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Subject:
From:
Matarr Amadou Sallah <[log in to unmask]>
Reply To:
The Gambia and related-issues mailing list <[log in to unmask]>
Date:
Wed, 29 Mar 2006 03:27:29 +0200
Content-Type:
text/plain
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text/plain (787 lines)
Sister Jabou
Can you please send me a private mail

Matarr


>From: [log in to unmask]
>Reply-To: The Gambia and related-issues mailing list              
><[log in to unmask]>
>To: [log in to unmask]
>Subject: Fwd: So-called confessions. You won't believe this!!
>Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2006 12:17:43 EST
>
>---------------------- Information from the mail header 
>-----------------------
>Sender:       The Gambia and related-issues mailing list
>               <[log in to unmask]>
>Poster:       [log in to unmask]
>Subject:      Fwd: So-called confessions. You won't believe this!!
>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>=20
>     =20
>Well, the Observer is hard at work  serving Master Jammeh. You will not=20
>believe this!
>=20
>Written by Ebrima Jaw Manneh    =20
>Tuesday, 28 March 2006   =20
>Last night a number of the coup plotters related how the  aborted 
>infamous=20
>March 21 coup plot was hatched, how they got involved,  the intrigues as 
>wel=
>l as=20
>their motivation. =20
>Tamsir Jasseh
>Former director of the  Gambia Immigration Department, said his 
>knowledge=20
>about the coup was  limited, adding that he was =E2=80=9Cable to get this 
>in=
>formation at=20
>the very last  minute. Personally when I looked at the situation, it 
>looked=20
>more to me  like a plan that was never executed. I was informed about the 
>wh=
>ole=20
>thing  by Col Ndure Cham, whom I knew through the service. He had more 
>like=20=
>a =20
>desire than a plan. He wanted to change the government. The change of =20
>government that he wanted was more like just change the leadership.=E2=80=
>=9D=20
>He added: =E2=80=9CHe said to me that he wanted to leave  everything as it 
>i=
>s. The=20
>political parties, the people in the opposition  and that even the APRC 
>will=
>  be=20
>allowed to continue as a party. And that  the constitution will not be=20
>suspended. And that there will be no  commission of inquiry and that life 
>wi=
>ll just=20
>go on.=E2=80=9D=20
>Mr Jasseh continued: =E2=80=9CHe (Col Ndure Cham) told me that  the whole 
>mi=
>litary=20
>was behind him. Then I said if the whole military was  behind you, then 
>Tams=
>ir=20
>Jasseh cannot stop you. He later mentioned about  how he can go about 
>stoppi=
>ng=20
>communication during the act. And one of the  major things he mentioned to 
>m=
>e=20
>that I have put some significance was when  he said to me, if we should do 
>i=
>t,=20
>we have to cut off the communication.  And I said to him no, no! If you 
>do=20
>that you are destroying the country. I  told him you just have to switch 
>the=
>m=20
>off, instead of cutting the fibres  of the cable, because I know the 
>cables=20=
>are=20
>very expensive and it will  take a long time before you can restore the=20
>telecommunication services.  And then he went about his way.=E2=80=9D=20
>According to Mr Jasseh, it was on the very day of their  plan that Col 
>Ndure=
>=20
>Cham informed him that =E2=80=9Cwe are going to do it. And  three hours 
>late=
>r he=20
>called me and said we are abandoning this thing and  that we are not going 
>t=
>o get=20
>started, because Lang Tombong Tamba has sent  the message to Mauritania. 
>So=20=
>I=20
>told him well that is the best thing you  can do. You have not even 
>started=20=
>it.=20
>No one is hurt, nothing is  destroyed. So maybe that is less of a 
>problem=20
>than if you have tried to  force your way through. So what are you going 
>to=20=
>do=20
>now? And then he said  I don=E2=80=99t know. So he went away=E2=80=9D. =20
>He then recalled that while he was in his house with his  wife and 
>children,=
>=20
>Col Ndure Cham said that =E2=80=9Csomeone has informed him that  he was to 
>b=
>e arrested=20
>and that he was on the run.=E2=80=9D =20
>He said: =E2=80=9CAt that point, I begin to realise the  seriousness of 
>the=20
>situation. Then I discussed it with my wife. I said  this is what has been 
>h=
>appening.=20
>This guy has told me this. And my wife  was very concern and she said I 
>thin=
>k=20
>you better go and speak with the  American ambassador as US citizen. When 
>I=20
>told him (US ambassador) about  this he said go home and if the 
>authorities=20
>question you, cooperate with  them. Tell them what you know. And I was 
>picke=
>d up=20
>and brought here and I  have told them what I know.=E2=80=9D =20
>The Ex-Police Adviser Jasseh then expressed his regret  and sorrow and=20
>further remembered: =E2=80=9CIt was between 5:30  and 6:00  evening, when 
>I=20=
>transported him=20
>to Kujubeh, which later on, I found out  was actually in Senegal. And I 
>came=
>=20
>back. I did it because this is the way  out for both of us. When we got 
>ther=
>e I=20
>said no! I am coming to face the  consequences and I came back.=E2=80=9D 
>=20
>External Support
>Tamsir Jasseh  recalled that it was about two months ago, when Col Ndure 
>Cha=
>m=20
>talked to  him about the border problem between The Gambia and Senegal. 
