COLLY:

Once again, very many thanks for another brilliant piece. Your stories are
more than just names World-wide, for you are setting the records straight,
and more importantly, you are piecing together for us the  pivotal role each
and every officer played in the coup. The significance of these stories
cannot be determined in volumes, but their eminence and validity should be
absolutely paramount in the eyes of DEFENSE EXPERTS, NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISERS and INTELLIGENT AGENTS in the country. Colly, you are NOT only
educating and informing us about what really happened, but also
significantly highlighting the FUNDAMENTAL ILLS that ruptured the entire
COMMAND STRUCTURE of the GNA. In addition, you have depicted the fundamental
causes of instability that befell our beautiful country for the past seven
years. Considering the present changing security environment prevailing in
our country, the emergence of your stories is a clear signal for the next
leader of our country to take a closer look at the entire security
arrangements of the nation. Whether Darboe, Halifa or Bah, who ever assumes
power, his first priority MUST be to correct the security ills that befell
the country. Though, many prominent contributors like KB, SAUL have vividly
dwelled on these fundamental ills, it is once again necessary to take a
closer look at each of these ills, separately.

RUPTURED COMMAND STRUCTURE
--------------------------
The Antouman Sahos of this World are the kind of officers who caused the
systematic and gradual rupture of the very fine command structure that was
in existence since in the beginning of the young GNA. Talking to a retired
senior officer who served during the time of the British Army Training
Team(BATT) in the Gambia, Officers like Saho had imported the former Field
Force and Police cultures of "DOGODOGO" and INTEGRITY PROSTITUTION,
BOOT-LEAKING superiors for promotion, into the young Army. The culture of
DOGODOGO and Integrity prostitution had been the SOLE STANDARD for promotion
at the expense of COMPETENCE in the old Field Force and Police force. Honest
performance and excellence on the job were secondary standards gauged for
promotion. According to this senior officer I was chatting with, since most
of the senior officers were taken from both the police and Field force to
form the command structure of the very young GNA, those senior officers
transferred to the GNA, were the very people who encouraged the Sahos of
this World. Officers like Saho had bought their way to the top. Giving fuel,
fish, cola-nuts, lobbying women and in some instances even giving their
monthly salaries to superiors just for promotion. Consequently, the culture
of dogodogo and integrity prostitution became the only standard for
promoting officers, even during the time of the Nigerians officers. This
situation caused serious mistrust between the junior and senior officers up
to a point that the Army was being managed like a civilian institution. I am
told that execution of command orders from top to bottom was at all time
low, and as a result, MORALE amongst the junior officers was in bits, and
ESPIRIT-DE-CORP was just a name within the officer corp. As time went on,
however, the situation became out of control with some officers being
COURT-MARTIALED in the presence of their subordinates, whiles some officers
resigned. According to this senior officer, the Command structure became so
disoriented that Senior Officers could no longer command respect from their
juniors. Consequently, DISGRUNTLE NESS cropped up within the junior ranks,
and that was when every thing started to erupt out of control.

MILITARY IMBALANCE
------------------
Colly, as you had already re-emphasized, the next president come October
MUST vigorously deplete the vast imbalance that existed between the TSG and
the ARMY. As we have come to comprehend in your consecutive episodes of the
coup, that TSG's sheer rifles were no match for the sophisticated and
well-equipped ARMY as they matched towards the Capital to overthrow the
JAWARA government without much resistance. Even in Nigeria where coups used
to be frequent, if DODAN BARRACKS were not in for any coup or if any of the
well-equipped units were not in for any coup, that particular coup was bound
to be a failure. And the point to stress here is that there were never
existing ANTAGONISTIC UNITS in Nigeria that used to serve as units of checks
and balances of the Nigerian Army. But despite that, each individual unit
must be behind any coup in Nigeria before that coup will succeed. What I am
trying to portray here is that BALANCE OF POWER between ANTAGONISTIC forces,
NOT forces of the same units, ACT as a form of resistance or impediment to
the MAL-INTENTIONS of the each other. Therefore, it was a huge oversight on
the part of Former President Jawara's Senior Security Adviser to brush aside
the crucial significance of Balance of Power.

