To G-L Community:
For those of you unable to open the earlier attachment that was sent, I
am sending it via e-mail. Your comments and suggestions are always
welcome.
Gambia's Foreign Policy Since the Coup: 1994-1999
Abdoulaye Saine
Miami University
This paper analyzes Gambia's foreign policy since the 1994 coup
d'etat1 that ousted Sir Dawda Jawara, Gambia's first president
(1965-1994). The coup brought to power Lt. Yahya Jammeh who headed the
Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC), from July 1994 to
September 1996 when the AFPRC was dissolved. Jammeh, who had earlier
resigned his commission, contested and won the presidential election on
September 26, 1996. Thus, attention is also paid to the policy
framework that continues to shape Gambia's foreign- policy under
Jammeh.2 Three central questions underpin this study. First, what
external policies did the AFPRC adopt to achieve its objectives?
Second, What is the foreign-policy orientation of Gambia's current
Alliance for Patriotic Reconciliation and Construction (APRC) government
and third, what effect(s) did the foreign policies of the AFPRC and the
ruling APRC government have on the national economy and Gambians?
An appraisal of the content and conduct of Gambia's foreign relations
since the coup of 1994, must of necessity, be preceded by a quick recap
of what transpired during the Jawara years (1965-1994). It is generally
agreed that the search for outside resources to maintain domestic power
structures was central to the foreign policies of the great majority of
African states.3 The way in which this search was conducted, however,
varied appreciably according to the nature of the governments concerned
and the domestic and external threats they faced. At independence in
1965 and until the coup in 1994, Gambia's foreign policy was driven by
two overarching objectives. First has been the desire to maintain
sovereign statehood for the territory within the context of a perceived
potential threat of assimilation by neighboring Senegal.4 The second had
to do with attracting external economic resources to support the Peoples
Progressive Party (PPP) government's development agenda as well as help
enrich Gambia's political and bureaucratic class. In so doing, the PPP
government under Jawara succeeded in attracting considerable economic
and political support from the outside, principally because of his
pro-Western, anti-Communist and strong human rights record. Also,
Gambia's cordial relations with oil-rich Arab and Gulf states proved
financially rewarding in Jawara's bid to diversify Gambia's funding
sources in order to reduce the country's dependence on the UK.
Gambia's relations with its all encompassing neighbor, Senegal, have
occupied center stage since independence in 1965. It is a relationship
often characterized by periods of relative calm and turbulence,
cooperation as in the now defunct Senegambia Confederation and border
closures to stem Gambia's re-export trade into Senegal and neighboring
states. A UN report prior to independence suggested several possible
strategies that ranged from total integration into Senegal to proposals
for a monetary and customs union.5 In the immediate aftermath of the
1981 aborted coup led by Kukoi Samba Sanyang, Gambia agreed to join
Senegal in a loose confederation, which Senegal hoped would lead
ultimately to full political union. The confederation was however
marred from the outset by Gambian fears of being disadvantaged and the
Confederation's "shot gun-wedding" character.6 The Confederation ended
in 1989; in particular, over the issue of a rotating presidency, which
Jawara would have liked, but which Abdou Diouf of Senegal opposed.
Predictably, with the 1994 coup against Jawara, Senegal refused to
intervene but offered the ex-president and his entourage political
asylum immediately. In fact, poor relations with Senegal after 1989 and
in particular, Senegal's border closure contributed partly to both the
cause and success of the coup. The immediate causes of the coup
however, lie more concretely in the social, political, class and
generational problems that built up in the long years of PPP rule and
within the army as well.7
Reviewing Gambia's political history under Jawara indeed resembles a
plateau occasionally marred by volcanic eruptions. The general image,
as projected perhaps too often to the world outside, was of a mini-state
adept at survival, able in spite of underdevelopment to run an open
society with a multiparty democracy and encapsulating both the problems
and opportunities of small states.8 In this picture the putsch in 1981
and for that matter, the coup of 1994 were potrayed as aberrations. On
the economic front, despite years of claimed economic success, Gambia
under Jawara continued to have one of the lowest living standards in the
continent and ranked 166th in the world out of 173 countries according
to the UNDP Human Development Index.9 In spite of very generous
financial assistance after the 1981 attempted coup, approximately 60 per
cent of Gambia's population still live under the poverty line. Thus,
Gambia's paradox under Jawara lay in the fact that here was a mini-state
whose viability at independence was in question and in spite of the odds
managed to build a relatively open economy and a functioning democracy,
but with a very low level of development.10 Clearly, while part of the
problem lay in elite corruption and enrichment, the overriding cause
more generally, was the poor performance of public institutions.
