GAMBIA-L Archives

The Gambia and Related Issues Mailing List

GAMBIA-L@LISTSERV.ICORS.ORG

Options: Use Forum View

Use Monospaced Font
Show Text Part by Default
Show All Mail Headers

Message: [<< First] [< Prev] [Next >] [Last >>]
Topic: [<< First] [< Prev] [Next >] [Last >>]
Author: [<< First] [< Prev] [Next >] [Last >>]

Print Reply
Subject:
From:
saul khan <[log in to unmask]>
Reply To:
The Gambia and related-issues mailing list <[log in to unmask]>
Date:
Tue, 7 Dec 1999 01:26:20 GMT
Content-Type:
text/plain
Parts/Attachments:
text/plain (521 lines)
Mr. Ceesay,

Thanks for this overview. It puts things in perspective. I do have a few
comments/observations though.
Your figures on poverty do not seem to add up: 64% under the poverty line,
40% under the FOOD poverty line; 20% dismally poor (inability to afford
2.7Kcal of food/day)? You may want to review the % breakdown.

The pop growth figures are alarming. And this is one area where we can all
help. Everyone needs to advice his/her brother(s)/sister(s) about being
responsible when it comes to having children. Most of the people popping up
babies all over the place in Gambia are of our generation. They need to be
told to exercise SELF CONTROL. We can't blame Yaya Jammeh for this one. So
Each one, Teach one. If you have economic strings that would make them
listen to you, pull them. That's what I've been doing. No apologies to Imam
Fatty's supporters there.

It seems the most promising sector remains telecoms. Gamtel remains
seriously under-utilized. We need to urge the govt to expand phone services
to all parts of the country, and even approach the Senegalese govt to allow
Gamtel access to regions of Senegal where Sonatel can't serve.

Just some thoughts.

Peace.

Saul.

