hi guys,
I culled the story as it appeared on today's Daily Observer. Is anything in
the offing?


Singhatey loses two portfolios

A press release from State House last evening has announced that President
Yahya Jammeh acting under his constitutional prerogatives, has "reassigned
responsibility for Fisheries and Natural Resources to the Office of the
President with effect June 24 1999."

The responsibility was formely held by Edward Singhatey secretary of state
responsible for Presidential Affairs and the National Assembly.

No reasons have been officially given for the transfer of the portfolios.



>From: Foroyaa <[log in to unmask]>
>Reply-To: The Gambia and related-issues mailing list
><[log in to unmask]>
>To: [log in to unmask]
>Subject: On Casamance
>Date: Tue, 29 Jun 1999 11:54:51 +0100
>
>Published in FOROYAA of 28 June - 1 July 1999
>
>
>CASAMANCE
>
>The Facts, The Fears, The Possibilities, The Dangers And The Way Forward
>
>
>The first consultative meeting of the MFDC, the Movement of the Democratic
>Forces of Casamance, held in Banjul at the Atlantic Hotel, ends on 25th
>June
>1999.
>
>The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Momodou Lamin Sedat Jobe,
>told the members of the movement at the opening ceremony that they were to
>decide how best and on what platform they would approach their  fraternal
>talks with the government of their country, The Senegal.
>
>Here Dr. Jobe conceives Casamance to be a part of Senegal.
>
>In his opening speech Father Diamacoune Senghor referred to the history of
>the struggle of MFDC and added +IBw-in effect, united as a single person,
>these
>illustrious sons of our dear Casamance shared the same ideal and the same
>love for their country, Casamance as had done before our valorous
>ancestors.
>
>A Casamance which, after God, was their reason for living and acting as it
>is and must be all the more for us today. They had given their persons to
>Casamance as a gift. This is a cause for pride and patriotism for all the
>people of Casamance+IB0-
>
>Hence it is very clear from this that father Diamacoune is talking about an
>Independent Casamance.
>
>The fact still remains that Senegal sees Casamance as a part of her
>territory. Peace according to Senegal is one based on the inviolability of
>the territorial integrity of Senegal as conceived by her government.
>
>On the other hand, the position of MFDC is that Casamance is the land of
>their ancestors. Peace according to father Diamacoune Senghor must be based
>on truth and justice and that is the recognition of the Independence of
>Casamance.
>
>The two positions have always been and still are diametrically opposed to
>each other. How to harmonize the two positions is the fundamental task of
>the peaceful negotiator. One may now ask what is Gambia+IBk-s role in
>harmonizing the two positions?
>
>According to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Jobe, +IBw-the
>gathering is here today in pursuant to president Jammeh+IBk-s offer of
>mediation
>in the long-drawn out crisis in the Casamance+IB0-
>
>According to Dr. Jobe, the gathering constitutes +IBw-the beginning of a
>determined will to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the Casamance issue
>in
>the interest of the socio-economic development of the region as a whole
>with
>the advent of permanent peace+IB0-
>
>Hence as far as the Gambia government is concerned, it is assumed that an
>environment is being provided to ensure the harmonization of the various
>positions of the Casamance groups in preparation for peaceful talks.
>
>The fears, however, are that the position of the Senegalese government for
>maintaining Casamance within its territory and the position of the MFDC for
>Independence may not harmonize. If that occurs the Gambia government would
>be left in a confused situation. There is no doubt that the MFDC did bring
>mentors of the movement together. Time will tell whether the movement has
>been consolidated to negotiate for autonomy or independence.
>
>It goes without saying that the Senegalese government has observers at the
>talks. In this regard, it is now acquainted  with all the personalities and
>all the positions. Senegal will therefore not be caught by surprise by any
>eventuality.
>
>Suffice it to say, the two sides could come out of the Banjul talks to go
>back to prepare for a more devastating war or for a more durable peace.
>Nothing indicates that either is impossible.
>
>THE POSSIBILITIES
>
>The aim of a negotiation is to reconcile the positions of adversaries so as
>to achieve an agreement on core issues. The aim of the talks in Banjul is
>said to provide opportunity for the MFDC to develop a negotiating position.