Regionally, Jawara maintained good relations with neighboring states
and as an elder statesman, sought to resolve the Liberia conflict. At
the continental level Gambia under Jawara supported the OAU and its
efforts to end racism and apartheid in South Africa. What at first
started out as good relations with Libya quickly deteriorated in the
early 1980's because of Gadaffi's support of Kukoi Samba Sanyang, who
led the unsuccessful coup attempt against Jawara in 1981. By the time
he was overthrown, Jawara was acclaimed internationally for his
commitment to human rights, democracy and the rule of law especially
within the Commonwealth. Consequently, the condemnation and the
subsequent sanctions imposed by the West and Western institutions on the
AFPRC following his ouster, was to have a chilling effect on the coup
and Gambia's economy.
The AFPRC's External Policy Pronouncements: 1994-1996
The central preoccupation of the AFPRC following the coup was the
need to ensure Gambia's economic survival in the face of mounting
Western displeasure and threats of economic sanctions. These threats
were not taken lightly by the AFPRC, understandably. The fact that 80
per cent of Gambia's national development budget was at the time funded
by the EU, Japan, the UK and international financial institutions meant
that the severing of aid would have disastrous economic and social
consequences. Until 1972, Britain provided the bulk of foreign
financial assistance to Gambia and by 1981, EU aid to Gambia rose from
$0.5m in 1976 to $13m, making it the largest multilateral donor in that
period. Although the volume of aid declined in subsequent years, the EU
maintained its lead as Gambia's principal multilateral donor until
1986.11 In that year, the International Development Agency, a World
Bank affiliate took the leading position. Between 1987-1990 EU's
assistance to Gambia amounted to some $30m. A large part of this came
in the form of balance of payments assistance.
Furthermore, US withdrawal of $10m in aid coupled with Japan's and
the UNDP's freezing of all development aid, meant that Gambia's external
reserves, scant as they were, would become a major source for financing
the balance of payments deficit. A British Foreign Office "travel
advice" on November 23,1994, four months after the coup, that "Banjul is
calm but the political situation in The Gambia remains uncertain and
could deteriorate quickly" literally gutted the tourist industry.12
This travel advice was quickly followed by similar Swedish and Danish
announcements cautioning potential tourists not to visit Gambia, because
of political instability. Since the mid-1970's, tourism had become
Gambia's main source of foreign exchange and constituted 12 percent of
GDP. It employed approximately 10,000 workers many of whom were heads
of households supporting on average ten individuals.
Combined Western sanctions came into effect in November, following
the failed coup attempt on November 11,1994 in which as many as 30
soldiers were said to have been summarily executed. Also, the dismissal
of Bakary Dabo, allegedly for his involvement in the foiled coup,
triggered a swift and severe Western reaction.13 Dabo, who was at one
time Jawara's minister of finance, also held the same portfolio in the
new regime. He subsequently fled the country out of fear for his life.
The EU froze all balance of payments support, followed by the suspension
of all but humanitarian aid by the US and Japan, pending the
announcement of a program to return the country to democratic rule.
With sanctions in place, government coffers were quickly being depleted
with reverberating effects on the average Gambian's standard of living.
The failed coup attempt combined with Western sanctions to create an
atmosphere of growing AFPRC insecurity domestically.
Consequently, the first reaction to suspend bilateral aid and balance
of payments assistance provoked two main reactions. The first was a
defensive reaction from the AFPRC itself that "with or without aid, The
Gambia would maintain an independent state, run by Gambians in the
interest of Gambians." 14 The second came generally from government
officials and the public at large, who felt that the sanctions were
unjustifiable. All however, were concerned with Gambia's economic
future in the face of these sanctions. The sanctions also had the
immediate effect of potentially affecting the projects outlined in the
development programs of the transition period. Indirectly, they led to
lower tax revenue for the AFPRC, due in part to dislocation of trade
caused by foreign currency shortage. Jammeh criticized the IMF and
World Bank for the negative effects structural adjustment had on
Gambia's poor and vowed that the burden of such policies would no longer
be borne by the poor alone, but by the rich as well. He also rejected
forthwith the linkage between Western aid resumption to Jawara's return
to Gambia. He castigated Jawara for presiding over a democracy defined
by corruption and promised to recover money embezzled by officials of
the previous regime.
