKGROUND
This paper surveys and assesses the writings of selected African
scholars on what they regard to be pan-African culture and personality
traits, and patterns and processes of African cultural adaptation (1).
Suggestions are also made for reinventing the study of African social,
cultural and psychological characteristics, and using such knowledge to
help solve socioeconomic problems in Africa. Finally, comments are made
regarding the impact of sociocultural particularism and Western
individualism on the study of culture and cultural evolution.
During the late 1950s and 1960s, national character and typical
personality studies were broadly condemned, breathed their last gasp,
and were ultimately relegated to the dustbin of bad social science.
Since that time, various African scholars outside the social sciences
have nevertheless been sustaining and redirecting group personality
inquiry. They are not, however, approaching their subject as did
Western social scientists in the first half of this century who used
questionnaire instruments to determine if Africans were "traditional"
or "modern" (2). This was a particularly popular approach among Western
occupational psychologists working in Africa in the 1950s and 1960s who
sought to scientifically assign statistical coefficients of
modernization to African populations. They did this, for the most part,
to find out which African groups were better suited for white or blue
collar work in the colonial and post-independence socioeconomic setup
(3). The majority of prior culture and personality researchers focusing
on Africa were interested in creating and testing a
"traditional/Western measuring device" (Dawson 1967), "assaying
psychological modernization" (Doob 1967), or "measuring individual
modernity" (Smith and Inkeles 1966, Kahl 1968, and Gough 1975 and
1976).
African scholars writing on these subjects since the early 1960s have
taken a humanistic, liberating or empowering approach. They have been
specifically interested in identifying and explaining African
psychological processes, personality characteristics, and the processes
of African cultural adaptation to indigenous social conditions and
exotic influences. For example, the work of University of Nairobi
philosophy professor Joseph M. Nyasani (1997), which features
prominently in this paper, is a recent attempt to define the "African
psyche."
CURRENT WESTERN PERSPECTIVES AND METHODS
Since the 1960s, the predominant approach to social and cultural
research among social scientists has been to examine a clearly defined
society, population, sector, geographically defined area, or topic.
Such research tends to steer away from cultural and psychological
generalizations at higher levels of social organization such as the
ethnic group, society, nation or geographical regions such as sub-
Saharan Africa. Culture and personality and broad cultural adaptation
studies became and remain the target of the most severe criticism by
social scientists and social advocates. Many, in fact, consider such
inquiry to be no more than unscientific stereotyping, usually with
malevolent intent and effect. Some argue that group personality studies
are an anathema to cultural relativism and the particularistic study of
singular populations and topics. Still others go as far as to assert
that all culture and personality studies obscure the uniqueness of the
individual, and divert attention and resources from more fruitful lines
of inquiry such as the dynamics of class struggle and the scientific
study of particular social structures and functions. At its worst,
critics and social advocates say, group personality studies and inquiry
into broad patterns of cultural adaptation on the part of social
scientists exacerbate racism and bigotry. So, for the sake of not
giving legitimacy to broad cultural generalizations, which the
detractors say will most likely be misused to oppress or persecute a
particular group, all efforts in the social sciences to identify and
study core cultural traits and make cross cultural comparisons in
search of broad patterns of cultural adaptation are condemned and
rejected.
I do not mean in any way to disparage particularistic types of
academic and problem-oriented research. African social scientists, in
general, like their Western particularist counterparts, have also moved
toward greater topical and problematic specificity in their social
research to more accurately focus their efforts (4). However, the work
of African scholars outside the social sciences, such as that surveyed
here, suggests that it is time to reintroduce culture and personality
and cultural adaptation studies of contemporary populations into the
social science mainstream.
AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES AND METHODS
From the early sixties to the present, African scholars outside the
social sciences have consistently claimed that there have been, are and
will continue to be widespread psychological and cultural themes and
patterns that there are unique to sub-Saharan Africa (5). They also
argue that these broad themes and patterns are undergoing rapid change
in a similar manner and most often for the worse throughout most of the
continent. The strength of their commitment to these concepts is
reflected in the fact that the scholars persist in their efforts
despite a historical intellectual context that eschews such inquiry.
This survey reveals they have done so to clarify and extol the virtues
of what it means to be African in the face of increasing global
Westernization, and to identify and promote the importance of
"Africanness" in African national and regional development. African
scholars also seek to reassert Africa's importance in the broader
philosophical and cultural evolution of humankind. Although some of the
works contain significant methodological shortcomings which will be
addressed below, most of the scholars' assertions and arguments are
well-reasoned and extremely compelling.
Social scientific approaches to African culture and personality are
regarded by many African thinkers to be part of a long-standing and
concerted Western effort to suppress and dominate Africans (See
especially Thairu [1975] and Nyasani [1997]). In contrast, African
scholars' approaches outside the social sciences have been
theoretically and methodologically eclectic and intended to protect and
liberate Africans, not dominate or control them. For example, Kenyan
medical doctor and author Kihumbu Thairu (1975) offers a personally
challenging approach that focuses on the need for Africans to
rediscover who they are, independent of their assimilated Western
values and ways of thinking and behaving.
South African professor and former Deputy Vice-Chancellor at the
University of the Witswatersrand M. W. Makgoba (1997), using a more
practical and problem-focused approach to bring matters back to the
social scientists, sees a prominent and practical role for African
social scientists in the post-colonial reconstruction of Africa. He
writes:
Africa has faced some of the great social changes in this century in
terms of race, ethnicity, politics, violence, labour relations and
industrialisation. Graduates in the social sciences are going to be a
critical component to the success of African democracies as they
struggle to emerge from the mess in which they have been. Universities
are not only essential for the training and nurturing of highly-skilled
scholars in this area, but are poised to make a unique contribution to
the overall development of post-colonial Africa (1997:180).
AFRICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS
All the scholars surveyed believe there are categories and processes
of thought that are unique to Africa. African scholars also believe
that the African way of organizing and cognitively engaging the world
derives from a strongly restrictive indigenous sociocultural milieu,
and that this approach to social life and the broader world has been
negatively effected by Western cultural influences. Regrettably,
however, the African scholars surveyed sometimes use what is normally
regarded to be social scientific terminology in making reference to
what they regard to be widespread African psychological and cultural
characteristics, yet do not clearly define or qualify such usage. With
the exception of Geyekye (1988), they also fail to clearly and
consistently link their assertions and arguments to historical and
ethnographic data. For example, political scientist and historian Ali
A. Mazrui, in his most recent attempt to place Kiswahili language as a
crucial element in East Africa's political and economic development and
ultimate regional integration, refers to the "East African mind" as
follows:
"The psychology of living together is also undergoing a change - and
Kiswahili is part of the new East African mind in communion with the
modern world" (Mazrui and Mazrui 1995:134). Further, Mazrui's
collaborator and linguist, Alamin M. Mazrui, in a discussion of
nationalism and the contributions of African Americans to Africa,
states that "African Americans have made important philosophical and
political contributions to the formation of movements like Negritude,
pan-Africanism, and the African personality" (1995:161, emphasis mine).
Nyasani (1997) is no more reticent in his vaguely defined references
to the "African mind" and its characteristics. He believes that "in the
same way reference is made to the Greek or Roman civilization, it must
be quite appropriate and legitimate to refer to a particular strand of
mind that is quite peculiar to Africa and which shapes the prevailing
conditions or permits itself to adapt to those conditions. ... (T)here
is a distinctive feature about the African mind which seems to support
the claim that the mind in black Africa may not necessarily operate in
the same strict pattern as minds elsewhere in the world.... (I)t is the
way our mind functions and operates under certain conditions that we
are able to arrogate to ourselves a peculiar status, social
identification and geographical label" (1997:51-55, emphases mine).
According to Nyasani (1997:56-57), African, Asian and European minds
are products of unique "cultural edifices" and "cultural streams" that
arose from environmental conditioning and long-standing cultural
traditions. Within the African cultural stream, Nyasani claims, are
psychological and moral characteristics pertaining to African identity,
personality and dignity. Makgoba (1997) goes further and argues that
throughout the African Diaspora peoples of African descent:
"are linked by shared values that are fundamental features of African
identify and culture. These, for example, include hospitality,
friendliness, the consensus and common framework-seeking principle,
ubuntu, and the emphasis on community rather than on the individual.
These features typically underpin the variations of African culture and
identity everywhere. The existence of African identity is not in doubt"
(1997:197-198).
Regarding personality characteristics he believes to be inherent in
the African mind, Nyasani identifies and discusses sociality, patience,
tolerance, sympathy and acceptance as:
"areas in which the African mind seems to reveal itself in a somewhat
dramatic way. It reveals itself through what may rightly be called a
congenital trait of sociality or sociability. It further reveals itself
as a virtuous natural endowment of patience and tolerance. And lastly
it manifests itself as a natural disposition for mutual sympathy and
acceptance. These three areas then appear to serve as important
landmarks in the general description of the phenomenology of the
African mind" (1997:57, emphases mine).
Caught in a social pyramid characterized by a one-way vertical
authority structure and a two-way horizontal family and communal
support system, the African mind, beset with superstition and
destabilized by Western acculturation, is relatively unilinear,
uncritical, lacking in initiative and therefore "encapsulated," says
Nyasani. This, Nyasani (1997) insists, has been extremely negative for
Africa, especially in terms of the African individual's creativity and
ability to innovate:
(W)hat we experience in the practical life of an African is the
apparent stagnation or stalemate in his social as well as economic
evolution.... It is quite evident that the social consequences of this
unfortunate social impasse (encapsulation) can be very grave especially
where the process of acculturation and indeterminate enculturation is
taking place at an uncontrollable pace.? By and large, it can safely be
affirmed that social encapsulation in Africa works both positively and
negatively. It is positive in as far as it guarantees a modicum of
social cohesion, social harmony and social mutual concern. However, in
as far as it does not promote fully the exercise of personal initiative
and incentive, it can be regarded as negative (Nyasani 1997:130-131,
emphases mine).
AFRICAN SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL
The African scholars surveyed, with the possible exception of Ghanian
philosopher Kwame Gyekye (1988), regard African concepts of the
individual and self to be almost totally dependent on and subordinate
to social entities and cultural processes. Kenyan theology professor
John S. Mbiti (1969 and 1992), for example, believes that the
individual has little latitude for self determination outside the
context of the traditional African family and community. He writes:
"Whatever happens to the individual happens to the whole group, and
whatever happens to the whole group happens to the individual. The
individual can only say: 'I am, because we are; and since we are,
therefore I am.' This is a cardinal point in the understanding of the
African view of man" (1969:109).
For Ghanaian philosopher Kwame Gyekye (1988), the individual, although
originating from and inextricably bound to his family and community,
nevertheless possesses a clear concept of himself as a distinct person
of volition. It is from this combined sense of personhood and communal
membership that the family and community expect individuals to take
personally enhancing and socially responsible decisions and actions.
Although he accepts that the dominant entity of African social order is
the community, Gyekye believes "it would be more correct to describe
that order as amphibious, for it manifests features of both communality
and individuality. ? African social thought seeks to avoid the excesses
of the two exaggerated systems, while allowing for a meaningful, albeit
uneasy, interaction between the individual and the society" (1988:31-
32).
Agreeing with Gyekye, Senegalese philosopher Leopold Senghor (1966)
regards traditional African society to be "based both on the community
and on the person and in which, because it was founded on dialogue and
reciprocity, the group had priority over the individual without
crushing him, but allowing him to blossom as a person" (1966:5).
