Kudos Ebou,
That was a well described and calculated piece again.
I can't wait to see the next segment.
Hey,Just out of curiosity,what was your RANK at the army prior to your
departure.
Thanks meen!!!
Ous.


>From: ebou colly <[log in to unmask]>
>Reply-To: The Gambia and related-issues mailing list
><[log in to unmask]>
>To: [log in to unmask]
>Subject: COUP IN GAMBIA SIX
>Date: Sun, 3 Jun 2001 19:05:14 -0700
>
>   COUP IN GAMBIA SIX
>Well Saul, I am going to open the sixth segment of my
>narrative with a brief discussion aimed at
>enlightening your interesting friend who made that
>remark about Ndow Njie's command and its
>"Banjulian"-favored legacy.
>But before all that I would like to add the names of
>two GNA officers that I left out in my last issue
>where I tabulated the names, ranks and positions of
>all the officers on active duty at the time of the
>coup. Captain P. Sanneh and Lieutenant F. Joof were
>serving as contingent commander, ECOMOG, Liberia and
>AHQ officer respectively. I missed them altogether,
>which I sincerely apologize for, especially to the
>officers.
>Coming back to our man Saul, because you called him a
>friend, I would also attempt to treat him as a friend,
>but as a very dangerous one indeed. I am however glad
>that he was talking to you, a person who has
>transcended that primitive mentality where Africans or
>Gambians are easily manipulated into believing that
>our differences, in nothing other than the languages
>we speak, should be a cause for irrationality enmity.
>These are the dangerous cynics found in the continent
>fueling crisis among brothers, friends, families and
>all kinds of good-willed groups.
>  Unfortunately however, Gambians like our friend are
>usually played down as mere bigots with serious
>limitations; nonetheless, their occasional remarks,
>uttered here and there especially in the company of
>their weak-minded targets often cause devastating harm
>to social harmony. And we don't need to fool
>ourselves, there are many Gambians like him who think,
>talk, see and feel the world purely from such
>retrogressive senses. I am even surprised that our
>friend did not say it in the exact way I have heard
>his kinds talked about this so-called Ndow Njie-bias
>syndrome. But there is no doubt in my mind that our
>friend was speaking from the same deplorable premise
>that Ndow Njie's administration was only in favor of
>Wollofs to the detriment of other ethnic groups in the
>GNA. Yes, when Banjulians are mentioned in this
>context it is usually the Wollofs under scrutiny. And
>most of the time these critics don't give concrete
>evidences or they usually overlook the facts or worst,
>are too dogmatic to make an objective analysis of
>their dangerous thoughts. These are people for
>instance who would hear someone's last name being
>called Jobe, Njie, Ceesay or Touray and dogmatically
>conclude that the person belonged to a particular
>ethnic group or another, not prepared to understand
>that these family names are found in most major ethnic
>groups. But the most dangerous ones are those who
>consciously use these baseless stigmata for their
>selfish interest, be it economic, political, religious
>or social.
>In the case of our friend, I believe he was
>politically attempting to feel your soft spot. If you
>had fallen for his cheap stuff, I bet the next time
>you hear from him he would be telling you that he does
>not like the UDP party because it is a Mandinka party
>bent on reviving the Mandinka empire destroyed by
>Jammeh. You ask him how or why, and he would say
>nothing to substantiate his statement.
>But refer him to Yaya's pathetic leadership profile
>and he would swear to you that he does not necessarily
>support him only that he doesn't like Ousainou Darbo,
>Sidia Jatta or Hamat Bah. Mere deception and
>dishonesty! Anyway, next time when you run into people
>like this, my advice is that regardless of how
>convincing they may sound about not being Yaya
>sympathizers just try to remind them all those
>ethnic-bias actions of Yaya's government and challenge
>them to bring anything close in similarity to it. In
>the past. Remind them how Yaya's government introduced
>the prejudicial policy of harassing, arresting and
>deporting Northern Senegalese from The Gambia while
>those from Southern Senegal/Cassamance are registered
>and allocated with Gambian I.D.Cards.  Was that a
>lesser crime than that of Ndow Njie's? I don't think
>so. These are the APRC hidden supporters appearing in
>different colors and modes but too timid or sneaky to
>face the world in their true selves.