Perhaps the earliest and most significant demonstration of goodwill
toward the AFPRC came from Libya. Following the withdrawal of Western
bilateral aid in November 1994, Libya stepped into the void with a $15m
grant.15 In November 1994 full diplomatic relations with Libya were
restored after 15 years of hostile relations between Jawara and
Gadaffi. Chinese support and goodwill in the form of a $23m grant for
agriculture followed. Chinese assistance was to cease immediately,
however, following the AFPRC's resumption of diplomatic relations with
Taiwan on July 13, 1995, after a 21year break.16 The Jawara government
had earlier in 1968 established diplomatic relations with Taiwan, but
broke them off in 1974 in favor of China. Outraged by the APRC policy
change, China severed relations with Gambia on July 25, 1995. Since
then, Taiwan has been a staunch supporter of the AFPRC and the
subsequent APRC government with an initial loan of $35m.17 Today,
Taiwanese aid has totaled about $80m. Clearly, because of ongoing
difficulties with the mainland, Taiwan has tried to make friends and win
support for its position internationally. The AFPRC's efforts to make
friends and hence, end growing international isolation also led to the
dispatching of several government delegations to Nigeria, Sierra Leone
with Jammeh making his first trip to Senegal on September 22, 1994 to
meet with President Diouf.18 Diouf promised support for the new regime
aware of Jammeh's potential role and future involvement in the civil war
in Senegal's northern province of Cassamance. Senegal's border closure
before the coup, together with the impact of Western sanctions was
already putting a suffocating squeeze on Gambia's economy.19
At this point Nigeria became Gambia's benefactor and proved critical
to the survival of Gambia's economy. Surrounded by Senegal and other
French-speaking countries, Gambia has maintained warm and cordial
relations with its larger and more populous protector. With the demise
of the Senegambian Confederation in 1989, president Jawara sought and
received protection from the military president of Nigeria, General
Ibrahim Babangida. Subsequent to the coup in 1994, Jammeh inherited and
strengthened relations with Nigeria and became the protégé and ally of
the late Nigerian president, General Sani Abacha. In fact, Jammeh cut
short a regional tour to Mauritania, Cape Verde and Guinea on learning
of Abacha's death in June 1998. Jammeh maintained good relations with
Nigeria's military president and successor to the late Abacha, General
Abdusalam Abubakar, who visited Gambia in early 1999. With Nigeria's
new civilian government now in power, it is doubtful if such relations
with president Obasanjo will continue. Since coming to power in early
June, Obasanjo has begun a purge of many senior military officers in
Nigeria's army.
The severe reduction and in some cases the freezing of aid compelled
the Jammeh regime to seek alternative sources of development funding and
keep the economy afloat. In January 1995, Jammeh held talks with
President Joao Bernardo Vieira of Guinea-Bissau and held similar
meetings with Strasser of Sierra Leone and Rawlings of Ghana. A visit
to Mauritania in the summer of 1995 and various delegations to Egypt and
Nigeria and promises of financial support and cooperation eased at least
temporarily AFPRC isolation. At the same time however, Western pressure
to hand power over to a civilian government was mounting and the
sanctions were by now having a detrimental effect by way of sluggish
business activity.
By the end of November 1994, four months after the coup, Jammeh
announced at a rally in Banjul, the capital, that the AFPRC would return
the country to civilian rule in December 1998 after free presidential
elections. This meant the AFPRC would be in office for a little over
four years and five months. The length of the transition was condemned
both nationally and internationally. Chief Emeka Anyaoku, the
Commonwealth Secretary-General, issued a statement in London rejecting
the four-year delay as "unacceptable" and called for elections within
three to six months. Aware of mounting domestic and international
pressure against the four-year timetable and upon the recommendation of
the National Consultative Commission (NCC), the AFPRC agreed to a
two-year timetable to culminate in presidential elections in June 1996.
The AFPRC however, rejected the NCC's proposal for an interim civilian
government to be headed by Dr. Wally Ndow, a UN official or Dr. Lamin
Sanneh, a Yale University professor of religion.