South African philosophy professor Augustine Shutte (1993), citing the
Xhosa proverb umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu (a person is a person through
persons), writes:
This (proverb) is the Xhosa expression of a notion that is common to
all African languages and traditional cultures.... (It) is concerned
both with the peculiar interdependence of persons on others for the
exercise, development and fulfilment of their powers that is recognised
in African traditional thought, and also with the understanding of what
it is to be a person that underlies this.... In European philosophy of
whatever kind, the self is always envisaged as something "inside" a
person, or at least as a kind of container of mental properties and
powers. In African thought it is seen as "outside," subsisting in
relationship to what is other, the natural and social environment. In
fact the sharp distinction between self and world, a self that controls
and changes the world and is in some sense "above" it, this distinction
so characteristic of European philosophy, disappears. Self and world
are united and intermingle in a web of reciprocal relations (1993:46-
47).
In contrast to Gyekye's mutually enhancing understanding and Shutte's
idea that the community empowers and inculcates "personness," Nyasani
(1997) possesses a far less egalitarian view of the individual in
African society. According to Nyasani, the African individual hardly
knows how to act outside the context of his community's prescriptions
and proscriptions. For Nyasani, the existence of the individual in
African society is a "quasi-dissolution into the reality of others for
the sake of the individual's existence" (1997:60). For him, "everything
boils down to the 'me' in the 'we' or rather to the survival of the
self through the enhancement and consolidation of the 'we' as a generic
whole....Thus, in Africa, the individual will go to all lengths to
ascertain the condition of the corporate 'we' and to play his part, if
necessary, to restore the balance of wholesomeness" (1997:81-82).
There are many particularistic studies of the attitudes and values of
Africans by African and non-African scholars that support the
assertions made by Nyasani and others regarding African concepts of
self and the place of the individual in African societies (6).
THE AFRICAN FAMILY AND COMMUNITY
Nyasani (1997) identifies the traditional African family as a setting
wherein the vertical power structure of the society is introduced and
sustained as predominant over the freedom of individuals. For Nyasani
there is a "fundamental difference between the traditional African
child and a child in the Western culture. The child in Africa was
muzzled right from the outset and was thereby drilled into submission
to authority from above" (1997:129).
Within the communal context, Nyasani (1997) argues that Africans
exhibit an
"endemic and congenital trait of what could be described as a natural
benign docility generally brought about by years of blind social
submission and unquestioning compliance to the mystique of higher
authority that reigns surreptitiously yet effectively in all black
African societies in varying degrees. This benign natural docility is
generally regarded as positive, legitimate and virtuous strictly within
the context of a traditional social regime" (1997:113, emphases mine).
Community norms, he says
"are merely received but never subjected to the scrutiny of reason to
establish their viability and practicability in the society.... Maybe,
it is because of this lack of personal involvement and personal
scrutiny that has tended to work to the disadvantage of the Africans
especially where they are faced with a critical situation of reckoning
about their own destiny and even dignity" (Nyasani 1997:63-69).
Steven Shalita (1998), Kampala bureau chief for The East African, the
sub-region's premier English weekly newspaper, blames the colonial
past, in part, for African passivity and complacency. He argues that a
"passive attitude to life is common in many parts of Africa, where
most people are satisfied with the minimum. Many Africans prefer to
engage in subsistence farming rather than farming for profit and even
then, they wait for some bureaucrat to tell them about food security to
save them from starvation when drought strikes. ? This complacency by
ordinary people can partly be blamed on the colonial legacy which put
such emphasis on government. It caused them to believe that government
owed them a living and if things went wrong, why then government was to
blame and must find a solution" (1998:10).
THE AFRICAN WORLD VIEW
Senghor (1966), in comparing Africans and Europeans, argues that there
is a unique African world view focused on what he describes as "being"
and "life forces." He writes
(T)he African has always and everywhere presented a concept of the
world which is diametrically opposed to the traditional philosophy of
Europe. The latter is essentially static, objective, dichotomous; it
is, in fact, dualistic, in that it makes an absolute distinction
between body and soul, matter and spirit. It is founded on separation
and opposition, on analysis and conflict. The African, on the other
hand, conceives the world, beyond the diversity of its forms, as a
fundamentally mobile yet unique reality that seeks synthesis....This
reality is being, in the ontological sense of the word, and it is life
force. For the African, matter in the sense the Europeans understand
it, is only a system of signs which translates the single reality of
the universe: being, which is spirit, which is life force. Thus, the
whole universe appears as an infinitely small, and at the same time
infinitely large, network of life forces?" (1966:4).
Shutte (1993), like Senghor, argues that the force or energy of life
(seriti) is at the center of, sustains and permeates the traditional
African world view. As such it
"is the most fundamental (feature) in traditional African world-
views.... It is moreover a dynamic system in that the force of
everything, at least all living things, is continuously being either
strengthened or weakened. Human beings continuously influence each
other, either directly or indirectly by way of sub-human forces or
through the ancestors" (1993:52-54).
From Nyasani's (1997:97-100) perspective, the world view of the
African under colonialism became one where African cultural traditions,
beliefs and behaviors were regarded by Africans to be inferior when
compared to non-African ways. This, he says, resulted in self-loathing
among Africans. In fact, he asserts, the world view of most
contemporary Africans was replaced by and therefore is in many ways
indistinguishable from the European world view.
AFRICAN RESPONSES TO FOREIGN INFLUENCES
In general, the authors surveyed argue that the African individual's
response to overpowering foreign influences has been and remains
derived from the personal strategy he uses for survival within the
African family and community context--unquestioning acceptance and
conformity. Therefore, the larger world, like his family and communal
milieu, presents the African individual with an equally formidable set
of circumstances and requirements he is conditioned not to challenge,
is dependent on and from which he cannot escape.
Makgoba (1997) clearly identifies the motives behind the interest of
this larger world of non-Africans as follows:
"Knowledge about African people is always political, useful in
maintaining intellectual neo-colonialism, propagates Western culture,
helps generate and perpetuate an inferiority complex (in Africans),
fosters individualism amongst Africans, disrupts organisation and unity
in the (African) community because there is inherent fear of a united,
organised Afrocentric community, or a combination of all of the above.
In short, we are (regarded to be) a people who can only succeed,
realise our potential and destiny by being controlled, policed, nursed
and guided by Europeans. We are (therefore) incapable of being masters
of our own destiny" (1997:205).