DECENTRALIZATION AND BALANCE OF POWER
------------------------------------
Colly, you have mentioned another very essential Defense Strategy, though
costly for the government to implement in a short-run, it will profoundly
impinge on future Balance of Power between antagonistic units of security
forces. Decentralization is only feasible when power balance between
differing units in terms of TRAINING, EQUIPMENTS and PROFESSIONALISM is
non-existent, so that each unit serves as the POLICEMAN of the other. In
most advanced countries such as the United States and England where there is
a well established military culture and a deep rooted democratic system in
place, there may be no need for such extensive decentralization of a check
and balance on units existing side by side. Unfortunately, in a culture such
as ours, where wearing even a military camouflage tends to hypnotize CLOWNS
and MORONS like JAMMEH, EDWARD, SABALLY, TOURAY, of course, we definitely
need a decentralized balanced power between units stationed in the same
locality. Therefore, your idea of decentralizing balanced power in the
BADDIBOUS would be a brilliant idea, and worth trying.

In conclusion, Colly, I must once again commend you for such a well-thought
out presentation. You are really a hero, and we are indebted to you for your
honest efforts in piecing these together. Your episodes and analyses will
always be a GUIDING LIGHT for whoever may replace the Moron. Similarly, your
analyses of Imbalance, Decentralization and the Ruptured Command Structure
in the Army will provide a succinct insight for future Defense Experts and
Security advisers. To that end, brother, this is another superb performance.

Ansumana Kujabi.




>From: ebou colly <[log in to unmask]>
>Reply-To: The Gambia and related-issues mailing list
><[log in to unmask]>
>To: [log in to unmask]
>Subject: COUP IN GAMBIA FIVE
>Date: Sun, 27 May 2001 10:15:16 -0700
>
>                                               COUP IN
>GAMBIA FIVE
>At this moment of the stock taking of the 22nd July
>debacle, I would like to furnish my readers with the
>important information of the names of the GNA officers
>on active service at the time and where the coup found
>them on that special Friday. I will also be using
>their ranks then although almost all of them have
>since risen to higher ranks except those who were one
>way or the other discharged in the initial stage.
>There were also few of the junior officers whose
>parent units or their where about that day were not in
>my records.
>In Yundum Barracks there were:
>1. Major C. Davis, Second In Command, First Infantry
>Battalion.
>2. Captain M Badjie, Company Commander "C" Company.
>3. Captain M. Sonko, Company Commander "B" Company.
>4. Captain J Johnson, AHQ
>5. Captain M. Baldeh,  AHQ
>6. Captain Dibba, Band
>7. Captain N. Cham, Engineering.
>8. Lieutenant S. Gomez, Adjutant.
>9. Lieutenant B. Barrow, M.T.
>10. Lieutenant B. Saine, Intelligence unit
>11. Lieutenant Y. Jammeh, M.P.
>12. Second Lieutenant A. Kanteh, Platoon Commander]
>13. Second Lieutenant A. Kinteh, Signals Unit.
>14. Second Lieutenant E. Singhateh, Platoon Commander.
>15. Second Lieutenant S. Haidara, Platoon Commander.
>
>In Farafenni Barracks there were:
>16 Captain Sam Gibba, Commander Second Infantry
>Battalion
>17 Captain Dennis Coker, Commander Training School.
>18. Second Lieutenant Y. Touray, Platoon Commander.
>19. Second Lieutenant S. Sabally, Platoon Commander.
>20. Captain M. Bojang, Platoon Commander Kudang Camp
>(under the Farafenni Unit)
>In the Army Headquarters Banjul there were:
>21. Major Baboucarr Jatta, AQ Branch.
>22. Captain M.Cham, G. Branch
>23 Captain Wilson, AQ Branch
>24.Lieutenant E. Cambi, AQ Branch
>25 Second Lieutenant M. Sowe, Accounts section.