>Last week I ran into two of them at the Gambian hall
>in the Bronx where Mr. Ousainou Dardo and Mr. Halifa
>Sallah had been speaking about the political situation
>at home. I was amazed to see these two guys pretending
>to be Mr. Sallah's sympathizers when in reality they
>were far from that. I don't remember how I first met
>them last year, but for a while we were close. We used
>to call each other regularly and even had visited each
>other's apartments. Then one day a woman named Absa
>called me from their apartment. She said she was
>working for the NIA at state house but had decided to
>visit America and wanted to seize the opportunity to
>desert and seek political asylum here. She asked for
>my help in the form of writing a testimonial for her
>for the INS. Her reason for leaving, she said, was
>that she was afraid for her personal security in the
>wake of the next presidential election. She was afraid
>there would be serious political trouble that could be
>dangerous to those of them working too close to the
>president.
>One of the gentlemen said that the lady was his
>sister.
>They came to my apartment next. Without doubt I could
>recognize her face as one of Yaya's aides. She was
>fond of wearing white veil. I think she was a born
>again Muslim. Anyway I did not know that she was
>called Absa and had never spoken to her before.
>I told her the implications of the process of seeking
>for asylum-the need to justify her fears of being
>persecuted if she should go back to The Gambia and the
>advantage of getting an immigration lawyer to do the
>process for her. She agreed to all my proposals, but
>that was it. The next thing I was told was that she
>had taken employment at a restaurant. If it was true I
>am sure she must have been illegally employed. Anyway
>I kept on monitoring her with my friends at a safe
>distance.
>Then a month or so later, Yaya came to America. It was
>that last visit he made here when the NY Gambian
>movement gave him the hell he deserved. During that
>period however, I was able to get some inside
>information about the activities of this Absa with the
>Yaya entourage. It was confirmed to me that she was
>always with them, sometimes accompanied by her
>brothers. I was most of the time their subject of
>discussion and the members of the movement who were
>behind the embarrassing demonstration against Yaya. So
>at one point, James Kujabi even assured them that I
>was marked for execution the moment I stepped my foot
>in The Gambia.
>Anyway these were the two old friends I saw at the
>meeting cheering Mr. Halifa Sallah especially when the
>PDOI spokesman said anything that seemed to challenge
>Mr. Darbo's position.
>I think it was the panel moderator Mr. Saul Mbenga who
>raised the critical subject of the much desired
>opposition coalition to hear the opinion of Mr. Darbo
>and Mr. Sallah. According to Mr. Darbo who first
>responded, he had seen no problem about it and that he
>strongly believed that the three parties coming
>together would give them a better chance of winning
>Yaya. Mr. Sallah also expressed his positive hopes in
>a united front but went on to argue that it is
>normally explored in the second rounds of presidential
>elections. He quoted Senegal and Ghana as typical
>examples.
>  Mr. Darbo however observed that given their limited
>resources at this moment when a first round funding
>was still inadequate it would not be too easy to
>finance two rounds anyway. Mr. Darbo explained that
>together, they could mobilize all their resources and
>their followers to defeat the APRC.
>Then Mr. Sallah questioned the criteria of choosing
>the leader.
>Here I saw my two friends cheering with fanatical
>enthusiasm.
>Mr. Darbo replied by saying that the parties could
>discuss the question of who should be the leader after
>agreeing to come together.
>The audience gave a round of applause.
>That's when Mr. Sallah came up with the big one. As I
>heard it, the PDOI party believes in a
>state-controlled economic system or socialism, which
>is in total conflict with what, the other parties
>believe in. He even quoted a statement he said was
>said by Mr. Hamat Bah about his party's commitment to
>capitalism.
>My friends cheered again.
>I felt hopeless.
>When Mr. Darbo took the floor, he also made it clear
>that his party honestly believes in private-sector
>oriented economic system.
>That made the whole issue a difference in fundamental
>principles. To me, perhaps the UDP might be able to
>make it with the NRP, but as for the PDOI party, I
>could not see how it would be possible even in a
>second round situation. Socialism and Capitalism in
>their pure form don't mix. It's like mixing
>combustible gas with pure oxygen.