Concerning the impact of foreign socioeconomic ideology, Gyekye (1988)
argues that preeminent African leaders such as Senghor, Nyerere and
Nkrumah, all of whom underwent advanced Western education, incorrectly
regarded Western socialism to be compatible with traditional African
communalism. The consequences of their efforts to use Western socialist
ideology as a framework for nation-building in Africa were devastating,
he says. Gyekye argues that African communalism is "essentially and
basically a socio-ethical doctrine, not economic; whereas socialism, as
I understand it, is primarily an economic arrangement, involving the
public control of all the dynamics of the economy.... (Not) everything
that can be asserted of communalism can be asserted also for socialism,
and vice-versa" (1988:24-26).
Kenyan philosopher D. A. Masolo (1995) agrees that "the failures of
Nyerere's ujamaa were due, more than anything else, to the poor
sociological assessment of the causes of the apparent communalistic
'attitudes' in African traditional social relations. ... Taking the
communalistic phenomenon of African traditional society as a given,
Nyerere proceeded to inappropriately build upon it a social-political
structure--the ujamaa system" (1995:27-28).
Culturally, it is as if the traditional African script of "submit to
family and community authority and immerse yourself in and partake of
all group values and norms" was rewritten during the colonial period.
Through force, Western education and missionary proselytization, the
colonialists subordinated traditional African authority and the values
and norms of African communalism in the minds of Africans. This new
anti-African script, argues Nyasani (1997), remains deeply imbeded in
the minds of contemporary Africans to the point that they:
"have adopted and assimilated wholesale whatever the West has to
offer. The end result is not just a cultural betrayal but a serious
case of self-dehumanization and outright self-subversion both in terms
of dignity and self-esteem. Indeed there is no race on earth that
abhors its own culture and is so easily prepared to abdicate it and
flirt with experimental ideas which promise no more than vanity, to a
large extent, like the African race.... Africa is simply overwhelmed
and decisively submerged by the never-receding tide of cultural
imperialism" (1997:126-128).
Psychologically, Nyasani argues that the Africans' "natural benign
docility" contributed to and exacerbated Africa's widespread social and
cultural demise via Western acculturation. He argues that "it would not
be difficult to imagine the ripe conditions encountered at the dawn of
European imperialism for unbridled exploitations and culture
emasculations which left many an African society completely distraught
and culturally defrocked. Indeed the exploiting schemers must have
found a ready market glutted with cultural naiveties for quick but
effective alienation" (1997:113-114). The post-colonial era has been no
different, Nyasani says, in that contemporary "black Africa is
painfully crucified on the cross of blackmailers, arm-twisters and
their forever more enslaving technologies and each nail of the cross
belongs to the economic aid donor nation" (1997:96)!
Regarding the impact of Westernization on African community and family
life, Preston Chitere (see Kimani 1998), Kenyan rural sociologist at
the University of Nairobi, offers the following observations regarding
the current state of the African family in Kenya, a state or condition
that exists in many other sub-Saharan African nations:
"The effects of capitalism are already being felt in our families.
Individualism in society is increasing. Even families in rural areas
like to operate in isolation, and those who offer any help are keen to
help their immediate families only. The (conjugal) family is becoming
more independent. The loss of community networks and the development of
individualism have resulted in (increased occurrences of) suicide,
loneliness, drug abuse and mental illness. The communal system is
breaking down. The extended family had certain functions to perform,
for instance, to reconcile couples at loggerheads with each other, but
this is no longer the case. It is no one (else's) business to know
what's happening in one's marriage today (Kimani 1998:1)."
APPLYING THE "NEW AFRICAN ETHNOLOGY"
Ghanaian historian Osei (1971:62-63) believes that Africa should chart
its future from its indigenous cultural traditions and adopt and adapt
only those aspects of non-African cultures that are compatible with
Africa's needs, goals and circumstances--namely, a scientific
perspective and Western educational practices. Taking a broader
perspective, Thairu (1975:168-169) argues for a future of greater
regional integration through educational and cultural exchanges within
and between African nations. This, he says, will bring into the open
pan-African cultural similarities, promote more widespread
understanding and tolerance on the continent, and contribute to greater
overall African unity. Philosopher Gyekye (1988) shares much of
Nyasani, Makgoba and Thairu's concern over Africans too often forsaking
indigenous African values and their wholesale and uncritical adoption
of Western ideologies and institutions.
One of the most unusual efforts among contemporary African scholars to
apply traditional African concepts to national development is that of
South African Lovemore Mbigi of the Ubuntu Institute near Pretoria.
Professor Mbigi (1997), freely using expressions such as "ancient
African wisdom," argues that the traditional African concept ubuntu ("I
am because we are. I can only be a person through others.") is useful
for African corporate and organizational executives, managers and
others pursuing organizational or national transformation. Mbigi argues
that "birthing rituals are important in African societies....Leaders
must carry out the birthing rituals of creativity and innovation in
organisations. They must have a sense of legacy and selflessness if
they are going to define the ultimate mystery and meaning of human
existence to their followers" (1997:37).
The emphasis on Africa's traditional past as found in the writings of
Nyasani and the other African scholars reviewed in this paper, however,
is not without its African detractors. Kenyan philosopher Masolo
(1995), for example, in his discussion of "ethnophilosophy" (formal
efforts to systematically describe traditional African beliefs and
practices) finds little in Africa's past that can be applied to the
present and future of the continent. He believes that
"philosophers who are seeking to revive and reinstate the traditional
African philosophy as the appropriate philosophy for Africa today are ?
doing disservice to Africa in trying to pretend that that philosophy is
still sufficient or useful or applicable to Africa's needs, i.e., that
it is able to cope with the new and modern problems and issues facing
Africa today as brought in with encroaching modernization. And because
this encroachment requires new methods of investigation and analysis,
which must be diversified due to the complexity of the situation,
ethnophilosophy just has no place in it" (1995:225).
Similarly, Gyekye (1996) abhors the fact that ancestors continue to be
of paramount importance in modern and traditional African life. He also
recommends that for Africa to progress scientifically and
technologically, "science should be rescued from the morass of
(traditional) African religious and mystical beliefs" (1996:174).