>=E2=
>=80=9CIt=20
>got to a  point that it affecting both countries economically and so many 
>ot=
>her=20
>  ways. And I remember distinctly telling him that the cost of cooking gas 
>=20
>has gone up in both countries so much so that business people and  
>restauran=
>ts=20
>do not even make profit on cooking gas,=E2=80=9D he added, and then  
>pointed=
>  out: =E2=80=9CHe=20
>said to me I want to send a message to the Senegalese  High Commission 
>that=20
>the securities services between The Gambia and  Senegal should continue 
>work=
>ing=20
>smoothly together and let the politicians  sort out their political 
>issues.=20
>Because at these borders it is the  security personnel that stand there. 
>If=20=
>the=20
>security personnel facilitate  movement, there will be smooth cooperation. 
>A=
>nd=20
>he wanted me to go to the  Senegalese Ambassador to formally discuss 
>with=20
>him. I asked him how he  could do that? He said I am not too sure whether 
>th=
>at is=20
>in line with  Gambia government policy but I just want them to know. It 
>took=
>=20
>me a while  before I was finally able to go there.=E2=80=9D=20
>=E2=80=9CI went in. I gave my name and all my information. It was  about 
>thr=
>ee, four=20
>days later when they called me and said you have  requested meeting with 
>the=
>=20
>ambassador. You can come. And I went in. I  greeted the ambassador and 
>befor=
>e I=20
>started he said wait let me call a  witness. I told him that Ndure Cham 
>has=20
>asked me to come to you personally  and explain to you what is happening 
>at=20=
>the=20
>border. That the security  services of both countries should work 
>together=20
>smoothly. And then the  ambassador himself at first expressed surprise why 
>I=
>=20
>must be the one to  convey such a message...And for now this is what he 
>has=20=
>asked=20
>me to do.  And that I would like you to understand that he is seeking a=20
>cooperation  between the two securities and the politicians can take care 
>of=
>  their =20
>problems and that the situation in The Gambia has  become dangerous  in 
>his=20
>point of view. This is what he was concerned about. And the  ambassador=20
>listened at me surprisingly. Then he elaborated on the need for  closer 
>rela=
>tion as=20
>you would talk to a Senegalese, for closer  collaboration. Just on that 
>gene=
>ral=20
>term. And then he said ok, I will  contact you,=E2=80=9D he explained. =20
>Mr Jasseh noted that it was after about five days later  that he received 
>a=20
>call from someone in =E2=80=9CSenegal, who identified himself  as Pap Seck 
>a=
>nd said my=20
>superior gave me your name and number. So I just  call to say that I will 
>ca=
>ll=20
>you back. Then I told Ndure Cham, instead of  the ambassador calling me, 
>it=20
>was somebody calling me from Senegal. So I  gave Ndure Cham that 
>information=
>=20
>and he said Pap Seck might be in the  Military Intelligence. Mr Cham gave 
>me=
>  the=20
>information that Pap Seck would  give him money. He requested the money. 
>But=
>=20
>I asked him why did he needed  the money from anybody? And he said no 
>member=
>  =20
>of the military will  be in the government. It will be a purely civilian=20
>government and that if  these senior officers are paid money, it will be 
>lik=
>e some=20
>kind of  compensation not to request for positions, because the government 
>w=
>as=20
>just  suppose to continue as it is.  He said if he has a million dollars. 
