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----- Original Message ----- 
From: Sophia Anyomokolo 
To: [log in to unmask] 
Sent: Friday, November 14, 2003 12:12 AM
Subject: Re: Museveni's full statement: Kony, Otti must surrender by December


Museveni:

"Nevertheless, there is no other way you will break the terrorist gangs except by relentlessly following them in that high grass wilderness (amahamba, eddungu) and hitting them; and, then, permanently occupying of those forests or deserted areas by zonal forces." 

Bakiga tribe finally have a permanent home, a piece of land they can call their own. Acholis have been skillfully displaced so that the homeless Bakiga tribe can occupy the land that they, the acholi people, have 'deserted'. Museveni is joking.  Nigerians say Nawao... 



Anyomokolo









There will never be another Anyomokolo (I married trouble!). AN will not be the same again.
A big thank you!
An Eileen Phoebe Ocaya. 

 
>From: "Chris Opoka-Okumu" 
>To: 
>Subject: Museveni's full statement: Kony, Otti must surrender by December 
>Date: Thu, 13 Nov 2003 17:07:47 -0500 
> 
> 
> 
>Kony, Otti must surrender by December, says Museveni 
>By Yoweri K. Museveni 
>Nov 14, 2003 - Monitor 
> 
> Last June the criminal terrorists of [the Lord's Resistance Army rebel leader Joseph] Kony en tered Soroti-Katakwi area. Those who are always dreaming of the downfall of the NRM government predicted that the situation was worsening. 
> 
> 
> Battle vehicles such as this Mamba, seen in operations in Gulu sometime back, are part of the equipment the military needs to end the Kony war (File photo). 
> Kony proclaimed his intention to proceed to Kumi, Mbale and Kaberamaido. They, indeed, launched an attack on Soroti town, which was promptly repulsed by the 21st Battalion that had just arrived in that area from the west of the country. 
> 
> The Kony criminality, apart from the external sponsorship, has been encouraged by a tiny criminal clique of opportunists among the political class. 
> 
> When Kony was defeated in the Kit valley and the Imatong mountains (both in southern Sudan) last year, he wanted to give up the useless struggle. It was the criminal elements among the political class who encouraged/ advised him to spread the terrorism to Lango, Adjumani and, later, Teso. 
> 
> They sent him [Mr James] Opoka (a former Reform Agenda activist) and promised him to open another front against Uganda through Ituri in Congo. Kony, being illiterate and criminal, got encouraged to continue his killings. 
> 
> Otherwise, there were clear signs that Kony wanted to stop his criminality after the defeat in the Imatong hills last May. 
> 
> Added to this was the undermining of our security by the donors who decreed, against all logic, that we could not spend more than 2 percent of GDP on Defence in spite of living in the midst of such turbulence in this region of Africa. 
> 
> Then there were other weaknesses within the Army; but all springing from the under-spending on Defence. 
> 
> All notwithstanding, on account of the fact that I closely follow what goes on, I told the country that Kony and those who side with him against the popular will of the people of Uganda and do so in such a criminal manner that has no precedent in the world, will be defeated. 
> 
> We forced the donors to accept a modest increment in Defence expenditure. 
> 
> Unfortunately, the equipment acquired by the additional money only arrived last May when the dry season was ending. 
> 
> Even then the equipment did not come with the necessary accessories, including munitions. This is why Uganda will have to manufacture some of the vital munitions so that we are no longer blackmailed by events outside our country. 
> 
> When Kony spread his terrorism to Teso region, I told the country that that was suicidal for him to do. That we would use the more open countryside of Teso to decimate his groups, the bottlenecks in the Army notwithstanding. We shifted elements of the 2nd Division from the west and enhanced the Teso region with security. The Teso region had had no troops at all by June last. 
> 
> Above all, the Teso people, encouraged by patriotic leaders in that area, led by Minister [of State for Health Mike] Mukula and [Kasese RDC] Moses Ecweru, rose up against the criminal, idiotic gangs of Kony. 