>From: ebrima ceesay <[log in to unmask]>
>Reply-To: The Gambia and related-issues mailing list
><[log in to unmask]>
>To: [log in to unmask]
>Subject: Assessing Jammeh's 5 years in Office (Part 1)
>Date: Mon, 6 Dec 1999 03:50:22 PST
>
>Gambia L,
>
>
>On July 22, 1994, the unexpected happened in the Gambia. On that day, a
>group of junior officers of the Gambia National Army overthrew the 30 year
>old PPP government of Sir Dawda Jawara.
>
>A lieutenant, named Yahya Jammeh, who led the take over, explained that the
>coup had been necessitated by the "widespread corruption that was rampant
>under Jawara's leadership."
>
>The young coup leader made it abundantly clear that he had come to "get rid
>of corruption" and replace it with "a government that would be accountable,
>transparent, progressive and democratic."
>
>But the then lieutenant did not stop at that. He also promised a government
>that would be committed to combating poverty, reducing unemployment,
>improving agriculture, as well as upgrading the Gambia's inefficient health
>care system.
>
>Consequently, as we are about to enter the new millennium, but more
>importantly, having regard to the fact that Mr Jammeh has now had a little
>over 5 years in public office, I find it imperative, as a concerned
>Gambian,
>to assess his performance at the helm so far.
>
>To this end, I'll assess Jammeh's performance - from the time of the coup
>to
>now - against the backdrop of his well pronounced mission and goals, most
>of
>which have been already cited above.
>
>Three fundamental questions now arise: Have the living conditions of the
>majority of Gambians improved significantly since the coup? Has Jammeh
>adhered to his many pledges?  Does the future for the Gambia look bright or
>bleak, as long as Jammeh is at the helm?
>
>In order to try and answer these vital questions, I would be looking at
>sectors such as health, education, women's affair, tourism, agriculture,
>the
>economy, human rights, population, agriculture, the press, foreign policy,
>judiciary, etc to see HOW they have performed/fared under Jammeh.
>
>In my view, looking at the performances of all these vital sectors would
>give us some pointers as to whether or not, overall, the majority of
>Gambians are better off today than before. I'll start by looking at the
>performance of the Gambian economy between 1998 and 1999.
>
>                     THE ECONOMY (1998 and 1999)
>
>A useful source for assessing the performance of the economy for this
>period
>is the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) Policy Framework
>Paper
>1999-2001, released just last month, November 1999. The Policy Frame Work
>Paper was prepared by the Gambian Government in cooperation with
>International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank staffs.
>
>According to the policy paper, the "overall economic performance under  the
>first annual ESAF arrangement (1998) was mixed."
>
>There was "significant progress", but there were also some "set backs".
>Positively, according to the paper, inflation had fallen from 2.8 per cent
>in 1997 to 1.1 per cent in 1998, while overall GDP growth had risen from
>2.7
>per cent in 1996/97 to 4 3/4 per cent in 1998.
>
>However, while these have been achieved, the overall deficit (excluding
>grants) for 1998 was 4.5 per cent of GDP, above the targeted 4 per cent.
>
>Total government revenue also declined to 18 per cent of GDP and was below
>the program target. The policy paper blames this decline on a "short fall
>in
>import tax revenue".
>
>In order to finance the deficit, according to the policy paper, the
>government had greater recourse to domestic financing, thereby contributing
>to further increases in domestic interest payments to 21 per cent of total
>government revenue in 1998.
>
>Consequently, "total government domestic debt increased to 26 per cent of
>GDP from 23.5 per cent in 1997", according to the paper. Also, towards the
>end of 1998, there was a scarcity of foreign currencies within the
>commercial banks, because their net foreign assets had decreased.
>
>Furthermore, at the end of December 1998, the Gambia's total outstanding
>public debt had amounted to US $439.2 million, or 105.7 per cent of GDP,
>according to the ESAF paper.
>
>Take note that this staggering figure does exclude, or not include, the
>Gambia's private and commercial debts, whose figures are not known. Let us
>also not forget that at the end of December 1997, the Gambia's outstanding
>external debt was US $421.9 million. This means that just within a year,
>the
>external debt had increased by US $18 million if my Maths is correct.
>
>Debt owed to multilateral creditors represented approximately 80 per cent
>of
>the total stock of outstanding debt, including about 3.2 per cent to the
>IMF
>and 3.8 per cent to the World Bank.
>
>Debt owed to official bilateral creditors accounted for almost 19 per cent
>of the total outstanding, including about 8 per cent to Taiwan and less
>than
>5 per cent to Paris Club creditors.
>
>According to the policy paper, the projected debt service is estimated at
>US
>$16.6 million in 1999, including US $5.6 million in interest. Therefore,
>the
>debt service obligations in 1999 represent "about 7.2 per cent of exports
>of
>goods and non factors services."
>
>Be reminded that in 1998, the total external debt service had amounted to
>US
>$20.8 million. In fact, given the hugeness of the Gambia's external debt,
>the Gambia will now "keep seeking grants  and loans on concessional terms."