>=20
>But to me, that was just daydreaming. Who gonna give him a million  
>dollars?=
>=E2=80=9D  =20
>The Ex-Deputy IGP Jasseh confirmed that he has always  expressed that 
>his=20
>interest was business throughout their planning. He  added: =E2=80=9CBut 
>he=20=
>(col Ndure=20
>Cham said to me, you are good in law enforcement  and the IGP Sonko is a 
>ver=
>y=20
>good soldier, who I will really like to  promote and transfer back into 
>the=20
>army, because most of the senior people  in the army are gone.=E2=80=9D=20
>Alieu Jobe
>On his account, a 36- year  old Alieu Jobe, who was the acting director 
>of=20
>Treasury confirmed that Col  Ndure was like a 
>=E2=80=9Cgrandfather=E2=80=9D=20=
>to him, who repose =E2=80=9D
>very high trust=E2=80=9D in  him.  =20
>He recalled that Col Cham had told him, when he was the  commander of 
>the=20
>National Guard that =E2=80=9Che is contemplating overthrowing the  
>governmen=
>t. I told him=20
>that this is not a good idea.  I kept  discouraging him until when he 
>was=20
>appointed Chief of Defence Staff when I  was not in town. I gave him a=20
>congratulatory call and I told him to work  hard.=E2=80=9D=20
>On his return, Mr Jobe said he was surprised by Col  Cham=E2=80=99s 
>solidity=
>  to=20
>pushing for the same =E2=80=9Cthing. I still continued  discouraging him.  
>I=
>  told him that=20
>if he was not happy and he is now  promoted, that should be the end of 
>thing=
>s.=20
>But he always told me I will  go ahead and I always insisted, 
>don=E2=80=99t=20=
>do it. He=20
>has been threatening me at  that level in the event he heard this thing; 
>he=20
>will make sure that my  head is blown up, because he is the head of the 
>arme=
>d=20
>forces.=E2=80=9D=20
>He then added: =E2=80=9CAnytime I visited him, I normally go into  the 
>house=
>, sit and=20
>chat with the wife and he will tell me this is Tamsir  or whatever. He 
>said=20
>Tamsir was dealing with the key intelligence officer  in Senegal. He 
>said=20
>Senegal was about to give them somebody in their  Intelligence to give 
>them=20=
>money,=20
>but he said he did not have the money. I  told him that this was an 
>indicati=
>on=20
>that he could not do it. He said they  were about to bring weapons into 
>the=20
>country. That was just one discussion  he mentioned all that, money, 
>weapons=
>,=20
>whatever but he said he believes  the weapons cannot come here. So in any 
>ca=
>se,=20
>one thing I know was that it  was Tamsir who was between him and this 
>man.=20
>What he told me was that  Senegal would deploy troops in either Cassamance 
>o=
>r=20
>somewhere around the  Kaolack area and those people would give him support 
>i=
>n an=20
>event he is  about to fail. He also said that Mbye would take care of the 
>2=20
>Infantry  Batallion and those in Cassamance would take care of Kanilai. 
>Whet=
>her=20
>it  is true or it is not true, these are his words.
>And in most cases I  keep telling him, you should forget about this thing.=
>=E2=80=9D=20
>Recalling that Col Cham had asked him to inform Captain  Famara Jammeh to 
>be=
>=20
>part his complot, Mr Jobe said he had never heeded his  request. 
>=E2=80=9CI=20=
>did not=20
>subscribed to it and I do not want a close friend of  mine to subscribe to 
>i=
>t. I=E2=80=99
>ve never informed him. We continued like that  until on Monday at night, 
>whe=
>n=20
>he told me that he is not going to wait  anymore. He said he is going 
>ahead=20
>with his plan. I was very confused. And  the next day early in the morning 
>I=
>=20
>called Capt Famara Jammeh and I  informed him that I am not very 
>comfortable=
>. It=20
>seems something is about  to happen and let him watch out. From there I 
>thin=
>k=20
>Capt Jammeh left for  his office.=E2=80=9D=20
>=E2=80=9CAround 5:00, he phoned me indicating that he is  confused. I 
>asked=20=
>him what=20
>the confusion is. He said an NCO in Yundum  called him to inform him 
>that=20
>there is a planned coup. And I told him that  I think this was the message 
>I=
>=20
>wanted to put across to you. But because of  the threat on me, I could not 
>g=
>o=20
>ahead. I am not very sure. What Col Cham  told me was that I watch out who 
>t=
>o talk=20
>to, because whoever you talk to  could be part of it. And since it is a=20
>military thing and I am a civilian,  I thought the best thing is just to 
>avo=
>id. And=20
>not to even talk, because  when you talk, it will be used as an exhibit=20
>against you. And when you  talk, you do not know whether the guy you are 
>tal=
>king is=20
>even part of it.  These were all worries in my brain,=E2=80=9D he 
>acknowledg=
>ed. =20
>According to him, under the circumstance, Capt Jammeh  called around 
>5:00,=20
>saying he is confused. =E2=80=9CI told him, I am also confused  but I said 
>t=
>his was the=20
>message I was trying to put across at least for  you people to be alert. 