>
>One may now ask: Have the talks achieved the purpose? The answer lies in
>the
>final resolution of 25th June 1999 of what was referred to as a congress of
>MFDC. The Resolution reads:
>
>
>CONGRESS OF THE MOVEMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC  FORCES OF CASAMANCE
>
>
>+ACI-FINAL RESOLUTION
>
>+ACI-The Movement of Democratic Forces (MFDC) meeting in congress from the
>21st
>to the 25th June 1999, in Banjul, in the Republic of The Gambia, thanks to
>the kindness of the republic of The Gambia, has examined the present
>political and military situation which is of concern to it.
>
>+ACI-In that regard, the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance
>considering
>the unshakeable will of the secretary general Abbey Augustine Diamacoune
>Senghor to establish unity and cohesion within the movement+ADs-
>
>+ACI-Considering the solemn desire and commitment of Sidy Badgie, former
>chief
>of staff of the fighting forces of the movement of Democratic Forces of
>Casamance +IBw-ATIKA+IB0- to entirely subscribe to the line adopted by the
>Secretary
>General+ADs-
>
>+ACI-Considering that the new political situation has offered, in the
>supreme
>interest of our nation, the creation of a provisional piloting committee
>and
>the holding of talks in Banjul, the Gambia, from the 21st to the 25th June
>1999+ADs-
>
>+ACI-Considering that the conclusions of the deliberations of the
>provisional
>piloting committee are largely within the frame work of the mission
>assigned
>to him by the Secretary General of MFDC, Abbey Augustine Diamacoune
>Senghor+ADs-
>
>+ACI-Considering the strong mobilization of the different delegates, as
>well as
>the richness of their respective contributions are perfectly within the
>logic of the directive of the Secretary General+ADs-
>
>+ACI-Considering the difficulties of coordinating the different military
>commands+ADs-
>
>+ACI-The Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance takes note of the
>necessity
>of restructuring and reforming its institutions+ADs-
>
>+ACI-Within this perspective, the MFDC has examined and adopted its
>constitution
>and rules and regulations, a national Charter of Casamance resistance and a
>platform of demands.
>
>+ACI-Considering however that the present congress is acting as a national
>Bureau and in conformity with the provisions of the constitution and the
>rules and regulations+ADs-
>
>+ACI-The MFDC proclaims the retention of Abbey Augustine Diamacoune
>Senghor,
>starting from this date, in his functions as Secretary General.
>
>+ACI-The MFDC calls on its Secretary General to nominate an officer
>responsible
>for internal affairs and an officer responsible for external affairs who
>should form their respective executives in conformity with the provisions
>of
>the constitution and rules and regulations.
>
>+ACI-The congress recommends to the Secretary General of the MFDC to take
>initiative of creating and establishing the necessary conditions of a
>lasting peace in Casamance.
>
>+ACI-The congress denounces the destabilisation manoeuvres  by the
>Senegalese
>army of occupation with a view to sabotaging our days of reflection.
>
>+ACI-The congress energetically condemns the kidnappings, tortures,
>arbitrary
>arrests, rapings, degrading treatments, humiliations and assassinations
>perpetrated by the Senegalese army and its henchmen in Casamance.
>
>+ACI-The congress demands from the Senegalese authorities the immediate
>withdrawal of military and paramilitary forces in Casamance.
>
>+ACI-The retention of only the military camps whose creation is anterior to
>25th
>December 1979 and the immediate closure of the camps and stations created
>after this date.
>
>+ACI-The non-reinforcement of troops of the Senegalese army in Casamance as
>well
>as the holding of ceasefire on either sides in Casamance.
>
>+ACI-The congress reaffirms its determination to go to the negotiating
>table.
>
>+ACI-The congress congratulates itself for the active participation of
>observer
>groups and renews its request for it not to spare any effort in bringing
>about peace in Casamance.
>
>+ACI-The congress renews its total trust in the brotherly people and high
>authorities of Guinea Bissau as guarantors of the ceasefire agreements
>signed between the MFDC and the Senegalese government.
