COLLY:
Welcome back. A week's distraction was too long, and we could not wait for
you to resume your exciting episodes. At long last, you have escaped being
drawn into dry intellectualism. Coup Seven is another master piece. We thank
you for giving us a magnificent Father's Day present , a present which is
absolutely ESSENTIAL in ENLIGHTENING every father in The Gambia, Senegal and
Guinea Bissau about the VOLATILE situation prevailing in their surroundings,
which is set on a time bomb; and when that volatile situation explodes,
these fathers could be separated from their love ones for a prolong period,
may God forbid. This is the CASSAMANCE SITUATION, a tense situation which
the Moron is playing with. I am glad that you honestly extended a warning to
Sedat Jobe not to further deepens and complicates the serious mistrust that
currently exists between the two sides. Sedat Jobe must be aware that his
boss's peace plan is not a genuine and honest one, which has further
complicated his efforts in bringing about genuine peace between the two
sides. Moron Jammeh is so bent on aiding the MFDC rebels so much so that he
could not hide his intentions, and the Senegalese are of that. And now that
his closest friend and body with whom he shared similar intentions, Ansumana
Mane, out of the equation which tremendously impeded the implementation of
his dubious intentions, the MDFC has no other reliable safe heavens to
retreat to, but The Gambian borders. Consequently, as you have already
mentioned, these rebels are escaping into the country and terming themselves
as refugees whiles in actual fact, in collaboration with the Moron, the
rebels are making the country as their permanent base. Allowing these rebels
in our country is beginning to have dangerous and far reaching Domestic and
International repercussions, which will destroy lives all the things we
rightly value as a nation.

Domestic repercussions have  already began to unfold, for instance, the
recent armed robbery on Banjul International Airport high way was a vivid
example of the danger and insecurity innocent and defenseless people will
continue to face with rebels in their midst. It is only through looting,
kidnapping, robbery, killings and raping that rebels could get what they
want. The rebels' presence in the country should be a course for concern for
every one, and more importantly, the already skyrocketing crime rate in the
country will quadrupled, making our state a complete rebel zone. This is
what the Moron wants, so that he could use the rebels to foster his dubious
agenda, ie eliminating opponents, intimidating, harassing voters, come
October. In addition, the Moron will use the rebels as agents and
facilitators of his drug smuggling scheme, which has been under scrutiny
recently. Similarly, he will register the rebels to vote, come October, and
that will be disadvantageous to the opposition. All these clearly reminds us
that there will be difficult road ahead for opposition, come October.
Therefore, this brings us back to issue of a COALITION, which has caused
brouhaha and even intensified dry intellectualism on the forum, which is
absolutely pathetic and frustrating for most people. Of course, people have
all rights to be frustrated since the leaders they hope would bring about
the restoration of democracy and hope to their beloved country cannot still
get their acts together on the issue of Coalition. Whiles some opposition
members have endorsed the idea of forming a coalition in FIRST ROUND of
voting, others have dogged their heels firmly in the mud vetoing the idea of
first round Coalition, for reason better known to themselves only. This is
further evidence that we still have dishonest intellectuals amongst our
leaders, who are pretenders in this World and whose actions are antagonistic
to their rhetoric. Considering the cloudy and dangerous circumstances
surrounding the registration of voters and election campaign itself, and
more significantly, lack of resources and fair access to National Media to
sell their messages to the people, how could the opposition parties afford
not to endorse the idea of a Coalition in the first round of voting? I am
still struggling with that perception. I think there is still time for the
opposition to re-visit the idea of forming a Coalition.

International repercussion of the Moron's REBEL DIPLOMACY in the Cassamance
conflict would come back to hunt us in not distant future. With his dubious
and dishonest intentions which he has briefed Sedat Jobe to use as a corner
stone for his rebel diplomacy between MFDC and the Senegalese, the Moron is
causing irreparable damage to the bedrock of our foreign policy and
diplomacy which were second to none in the region. Years back, despite our
size and stage of development, The Gambia's Foreign Policy used to be a
sample not only in the sub-region, but also in the continent as a whole.
Gambia's chief diplomat, then External Affairs Minster, used to be a signing
star amongst his counter parts, even during tough negotiations. But, in the
21st Century when our country's chief diplomat should have been setting
agenda of peace and economic development in the continent, is instead now
boxing himself in a tinny and volatile box. We are in big trouble.

Ansumana.