Nevertheless, Gyekye insists there are many "cultural values and
practices of traditional Africa (that) can be considered positive
features of the culture and can be accommodated in the scheme of
African modernity, even if they must undergo some refinement and
pruning to become fully harmonious with the spirit of modern culture
and to function?satisfactorily within that culture" (ibid.). He
discusses these traditional African values at length under the
following chapter headings: humanity and brotherhood, communalism and
individualism, morality, the family, economic system, chiefship and
politics, human rights, knowledge and wisdom, and aesthetics.
Kenyan social commentator Mwiti Mugambi (1998) pragmatically argues
that the future of Africa can only be forged from accepting and mending
the sociocultural present. For Mugambi it is only from aggressively
addressing the practical problems found within African nations that
improvements in Africa can be made. Colonial cultural hangovers,
pervasive Western cultural inundation, and aid-giving arm-twisting
donors are, he argues, here to stay and no amount of looking into
Africa's past will make them go away. He asserts that:
"Colonisation and westernisation have brought a permanent and
irreversible change in Africa.? As long as we continue talking of
Africanisation and 'going back to our roots' yet we remain quiet on the
reality of modern society, we will sound foolish, out-dated and out of
touch with reality. ... What African writers and scholars should do is
deal with the issues that are afflicting our society such as violence,
corruption and rising costs of basic needs, rather than waste time on
the issue of 'Africanness'. ... (T)he effects of Westernisation are
here to stay and the faster we adapt to living with them the better for
us and the generations to come" (1998:III).
Finally, Sam Mwale (1998), journalist and commentator on Kenyan public
policy issues, writing on U.S. President Clinton's recent visit to the
continent, believes that the U.S. head of state's references to an
"Africa that works" and an "African Renaissance" were premature. Mwale
argues that, yes, the nations that Mr. Clinton visited have, in fact,
instituted significant reforms; however, "Africa does not work" in
three of Africa's four largest regional economies--Nigeria, Kenya and
Congo-Kinshasa. Mwale believes that a true renaissance can only be said
to have occurred when fundamental changes in how African societies
operate have taken place. That "economic development on the continent
is taking place in a cultural and philosophical vacuum. The cultural
foundations of virtually all African nations remain undefined--an
unrefined mish-mash of traditional, colonial and neo-colonial cultures
and identities. From this have often arisen the clan, ethnic, racial
and religious fault-lines that have been the bane of independent
Africa" (1998:23).
For Mwale, an Africa "that works" would show signs of reversing the
crushing conditions of poverty and low economic opportunity under which
over eighty percent of Africa's people now live. Regrettably, says
Mwale, not one of the countries mentioned as "working" has as its first
budgetary priority solving these two most basic of problems. Mwale's
solution to Africa's future lies in the emergence of ethnically
pluralistic societies on the continent. He argues that:
"despite the wonderful talk of an African renaissance, there is no
evidence of attempts to evolve an all-embracing culture which allows a
healthy expression of diversity. Without a mosaic (national) culture
that provides room for co-existence, there cannot be an inclusive
political philosophy that allows all to become stake holders in
government. Neither can there be a moral order--upon which all
development is predicated--without a solid cultural foundation....
Africa's post-colonial trauma results from institutions, governance and
economic development models without any cultural underpinnings" (ibid).
CULTURAL RELATIVITY AND SOCIAL ACTIVISM
In the 1960s, cultural relativism came to dominate the social sciences
and civil rights emerged at the top of America's sociopolitical agenda.
Both historical movements were welcome and necessary for the emergence
of a greater respect for the individual and his humanity, and for
acknowledging and respecting cultural diversity in a rapidly shrinking
global community. These changes were significant and a very much needed
improvement over the narrow, ethnocentric approaches to ethnicity that
preceded them. Regrettably, the response within the social sciences to
the ascendance of cultural relativity and heightened ethnic sensitivity
and politicization was to retreat from studying broad patterns of
culture and cultural adaptation toward a narrower focus on
particularistic studies of societies and cultures.
This resultant lack of social scientific interest in the study of the
broader aspects of African culture and personality manifests itself in
the often vague, inappropriate and less than effective manner with
which the African scholars surveyed in this paper, for example, use
social scientific terms and concepts. Despite the lack of social
scientific interest in this form of inquiry and the fact that there is
no unanimity regarding the meaning of culture and personality terms and
concepts, there are nevertheless many terminological and conceptual
usages cited in the foregoing excerpts that easily exceed or violate
the most liberal of social scientific definitions. This is of concern
because the high intellectual status of the writers legitimizes such
usage. It also misinforms and misleads non-social scientists and other
readers of their works. For example, an editorial essay in the March 23-
29, 1998 edition of The East African, East Africa's best English weekly
newspaper, made the following comment on U.S. president Clinton's 1998
visit to Rwanda:
"His aim in Kigali will be to condemn the 1994 genocide and to stress
that ethnic killing must be rooted out of the African psyche. Genocide
is by no means unique to Africa but our record of violence stemming
from tribalism is a bad one, as recent incidents in Kenya, for
instance, attest. If President Clinton can convey the repugnance of the
international community for this shameful and recurring madness that
afflicts Africa, more power to him" (emphases mine).
This reference to the "African psyche" may well have been derived from
someone on the East African's editorial staff having read and been
convinced of the validity of such usage as it appears in Nyasani's
(1997) book of the same title (7).
I do not agree with those who argue that the non-participation of
social scientists in group culture and personality studies is as it
should be. I do accept and agree that purposeful insensitivity to the
validity of any social group's ethnicity, values and beliefs is never
acceptable and should be challenged from all quarters. However,
cultural relativity, social science particularism, and social activism
should not be allowed to block, overtly or subtly, responsible inquiry
into the patterns and processes of contemporary global cultural
adaptation. The African scholars, as evidenced by their generalistic
yet persuasive works cited in this paper, are obviously undeterred by
such inhibiting influences. As such, they should be encouraged and
joined by social scientists in these areas of inquiry. Both levels of
inquiry, the particular and general, are needed if for no other reason
than to promote more informed, accurate, and effective international
discourse and relations. An emphasis on sociocultural differences and
uniqueness is important and, in fact, essential for enhancing
individual identity and social cohesion, and furthering sociopolitical
goals.