>I think it would be good for interested Gambians to
>try and purchase the video clip of that meeting to get
>the first hand picture of what transpired. It is also
>of great importance for us to discuss this matter
>especially the fund-raising activities and how the
>various parties should benefit from it if they cannot
>come together.
>Anyway Saul I don't want us to lose track of our
>theme.  What I was saying was that the APRC
>sympathizers have to be watched. Most of them could
>sense that Yaya's government has no future so they
>take the clandestine path, which allows them the
>periodical latitude to even condemn Yaya if the heat
>is too much on them.
>To conclude this discussion on NdowNjie's critics I
>want to refer everybody to the role of the British
>Army Training Team (BATT) in the army. I don't know
>how people tend to forget that it was BATT that was
>contracted by the government to establish the GNA in
>1984, and that until 1992 when the Nigerians took over
>that responsibility from them, they were still calling
>the shots. But when things started falling apart,
>everybody decided to trivialize the role of the
>"toubabs" and heaped the blame on Ndow Njie.
>The British could have put the proper standards in
>place, especially in the officer corps. Everyone was
>aware of their presence and how the Gambians depended
>on them to build the army with little or no Senegalese
>interference. It would be another long story to talk
>about the BATT. But their role was as much critical.
>Have you ever heard about Colonel Jim Shaw the last
>BATT commander?
>Let me now answer Dampha's last questions. About
>whether there was any confrontation between the GNA
>soldiers and the TSG guards at Denton Bridge when the
>former were crossing, that's a big no. After Chongan
>left for Banjul, Captain Swareh took charge. He
>quietly allowed them to cross without any squabble.
>There was no problem whatsoever. Dampha also wanted to
>know how Yaya did in that GNA officers' test conducted
>by the Nigerians. He was sill at the TSG then. He
>transferred over to the GNA after.
>Yundun Barracks was my last stop. We arrived there
>between 3:00pm to 400:pm. The camp showed the evidence
>of how disorganized the coup was in nature. In a
>well-organized military operation, the norm is to have
>your rear-operation base fully equipped and manned to
>coordinate the efforts of those in the front line. I
>thought I was going to find some officers in control
>of the camp giving out the necessary orders and the
>logistic supplies. Nothing close to that existed at
>the barracks.
>The first things that drew my attention were the
>officers locked up in the soldier's cells. Major Davis
>the number two man in the battalion, Lt. S. Gomez, the
>adjutant and Lt. O Mbye were all in the cells. I went
>to speak to them. I did not see Major Davis whom I
>understood was sitting on the floor, but I spoke to
>both lieutenants.
>Lt. O. Mbye could not understand why he was singled
>out among all the platoon commanders that morning and
>arrested and thrown in the cells.
>As for the adjutant Lt. S. Gomez, he told me his
>harrowing confrontation with 2Lt Singhateh that
>morning to get him surrender the keys of the armory.
>Singhateh had almost killed him with a shot he fired
>very close to him.
>  As the adjutant he was always entrusted with the safe
>keeping of the weapon-store keys. However, according
>to the lieutenant, the keys were in the safe in his
>office. He told Singhateh where they were but he would
>not believe him. He tore apart his brief case and
>fired a shot from his rifle after forcing him to kneel
>on the ground. He was then ordered into the cell,
>Mr. Gomez could not understand why. The two
>lieutenants asked me to see whether I could get
>someone to let them out of the cells and at least
>allow them to stay in the officers mess.
>I went into the camp toward the main admin office.
>There was a lot of commotion at the soldier's
>television hall. I found out that it was full of
>arrested TSG guards. Lt. Dibba was one of them. I
>spoke to him briefly to find out who brought them
>there but he could not explain anything.