>From: ebou colly <[log in to unmask]>
>Reply-To: The Gambia and related-issues mailing list
><[log in to unmask]>
>To: [log in to unmask]
>Subject: COUP IN GAMBIA SEVEN
>Date: Sun, 17 Jun 2001 18:56:59 -0700
>
>                                                   COUP
>IN GAMBIA SEVEN
>I am going to be rather brief in this piece because of
>the tight schedule at my disposal . I was almost going
>to call of any writing this week but considering the
>last break, I thought another one could send a wrong
>signal to my keen readers.
>Anyway, I am going to start this week by giving a
>serious warning to Dr. Sidat Jobe that he is
>definitely playing with fire now in the Cassamance
>conflict.
>Cheyassin Secka, Yaya's latest victim in his double
>standard games of forcing his blind loyalists to take
>rigid positions on his behalf just to turn around and
>disassociate himself from them or even sacrifice them
>at the heat of things should have taught the foreign
>affairs secretary of state all the lessons he needs to
>about working for his boss.
>From what I understand lately, when The Gambian papers
>first reported the statement made by Dr. Jobe to the
>MFDC rebels during their meeting in the country a
>couple of weeks ago, the man quoted Yaya as being his
>president whom he was speaking on his behalf. But when
>the rebels reacted in an uncompromising manner to the
>foreign affairs secretary's statement, it seemed,
>nobody wanted to remember that Jobe clearly had told
>the rebels that it was President Jammeh and not he who
>wanted them to abandon the fighting option and take
>the political alternative.
>Yaya on the other hand whom I have repeatedly said
>would never make his position clear as to whether
>Cassamance should be totally separated from Senegal or
>not has said nothing to defend Dr. Jobe at this
>critical moment. So the whole blame now goes to Dr.
>Jobe. And it is very unlikely that he would not call
>on his deceptive boss to straighten out the records
>while the issue is still hot. Instead it could be very
>likely that Dr. Jobe would shoulder the entire
>responsibility thinking that it would soon be another
>APRC blonder of the past. Certainly this is what is
>typically expected of Yaya's cohorts who have sold
>their souls to their erratic leader in order to keep
>their jobs secured.
>However what Dr. Jobe fails to realize is that the
>Cassamance insurgency has recently taken a more
>dramatic and very dangerous turn. The rebels since the
>demise of strong man General Ansumana Manneh and their
>subsequent misfortunes with Kumba Yalla's government
>in Bissau have now moved their active operations very
>close to The Gambia's frontiers with the hope of
>getting all the support they need from Yaya's
>government. As a matter of fact with the last reported
>armed robbery carried out by the rebels in Gambian
>territory, led by one Sanyang Sanyang, one can very
>well assert now that the rebel combatants known for
>their looting spree of innocent people's properties
>are present in the country.
>One may argue that they are refugees, but that was the
>same way they were treated in Bissau during General
>Manneh's days until they almost brought that country
>at its knees.. Being in mufti and not being seen in
>possession of arms does not make such refugees
>innocent civilians as they often claim to be.  The
>rebel respects no uniform code and is termed a mere
>bandit until the UN comes to endorse him as a freedom
>fighter.
>Would the UN ever recognize them as so in Cassamance?
>I doubt it very much. There are international
>standards at the UN for the organization to make such
>endorsements, which among other things require the
>combatants' success to show a significant portion of
>occupied territory in the land being fought for, the
>presence of an administrative structure that resembles
>a viable government with schools and other serious
>institutions in full operation and, above all, their
>understanding and respect for international
>humanitarian law.
>Anyway after about two decades of fighting, the
>Senegalese forces may though be questioned in their
>ability to crush the rebellion, yet on the flip side
>of the equation there is a bigger question we mostly
>ignore. . How much of land did the rebels liberate
>from the Senegalese forces after about 20 years of
>guerilla warfare?  Of course none. This is to a large
>extent an indication of a serious failure in the
>rebellion.
>The rebels therefore are getting more and more
>desperate, frustrated by the ever tough stand taken by
>the Senegalese governments-Joof first and now Wade-
>against the separation of Northern Senegal from the
>South.
>So many people have died in the conflict both from the
>rebel's side and the government troops' side, not
>forgetting the numerous civilians dying from the nasty
>war often waged by both sides. Each side is committed
>to fight to the end. It's a serious matter of life and
>death now Dr. Jobe. And I cannot see things getting
>any better now or in the near future.