>26. Second Lieutenant Y Drammeh, ADC to General Dada.
>At the State House there were:
>27.Captain S. Sarr, Staff Officer
>28.Captain M. Kassama, ADC to President Jawara.
>At the Marine Unit, there were;
>29.Major A. Saho, Commander Marine Unit
>30. Lieutenant M.B. Sarr
>31.Second Lieutenant Fofana
>32, Second Lieutenant A. Sarr
>On foreign training:
>33. Major O. Faye, USA.
>34. Captain L. Jarra, USA.
>35. Lieutenant E. Jallow, USA.
>36. Lieutenant Marong, Nigeria.
>36 Second Lieutenant P. Singhateh, USA.
>Others:
>38 Major M. Njie (Doctor), on leave. Just arrived from
>training in Nigeria.
>39. Major A. Conteh, on leave in the USA.
>40 Captain P. M. Ann, on leave, scheduled to attend a
>course in Nigeria.
>Other officers not in my records were:
>41. Second Lieutenant C. Jallow.
>42. Second Lieutenant V. Jatta
>43. Second Lieutenant S. Mendy.
>44. Second Lieutenant Masaneh Kinteh
>Over all, these were the GNA officers in active
>service at the time of the coup. However it is equally
>important to note that despite their higher ranks, the
>senior officers had literally little or no command
>power in the presence of the Nigerians. The most
>senior officers were majors. There were five: Majors
>Davis, Saho, Faye, Conteh and Jatta.
>The only senior officer who was fairly autonomous in
>his command jurisdiction was Major. Antouman Saho.
>There was no Nigerian trainer at his unit plus he
>could deal with the defense department directly
>without necessarily going through the rigid chain of
>command. Anyway we all knew how the major got and
>maintained that edge over his counterparts in the
>midst of the intolerant Nigerian "Orgas". It was no
>secret that the Marine Unit commander constantly
>supplied the Nigerian heavy weights with fish and
>liquor in abundance. Even in the short unsuccessful
>time the embattled Colonel Gwadebeh spent in The
>Gambia to take over from General Dada, Saho managed to
>shower him with the excesses of his generosity.  I
>could remember that the colonel was flown into the
>Gambia in a private jet owned by one of his friends.
>When the jet was leaving Major Saho loaded it with
>huge crates full of all kinds of fish with a strong
>pledge to the new commander of his absolute loyalty
>and support.
>That was the same way he had treated General Dada
>until he was sure that the old commander was about to
>lose the battle to stay in the country.
>And Baboucarr Jatta would say that shortly after the
>coup, to win Yaya's recognition, Major Antouman Saho
>for weeks took it as his personal responsibility of
>supplying Yaya with the best cola nuts in Banjul. Then
>one day Yaya in his snappy moods saw the sycophant
>walking into the state house with a basket full of
>fresh nuts and ordered his aides to tell him to take
>them back and never to bring him any gifts again. That
>was very typical of Yaya-very erratic.
>You see, it is hard to say but that's where the
>Nigerians sapped their own program of rectifying the
>enigmatic ills of the GNA right before our eyes. When
>General Dada was appointed, he first made a
>familiarization visit to The Gambia to make an
>appreciation of the general situation in the GNA
>especially with regards to those maladies that
>warranted his urgent appointment. He therefore visited
>Yundum Barracks where the entire administrative and
>operational organs of the army were located then under
>the supervision of the British training team. The
>general, a colonel by then, in a rather unconventional
>demeanor assembled all the GNA officers in the
>barracks for a consultation meeting. He made it
>crystal that he was out to help us in the shortest
>time possible and that he wanted to know directly from
>us what we thought was or were the problems of the
>less-than-decade-old GNA.
>The GNA was established in 1984, only eight years old.
>
>The meeting was frank and very free, something totally
>uncharacteristic of military tradition. The officers
>among other things had complained in a consensus voice
>the lack of promotion standards in the officer corps.