> 
> Although all the youth were demanding arms, we discouraged them and only armed 7,000 (the Arrow groups). In a short time, the Teso region had a large number of fighters (Uganda Peoples Defence Forces regular and Arrow groups). 
> 
> Earlier on, in the anti-Kony campaign, I had told our commanders and the public that we should imitate the threshing of millet (kuhuura, dino kal). When you are threshing millet in the village, you concentrate on the central heaps. 
> 
> As much as possible, you should not allow yourself to be distracted by the millet that scatters away from the central heap because of threshing. In Luganda we have got a better word for the millet that escapes from the threshing. It is called empulunguse. 
> 
> That should not distract you from concentrating the blows of the threshing club (ekihuuzo) on the central heap of the millet. 
> 
> The only difficulty here is the fact that those mpulunguse (the millet that scatters when you are threshing) are small groups of two or three that go to the villages to kill people in the scattered homesteads that is the pattern of our settlements in rural Uganda. 
> 
> That is why the people run from the villages to the Internally Displaced Persons camps (IDPC), always creating a pathetic humanitarian situation. 
> 
> Simultaneous with this humanitarian situation you get demands from the political leaders to scatter the Army in order to protect the people against these mass killers. 
> At the same time, the UPDF is normally blamed by the public for not responding quickly. 
> 
> Yet the Army will only break the terrorism when they concentrate on the gangs where the terrorist ringleaders are i.e. where Kony, Otti and Tabuley are so that they do not rest or, even better, we kill them. 
> 
> Doing this in the very tall grass of northern Uganda, not to mention crossing the swamps, is a tedious job for the Army. Yet when the population flees from the countryside, the grass grows even taller. The going for the Army is tougher. 
> 
> Nevertheless, there is no other way you will break the terrorist gangs except by relentlessly following them in that high grass wilderness (amahamba, eddungu) and hitting them; and, then, permanently occupying of those forests or deserted areas by zonal forces. 
> 
> The best examples in the Lango-Acholi areas are: the Zambia swamps, Opok forest, Wicheri, Atto hills, Tel te, Latwela, Latanya hills, Aswa Ranch, Bolo, Koyo Lalogi, Omunyole area, Le Pan Game Reserve and Otuke hills. 
> 
> Therefore, as you dino kal (threshing or clubbing) the main groups where the terrorist leaders are, you must also permanently occupy the deserted wilderness. 
> 
> Other two tasks are imposed on the Army: to guard the IDPCs and to escort food convoys for relief. The bandits try to starve the people by attacking relief vehicles. 
> 
> Nevertheless, as I told you in my previous missives on this subject, the primary work of the UPDF is to dino kal (club-thresh) the groups in which the bandit leaders are and, inevitably, we scatter, wound or kill them. 
> 
> In the last five years, we have either killed or expedited the dying/killing of the following Kony terrorist leaders: Otti Lagony, whom we first injured near Pabo; and, then, later attacked Jabelain, 39 miles from Juba, where we killed 700 Kony fighters that had been sent by the Sudan Army to dislodge us from the position we had captured in the offensive of 1997. 
> 
> In that fight we killed Lagira, who had kidnapped the Aboke girls. Otti Lagony himself was not killed that time. 
> 
> However, the demonstration of UPDF might convinced Lagony that the Kony terror had no future. 
> 
> A difference between him and Kony developed about the way forward; and Kony organised the killing of Lagony. Lagony was the No.2 to Kony in their criminal organisation. 
> 
> Okello Matata died early this year because of Aids exacerbated by our relentless pursuit of him, southwest of Amuru, near the River Nile. Beba Beba had been killed earlier by the UPDF. 
> 
> Therefore, by June last, when the Kony gangster criminals entered Teso, the top criminals were: Kony (still hiding in Sudan), Vincent Otti and Tabuley. The most active, however, have been Otti and Tabuley. We wounded Otti last year near Tel te. 