>In the adjutant's office however I was a bit relieved
>to find Captain M. Badjie and Lt. B. Barrow. Despite
>being the only officers in the barracks, it did not
>take me long to know that they were not in control of
>anything. But they did not want to say so. They could
>not tell me why there were three officers in the
>soldier's cells, or why they could not be released
>immediately since there was no problem in the coup
>operation. I thought they could be out to help
>stabilize the situation better. Moreover, I discussed
>with them the urgent need to start planning what to
>tell the Gambian people, since the government had been
>overthrown. It was apparent that the longer the
>situation remained uncertain, the more likely it was
>for troublemakers to exploit it. It was therefore
>important to at least make a radio announcement
>explaining what had happened and to assure the
>population that everything was under control. Every
>one of them agreed about the urgency of the moment and
>the danger of a protracted silence. But as for the
>officers in the cells they finally told me to try and
>see Sergeant Major Ebrima Bah. He was said to be at
>the "B" or "C" Company office. On my way out of the
>office, I noticed two civilians in the adjacent
>office. It was the office of Major Davis. They were
>the permanent secretary ministry of defense Mr. B Jack
>and Mr. Kebba Ceesay director general NSS. Both were
>arrested and brought to the camp. They asked me to
>help them to go home to their families. I told them
>that I was not part of the coup and had nothing to do
>with their arrest but that I was going to see the
>person said to be responsible. They did not seem to
>believe that I was not part of the conspiracy.
>I met the sergeant major and he complimented me
>accordingly but would not cooperate with me on the
>issue of releasing the arrested officers and two
>civilians. He said he could not release anyone unless
>he was given orders from the right persons. He would
>not tell me who the right persons were either.
>I went back to the cells and explained to the officers
>the problem I was facing to obtain their release. I
>promised them that I would keep on trying.
>It was outside that building where I met Sergeant
>Major Gibril Saye. When I asked him what happened, he
>cleared himself of any involvement in the mutiny. He
>told me how he resisted it until he was locked up in
>the cells too. But when they realized that they could
>not assemble the heavy weapons without him, they later
>brought him out and begged him to cooperate. It was
>the same Saye who was later commissioned as lieutenant
>and murdered.
>I went back to the main office and explained to Mr.
>Jack and Mr. Ceesay what happened. They were
>devastated.
>Surprisingly, when I returned to the adjutant's office
>Captain Sonko and Lieutenant Barrow had left Banjul.
>Captain Badjie was alone in the office.
>I asked him how I could get a weapon. He called one of
>the NCOs to get me one from the armory. He brought me
>one AK47 rifle and two magazines full of ammo. It was
>really reassuring to be armed. I could not tell what
>was going to happen, but the air of trouble was
>looming thick in the atmosphere.
>It was not long when a corporal came to tell us that
>all officers were required to report to the state
>house for a general meeting. The corporal had a stolen
>van and certainly had no driver's license. But he
>drove us to the state house.
>On the way at around Westfield Clinic, we heard the
>first radio announcement made by Lt. Barrow and Capt.
>Sonko at Radio 1 F.M. On the whole that was where they
>had gone to after they left us at Yundum.
>We also found Sabally and Haidara mounting a
>checkpoint by the JIMPEX junction. He stopped our
>vehicle and began to ask stupid questions. We told him
>that we were told to report to the state house. He was
>noticeably hyperactive and incoherent. After stopping
>two or three more vehicles driven by over excited
>soldiers he finally told us to go.
>The state house was chaotic. Soldiers were driving in
>and out of the place in different kinds of vehicles,
>most of them seized from their owners or government
>departments. There was no speed limit. Some of the
>soldiers were carrying officer's ranks as high as
>lieutenants.
>The first officer we met when we walked into the main
>building where the meeting was scheduled to take place
>was 2Lt. Singhateh. He spoke to me in an upset tone
>about why I told them that the Americans had planned
>to intervene when it was not so. He said he asked
>Major McClain but the American defense attaché denied
>any involvement of US troops.
>I asked him what the fuss was all about when their
>objective was achieved without any complication. He
>mumbled some words in anger and walked away.
>By 6:00pm, most of the officers in large numbers, GNA
>and TSG arrived at the state house. The meeting room
>was a fairly wide space on the ground level of the
>state house building.