>Anyway to cut a long story short, Dr. Jobe I am
>warning you to be mindful of how far you want to go in
>this senseless conflict to cover up Yaya's back. The
>chances are if the situation turns a little more
>worse than it is now, Yaya could sacrifice you. Not in
>the way he did to Cheyassin but very likely in a more
>drastic style.  Watch out for what happened to Koro
>Ceesay.
>On another commentary, I did read Jatta defending me
>against some weird person arguing that because I had
>in the past served in The Gambia Armed forces during
>the APRC administration I was not justified to dissent
>from the system and expose it. What an interesting
>thinking! I guess this man who sounded too narrow was
>also sending a frightening message to the serving
>members of the GNA, especially those in the officer
>corps .  Most officers in the GNA however are simple
>professional soldiers having little to do with
>politics and hope to carry on with their jobs well
>after Yaya is long gone.
>They should instead be encouraged to maintain a
>neutral attitude, especially in the wake of the up
>coming elections. Hardly do the opposition forces
>discuss the fate of the armed forces in a post APRC
>government. It may not be treated as a relevant
>subject in the on going political campaign; but
>believe in me folks they should be on top of the
>priorities in any future government of the country.
>Some critics occasionally recommend the drastic
>measure of disbanding the army in particular
>forgetting that the British did the same thing to
>their forebears in 1958 to be substituted by the
>Gambia Field Force.
>I don't have much time to go into that historical
>blonder.
>Anyway for our weird friend, I would recommend that he
>reads THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH by William
>L .Shirer. Considered to be the definitive history of
>National Socialism in Germany, this monumental
>bestseller examines how Adolf Hitler nearly succeeded
>in conquering the world.
>Anyway as the picture unfolds from the birth of the
>NAZI party and Youth of Adolf Hitler to the
>disintegration of the NAZI Empire amid the rubbles of
>Berlin one could see how dissidents once loyal to the
>mad man helped genuinely to destroy the devil. As late
>as the summer of 1944 some of Hitler's most decorated
>war heroes including Field Marshal Rommel the Desert
>fox and Colonel Ribbentrop another fine soldier got
>executed for attempting to assassinate Hitler at his
>bonkers.
>Historians had agreed that that last attempt on
>Hitler's life by the German military officers was the
>greatest lost opportunity for the Germans to save
>their country and reputation from the madness that
>NAZISM brought them. But no, the monsters and
>opportunists who at the time had sold their souls to
>the devil failed to grasp the chance which led to
>almost all of them going down with Hitler to hell.
>People with conscience and have faith in god may by
>chance follow a wrong path, but sooner or later  they
>would discover the truth and  abandon the course
>without sin. I have without doubt served in the GNA
>but records could also show that my professionalism
>was never compromised.  I never abused my powers,
>neither had I carried out any unlawful orders.
>However, back to July 23rd 1994, it was the second day
>of the coup. It started with a heavy down pour of rain
>that seemed to have delayed our actions that morning.
>But no it was not only the rain. In reality the slow
>start was primarily caused by the confusion generated
>by the overwhelming military crowd in the state house
>that had no idea as to what we were suppose to do.
>Yaya was the only one we could account for his
>presence in the early morning hours. Edward Singhateh
>was also visible for a while but he soon disappeared
>with his guards.
>For a quick reminder, it would be recalled that my
>presence and that of Captain Cham's at the state house
>was as a result of Lt. Barrow's recommendation that
>the two of us should stay and help the young officers
>who seized power. Too bad that it was the last time I
>saw or spoke to Barrow. Five days later I was arrested
>and by the time I was released from jail ten months
>later Barrow was dead.
>Yaya however was quietly withdrawn under a shed in a
>role of an observer-like participant. I was very close
>to him since he confessed to me that all that
>monkey-baboon protest he regrettably made the previous
>day was directed against Captain Sonko. He told me how
>the soldiers wanted to put Captain Sonko in the
>soldiers' cells in Yundum just before their march to
>state house, but that he ordered the captain by force
>to join them.