> He, however, recovered from the injuries. He has since survived narrowly several times. On October 29, near Anyara, we killed Tabuley, the one responsible for numerous crimes including the castrating of three men near Soroti recently. 
> 
> Tabuley was number No.3 in the Kony group; but the most active. We are now working hard to kill Kony and Otti and we shall kill them. The commanders are well briefed. 
> It is not enough to scatter bandits. They must be annihilated so that our people live in peace hereafter. The wages of sin is death. 
> 
> Apart from Tabuley and those killed earlier, we have killed the following Kony gang leaders since we launched Operation Iron Fist in May last year: Tabuley, Lumumba, Okello Trigger, Orak Madaka, Ojok, Lamoko Okello, Omona, Omalkol, Ojara, Ojok Peter, Kitara, Olum Tadeo, Olum Pa-alit, Kalele, Okot, Okot Ogek, Oyat, Opio, Oling Nakufa, Omal, Ojok Kampala, Luwum Janan, Obwol, Odokanyero, Kilala, Obol, Okello Ogwe, Alifa Fadul, George Lugwo, Patric Ojok, Vincent Nyero, Martin Ojara, Ojara Karambiti, Oruba, Okello, Bongoman Akena, Lububu Ochara, Wol, Anek, Oyuru, Ochan Abidigu, Jinalo Onen, Okot and Komakech. All these are what the Kony gangs call commanders of one level or another. 
> 
> There are three gang leaders that were previously abducted: Nyeko, Abu Dema and Lukwiya Raska. Although they have committed atrocities in the past, I have not included them in the list of the ringleaders because they were originally abducted themselves. 
> 
> They should now distance themselves from crimes as we continue to hunt the two remaining ringleaders: Kony and Otti. If they do not, we shall target them specifically. 
> 
> As for Kony and Otti, they have only up to December to benefit from the Amnesty Law. After that time, we shall issue an international Warrant of Arrest and we shall hunt them to the end. 
> 
> With the anti-terrorist operations, you normally get a lot of "experts". However, our experience convinces us that our counter-insurgency doctrine is correct. 
> 
> Now that we are solving somewhat the problem of under-equipment, we shall end this terrorism. 
> 
> In fact, we have since long ago, defeated the main means of the bandits. 
> 
> These bandits had significant external backing including portable surface-to-air-missiles (Igla II); hollow-charge anti-tank guns such as SPG-9 (Big RPG) RPG-7B and B-10; 12.7mm anti-aircraft guns; and a lot of mines (anti-tank and anti-personnel). 
> 
> You all can see how these can be dangerously used in Iraq. Hundreds of American soldiers and thousands of Iraqi civilians have been killed by the anti-coalition fighters. 
> 
> Yet Iraq is, mainly, a desert with little vegetation cover except near the irrigated parts of the rivers Tigris and Euphrates. 
> 
> Helicopters have been shot down and a lot of lightly armoured vehicles (HUMVEES) and other Infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) have been destroyed. UPDF has acquired long experience in dealing with these weapons. That is why we are finally defeating the terrorism. 
> 
> We always ensure that we create such tactical situations that the terrorists cannot use these weapons against us or do so at their own peril. We do not always succeed but the successes have been many more than the failures. 
> 
> The incursion into Teso has come with disastrous results for the Kony gangs. 
> 
> We are now hunting them wherever they go. There is greater presence of the Army in the whole of the Acholi area. We are working harder to strengthen the Amuka groups in Lango. 
> 
> The Kony gangs have two options: either to do what I told them to do last year in my August speech in Gulu or to perish like their colleagues, including Tabuley, have done in recent times. 
> 
> In my August speech, I told them to assemble at any point, mutually agreed, near the Sudan border so that neutral parties can talk to them about their future and also give them relief. That is what will save them. 
> 
> The writer is the President of the Republic of Uganda. 
> 
> 
> 
>© 2003 The Monitor Publications 
> 
> 
> 
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