>Wha=
>t=20
>he told me was what do I do now? He said he  had called the commander and 
>I=20
>said talk to any commander you have to talk  to. And he said the CDS told 
>hi=
>m=20
>that I should have informed him. I told  him I am not part of it and if I 
>am=
>  not=20
>part of it I do not want you to be  part of it. Therefore, I do not think 
>I=20
>should inform you.=E2=80=9D =20
>According to him, the CDS =E2=80=9Ccalled me to inform me that he  is 
>leavin=
>g and he=20
>wants me to take care of his family in his absence. He  was the very one 
>who=
>=20
>told me that the President is aware and that they  have dispatched 
>soldiers=20=
>to=20
>arrest most of the officers. I arranged for  him to come to Farato. I 
>assign=
>ed=20
>my uncle to send him money, I think it  was about D6,000 to Tanji to take 
>a=20
>taxi. And the taxi brought him to  Brikama and then he came to Farato.=E2=
>=80=9D=20
>He slammed =E2=80=9Cbad associates=E2=80=9D as he regrets, and then  
>warned:=
>  =E2=80=9CTo have a bad=20
>associate, who you think is somebody who is part  and parcel of you is 
>the=20
>worse thing that can happen to a human being. And  one has to be very 
>carefu=
>l=20
>about whom you are associated with.=E2=80=9D  =20
>Alieu Jobe apologised for his inability to leak the coup  plot and then 
>said=
>:=20
>=E2=80=9CIf Gambian people think that I should have leaked it  under the=20
>circumstances and the truama I was going through, well I am very  sorry to 
>e=
>verybody. And=20
>prayed to God that this current undesirable  situation ends as quickly 
>as=20
>possible. And I wish that there is peace,  tranquillity and order in the 
>cou=
>ntry.=E2=80=9D=20
>Bunja Darboe
>Capt Bunja Darboe,  military assistant to the Ex-Chief of Defence Staff 
>Col=20
>Ndure Cham,  confirmed: =E2=80=9CI have worked with him (Col Cham) 
>directly.=
>  I have=20
>access to  his office than any other officer.  I hold the key to his 
>office,=
>  I =20
>write for him and hold appointments for him, as well as briefings and his 
>=20
>official engagements. That was my task.=20
>Capt Darboe, who joined the Gambia National Gendemerie on  10 June 1991 
>said=
>:=20
>=E2=80=9CIt was sometime at the beginning of March, when I went  to Col 
>Cham=
>=E2=80=99s=20
>office that he told me of a particular operation. He told me  whether I 
>am=20
>interested in the operation. I did not understand what he  meant at that 
>tim=
>e. And=20
>then I did not take him seriously. As time goes  on, anytime I go   into 
>his=
>=20
>office he explains to me so many  things. And to get me actually involve  
>in=
>to=20
>this thing. He did not  tell me at that time that it was an overthrow of 
>a=20
>government. He only  told me about an operation.=E2=80=9D  =20
>However, the the former Gaf PRO Darboe recalled: =E2=80=9COne day  I asked 
>h=
>im what=20
>he means by this operation. He said look you have been in  the army for a 
>lo=
>ng=20
>time. You know very well that you are above an average  officer but you 
>have=
>=20
>not been promoted. Your juniors have been promoted  over you. You have 
>been=20
>left out. And you should find out why you are left  out. And I said you 
>are=20=
>the=20
>one who should tell me exactly what happened,  because I do not know. He 
>sai=
>d=20
>that=E2=80=99s what am trying to tell you that you  are left out not 
>because=
>  you are a=20
>sub-standard officer. It is because you  are not in the good book of the=20
>Commander-in-chief. I said if that is so I  am yet to have knowledge  
>about=20=
>it. I=20
>told him that am not somebody  who have done anything wrong that I do 
>not=20
>deserve such promotion. He said  but you can see for yourself. All your 
>juni=
>ors=20
>have been promoted over you  and you are here. You cannot have the 
>privilege=
>  that=20
>they are enjoying.  And you are compelled to compliment them. These were 
>his=
>=20
>words that he  used to tell me every time, anytime.=E2=80=9D
>Noting that it was after sometime  later that he used to reflect over 
>what=20
>Col Cham told him, Capt Darboe  confirmed: =E2=80=9CI also reflected on it 
>w=
>hen one of=20
>my junior officers who has  now been promoted, confronted me and said that 
>w=
>hy=20
>I did not compliment  him. It pains me so much on that very day. But I 
>took=20=
>it=20
>in good faith,  because I know that one day my turn will come.=E2=80=9D=20
>According to him, it was until on Monday that Col Cham  reminded him 
>about=20
>the particular operation, saying it will =E2=80=9Ccommence  tomorrow, at 
>2:0=
>0 a m. I=20
>said but how? He said you don=E2=80=99t have to worry,  because so many 
>peop=
>le are=20
>involve in this. I have made a lot of contacts.  And many officers were 
>invo=
>lved it.=20
>He told me you don=E2=80=99t have to worry. I  said I have to know those 
>who=
>  are=20
>involved.=E2=80=9D=20
>=E2=80=9CHe told  me about Capt Wassa Camara, Capt Yahya  Darboe, Lt. 