Particularism, however, needs to be counterbalanced and contextualized
by studies that emphasize cross-cultural similarities such as the works
cited in this paper. If not, the evils of cultural stereotypes,
ethnocentrism and bigotry spawned by past culture and personality
studies will be replaced by particularism's negative outcomes of
greater cultural exclusivity, arrogance, intolerance, xenophobia,
mistrust, and inter-group conflict. Put simply, it is generally
recognized that conflict is more likely to arise among peoples who
accentuate their differences and uniqueness rather than among those who
acknowledge and celebrate their similarities. If nothing else, there
should be a freeing-up of academic and public discourse such that
sociocultural uniqueness is respected and the characteristics shared by
related or similar sociocultural groups are acknowledged, discussed,
and used to find common ground for resolving conflict and sustaining
cooperation. Regrettably, free discourse of this kind does not widely
characterize the current state of discourse within academia. Such
discourse and goals are also lacking in international (especially inter-
governmental) relations where national and sub-national sociopolitical
uniqueness, competition and efforts to control and dominate are most
often touted and pursued.
REINVENTING CULTURE AND PERSONALITY STUDIES
In light of both the strengths and the weaknesses of contemporary
African scholars' efforts at generalizing about African culture and
personality, I encourage among African and non-African social
scientists a reinvention of African ethnology and crosscultural
studies. To the particularist core of the social sciences should be
added an inter-disciplinary approach where the focus is on African core
cultural values, cultural themes and, most importantly, widespread
patterns and processes of cultural adaptation. The focus should not be
on stereotypes, typical personalities, modernity coefficients, etc.,
but rather on adaptive cultural processes and trends. The descriptions
and insights derived should be firmly grounded in the substantive data
of history, particularist ethnographies and applied anthropology case
studies.
Reinventing ethnology along these lines will not be easy. The social
sciences, in the United States in particular, it appears, are suffering
from a malady similar to that in the humanities described by University
of California, Santa Cruz Professor Emeritus John Ellis (1996). In his
book Literature Lost: Social Agendas and the Corruption of the
Humanities, Ellis argues that:
"academic literary criticism has been transformed" from traditional
inquiry into a overarching search for relevance and significance
applicable to modern society. That literature and humanistic inquiry
are subverted to quests for political power such that "the universities
should have an overtly political function, work directly for social and
political change, and inculcate a particular political viewpoint in
their students."
Every piece of literature, Ellis argues, is too often reduced to
issues of race, gender and class where expressions of victimization and
oppression are focused on to the exclusion of all else. Ellis argues
that "if we are determined to take from literature only the attitudes
that we bring to it, it ceases to have any point". A large group of
contemporary scholars, Ellis notes, "have no real interest in what
literature might say (in its full diversity), only an interest in what
they can use it for" (1996:13).
What Ellis describes for the humanities is also true for Western
social science, at least where culture and personality studies are
concerned. Social scientists and/or social activists who seek to
promote greater diversity in the controlling sectors of society, and
related agendas, are too often the first to restrict social science
inquiry to areas of theory and methodology that promote or at minimum
support their particular brand of political and social activism. For
example, at present, at least in the U.S., culture and personality
studies or their associated concepts are condemned when they are seen
as harmful to social and political change, yet embraced when they are
seen as advancing such causes. This low tolerance for a wide diversity
of approaches in the social sciences is such that academic freedom is
stifled from a fear of offending a colleague at the academy, or being
lambasted as being a bigot for suggesting that it may be worthwhile
researching and describing core cultural values and broad patterns of
cultural adaptation within and between large contemporary populations.
If social scientists, as Makgoba (1997) asserts, have a crucial and
practical role to play in African socioeconomic development, we must
identify particular and general themes and patterns of cultural
adaptation and their attendant psychological processes throughout sub-
Saharan Africa. The first step in expanding what are acceptable social
science areas of inquiry is to look at what scholars in the lesser
developed societies such as those in Africa are focusing on. This paper
has made an attempt to move discussion and debate in this direction.
The second step is to investigate the validity of specific claims of
pan-African cultural and psychological traits and adaptive responses.
The assertions made by the African scholars surveyed above suggest new
areas of research as follows:
1. Do traditional African authority structures and communal
proscriptions and prescriptions give rise to psychological handicaps,
such as "natural benign docility" or "mental encapsulation" (Nyasani
1997:113, 130-131), that have and continue to put Africans at a
disadvantage when confronting non-African cultural influences? Or, is
Gyekye (1988:31-32) correct in asserting that African communalism
allows for and demands individual expression and accountability; and
that the causes of Africa's cultural maladaptations are to be found
elsewhere? Are Masolo (1995) and Mugambi (1998) correct in insisting
that the solutions to Africa's problems and its future are not to be
found in Africa's traditional past, rather in addressing the problems
of the present, using contemporary methods?
2. Is Nyasani (1997:51-55) justified in insisting there is such a
thing as an African "mentality" or "psyche" that arose from and
reflects a long history of social, cultural and environmental
adaptation and acculturation? Is he justified in positing the existence
of African, European and Asian "cultural streams and edifices" (1997:
57)?
3. Mazrui and Mazrui (1995:1-3) argue that Kiswahili has promoted
"detribalization" in East Africa in the sense of "declining 'ethnic
behavior'". Yet, they say there is "stable or even increasing ethnic
loyalty in terms of emotional attachment". Do ethnographic and other
sources support this? Attitude and values surveys should be conducted
to test this assertion. If true, how widespread and intense are these
ethnic "behaviors" and "loyalties"?
4. Are prominent Kenyan social commentator Philip Ochieng's (1998)
assertions about Luo culture, group personality and origins valid? Has
Luo cultural arrogance undermined their pursuit of political power in
Kenya? How do Luos view their history and culture vis-a-vis other
tribes and ethnic groups?