Following the two-year term limit announcement, AFPRC foreign
relations assumed a more aggressive stance with Jammeh visiting Egypt on
June 11-12, 1995 where he met President Mubarak and PLO leader Yasser
Arafat. At the 31st Summit of the OAU heads of state meeting in Addis
Ababa, Jammeh pledged to pay in full, Gambia's overdue contributions to
the organization. This earned him needed recognition. But perhaps the
regime scored its greatest success in its foreign relations, when it
succeeded in July of 1995, in hosting President Rawlings of Ghana as the
guest of honor during the first anniversary of the coup. Also, the
official opening of the mosque at the State House, later that summer by
the Imam of Mecca, had an important symbolic effect on a predominantly
Muslim country, in addition to cultivating support and goodwill with the
oil-rich Arab and Gulf States. In time, the AFPRC cultivated and
maintained cordial relations with these states and in August 1996, Iran
pledged to improve relations with Gambia and to cooperate in agriculture
and fishing sectors. It appears that by the time the AFPRC celebrated
its second year in office in July 1996, it had succeeded in spite of the
sanctions, to make friends and earn the financial support it needed to
undertake its development projects. A $20m loan from the Africa
Development Bank to refurbish Banjul's international airport is a case
in point. This was indicative of the slow but growing acceptance of the
regime in some circles, in part because of its putative objective to
improving living conditions for the average Gambian. A visit by
President Abdou Diouf of Senegal earlier in January, was also a sign of
Senegal's approval, perhaps apprehensiveness of the AFPRC. The
resumption of some financial aid from the West, in preparation for the
impending presidential elections now slated for September 1996,
suggested some shelter from the storm. In fact, during his address at
the second July 22 celebration of the coup and two months before the
elections, Jammeh singled out Taiwan, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Sierra
Leone, Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia as "true friends." He also
spoke warmly of the improved relations with Senegal.20
In retrospect, it seems that the AFPRC succeeded in maintaining the
economy, albeit marginally with funds made available by friends. In
fact, by March 1996, Gambia's external reserves stood at $112m compared
with $90m at the end of June 1995. The generally held belief that the
economy would ultimately collapse in the face of reduced development
aid, balance of payments support and reduced revenue because of the
British travel advice, was in reality, not realized.21 While all these
were inevitably affected, Gambia's macro-economic framework under the
supervision of Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance averted major
economic dislocation. That the AFPRC initiated several development
projects including two high schools, a hospital in Farafenni etc. and
raised salaries was indeed remarkable given the adverse international
environment.
The consequences of donor sanctions were far-reaching, nonetheless.
They undermined business confidence and activity, created mass
unemployment in tourism and raised the price of essential commodities.
Personal income, not even to speak of government and corporate revenue
plummeted. It is estimated that the sanctions resulted in a $100m loss
in aid and approximately $10m in direct foreign investment by the end of
1995. While the sanctions targeted the AFPRC, in hindsight it hurt the
average Gambian economically. Economic sanctions, as other countries
like Iraq and Libya suggest do not bring about the intended political
changes in leadership. If anything, they tend to worsen the hardship
among the poor and vulnerable in the population.
The APRC and Gambia's Foreign Policy: 1996-
1999
Gambia's transition to "civilian" rule culminated in the election of
retired Captain Yahya Jammeh as president of the Second Republic on
September 26, 1996 and the holding of National Assembly elections on
January 2, 1997.22 Jammeh resigned his commission shortly before the
presidential election, formed the APRC party and tilted the rules to
favor him after having banned his major political opponents.
Predictably, the Commonwealth condemned both the results and the process
in which all the major contestants were excluded from participation.
Jammeh responded "that the West wanted democracy to be restored in
Gambia. Now they have it and as an added bonus an olive branch to
march." He further argued that there was no reason to ostracize the
regime and no justification for maintaining the economic sanctions on
the country. In early November 1996, Libya expressed strong support for
the new government and urged Gambians to "live in dignity and freedom
under its youthful revolution." Thereafter, Jammeh paid a four-day
visit to Libya and in a communiqué called on OAU member states to work
together and called for the end "to unjust sanctions imposed on the
Libyan people." In January 22, 1997, Taiwan announced a $411,500 grant
to enable the Jammeh government pay the salaries of Cuban, Nigerian and
Egyptian doctors and healthcare workers. Aware of the fact that his
regime was not looked upon favorably by its main aid donors, Jammeh was
bent on cultivating productive alliances and support elsewhere. He made
several trips to the Middleast and performed the pilgrimage to Mecca in
1997. Thus, with Jammeh in power and control over the National
Assembly, the APRC's diplomatic flurry sought to consolidate
pre-election friendships and the creation of new ones. In fact,
Jammeh's wedding to an Algerian national in early 1999 strengthened
further Gambia's relations with Algeria.