>
>+ACI-The congress expresses its gratitude to the brotherly people and high
>authorities of the republic of the Gambia, particularly to H.E. President
>Yahya Jammeh who, in addition to his constant and selfless action in the
>service of peace in Casamance has kindly accepted, with a lot of
>friendship,
>willingness and devotion, to host in his country the present talks.
>
>+ACI-The congress solemnly demands from H.E. President Yahya Jammeh to work
>for
>the release to freedom of the Secretary General and all officers and
>militants of the MFDC as a priority, among other things, for negotiation
>with the Senegalese government. His freedom to travel within and outside
>the
>country.
>
>+ACI-To rigorously respect the free movement of people and goods.
>
>+ACI-Banjul, 25th June 1999.
>
>+ACI-The Congress.+ACI-
>
>
>What is now necessary is for all the players to become vigilant. There is
>no
>doubt that if MFDC accepts autonomy or Senegal accepts independence a
>peaceful settlement could be hatched which would have crowned the Gambia
>government+IBk-s mediation efforts with success. However, if the positions
>become hardened the Gambia government would become increasingly vulnerable.
>Senegal is likely to compel it to close its doors to MFDC, extradite its
>agents and offer no sanctuary to them. In that case the ease with which the
>recent talks were held would disappear and MFDC would again have to meet
>under a climate of clandestinity. The members of the movement should
>therefore bear in mind that the free atmosphere they received in the Gambia
>is only possible because of the hope that it will lead to a peaceful
>settlement of the Casamance issue. Needless to say, once a peaceful
>settlement becomes illusive, the Gambia government would be accused of
>collaboration if it continues to accommodate MFDC. This could even lead to
>retaliation on the side of Senegal.
>
>Hence the Secretary General of the MFDC needs to understand international
>politics. The talks took place in Banjul not because of President
>Jammeh+IBk-s
>openness to MFDC but because President Jammeh is given a green card by
>Senegal. Any day that Senegal gives a red card Gambia will become a no go
>territory for MFDC.
>
>President Jammeh has already been accused of collaboration with the forces
>in Casamance. If the talks fail to be fruitful he is likely to distance
>himself more than ever to prevent the destabilisation of his own
>government.
>In this regard, members of the MFDC should understand the delicate
>situation
>Gambia is in and the delicate balancing act that is taking place. Their
>experience in Guinea Bissau, whose government was the guarantor of the
>ceasefire accords of 31 May 1991 and 8 July 1993, should be a constant
>reminder that accommodation of the MFDC in any country must not be taken
>for
>granted. Nkrumah Sane, who was sent to Senegal from Guinea Bissau, knows
>this very well.
>
>There is no doubt that if MFDC is resolved for autonomy, it will continue
>to
>enjoy the accommodation of the Government of The Gambia and Guinea Bissau.
>However, once it is resolved on demanding independence, international
>politics will compel the Government of The Gambia and Guinea Bissau to
>distance themselves.
>
>In this respect, Nkrumah Same may be more in tune with international
>politics than Dr Jobe, who claims that Sane is out of touch with the
>realities on the ground.
>
>What Sane realised, which was not realised by Dr Jobe, is that the
>combatants in the field are for independence. Sane may have thought that
>Father Diamacoune was coming to Banjul to discuss about autonomy. He may
>have thought that Father Diamacoune would be isolated from the combatants
>if
>he calls for autonomy at the Banjul talks. This may have been the reason
>why
>he started giving excuses for Father Diamacoune by saying that he was out
>of
>touch.
>
>Hence, Nkrumah Sane envisaged failure of the talks for good reasons. Any
>careful observer would know that if Father Diamacoune spoke about autonomy,
>he would have been isolated from the combatants. If he speaks about
>independence, he would be isolated from the Gambia Government and all
>current members of the OAU. The Banjul talks, therefore, have not helped
>the
>MFDC to resolve the question of autonomy or independence which is the key
>question if there is to be a peaceful resolution of the Casamance crisis.
>
>The delegates left Banjul with false hope because they have not been
>properly guided on matters dealing with diplomacy and international
>politics. The idea was for the Movement to deal with its internal
>contradictions. They ended up drawing resolutions which dealt with their
>relation with the Senegalese state.