CONCLUSION
Numerous core values, cultural themes and patterns of cultural
adaptation unique to Africa have been presented in this paper, as
identified in the writings of selected African scholars. Most of the
writers effectively argue that there is a widespread pattern of social
and cultural maladaptation within African societies evidenced by
continuing national development under-achievement and less than optimal
regional socioeconomic integration. This is regarded by the majority of
the writers to be a post-colonial legacy, the result of ongoing
external interference, and a now endemic and intense African admiration
of Western culture over African culture. The African scholars'
prescriptions for Africa's future focus on economic independence
through educational processes that combine Western techno-economic
theory and practice with the best of African sociocultural traditions.
Overall, the efforts of the African scholars examined in this paper are
significant and provocative contributions to understanding Africa and
its peoples. However, their works, excluding Gyekye (1988), are not
clearly or consistently tied to ethnographic and historical data. This
omission weakens their often innovative insights and arguments. It also
prohibits independent cross-cultural comparison and verification of
their generalizations and persuasive assertions. Finally, their
conclusions and recommendations are weakened by their not adequately
addressing cultural and behavioral variation and deviance within and
outside Africa.
Social scientists, including ethnologists, should join African
scholars outside the social sciences in studying the broader core
values, cultural themes and adaptive responses of Africans to
indigenous sociocultural circumstances and external influences.
Regrettably, eminent Western scholars such as Eric Wolf (1994) continue
to encourage anthropologists along the narrow path of particularism in
their studies of culture in order to "take much greater account of
heterogeneity and contradictions in cultural systems" (1994:7).
Conceptions of race, culture and people will indeed remain "perilous
ideas", as Professor Wolf calls them, if social scientists continue to
avoid such broader global cultural landscapes that in fact unite us,
and focus only on particularistic studies of societies and cultures
that separate us and allow us to stand proudly apart. What is worse,
however, is that without generalistic studies of cross-cultural
similarities and broad patterns of cultural adaptation serving to
complement particularistic studies, we risk increasing the global
occurrence and intensity of cultural isolationism and arrogance,
xenophobia, inter-cultural misunderstanding, and international
conflict. Perilous ideas, indeed!
Anthropology should not allow itself to be influenced by or become the
exclusive domain of contemporary Western culture, political
correctness, or social and political activism. Anthropology, and
ethnology in particular, should freely pursue a full range of
understandings of culture, specific cultures and their similarities and
differences, the processes of regional and global cultural adaptation,
and how such knowledge can improve human living conditions.
Particularistic studies of cultures, groups and sociocultural topics,
alone, are not enough. To this must be added the study of core cultural
values and themes, patterns of regional cultural adaptation and global
acculturation. The imprecise usage of cultural and psychological
terminology and concepts by scholars outside the social sciences and
the social science community's refusal to attend to large group
psychological processes and the broader patterns of human cultural
adaptation are significant matters. They tend to draw attention away
from our common humanity and destiny, and impede understanding of on-
going global cultural processes of utmost importance. However, all of
us, Africans and non-Africans, scholars, social scientists and the
public, have a personal responsibility to ensure, by all means
possible, that such broad cultural and psychological understandings are
not used to legitimize injustices or promote malevolent struggles for
political power and dominance.
Endnotes
(1)The opinions and conclusions expressed in this paper are solely
those of the author. They in no way reflect or otherwise represent the
policies or official positions of the United States Immigration and
Naturalization Service or any other U. S. Government entity. I wish to
express my sincere appreciation to the following African scholars and
educators who reviewed and commented on this paper in the earliest
stages of its preparation: Howard University Education Professor
Emeritus Paul Emoungu, Mr. Yves Kore, M.Ed., M.P.A., and Ms. Immy Rose
Namutosi, B.A., D.S.E. I am also most grateful to Anthropology
Professor Vernon R. Dorjahn and Assistant Anthropology Professor Jerry
Marr of the University of Oregon who reviewed and provided comments on
early and later drafts of the paper. Their candid and at times sharp
criticism were invaluable and greatly improved the paper in many ways.
The fact that they reviewed and commented on drafts of the paper does
not mean that they necessarily endorse all the opinions I have
expressed, approaches I have taken, or conclusions I have drawn. The
shortcomings that remain, and opinions expressed, in this article are
mine alone and for which, I am fully responsible.
(2) The terms "tradition" and "traditional" occur frequently in the
writings of the Western social scientists and contemporary African
scholars cited in this paper. However, all the scholars seldom, if
ever, define the terms outright. "Tradition" and "traditional" are
usually presented in contrast to terms that represent the scholars'
research aims, namely how "modern" or "Western" their subjects are. For
example, Smith and Inkeles (1966) defined "modern" as a "set of
attitudes and values, and ways of feeling and acting, presumably of the
sort either generated by or required for participation in a modern
society..." (1966:353). Similarly, the African scholars surveyed give
much attention to and examples of African "traditions" and "traditional
African culture", yet seldom if ever clearly define the terms. For the
sake of clarity and the general purposes of this paper, and as an
expression of what I understand the general definition of the term to
mean to the African scholars I have cited, I have employed the
following working definition of "traditional African culture":
generally widespread sub-Saharan African core values, beliefs, cultural
themes and behaviors as they existed prior to European contact; and as
they still exist, especially in the rural areas and to a lesser extent
in the urban areas of Africa; and upon which many, if not most,
fundamental thought processes and behaviors of contemporary sub-Saharan
Africans are based and continue to be derived from.
(3) See for example the works of Biesheuval (1954), Smith and Inkeles
(1966), Dawson (1964 and 1967), Doob (1967), Kahl (1968), Hoogvelt
(1974), and Gough (1975 and 1976).
(4) Most of the African scholars' works cited in this paper have not
come from social scientists. African scholars I have spoken with
believe the lack of social science involvement in this area of research
is due, in large part, to an inadequacy of resources in African
university social science departments to support indigenous social
research. They also believe it is due to the generally oppressive
nature of post-independence African central governments when it comes
to academics and their students studying and exposing various social
ills, including government corruption, incompetence and criminality.