>In the GNA, we had told him, the ordinary soldiers
>were put through rigorous tests of all kinds in the
>form of cadre courses before they were promoted, but
>in the officer corps, the guidelines stopped at the
>ridiculous Field Force criterion of promotion by
>first-come-first-serve basis. That was to say that
>officers were not promoted based on competence or
>merit but on who first enlisted before the other. As a
>result, the army naturally started to be choked by
>what could be best termed as square pegs in round
>holes where ranks and appointments were concerned
>among the officers.
>Dada had expressed shock and dismay over how an army
>could properly function with no promotion standards in
>place for its officers, particularly during peacetime.
>He assured us that upon his assumption of office, his
>first priority would be to rectify that unmilitary
>flaw that he agreed was the root problem of the
>establishment.
>Upon his assumption of office, Dada for a while
>demonstrated signs of sticking by his promise by
>organizing a two-week training course for all the GNA
>officers. The course was tutored and monitored by all
>the five colonels and the numerous majors he brought
>along from Nigeria. At the end of the course, topics
>for analytical writing were given out to all the
>officers to test their knowledge on the subjects
>covered. We were to write about the military history
>of The Gambia and its present state with reasonable
>recommendations on how best to improve its future
>condition.
>Months later the results were out. The commander
>reassembled the officers and even awarded trophies to
>the first three officers identified as the best. Then
>the next thing we heard was that the commander sent
>the results to the ministry of defense but with an
>advice the authorities that the GNA officer corps
>could not be systematized based on the present
>competency level of its personnel, because their
>assessment showed that the relatively junior officers
>were far more competent than the ones in the upper
>echelon. And for them to put the right people in the
>right place at that time would cause a serious
>breakdown of morale among the senior officers. But
>they promised the department that given a little more
>time than the two years scheduled to finish their
>program, they should be able to groom or mentor the
>right persons from the higher ranks to eventually
>succeed them when they left. Only God knew when they
>would have completed that.
>That was where Dada's top priority on GNA-officer-
>promotion-policy ended, making the ideal room for the
>Antouman Sahos to flourish above almost everybody. It
>also bred a culture of disrespect from the lower ranks
>to the upper ones giving rise to a mutinous
>atmosphere, which finally exploded, into that
>regrettable Friday, 22nd July 1994.
>Having said that, I would want to briefly touch on two
>issues mentioned by Dampha and Kujabi.
>I could not proceed without saying a word or two over
>Dampha's true statements on how Chongan and some of us
>were relentless to avoid chaos by all means that day.
>Chongan was fully prepared to fight and die for the
>legal establishment but after considering the
>disastrous ramifications of the senseless gun fighting
>it would start in the small Gambia he decided to put
>the peace and stability of the nation beyond
>everything. He knew that the innocent families were
>there, i.e., the wives, children, parents, friends and
>also the sick the disabled and the weak. So Chongan
>gave up the battle but with the heart of a lion that
>is still proud of every action he took that day
>against those criminals. Chongan understood what
>family meant; the value of virtue was instilled in him
>from infancy; home was a treasure he cherished and
>above all he was free from that cynical disease that
>often turned humans into blood thirsty predators.
>In contrast, just like Dampha rightly said it, they
>were spineless bandits who had nothing at the time of
>moral or economic value in the nation to make them
>perceive the disaster they were bent on causing in the
>country. Nothing meant much to them.  They were
>wife-less, did not understand what family love meant,
>living in fragile homes desperately trying to pull
>through at the brink of imminent disintegration,
>destitution in the most abominable context, their
>emotions fueled with hate associated with the
>successful people they so obsessively envied-call it
>jealousy at the neighborhood of absolute madness. But
>time will teach them that the short cut to success is
>by divinity always temporary. Well, were Sabally and
>Haidara not classic testimonies to that reality? The
>imbeciles will say no.