>
>The resolution should have dealt with their internal+ADs- matter and the
>steps
>they wish to take to bring about a peaceful settlement.
>
>In short, we have recommended the doctrine of positive neutrality for The
>Gambia Government and that of progressive rapprochement between MFDC and
>the
>Senegalese Government. If these foreign policy doctrines were adhered to,
>The Gambia Government would not be in the trap it has put itself today.
>
>
>THE WAY FORWARD
>
>The Gambia Government needs to communicate with the MFDC to know their true
>position. This should determine whether Gambia can play the role of a
>negotiator or not. If it is clear that The Gambia Government cannot
>influence MFDC to give up its claim to independence, then The Gambia should
>play a neutral role and serve as host for refugees.
>
>If there is possibility of MFDC accepting autonomy, the Gambia Government
>could serve as a negotiator of the most comprehensive form of autonomy that
>comes close to the exercise of right to self determination. In that regard,
>it could begin by asking both sides to formulate their model structures in
>preparation for peace talks.
>
>It has given the impression that it would accommodate the MFDC under any
>pretext when its precise intention is to accommodate Senegal's call for
>autonomy. In this respect, false hopes have been given to the members of
>the
>MFDC to think that they could rely on the Gambia Government under all
>circumstances.
>
>The doctrine of progressive rapprochement does not call for  condemnations,
>ultimatums and rigidities. It calls for mutual accommodation of positions,
>cessation of hostilities, regrets of roles each has played in causing
>suffering, humility and expression of common and equal desire to redress
>past ills.
>
>For example, the resolution at the end of the meeting could have called for
>openness in their negotiations with Senegal. They could have called for the
>freedom of movement of Father Diamacoune so that he could consult with
>everyone to prepare a negotiating position, called for openness in their
>negotiation with Senegal. They could have limited their demands from the
>Senegalese Government to the granting of the freedom of movement of Father
>Diamacoune so that he could consult with everyone and prepare the ground
>for
>a negotiated settlement.
>
>This would have been sufficient and reasonable as far as the doctrine of
>progressive rapprochement is concerned. This policy calls for step by step
>process in the building of trust between adversaries.
>
>The Gambia Government needs to take the role of a negotiator with less
>fanfare and more candour. A negotiator cannot stand aloof while situations
>develop on their own. This leads to blame when things go out of control. A
>negotiator must guide a process. They should have helped the MFDC to know
>international politics and guide them to formulate realistic demands to get
>to the next phase of the negotiation and avoid Senegal being motivated to
>take rigid positions.
>
>Hence, The Gambia Government is now required to discuss very frankly with
>the MFDC to find out whether it could ever renounce its position for
>independence. If that position is unnegotiable, then The Gambia Government
>should know that it is not in a position to negotiate peace in Casamance.
>It
>should then end the false impression that is given that Gambian territory
>can be utilised by the MFDC to operate freely.
>
>On the other hand, it is necessary for MFDC to realise that Casamance
>refugees have found peace in The Gambia and any attempt to utilise Gambia
>for its operations will draw Gambia into any armed confrontation with the
>Senegalese regime. If their stand  is for independence, they should be
>honest enough to pursue their goal without drawing Gambia into the
>conflict.
>They should not utilise a platform for peaceful negotiation as a platform
>to
>pursue their own ends.
>
>The MFDC talks are over, but it has not drawn us any closer to peace in
>Casamance. The negotiating positions are as far apart as ever. The movement
>cannot heal its wounds until it is decisive on autonomy or independence.
>Once a position is taken, the rift will come. Hence, what has been done in
>Banjul is to patch up differences and leave matters to be decided later.
>This is simply a marriage of convenience. We hope the Senegalese regime
>will
>not behave immaturely by over reacting to events in Banjul. We hope they
>will see that Banjul is yet to know how to negotiate a settlement. They are
>engaged in a trial and error diplomacy and should not be penalised for
>their
>unseasoned approach to peaceful resolution of conflicts. We are all
>interested parties and we will continue to play our part in the process.
>
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