The meeting in Gambia on September 11, 1997 of the nine member
countries of the Permanent Interstate Committee on Drought Control in
the Sahel (CILSS), accorded the new regime much needed recognition and
prestige regionally. Serving as the CILSS current Chairman gave Jammeh
a forum to showcase his development programs, especially the newly
refurbished airport and new television station. The APRC gained more
international recognition when Gambia became a non-permanent member of
the UN Security Council on January 2, 1998 for a two-year term. Jammeh
has used his newly found status to support friends like Taiwan, Libya
and Iraq. On May 14, 1998, Iraq's foreign minister visited Gambia to
seek help in fighting UN imposed sanctions. Similarly, Jammeh has
called for the end of UN imposed sanctions against Libya at the OAU and
the UN respectively. It appears that Jammeh's international image is
improving with Gambia's presence in the Security Council. In February,
1998 Jammeh paid visits to France and Italy, chaired the UN Security
Council in March and held talks with leaders in Saudi Arabia, Iraq and
Nigeria in April and May. Regionally, Jammeh's government successfully
mediated the conflict in Guinea- Bissau. This was a major
accomplishment. The APRC has also offered its good offices in the civil
war between Senegal's government and the rebels of the Movement for a
Democratic Casamance (MFDC). Clearly, this has enhanced Jammeh's sense
of confidence. Thus, Jammeh like Jawara before him has emerged as a
peace broker in part to ward off these conflicts from destabilizing his
regime. Already, Gambia is home to over 10,000 refugees from Senegal's
neighboring province of Casamance, Guinea- Bissau and Sierra-Leone. The
need to attract foreign resources to support his development agenda at
home and maintain Gambia's territorial integrity are the driving forces
for Jammeh's numerous missions abroad. This is a paradox however,
because this is an issue that he consistently criticized ex-president
Jawara for, after the coup.
Gambia's foreign policy successes are also attributable to a cadre
of seasoned career diplomats, notwithstanding the frequent changes at
the foreign minister level. Since the coup, Bolong Sonko, Baboucarr
Blaise Jagne, Omar Njie and its current holder, Lamin Sedat Jobe, an
official at UNESCO, have held this position. Together, they have given
leadership, coherence and direction to Gambia's foreign relations. The
appointment of seasoned diplomats like Njogu Bah, who serves as
Ambassador to France is indicative of France's growing importance and
source of support for Gambia. Bah, who studied in Dakar and France,
respectively, first served as Ambassador to Senegal and is also
accredited to several European countries. Ex-minister Sonko has since
joined the major opposition party, the United Democratic Party (UDP) and
Jagne now serves as Gambia's representative to the UN. As in most
countries, Ambassadorial appointments under Jammeh have often been
political. The accreditation of Crispin Grey-Johnson as Ambassador to
Washington was greeted with enthusiasm. Though not a career diplomat,
Johnson, by most accounts performed well as Ambassador. As of this
writing, he has been recalled to Gambia with the official reason that
his two-year term was up and was needed elsewhere.
Yet, it seems likely that Gambia's increasingly activist foreign
policy may begin to restore the goodwill of its main donors and reverse
what once was an antagonistic relationship. This is precisely what
appears to be happening. After almost a four- year absence, the World
Bank has resumed lending to Gambia with an initial loan of $18m in April
1998. The IMF at the end of June 1998 also approved a three-year loan
to the regime under an enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF) of
$27m. The UNDP and the US have resumed some aid. The EU has also
promised aid to the tune of $100m over a three-year period. The
African Development Bank also made an additional $13m loan in 1998 to
compliment the $14m in aid given in 1997. The money would be used to
improve health services, population and poverty reduction measures.
While some major Western donors have resumed aid it is yet to reach
pre-coup levels. Jammeh's commitment to democracy and human rights will
be the basis upon which Western aid and support will be continued. Yet,
with tourist bookings approximating pre-coup levels, the economy could
get a shot in the arm. These loans and added revenue could give the
regime the needed stamp of approval to attract more loans and support.
Also, the resumption of aid to almost pre-coup levels and relations with
Senegal improving, Gambia's re-export trade could get a new leash on
life. Jammeh's conciliatory gesture to the diplomatic Community in
Gambia in January 1998 seeks to forge a "new era of partnership and
cooperation." In spite of the resumption of some aid and returning
tourists however, the economy remains vulnerable to external shocks. The
APRC's growing repression of opposition leaders, parties and the press
could deteriorate into instability with potential spillover into the
army and civil society. It seems the donor community will keep a
watchful eye over Jammeh's commitment to principles of good governance
and human rights.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Gambia' s foreign policy since the coup d'etat of 1994
has been remarkably innovative and effective in attracting needed funds
from alternative sources abroad to support domestic programs. Jammeh
and his ministers wasted little time in cultivating new friendships and
consolidating old alliances outside the Western sphere of influence.