>Anyhow, the way I saw it, Captain Sonko's role showed
>his actions equally or even more risky than all of
>them trying to down play it. But the hidden truth was
>later proven in their first moves to ensure that only
>officers of the lowest ranks took control of the
>government. This suspicious concept was further
>consolidated by the reception they gave to the
>Farafenni unit that arrived from Barra the following
>morning. Captain Sam Gibba arrived at the state house
>with his men including Yankuba Touray. The captain was
>in total guilt marked all over his face when he found
>me sitting with Yaya. He perhaps thought that I was
>among those in charge. However it was Yankuba who gave
>the report about their tedious journey under the
>directive of Colonel Akogi. He also added the part of
>his battalion commander's defiance of my
>recommendations for them to take the south bank
>instead of the north.
>Yaya immediately ordered Capt. Gibba to go back to
>Farafenni and wait there until things were settled to
>deal with his case. Yankuba was asked to stay.
>Twenty-four hours later, he was co-opted as council
>member.
>I don't still know but I believe that Yaya's quick
>decision to send Captain Sam Gibba was to save him
>from the wild arrests of officers soon started by
>Sabally and Haidara. And interestingly, with all his
>bad records in the GNA, Capt. Gibba was one of the
>very few officers who were altogether spared in the
>arrests.
>Anyway while we were thinking about how to get to
>General Dada to advice us on how or what we should do
>next, Sabally and Haidara arrived in Pajero vehicles
>armed with all sorts of weapons and overloaded with
>over-excited soldiers. As usual Sabally came down
>yelling all of threats to open fire and destroy
>everything if people were not careful of their
>activities. No one seemed to understand what the
>little man was upset about.
>Then suddenly he started screaming about the police
>officers at the police headquarters. Before we could
>say anything he had mobilized his guards and called on
>Haidara to follow him to the police headquarters where
>Chongan was found and arrested to Mile Two Central
>Prisons.
>By the time he came back, Captain Mamat Cham had
>already left to Fajara to talk to General Dada.
>The angry Nigerian commander was very cooperative. He
>advised us to first invite the religious leaders
>within Banjul and environ that same evening followed
>by the diplomatic community the next day for briefing.
>Captain Cham took up the responsibility of going to
>all the religious leaders' homes to invite them to the
>meeting at state house that evening.
>The religious leaders responded in big number that
>evening. We met them at the same room the officers had
>their first meeting the day before. The religious
>leaders though showed their appreciation of the
>consideration we showed them by inviting them first,
>still warned us to be mindful of offending innocent
>people. Betrayal was also an ungodly thing we were
>warned to watch out for. Then they offered us prayers
>and left for their dusk prayers.
>While they were leaving, a soldier came to tell me
>that Major McClain the US defense attaché was outside
>asking to talk to me. The major told me that he was
>sent by Ambassador Winters who wanted to have an
>urgent discussion with the coup leaders. I told him
>that there was no coup leader yet as far as I could
>read the situation, but if he did not care we could go
>together to find out from the young officers.
>The ambassador wanted help for two US navy personnel
>who were stranded in the Kombos and had no means of
>going back on board of the vessel which was anchored
>off stream. He wanted permission to have the vessel
>sent a small boat to the beach around the ambassador's
>residence in Bakau where the men could be picked up;
>or for them to be escorted to the Gambia Marine Unit
>base in Banjul where they could be provided with a
>means of transportation to the ship.
>Edward Singhateh rejected the former but approved the
>latter. He was definitely the one calling the shots.
>Just after Major McClain's departure, the worrisome
>report started reaching us that the Senegalese Armed
>forces had amassed their troops around our borders
>with a very likely intent of intervening like they did
>in 1981. The unexpected story put us through a long
>night of negotiation with the Senegalese Ambassador
>Muktarr Kebbeh whom for the best part of our efforts
>refused to even meet us when we went to see him at his
>residence. But we stayed there coaxing his guards
>until the ambassador  relented. After talking to us he
>clearly confessed to us that he was given a wrong
>information about what was happening. To him, he was
>given the impression that the coup organizers were
>from the lowest ranks of the army and that they were
>just going around looting people's properties and
>causing havoc to the nation. But he was now satisfied
>with us after the short meeting. He assured us that he
>would call Dakar and feed them with the correct
>situation report.
>We extended an invitation to him to come to the state
>house the next morning to meet some of the other
>officers before the scheduled meeting with the
>diplomats.
>Anyway just wait until you run into the documentary
>video Yaya made about that encounter with the
>Senegalese ambassador and how he said he conditioned
>the Senegalese forces to withdraw from our borders by
>force. It was like an infant fantasizing over some
>fairy tales.