>
>Also, the government will no longer contract or guarantee any "new
>non-concessional external loans (that is loans not entailing a grant
>component of at least 35 per cent)."
>
>So, while people are commending Jammeh for the significant strides made in
>developing the Gambia's infrastructure, we shouldn't lose sight of the fact
>these developments have been achieved at a heavy costs, for we can now see
>how the Gambia's debts, both domestic and external, have drastically
>increased, since Jammeh seized power.
>
>                           POVERTY
>
>Let me now talk about poverty, so that it would be clear to you that the
>living conditions of the majority of Gambians have remained unchanged,
>despite the rhetoric.
>
>For your information, demographic and socio-economics indicators on the
>Gambia can be obtained from a number of sources, including UNDP Human
>Developments Reports, Data sheets from the Department of Central Statistics
>of the Gambia, World Development Reports and World Health Reports.
>
>To start with, let me inform you that the Gambia's GNP per capita income is
>US $350, while the developing countries, on average, have a GNP per capita
>income of US $987.
>
>Now, about 64 per cent of the Gambian population presently live under the
>poverty line, while 40 per cent are reported to be under the food poverty
>line, meaning that this 40 per cent under the food poverty line cannot
>afford to buy or eat 2700 calories day, which can fill a very small basket.
>But this is not all.
>
>Another 20 per cent of our population is considered to be "extremely poor."
>Furthermore, as I write this piece, 50 per cent of the public are said to
>lack access to safe drinking water.
>
>                          HEALTH
>
>While the government boasts about the fact that it has built another
>hospital in Farafenni, a lot remains to be achieved in this sector. The
>Gambia's health indicators are very, very low, to say the least. In fact,
>they are among the lowest in Africa.
>
>The infant mortality rate remains high: 92 deaths per 1000 live births
>compared to 68 per 1000 for the developing countries. Take note that the
>figures for infant mortality rate are different from those for child
>mortality rate which are 181 deaths per 1000. The child mortality for
>developing countries, on average, is 91 deaths per 1000 live births.
>
>With regard to maternal mortality rate, the figure for the Gambia is 1050
>per 100,000, while the figure for the developing counties, on average, is
>480 per 100,000. The life expectancy at birth in the Gambia is 48 years;
>however, 34 per cent is likely to die before reaching 40 years. The average
>life expectancy for Africa is 52 years.
>
>Also, 12 per cent of children under 5 in the Gambia are reported to be
>"malnourished". In fact, malnutrition is widespread. We are also told by
>various indicators on Gambia that 56 per cent of births are not attended by
>qualified personnel.
>
>                      EDUCATION
>
>Although, the Gambia has set up a university, for the first in Gambian
>history, and built more schools under Jammeh than Jawara, the education
>sector still leaves a lot to be desired. Yes, more schools have been built,
>but the student-teacher ratios are low, according to the policy paper.
>
>Furthermore, inadequate resources are spent on instructional materials,
>meaning that there are not sufficient teaching materials and furniture for
>these newly-built schools. Meanwhile, the illiteracy rate is still 61 per
>cent as opposed to the African average of 44 per cent.
>
>In 1997, the primary school enrolment figures for our country were 77.7 per
>cent, as compared to 100 per cent for all developing countries. In fact,
>secondary enrolments in the Gambia are very low at 15.1 per cent compared
>to
>35 per cent for the rest of Africa.
>
>Another constraint to the country's education sector is the serious
>shortage
>of technical man power and professionals. It is reported that about 60 per
>cent of the trained teachers in Gambia are non-Gambians.
>
>                       POPULATION
>
>The rate at which the population of the Gambia is growing is a cause for
>concern not only to Gambians, but also to the country's development
>partners. In fact, the policy paper makes it loud and clear that "the high
>rate of population growth and low level of family planning are serious
>factors hindering the Gambia's socio-economic development."
>
>The current population growth, according to the policy paper, is estimated
>at about 4.2 per cent. The total fertility rate has also remained high. The
>fertility rate is 6 births per one woman. In fact, the figure is even
>higher
>for rural women which stands at 7.2 births per woman. By the way, as of
>1995, the dependency rate in the Gambia was 92 per cent of the economically
>active population.
>
>                        WOMEN ISSUES
>
>This is also another area where a lot remains to be achieved. While the
>Gambia can boast about having appointed a female vice president and three
>other cabinet ministers, the majority of Gambian women still face a number
>of constraints.
>
>Although, as I write this piece, the government is trying to formulate a
>gender policy which will integrate the recommendations of the Beijing
>conference, the plight of the majority of the women remains unchanged.
>
>In fact, if the government is genuinely committed to women's empowerment
>and
>development, then why is it taking the Jammeh regime all these years and
>NOT