>  And believe in me, the terror these devils had
>intended to unleash in the country would have by
>comparison reduced the Kukoi phenomenon to a child's
>play. They thought terrorizing armless humans with
>guns and bullets was heroic, too ignorant to
>understand that children as young as six could be more
>vicious or deadly when the conditions are created and
>the weapons made available to them. Their mindsets are
>more or less the same as those we today see in those
>barbarians amputating innocent armless civilians,
>women and children, in the bloody civil war in Sierra
>Leone and Liberia.
>Kujabi spoke of national defense strategy. This is
>indeed very important. Anyway I will temporarily
>shelve it until at about 2.00pm on the 22nd July in my
>story. That was about the time I got the information
>at Radio Gambia Studio that Sir Dawda had left in the
>American ship and that the PPP government had been
>finally overthrown.
>So moving with my heavily armed escort toward Radio
>Gambia was not quite a comforting feeling.  I was
>still afraid of being caught up in some form of armed
>confrontation with the TSG guards. I knew that armed
>TSG personnel always guarded Radio Gambia.  But thank
>god we found one guard there, the guard commander. He
>was alone in the guardroom half-naked trying to pick
>and choose from a variety of "jujus" crammed in a
>traveling bag. The moment he saw us he raised his
>hands up in total surrender. He pleaded with us not to
>harm him saying that all his men were mobilized that
>morning and driven to Denton Bridge to reinforce the
>defensive position of the TSG troops there.
>I asked him his name.
>"Corporal Sonko", he said.
>Another Sonko; but in the opposing end. Now think
>about how ugly it would have been. Sonkos killing
>Sonkos, Jammehs shooting at Jammehs, Jobes, Kantehs,
>Camaras Njies, and all of us with the same family
>names and in some cases from the same roots fighting
>and killing each other like Singhateh wanted it to be.
>It would have been gross.
>I told Corporal Sonko not to fear anything and
>explained to him why we were there. We only wanted
>access to the radio transmission facility to make a
>short announcement. He immediately volunteered to lead
>us into the main yard.
>As if they were monitoring us from the distance, the
>Radio Gambia staff suddenly started streaming out of
>the building in a rush to leave the place by their
>cars. Mr. Bora Mboge, a senior broadcaster was the
>only one I could recognize among the group. I spoke to
>him about what we wanted. He told us to go into the
>building where the manager could be found. Mr. Mboge
>would not stop for a second to further clarify
>anything. By their looks, they were certainly very
>worried. For a moment I had the inclination that Bora
>was merely deceiving us to get away.
>But I could not blame them. In 1981, Radio Gambia was
>a center of bitter fighting between the Senegalese
>forces and Kukoi's combatants over the control of the
>strategic spot. I think one of the well-known
>broadcasters then, Femi Jeng was killed in that coup
>attempt. Therefore to see Bora and others trying to
>run away from all forms of trouble in another coup
>problem was perfectly normal. I could have easily
>stopped them by ordering the soldiers to stop anyone
>from leaving the facility but I really did not think
>that was necessary.
>I was surprised to see that the manager inside was a
>woman who chose to stay against the majority's desire
>to leave.  She was soft-spoken and very cooperative.
>When I informed her that we were there to make an
>announcement about the on going coup, she calmly
>stated her regret for that impossibility telling us
>that their main transmission equipment at Bonto could
>not function because it was not yet fueled that
>morning. Without that machine turned on, the Bakau
>unit was rendered useless. Anyway, she gave us the
>telephone number of the man responsible for fueling
>the station every morning. He was stuck in Banjul
>without any means of coming over. It was obvious that
>the road was closed. I tried the gentleman-he was
>called Jaiteh-and he assured me that if a vehicle and
>a risk-free passage was afforded for him he would be
>pretty willing to go to Bonto and fix the problem. I
>didn't know how to do that.
>There was another gentleman working for the station
>called Jawara who was with us all the time until the
>coup operation ended. It was in the presence of this
>man that I started making phone calls to all the
>places I thought important to the crisis in hand.
>Since there was no radio communication, I turned to
>the telephone, which was tremendously helpful.