>To name a few of those present we had Major Malick
>Njie (Doctor), Major Antouman Saho, Major Sheriff Mbye
>(TSG), Captain Mamat Cham, Captain Ndure (TSG) Captain
>S. Sarr, Captain M. Sonko, Captain M. Badjie, Lt. Yaya
>Jammeh, 2Lt. Singhateh, Lieutenant Barrow, 2lt Bajinka
>(TSG) and many more officers. The hall was almost
>full.
>Yaya and Singhateh were sitting beside each other
>facing the crowd. It seemed like we were waiting for
>Sabally and Haidara to arrive. For a while everyone
>was just sitting quietly waiting to hear from the
>first speaker. Then suddenly Yaya got up on his feet
>drawing everyone's attention. However to everybody's
>surprise and shock, he started using abusive language
>swearing to all of us to know that that it was not a
>monkey-work-baboon- eat thing. He swore that they were
>not going to allow any "bastard to come and enjoy this
>with us when they had not played any part in the
>struggle."
>He was on his feet for almost five minutes virtually
>insulting everyone, repeating the same phrase of "not
>a monkey work baboon eat thing."
>I could not take it after a while. I challenged him
>for his rudeness and told him to spare us his
>primitive ideas and tell us what we could do in that
>volatile confusion. I asked him what he had specially
>done after all to claim this so-called big victory
>when by all indication, the TSG that was supposed to
>resist made it so easy for them. It was clear that
>they both played equal roles in bring it to a peaceful
>end. So all we expected of them was to tell us what
>they had planned next and not some monkey and baboon
>story.
>After I was arrested the police CID wanted to build a
>case against me from that confrontation with Yaya. A
>senior police officer Jatta Baldeh asked me at the
>board reviewing the case of the detainees why I was
>rude to the chairman of the council at the state house
>on the 22nd July. It was simple to answer. I told him
>that at time he was nothing. There was no chairman
>until two days later.
>Anyway we all had our rifles in hand fully loaded,
>cocked and saved.
>At that point, Singhateh got up and held Yaya back
>while Majors Njie and Saho held me back too.
>"Listen to me gentlemen to tell you the background of
>this coup", said Singhateh after talking Yaya to sit
>down.
>He told us that the coup was originally organized by
>five of them: he, Lieutenant Barrow, 2Lt. Kanteh, 2Lt.
>Kinteh and 2Lt. Sabally. "Lieutenant Jammeh was not
>even part of it", he went on.
>"But we were betrayed by Barrow, Kinteh and Kinteh',
>he said.
>I looked at Barrow where he was sitting beside Capt.
>Sonko, but he was well composed and very quiet.
>Singhateh explained further how the two of them alone,
>he and Sabally, pursued the course to the end and that
>it was in the last days when they invited in Jammeh
>and Haidara.
>Yaya said nothing.
>In conclusion, Singhateh said that he even did not
>think that a meeting about what they should do next
>should be held in the absence of Sabally and Haidara.
>Major Saho turned around to me and said, "you heard
>that my brother? It is clear that the show belongs to
>the young officers, so we should allow them to finish
>their business."
>That statement froze all my spirit into a brick of
>ice.
>Lt. B. Barrow was the next to speak. He accepted being
>part of those who planned the coup in the beginning
>but disagreed with the statement that he betrayed the
>group. He said he was just not too comfortable with
>the timing.
>He however appealed to Singhateh to please let Capt.
>Mamat Cham and myself stay around to help forge ahead
>because of our experience and knowledge. It was
>endorsed by all.
>Just before the officers dispersed, Sabally arrived
>threatening to start a fight for having a meeting in
>his absence. He was yelling and screaming asking why
>there was a meeting in his absence.
>I think it was Singhateh who finally calmed him down.
>Before going home to see my family and change into a
>proper outfit for the operation, I had a brief meeting
>with Capt. Cham. In the end we decided that we were
>not going to fool ourselves. We did not have any idea
>about coups or what to do after. So we decided that
>General Dada who was still at his official residence
>angry with the government should be consulted to
>advice us.
>Anyway, I spent the night at the state house with all
>the monkeys and baboons.
>The following day, Sabally and Haidara started the
>wave of arrests and detention of officers. No reason
>was given for the madness.
>Till next time!
>
>Ebou Colly
>
>
>
>
>
>__________________________________________________
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