>Famara=
>  Jammeh,=20
>RSM Bah, Capt Seckan, Fanding Sanyang. All  these are officers he spoke to 
>m=
>e=20
>about.  I cannot recollect all  their names. He told me that  these are=20
>officers I=E2=80=99ve already  contacted and everything is moving on the 
>gro=
>und. And for=20
>you, your role  is just to make public statement after when the whole 
>thing=20=
>is=20
>successful.  That=E2=80=99s what he told me,=E2=80=9D he explained.  =20
>According to him, Col Cham confirmed to him that the  =E2=80=9Ctroops in 
>Far=
>afenni=20
>are already informed. It was on Tuesday before he  left for the NSC 
>meeting.=
>  He=20
>told me to call one Cpl Mbye Gaye. I didn=E2=80=99t  know that Mbye Gaye 
>was=
>   at the=20
>headquarters.  I was informed  about Mbye Gaye=E2=80=99s presence at the 
>hea=
>dquarters=20
>by one W.O.2 Gibba. What he  told me was that Mbye was supposed to be 
>posted=
>  at=20
>the state guard as one  of the outrider.  He said the OC for supply and=20
>transport has  informed him so that I can talk to my seniors not to post 
>Mby=
>e at=20
>the  outrider because he was the only clerk for him at that place. I asked 
>h=
>im =20
>where is Mbye, he said, Mbye came with me and he is with me downstairs. He 
>=20
>said W.O.2 Janha said you call him. So, I called Janha and I informed him  
>t=
>hat=20
>Mbye Gaye has been transferred to State Guard. He said the admin.  
>officer=20
>told him that Mbye should report to the headquarters and that he  was 
>posted=
>  to=20
>State Guard. And I asked whether  any posting have been  issued, he said 
>no.=
>  =20
>Then I replied you should not have allowed the  person to leave his  post 
>wh=
>en=20
>the posting order was not issued. Then  he said I will tell Gibba to tell 
>hi=
>m=20
>to come back.=E2=80=9D  =20
>He added: =E2=80=9CI went to the C.D.S Office and then I asked  him 
>whether=20=
>he is=20
>aware of any posting of Mybe Gaye to State Guard. He  asked me where is 
>he.=20=
>He=20
>told me to call Mbye. I went downstairs and send  somebody to call Mbye. I 
>w=
>ent=20
>with Mbye to the office.  He told Mbye  =E2=80=9CSuma Mbokahga=E2=80=9D 
>(rel=
>ative) in Wolof.=20
>He told Mbye =E2=80=9CDehnyo liffin waagee=E2=80=9D  (overthrow) in Wolof. 
>A=
>nd that I=20
>presumed it was the president. Then I  left the office and went to collect 
>t=
>he key,=20
>because I have to close his  office for him. When I came back he told me I 
>a=
>m=20
>going to the N.S.C  (National Security Council) meeting. So you can brief 
>Mb=
>ye.=20
>So I hinted  Mbye about the overthrow and Mbye told me he was not 
>interested=
>.=20
>He told  me so many things.  So I told him I cannot take any decision 
>about=20=
>=20
>this.You have to wait until the C.D.S come and discussed with him further. 