>formulating a gender policy to integrate the recommendations of the Beijing
>conference on women.
>
>Gambia L, remember that the Beijing conference was held in September 1995,
>over 4 years ago!! Ndey Jobarteh, your views on this delay would be
>appreciated by your brother.
>
>In any case, women in the Gambia, who make up 50 per cent of the
>population,
>continue to carry a heavy burden of work. But women in rural Gambia bear
>much of the brunt.
>
>Apart from being entirely responsible for household maintenance and family
>credit, they also represent about 30 to 50 per cent of the agricultural
>labour force. About 40 per cent of the total agricultural production is
>actually produced by rural women.
>
>At peak times in the agricultural season, despite the change, women in
>rural
>Gambia continue to work 15 hours per day processing and preparing food,
>among others things. Needless to mention that all their tasks are performed
>in the traditional way.
>
>For example, they still have to walk long distance to collect water and
>fuel
>wood and also to reach farms and markets. The female illiteracy rate also
>remains high. In fact, only 25 per cent of the female population is
>literate
>in one language.
>
>In a Division like Upper River, about 99 per cent of women of 20 years is
>illiterate. There are still cultural beliefs that favour boy education and
>see girl education as unnecessary. The drop out rates are higher for girls
>than boys.
>
>Having regard to all these contraints, it is clear that this sector also
>needs to be given the priority it deserves. The standard of living for
>rural
>women must be improved if the government is truly committed to women's
>empowerment and development.
>
>Access to income, land, market and capital will certainly ensure that
>economic advancement of our women can take place, while the availability of
>safe water, sanitation, health care and education are key ingredients of
>social reformation.
>
>                         TOURISM
>
>The Gambia's tourist industry suffered "severe set backs" in 1994/95, after
>the British government and other European countries had issued a travel
>advice, warning their citizens against travelling to the Gambia, in the
>wake
>of the 11 November 1994 alleged coup attempt.
>
>However, the sector is said to be picking up, although it is fair to say
>that not much progress has been registered. By the way, the tourism sector
>contributes significantly to GDP, accounting for an estimated 10 per cent
>of
>GDP per annum which is an average annual foreign exchange receipt of about
>US $42 million US dollars.
>
>The sector is also said to provide employment opportunities for around
>8,000
>Gambians. However, after the travel advice was issued, the number of
>tourists visiting the Gambia plummeted by 52 per cent from 89,997 in
>1993/94
>to 43,317 in 1994/95. The number of tourists that visited the Gambia in
>1996/97 was 82,540, an increase of 14.6 per cent over the 1994/95.
>
>But in spite of this increment, the industry still faces a number of
>constraints. Apart from lack of diversification of sources and products of
>tourism, the large number of tourists who visit Gambia nowadays are "low
>spending tourists".
>
>In fact, in 1996/97, there was a decline in the out-of-pocket expenditure
>per tourist. This means that apart from what they spent in paying for
>boarding and lodging, most of the tourists didn't spend extra, or anything
>at all, outside their hotels.
>
>So even though, the number of tourists has increased considerably in
>1996/97, the total of out-of-pocket expenditure during this period was
>estimated at D327.78 million dalasis compared with D346.4 million dalasis
>in
>1994/95.
>
>This decline represents a 5.4 per cent drop. The decline in the number of
>tourists not spending much money while holidaying in the Gambia is blamed
>on
>the fact that most the these tourists are "returners", who no longer need
>to
>spend a lot on buying souvenirs and gifts.
>
>               AGRICULTURE & NATURAL RESOURCES
>
>Due to good rains and favourable weather conditions, the Gambia's
>agricultural sector is reported to have seen slight improvements. The
>ground
>nut crop, in particular, was said to have increased by 7 per cent to about
>84,000 tons in 1998/99.
>
>However, while crop production was remarkable, there was over 50 per cent
>decline in the contribution of the fisheries sub sector.
>
>Consequently, the agricultural sector's total contribution to GDP showed no
>difference: 21 per cent in 1998 compared to 21.7 per cent in 1997.
>
>The agricultural sector is now third foreign exchange earner for the
>Gambia,
>employing about 75 per cent of the economically active and, as mention
>before, contributing more than 20 per cent of the GDP annually.
>
>This sector is said to generate 85 per cent of the national export
>earnings,
>while providing about two-thirds of total household incomes.
>
>By the way, the re-export trade is the largest foreign exchange earner for
>the Gambia, representing 27 per cent of GDP in 1998. The tourism industry
>is
>the second largest foreign exchange earner for the Gambian economy.
>
>The Gambia is also faced with an environmental problem. Given the rapid
>expansion of urban population at 6.21 per cent per year, as well as lack of
>the necessary infrastructure, the country is confronted with serious
>environmental health problems.
>
>By the way, the Gambia is reported to be one of 10 countries in the world
>most vulnerable to rising sea levels. In fact, the rising sea level and the