Thus, following the coup AFPRC policy had the dual objective of making
friends and securing alternative sources of financial assistance. In so
doing, AFPRC policy succeeded partly in circumventing growing
international isolation and the negative impact of Western imposed
economic sanctions. Under the APRC, Gambia's foreign policy also has a
dual strategy of appeasing the West and lending institutions in order to
attract needed funds, and support for so-called "rouge" states like
Libya and Iraq. Gambia's non-permanent membership of the UN Security
Council however, broadened the scope and conduct of its increasingly
activist foreign policy. This engendered a growing sense of confidence
for the president, leading him to play an important role in conflict
mediation and resolution, regionally and internationally. Gambia's
growing activist foreign policy has also begun a gradual reversal of
Western imposed economic sanctions and Gambia's international
isolation. The combined roles of the President as peace broker and
fundraiser underscore the two central objectives that have driven
Gambia's foreign policy historically, i.e., territorial independence and
procurement of external financial resources for internal development and
regime legitimization purposes. In this regard, Gambia's foreign
relations have remained remarkably consistent since independence. This
is what links Jammeh to Jawara and explains to some extent why both men
use(ed) foreign travel in part, to fulfill these dual national
objectives. The fates of geopolitics and limited resource endowments
have conspired to keep it this way. Future presidents are not likely to
deviate significantly from this trodden path.
Perhaps this realization coupled with Jammeh's slow, albeit,
growing acceptance in the international community has led him to temper
his once defiant and defensive posture toward the West. He has as a
result become more concilliatory like Jawara before him in order to gain
Western support and financial assistance with occasional criticism of
the West. However, this changed behavior or strategy has not
necessarily led to full resumption of aid. Jammeh therefore, finds
himself in a difficult mediator role as he seeks to balance Western
capitalist interests, adverse effects of structural adjustment, on one
hand and the welfare of a poor and growing population, on the other.
This systemic tension, perhaps conflict, is likely to sow the seeds of
discontent and instability in the army and civil society. Coups and
counter coups in Africa and in Ghana for example, have in part, been the
consequence of regime inability to mediate this conflict. While
Gambia's foreign policy under the AFPRC and APRC succeeded in attracting
external financial assistance, the question remains if this would
translate into tangible welfare improvements and benefits for Gambians.
Foreign policy under Jawara successful as it was, marginally improved
the lives of Gambia's poor. And notwithstanding APRC projects and the
good intentions of the donor and lending community, the logic of IMF and
World Bank structural adjustment policies and lending, in general, tend
to put in place a good macro-economic framework but often fail to
ameliorate or reduce poverty levels.
Jammeh's role(s) and skills as a regional conflict mediator and
between Western capital and domestic welfare needs, must be extended to
negotiate the crisis in the domestic political domain. The current rift
between the regime and opposition political parties and leaders must be
resolved to pre-empt a quickly deteriorating political atmosphere.
Political space must be provided these leaders and parties to enable
them to engage effectively in the political process. Political
repression and human rights abuses only delay temporarily the quest for
freedom, participation and accountability. A threshold is finally
reached when repression may not necessarily engender compliance. What
is needed is political "Vision 20/20" to complement its predecessor
(economic) "Vision 20/20." Jammeh's commitment to human rights and
democratic principles will be the basis upon which Western aid and
support will be continued. The appeal by Jammeh to traditional African
principles and practices of democracy as possible alternatives to a more
inclusive and participatory type democracy, are not likely to bring aid
to pre-coup levels. Insistence by Jammeh on maintaining the status quo
may not in the end elicit desirable outcomes. Consequently, an enabling
political and economic environment that has at its root individual
freedoms and opportunity for self- improvement, especially for women and
the rural poor must accompany this. Despite some obvious flaws, Vision
20/20 is a good start in this direction.23 These strategies combined
could go a long way in releasing and further developing both the
creative and entrepreneurial qualities of Gambians. However, when
stifled they deepen underdevelopment and mediocrity and no amount of
external funding or successful foreign policy per se, can begin to
reverse this process.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L
Web interface at: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/gambia-l.html
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