>=20=
>He=20
>said I cannot wait because am not feeling well.  It was after when  the 
>C.D.=
>S=20
>returned that I talk to him what Mbye have told me. Then he  asked for 
>Mbye=
>=E2=80=99s=20
>number. So, I have to call Yundum to get Mbye mobile  number.  So the 
>C.D.S=20
>spoke to Mbye in my presence and that I heard  him saying that Mbye should 
>m=
>eet=20
>him at his house in Bakau at 5:00. Soon  after he spoke to Mbye he told me 
>I=
>=20
>am leaving. Then he left the office  and I locked the office and  handed 
>ove=
>r=20
>the keys.=E2=80=9D=20
>Capt Daboe then disclosed: =E2=80=9CI received a call from a  private 
>number=
>  and then=20
>the person told me you better watch out, we=E2=80=99ve  been informed that 
>t=
>here are=20
>some officers who are having a meeting at  your residence. I told the 
>person=
>=20
>no. But am just informing you to watch  out. So when the person rang off, 
>I=20
>call the C.D.S. I told him that am  hearing something.  And it seems as if 
>I=
>  am=20
>the one masterminding  this thing and I am not.  And he told me you are 
>just=
>=20
>jittery and  that everything is under control. I told him this is 
>something=20=
>that=E2=80=99
>s  moved me because I have just been informed that officers are conducting 
>=20
>meeting at my place and that did not really happen. There is no meeting at 
>=20=
>my=20
>place. As a result, it seems somebody is framing. Then he told me you  
>are=20
>talking too much.  =20
>I asked him how the operation was going to be conducted,  he told me 
>your=20
>role is just to make a statement after it was  successful.  He told me I 
>int=
>ended=20
>to give envelopes to officers who  are concerned on the ground. And  the=20
>envelopes contain some tasks  for officers who are concerned on the 
>ground.=20=
>  When=20
>they open the  envelopes they will know exactly what they are supposed to 
>do=
>. =20
>   According to him, the operation will be carried out at 11.00  instead  
>of=20
>2:00.  He gave me the preamble of what needs to be said.  And  he told me 
>to=
>=20
>make a draft.  In the first draft I made, he said, the  power be handed 
>over=
>  to=20
>the interim government in 48 hours.  That was  the first thing he said.  
>But=
>=20
>he later changed it 10 days.=E2=80=9D =20
>=E2=80=9CFellow Gambians, The Gambia Armed Forces has taken over  the 
>countr=
>y from=20
>the regime of President Yahya A.J.J Jammeh.  The  Gambia under Yahya 
>Jammeh=20=
>has=20
>witnessed social and economic  degradation.  The cost of living for 
>average=20
>Gambians has reached an  alarming proportion.=20
>The Gambia Armed Forces has felt that under the present  political=20
>dispensation, there cannot be no other alternative but to  salvage The 
>Gambi=
>a from=20
>further degradation.  =20
>The high command of The Gambia Armed Forces have decided  that the power 
>be=20
>handed over to an interim government within 10 days from  today.  The 
>interi=
>m=20
>government shall be responsible for running the  affairs of the state.=E2=
>=80=9D=20
>=E2=80=9CThe writing is mine. My specific role was to make a  statement 
>that=
>  was all.=20
>On that very Tuesday, he called me to his office  and informed me that 
>he=20
>would want me to inform Cap. Seckan, Cap. Jah, Lt.  M.A Bah where they 
>are=20
>supposed to be posted. He told me to inform M.A Bah  that he was supposed 
>to=
>  be at=20
>the Fajara barracks. He also asked me to  inform Cap. Jah that he was 
>suppos=
>ed=20
>to be at the headquarters.  And  then he informed me to tell Cap. Seckan 
>tha=
>t=20
>he is supposed to be at the  Fajara barracks.  I called them and informed 
>th=
>em=20
>about the  developments. They all acknowledged the message,=E2=80=9D Bunja 
>s=
>aid.=20
>According to Capt Darboe, the coup was something he had  never thought 
>of=20
>this in his military career, and then said: =E2=80=9CIt is just  that I 
>have=
>  work with=20
>somebody who bear this idea and I was working with  him directly. There 
>was=20=
>no=20
>gap between him and I. We were seeing each  other everyday. And in a 
>similar=
>=20
>contest, I was like his confidential  secretary. So I know a lot about 
>him,=20=
>and=20
>he also knows a lot about me.  And because of that he was the one who 
>actual=
>ly=20
>made me to believe that  this can be done. So I would just have to 
>apologise=
>=20
>to the President.=E2=80=9D=20
>He confirmed that he has not been =E2=80=9Cmalhandled during the  period 
>of=20=
>the=20
>interrogation.=E2=80=9D=20
>To be  continued
>
>
>=20
>
>=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4=A4
>To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L 
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