>sand mining have already started degrading the coastal areas. Also, the
>salt
>water intrusion can now be felt in ground water and half way up to the
>length of River Gambia.
>
>            TELECOMMUNICATIONS, ENERGY & TRANSPORT
>
>The Gambia's telecommunications system is said to be very efficient and was
>ranked 8th in the world in terms of call completion rate. GAMTEL presently
>has capacity for over 220 international circuits, but this capacity,
>according to Gamtel, should be expanded to 750 in the medium to long term.
>
>With regard to the transport sector - the seaport, airport, roads and
>waterways network - its contribution to GDP had averaged 8.7 per cent up to
>1994.
>
>As for energy, no one on this list needs to be told that the supply of
>electricity in the Gambia is still erratic, perhaps even worse than before.
>There is load shedding still going on in the country, even as I write this
>piece. By the way, energy cost in the Gambia is among the highest in the
>region.
>
>The available capacity at Kotu Power station is now 25.3 MW and a reserve
>capacity of 3.5 MW, compared to a peak load demand of 21.8 MW. I'll stop
>here till next time.
>
>By the grace of god, and if time permits me, in part 2 of this write up, I
>intend to look at how human rights, the press, Foreign policy judiciary,
>among others, have also fared under Jammeh. This would be followed,
>hopefully, by some concluding remarks on what, in my view, the future holds
>for Gambia in the new millennium.
>
>Let me also inform some of you who do not know that the government is
>presently involved in legal tussle with ALIMENTA, a Swiss Company, over the
>seizure by the government of its property, which property is the processing
>plant of the Gambia Ground nut Corporation (GGC).
>
>GGC was owned by ALIMENTA, but in January 1999, the government seized the
>GGC processing plant, because it was not satisfied with the role of the
>company in the ground nut sector and also the difficult negotiations on the
>producer for the 1998/99 crop season.
>
>Consequently, in July 1999, ALIMENTA filed for arbitration with the
>International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes. Ironically, in
>August 1999, the government also filed charges against the GGC and its
>directors in the Banjul Magistrate Courts.
>
>However, because of the Government's decision to seize the GGC, the IMF did
>not allow the mid term review of the ESAF program to be completed. No
>wonder
>then that the government had to initiate discussions with ALIMENTA in order
>"to resolve the problem in a mutually agreeable manner."
>
>In concluding part one, I'll argue that even assuming that all the
>macroeconomic objectives set out for 1998/99 were achieved, or even
>accepting the theory that the Gambian economy is "on a sound footing",
>there
>is ample evidence that the majority of Gambians have not seen any
>significant improvements in living standards since the coup.
>
>Meanwhile, just consider, or ponder over, these realities:
>
>* About 64 per cent of the Gambian population live under the poverty line,
>while 40 per cent live under the food poverty line. 20 per cent are
>considered "extremely poor."
>
>* Illiteracy is still high: 61 per cent compared to the African average of
>44 per cent.
>
>* 12 per cent of the children under five are malnourished, and 50 per cent
>of the entire population lack access to safe drinking water.
>
>* The population growth rate is very, very high: 4.2 per cent; and the
>fertility rate is also high, 6 births per woman. Also 56 per cent of births
>are not attended by qualified personnel. And at the peripheral level, about
>27 per cent of health facilities are reported to be unmanned.
>
>* The Gambia's per capita income is US $350, while, on average, the per
>capita income for developing countries is US $987
>
>* Infant mortality is 92 deaths per 1000 lives, while the maternal
>mortality
>estimated in 1996 was 1050 per 100,000. The African average maternal
>mortality is 638 deaths per 100,000.
>
>* Child mortality rate is 181 per 1000 compared to African average of 107
>per 1000.
>
>* Gambia's total outstanding public debt amounted to US $439.2 million at
>the end of December 1998, or 105.7 per cent of GDP. At the end of December
>1997, external public debt was US $ 421.9 million. So just within a year,
>the external increased by US $18 million.
>
>* I do not have the figure for the Government's domestic debt, but it is
>equivalent to 26 per cent of GDP, according to the policy paper.
>
>Ebrima Ceesay,
>Birmingham, UK.
>
>PS: D.A Jawo, Could you please make three print out of this piece, if
>possible, and give them to The Point and The Independence newspapers, as
>well as Sheriff Bojang of The Observer, for publication in the Gambia. This
>is an era of information dessimination.
>
>By the way, do send my regards to my former boss, Cherno Jallow.
>
>______________________________________________________
>Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com
>
>----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L
>Web interface at: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/gambia-l.html
>
>----------------------------------------------------------------------------

______________________________________________________
Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L
Web interface at: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/gambia-l.html

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

ATOM RSS1 RSS2