(Kenyan philosopher Masolo argues that this "suppression of knowledge
and the resultant brain-drain remain Africa's foremost cause of
underdevelopment and sociopolitical instability" [1995:50]. Therefore,
since the mid-1960s, African scholars in philosophy, history, and
education have made greater strides in this area than their colleagues
in the social sciences primarily because central governments have seen
them as engaging in "academic" or "purely intellectual" pursuits, as a
result, less threatening to the status quo than are social scientists.
African governments, therefore, have allowed scholars other than social
scientists greater intellectual freedom of expression.
(5) The African scholars focused on in this paper include the
following: Senegalese Leopold Senghor (1963 and 1966); Ghanaians G. K.
Osei (1971) and Kwame Gyekye (1988 and 1996); Kenyans John S. Mbiti
(1969 and 1992), Kihumbu Thairu (1975), J. M. Nyasani (1997); and South
Africans Augustine Shutte (1993) and M. W. Makgoba (1997). The selected
works of these writers span a period of thirty-five years and come from
three of Africa's major sub-regions - West, East and Southern--where
the largest number of contemporary African scholars have intellectually
pursed the issues associated with pan-African cultural and
psychological traits and adaptive processes. As such, the selections
are regarded to represent serious and significant scholarly efforts on
the part of Africans to describe and/or analyze pan-African cultural
and psychological traits and widespread patterns and processes of
African cultural adaptation. Other key African works and commentary
discussed or cited in the paper include Mazrui and Mazrui (1995), D. A.
Masolo (1995) and Philip Ochieng (1998). Still other important works by
African scholars addressing these topics should have have also included
in the review but were omitted due to their not being readily available
to the author in Africa when this project began. These include H. Olela
(1971 and 1984), C. A. Diop (1974), P. Hountondji (1983), Kwame Appiah
(1987 and 1992), V. Y. Mudimbe (1988), Kwasi Wiredu (1990 and 1992),
Yoweri Museveni (1992 and 1997) and others. Finally, a number of other
important works published during the past twenty years by contemporary
African scholars offering analyses and solutions to Africa's current
political and socioeconomic problems were available to the author and
were reviewed and considered for inclusion. However, they were excluded
from the paper because they make little or no reference to pan-African
culture and personality traits or patterns and processes of African
cultural adaptation. These include: P. M. Mutibwa (1977), Gideon S.
Were (1983 and 1992), R. I. Onwuka and A. Sesay (1985), Philip Ndegwa
(1985 and 1986), Thomas R. Odhiambo (1988), P. Anyang' Nyong'o (1990
and 1992), Thabo Mbeki (1995), Eric M. Aseka (1996), and others. In
limiting the scope of this paper to the works of scholars from Africa I
am not discounting the efforts of Western scholars such as Aidan
Campbell (1997), Richard Werbner and Terence Ranger (1996), Verena
Stolcke (1995) and Eric Wolf (1994), for example, who continue to make
significant contributions to the study of African and non-African
ethnicity and individual and group identity. I have simply deferred for
the time being trying to place my findings within the contemporary
intellectual context that includes non-African scholars writing on
African ethnicity and identity.
(6) See for example Vilakazi (1979), Decalo (1980) and Lassiter (1983)
regarding Swazi and Batswana secondary school students and university
graduates.
(7) The reference to "violence stemming from tribalism" is also
noteworthy. Ethnically defined conflict is a symptom not a cause. It is
fomented and used by individuals and groups seeking wealth and/or
political power. It does not arise inherently, as the writer and many
others imply, from ethnicity or ethnic values, identity, loyalty or
behavior.
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Abstract: Western social scientists abandoned typical personality and
national character studies during the 1960s. However, many sub-Saharan
African scholars in various disciplines, those resident on the
continent and elsewhere, have continued to identify, describe and make
use of what they consider to be widespread African psychological
characteristics and patterns of cultural adaptation. These include core
African cultural values and themes, and what the scholars believe are
common African responses to the requirements of social life and
external cultural influences. To them, the analysis and use of these
widely shared values, themes and adaptive responses are crucial for
achieving viable and sustainable African national and community
development. In fact, a number of the thinkers argue this endeavor is
necessary for the ultimate survival of Africa and its cultures. In
contrast, Western and non-Western social scientists have given up
pursuing such broad concepts and adaptive processes as areas of invalid
and/or harmful social science inquiry. This paper attempts to identify
and assess the nature, range, quality, and utility of research and
writing by selected African scholars on African culture and personality
and recurring African responses to indigenous social life and Western
acculturation. It does so by reviewing and analyzing a sampling of
writings by African scholars published since the mid-1960s. Generally,
the paper asks: What are African scholars, commentators and the public,
saying about Africa's various ethnicities and Africanness and why is it
important to them? The feasibility of applying such understandings to
the socioeconomic conditions and practical problems of contemporary
African societies is also examined. In terms of social science theory
and methodology, the paper offers justification for reinstating within
anthropology, and more specifically ethnology, the study of African and
non-African core values, cultural themes and patterns of response to
social needs and external cultural forces. Finally, the contrast
between the approaches of social scientists and the African scholars
surveyed is discussed in the context of the historical shift in the
social sciences from generalization to particularism; and, more
broadly, in the context of the rise and dominance of individualism over
communalism in the global community.
JAMES E LASSITER is currently a Senior Refugee Program Manager in the
U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS), Office of International Affairs in Washington, D.C. He was
trained in anthropology and African Studies at the University of Oregon
(M.S., 1975; Ph.D., 1983) and has published in his area of expertise.
In addition to conducting anthropological research in Swaziland from
1980-83, he served as a Peace Corps administrator in Tanzania and Ghana
and as a Senior Desk Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya.
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Lassiter, J. E. 1999. African Culture and Personality: Bad Social
Science, Effective Social Activism, or a Call to Reinvent Ethnology? 3
(2): 1. [online] URL: http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v3/v3i2a1.htm
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