>I called the state house guardroom and first got one
>Lieutenant Sonko. He was the second in command of the
>presidential guard after Captain Bajo. Unfortunately,
>Mr. Sonko was not quite cooperative. I guess he must
>have had the notion that it was about the whole GNA
>without an exception in the whole mess. When I tried
>to coax him to restrain their fire by all means, he
>told me in an uncompromising language that they
>already had their orders to resist and if that meant
>fighting they would do it to the last man. Before I
>could tell him how disastrous fighting would be in the
>country, especially in that small Banjul, Sonko had
>slammed the phone on my ears. That was very scary.
>Now that it seemed there was going to be fighting, I
>immediately called Farafenni Barracks. Captain Sam
>Gibba was the commanding officer there. Captain Coker
>was there too but in the training school. The troops
>were actually under the command of Capt. Gibba. He was
>already briefing his men when I got him on the line.
>He had over a hundred men in his barracks and I wanted
>him to take as many of them as possible and bring then
>down to Yundum Barracks via the South Bank Highway. I
>gave him a hasty but comprehensive briefing about what
>was going on. Then I informed him about my fear of
>fighting erupting in Banjul which without doubt would
>put the lives and properties of every person in the
>urban area at the mercy of the criminals and bandits.
>The captain first gave me the flimsy excuse that his
>unit vehicle had a technical breakdown. It was indeed
>a very bad excuse in that crisis situation. I
>recommended that he tried getting a vehicle in
>Farafenni town by any means possible even if he had to
>commandeer one or two to move the troops to Yundum.
>I was hoping that in the event of any fighting we
>could create a command post in Yundum to police the
>urban area against banditry or terrorism. I told him
>how Serekunda (my hometown) could be the worst target
>for criminals. He hesitated for a while and then told
>me to leave him alone.
>"I am your senior", he went on, "so you cannot give me
>orders as if you are my superior".
>The captain went ballistics telling me that after all
>he already had been given his troops'- movement orders
>by Colonel Akoji who spoke to him from his house at
>Kotu. According to the acting commander they were
>supposed to come by the North Bank Highway and take
>the ferry to Banjul.
>I told him how bad that order was. In the event of
>fighting, the Banjul-Barra crossing would not be
>operational because no ferry operator in his right
>mind would be staying on a job there when bullets were
>flying all over the place. It was most likely that
>they would waste their time all the way to Barra just
>to realize that there was no means of crossing.  As
>for Colonel Akoji, I pleaded with the captain to
>disregard his orders because sitting at his house had
>cut him off from everything that was realistically
>happening.
>He banged the phone after telling me to butt out of
>his business.
>And guess what? The Captain with all his troops were
>stranded at Barra until the following day after the
>coup was pronounced over and successful. There was no
>ferry or boat to carry them over to Banjul. Second
>Lieutenant Yankuba Touray was one of his platoon
>commanders. He also spent the night at Barra on the
>orders of the Nigerian acting commander Colonel Akoji.
>Next, I tried Kudang Barracks where Captain Bojang was
>the commander. Although his sub- unit was under the
>command and control of Captain Sam Gibba, Bojang was
>not given any orders. When I called him, it was like
>talking to somebody who did not know what was going
>on. I told him everything I knew and recommended the
>same ideas I tried to sell to his company commander.
>He also did not have a vehicle at his post and his men
>were too few. He said he could only spare a section
>minus-nine men to be more precise. However, he agreed
>to join the first available GPTC bus with his nine
>men. He arrived on Saturday afternoon, 23rd July..
>When I called the state house again, Lieutenant L.T.
>Tamba received it this time. He was more reasonable to
>talk to than Sonko. He agreed with me about the deadly
>consequence of starting a firefight in Banjul. But
>since he was under command ha called Captain Bajo his
>boss to talk to me. It was more of a monologue. I
>spoke while he only listened. When I asked for his
>opinion, he could not tell me anything. Instead he
>told me to talk to the ADC to the president Captain M.
>L. Kassama. He was at his office, co-located to that
>of the president's.