>By the time Mr. Kebbeh arrived at the state house the
>next day, 24th July , the young officers had finally
>met, organized their council, gave it a name and chose
>a leader. I was not present at the meeting but Capt.
>Cham attended. According to the captain, the
>leadership was selected on seniority basis. Yaya the
>full lieutenant took the chairmanship; Sabally the
>most senior second lieutenant had the vice-chairman's
>position. And next it was Haidara, then Edward and
>Touray last. I think Yankuba was even higher in the
>army seniority list than Singhateh, but because the
>former was co-opted, his rights were limited.
>At that moment however Edward had also appointed
>himself minister of defense while Haidara took the
>interior ministry portfolio.
>We were not yet given any positions.
>That evening we met the diplomatic community in the
>state house. Only the Sierra Leonean ambassador spoke
>in total support of the coup, referring it to the
>situation very similar to what they had at home as
>Captain Valentine revolution. The Senegalese
>ambassador spoke too but in a manner not to betray the
>confidential consultation we had had with him.
>Mr. Andrew Winters the US ambassador did not hold back
>much about how his government will stop every kind of
>support the Gambia government was enjoying from
>Washington if the coup was not reverted. He therefore
>asked to meet the leaders of the coup in order to
>discuss a proposal he had that would bring about
>something possibly acceptable in Washington.
>After the meeting three of us met Mr. Winters and his
>political officer Mr. James Knight to hear the
>ambassador's new idea. Captain Cham, Edward Singhateh
>and myself met them.
>The ambassador first told us that he was still holding
>every report to Washington that the problem in the
>country was a coup. If he did, the US congress would
>slam the country with stiff sanctions that would be
>impossible to lift for a long time. The Gambia would
>no longer be termed an ally of the USA.
>However to prevent that, he suggested that the coup
>leaders must allow President Jawara to return under
>agreed terms that would at least allow him to share
>the powers of government with the officers in charge.
>Edward Singhateh was not happy about that, but he told
>the diplomats that the council members would look into
>it. When they left the idea was killed instantly.
>That same night, Ambassador Kebbeh provided us with
>the phone number to President Abdou Joof's palace in
>Dakar. Yaya spoke to Joof for about twenty minutes at
>about 8.00 p.m. It was a discussion conducted in the
>friendliest manner imaginable. Yaya even promised the
>Senegalese president his plan for the new government
>to put back in place the confederal solidarity that
>had existed between the two countries that "was
>destroyed by Jawara out of selfishness".
>But again, look for the documentary film of Yaya on
>this telephone issue produced by Mr. Ebou Waggeh of
>GRTS in July 1999. It was a documentary meant to tell
>his heroic deeds in the 1994 coup, but I don't think
>GRTS would ever play that junk again.
>Oh, I almost forgot about that famous telephone
>conversation between President Jawara and Edward
>Singhateh. The reason for bringing this up is to
>reinforce my assertion that it was Edward and not Yaya
>who was actually in charge. When Mr. Winters came to
>negotiate for the coup leader to talk to President
>Jawara by phone, Yaya was already selected chairman.
>He seriously thought he could go and talk to Sir
>Dawda, but was told by Edward that he, the minister of
>defense was the one to talk to the "former president".
>Knowing that Edward was not treating him with much
>respect coupled with wild Sabally becoming ever more
>too stupid and dangerous, Yaya soon began to surround
>himself with his former gendermarie colleague who were
>even close body guards to Sir Dawda. Prominent among
>them was Musa Jammeh one of his present hit men.
>Sabally by now had arrested Captain Sonko, Major
>Sheriff Mbye and Captain Ndure. No reason was given
>for their arrests and detention at Mile Two Prisons.
>The following day he arrested Captains Wilson and
>Johnson too.
>When you asked Yaya why Sabally was arresting officers
>he seemed to have had no answers to explain.
>However to get a well written speech for the chairman
>to read to the Gambian people about what the coup was
>all about, was one of our headaches that day. In the
>end we decided to contact Mr. Swaebou Conteh to help
>us. In actual fact we had wanted him to come to the
>state house and work it out with us. But when Capt.
>Cham approached him at his house he pleaded to be left
>alone out of it. Anyway with the heavily armed troops
>that escorted the captain to the journalist's house he
>was left with no choice but to scribble a draft for
>Cham. That was the ingredient of that maiden speech
>Yaya has now put on display at ARCH 22 with his name
>stamped on it as the author.
>
>Ebou Colly
>
>
>
>__________________________________________________
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