>The ADC was a very smart officer, very reasonable and
>easy to talk to. He was interested in what was going
>on at our end. I told him my encounter with the GNA
>officers led by 2Lt. Edward Singhateh, Lt. Yaya Jammeh
>and Capt. Momodou Lamin Sonko. I also gave him an
>account of the their strength and the weapons in their
>possession. However when I warned him about the danger
>of engaging the soldiers in a fight, he echoed his
>understanding of the risk.  He then informed me that
>the authorities were trying to work out something with
>the American. He had to suddenly leave me to attend to
>the president's duties. I could hear the president's
>voice in the background.
>It was not more than ten minutes when we got the
>information that Sabally and Haidara had taken the TSG
>main barracks -Fajara Barracks- without any
>resistance. Major T. Jawneh the man succeeded by
>Captain Bajo as the commander of the presidential
>guard was in charge.
>Within the next hour or so, we received another
>information saying that the president and his family
>had left the state house to the American vessel, USS
>Lamour County and that the soldiers had taken over the
>country. It was about 2.00pm.
>This brings me back to Kujabi's point on the
>importance of strategic defense policy that was
>definitely lacking in The Gambia. It was amazing that
>between 9.00am and 2.00pm, in only five hours, a whole
>government was overthrown just like that. Defense
>policies are an annual matter. Governments that know
>what they are doing take the trouble every year of
>reviewing the security threat of their nations and
>then come up with the latest preventive programs to
>secure their nations. The programs are often designed
>to prevent rather than manage or deal with security
>problems. This is not just putting men in uniforms and
>employing them in security establishments and
>expecting them to protect the country and its people.
>That robotic idea was too colonial when the
>colonialists were treated like semi-gods, despite
>their shortcomings and all the horrible things they
>known for doing. The "toubab" was always right even if
>he had to rape our wives in broad daylight. . Beside,
>the colony was merely a temporary residence for those
>who were sent to administer them. As a result, their
>defense strategies, not particularly meant for the
>general welfare of the whole land and its people,
>turned out to be dangerously threatening to the
>post-colonial governments. I think that was and is
>still a problem in most independent African countries.
>In the Gambia for instance, the British colonialist
>did not just create the deplorable Field Force
>liabilities and left them behind in the hands of those
>who did not know what to with them, but in addition,
>they built us an administrative infrastructure that
>stood on very frangible pillars.
>To have the entire life of the nation wired to a tiny
>island like Banjul is at best a real recipe for
>national calamity.
>Banjul held all the important seats of government, not
>mentioning the home and office of the president.
>Defense strategists should have long since come up
>with correcting this security risk. It should have
>been a priority for the PPP government long time ago
>especially after Kukoi in 1981.
>My number one corrective method to this problem would
>have been a radical decentralization plan. Instead of
>focusing all our attention in Banjul and its
>surrounding, government should have concentrated in
>developing a modern city in the North Bank area. The
>climate is good there, the land spacious making it
>possible to build everything there from an airport,
>seaport to schools, hospitals, sports facilities and
>even a second state house. And it could be well
>plnned. So that instead of having the enterprising
>Badibunkas migrating to land-locked Banjul where
>scientists have predicted that the sea erosion is
>going to submerge the island in the next fifty years
>or so, they should have been encouraged to stay and
>accelerate the development progress of the new city.
>A good development plan of five to ten years on that
>side of the country would have transformed The Gambia
>into one of the safest and most successful countries
>in the sub-region. And for any mad man to overthrow
>the government he would have been faced with the
>mammoth task of taking both the North Bank and the
>other end simultaneously. I could bet that if
>president Jawara was able to find another safe
>sanctuary in the nation other than in that American
>vessel he would have preferred going there which would
>have one way or the other foil the coup on the 22nd
>July 1994. I don't think the soldiers would have even
>dreamt about coup if that were possible.
>Anyway I think we should all thank God for the
>presence of the Americans that day. If they were not
>in Banjul to provide safe passage for the president
>and his family the situation may have been much
>uglier.
>It is also imperative that the Gambian people have a
>full say in the security structure of the armed
>forces. They should know who is there, how they are
>governed what they need or what they do not; the kinds
>of weapons they have and what they use or need them
>for. They should have say on what takes place in the
>barracks and have a free but fair hand to intervene
>when the situation is showing signs of poor leadership
>or discipline problem. The unnecessary barrier between
>the civil population and the armed forces, another
>negative colonial legacy, has to be obliterated. And I
>must say this again; the government should constitute
>a defense policy reviewing board that will look into
>the latest security requirement of the nation. This
>has to be documented for accurate implementation.
>Otherwise we will continue to gamble our lives and
>properties by living the security risk of having the
>likes of Yaya and his dangerous gang surfacing on us
>at any moment. And let us not be fooled they will
>always be there and will always have those bunch of
>civilian vampires ready to help them suck the blood of
>the normal people.
>Over thirty years old government, suddenly within five
>hours or less the PPP was history. That…was definitely
>not right.
>Anyway my next move was to call my family and put
>their minds at ease. To my surprise, they told me that
>there was word going around that I was part of the
>coup organizers and that I took over Radio Gambia. It
>was all baloney. Up to that moment I was trying to
>figure out how a coup could happen like that.
>By 3.00pm. an NCO, Corporal Njie who was an
>electrician in the Yundum workshop came to the studio
>driving a pickup vehicle. He was from Fajara Barracks.
>He was too excited to tell me any sensible thing. I
>decided to join his stolen vehicle to see what was
>going on for myself.
>We started at Fajara Barracks. There was nothing much
>going on there. No officer was on the ground. I told
>the person at the fuel storeroom to send enough fuel
>to Bonto so that Radio Gambia could start operating.
>Shortly before we left for Yundum, Captain Sonko
>arrived. He was more reasonable now, joking and
>laughing in the exact way he was known to be. I later
>learnt that Edward Singhateh drove him away from state
>house. Singhateh also drove away Baboucarr Jatta
>accusing him of being a puppet to the Nigerians who
>had been using him to charge and punishes junior
>officers. Many officers said that when they started
>the wave of arrests of senior officers Jatta crossed
>the border to Cassamance where he stayed until things
>were relatively safe for him. He had always denied
>that.
>Captain Sonko joined our vehicle to Yundum Barracks.
>It was in that barracks where I started to really
>understand what happened.  We will go into that next
>week.
>On a final note let us however hope that these last
>few months left for the presidential election in The
>Gambia will be the last days of the Yaya era. With the
>help of the almighty, may the Gambian people by this
>time next year outlived this terrible government. It
>would certainly be a period when people all over will
>be looking forward to the desired rectification. We
>will be freed from fear of our doors being knocked on
>at night for a government-orchestrated abduction,
>arrest or assault.  We will no longer be afraid of
>killers smiling in our faces during the day and then
>butchering us at night.
>We will be able to take the children of Barrow, Saye,
>and the other murdered soldiers in the hand to that
>national ceremony where their fathers would be dug out
>of toilet-pits and honored with twenty-one gun salutes
>in a proper military burial with reveille played in
>the graveyard.
>We will be able to satisfy Koro Ceesay's family
>members by ensuring that the monsters that killed and
>burned the young man for no just reason are put in
>chains and punished accordingly.
>We will build that memorial structure to eternally
>remind Gambia that in the year of our Lord 2000, on
>the 10th and the 11th of April, the APRC government
>that was here murdered 14 unarmed innocent young
>Gambians and then doctored the law to get away with
>it. But they have all suffered the consequence of
>their evil deeds.
>We will ensure that innocent people like Dumo, Jaiteh
>and others incarcerated at Mile Two Prisons for
>nothing will be free to live their normal lives again.
>(I personally commend Dumo's wife for the loyal woman
>she is). The criminals will pay for their crimes of
>abusing power.
>We will once again open the doors of the country
>allowing all those on exile to go home and live their
>normal lives without fear of being disturbed or
>enslaved by the system.
>Amen!
>
>
>  Ebou Colly
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>__________________________________________________
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>
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