COUP IN GAMBIA SIX
Well Saul, I am going to open the sixth segment of my
narrative with a brief discussion aimed at
enlightening your interesting friend who made that
remark about Ndow Njie's command and its
"Banjulian"-favored legacy.
But before all that I would like to add the names of
two GNA officers that I left out in my last issue
where I tabulated the names, ranks and positions of
all the officers on active duty at the time of the
coup. Captain P. Sanneh and Lieutenant F. Joof were
serving as contingent commander, ECOMOG, Liberia and
AHQ officer respectively. I missed them altogether,
which I sincerely apologize for, especially to the
officers.
Coming back to our man Saul, because you called him a
friend, I would also attempt to treat him as a friend,
but as a very dangerous one indeed. I am however glad
that he was talking to you, a person who has
transcended that primitive mentality where Africans or
Gambians are easily manipulated into believing that
our differences, in nothing other than the languages
we speak, should be a cause for irrationality enmity.
These are the dangerous cynics found in the continent
fueling crisis among brothers, friends, families and
all kinds of good-willed groups.
 Unfortunately however, Gambians like our friend are
usually played down as mere bigots with serious
limitations; nonetheless, their occasional remarks,
uttered here and there especially in the company of
their weak-minded targets often cause devastating harm
to social harmony. And we don't need to fool
ourselves, there are many Gambians like him who think,
talk, see and feel the world purely from such
retrogressive senses. I am even surprised that our
friend did not say it in the exact way I have heard
his kinds talked about this so-called Ndow Njie-bias
syndrome. But there is no doubt in my mind that our
friend was speaking from the same deplorable premise
that Ndow Njie's administration was only in favor of
Wollofs to the detriment of other ethnic groups in the
GNA. Yes, when Banjulians are mentioned in this
context it is usually the Wollofs under scrutiny. And
most of the time these critics don't give concrete
evidences or they usually overlook the facts or worst,
are too dogmatic to make an objective analysis of
their dangerous thoughts. These are people for
instance who would hear someone's last name being
called Jobe, Njie, Ceesay or Touray and dogmatically
conclude that the person belonged to a particular
ethnic group or another, not prepared to understand
that these family names are found in most major ethnic
groups. But the most dangerous ones are those who
consciously use these baseless stigmata for their
selfish interest, be it economic, political, religious
or social.
In the case of our friend, I believe he was
politically attempting to feel your soft spot. If you
had fallen for his cheap stuff, I bet the next time
you hear from him he would be telling you that he does
not like the UDP party because it is a Mandinka party
bent on reviving the Mandinka empire destroyed by
Jammeh. You ask him how or why, and he would say
nothing to substantiate his statement.
But refer him to Yaya's pathetic leadership profile
and he would swear to you that he does not necessarily
support him only that he doesn't like Ousainou Darbo,
Sidia Jatta or Hamat Bah. Mere deception and
dishonesty! Anyway, next time when you run into people
like this, my advice is that regardless of how
convincing they may sound about not being Yaya
sympathizers just try to remind them all those
ethnic-bias actions of Yaya's government and challenge
them to bring anything close in similarity to it. In
the past. Remind them how Yaya's government introduced
the prejudicial policy of harassing, arresting and
deporting Northern Senegalese from The Gambia while
those from Southern Senegal/Cassamance are registered
and allocated with Gambian I.D.Cards.  Was that a
lesser crime than that of Ndow Njie's? I don't think
so. These are the APRC hidden supporters appearing in
different colors and modes but too timid or sneaky to
face the world in their true selves.
Last week I ran into two of them at the Gambian hall
in the Bronx where Mr. Ousainou Dardo and Mr. Halifa
Sallah had been speaking about the political situation
at home. I was amazed to see these two guys pretending
to be Mr. Sallah's sympathizers when in reality they
were far from that. I don't remember how I first met
them last year, but for a while we were close. We used
to call each other regularly and even had visited each
other's apartments. Then one day a woman named Absa
called me from their apartment. She said she was
working for the NIA at state house but had decided to
visit America and wanted to seize the opportunity to
desert and seek political asylum here. She asked for
my help in the form of writing a testimonial for her
for the INS. Her reason for leaving, she said, was
that she was afraid for her personal security in the
wake of the next presidential election. She was afraid
there would be serious political trouble that could be
dangerous to those of them working too close to the
president.
One of the gentlemen said that the lady was his
sister.
They came to my apartment next. Without doubt I could
recognize her face as one of Yaya's aides. She was
fond of wearing white veil. I think she was a born
again Muslim. Anyway I did not know that she was
called Absa and had never spoken to her before.
I told her the implications of the process of seeking
for asylum-the need to justify her fears of being
persecuted if she should go back to The Gambia and the
advantage of getting an immigration lawyer to do the
process for her. She agreed to all my proposals, but
that was it. The next thing I was told was that she
had taken employment at a restaurant. If it was true I
am sure she must have been illegally employed. Anyway
I kept on monitoring her with my friends at a safe
distance.
Then a month or so later, Yaya came to America. It was
that last visit he made here when the NY Gambian
movement gave him the hell he deserved. During that
period however, I was able to get some inside
information about the activities of this Absa with the
Yaya entourage. It was confirmed to me that she was
always with them, sometimes accompanied by her
brothers. I was most of the time their subject of
discussion and the members of the movement who were
behind the embarrassing demonstration against Yaya. So
at one point, James Kujabi even assured them that I
was marked for execution the moment I stepped my foot
in The Gambia.
Anyway these were the two old friends I saw at the
meeting cheering Mr. Halifa Sallah especially when the
PDOI spokesman said anything that seemed to challenge
Mr. Darbo's position.
I think it was the panel moderator Mr. Saul Mbenga who
raised the critical subject of the much desired
opposition coalition to hear the opinion of Mr. Darbo
and Mr. Sallah. According to Mr. Darbo who first
responded, he had seen no problem about it and that he
strongly believed that the three parties coming
together would give them a better chance of winning
Yaya. Mr. Sallah also expressed his positive hopes in
a united front but went on to argue that it is
normally explored in the second rounds of presidential
elections. He quoted Senegal and Ghana as typical
examples.
 Mr. Darbo however observed that given their limited
resources at this moment when a first round funding
was still inadequate it would not be too easy to
finance two rounds anyway. Mr. Darbo explained that
together, they could mobilize all their resources and
their followers to defeat the APRC.
Then Mr. Sallah questioned the criteria of choosing
the leader.
Here I saw my two friends cheering with fanatical
enthusiasm.
Mr. Darbo replied by saying that the parties could
discuss the question of who should be the leader after
agreeing to come together.
The audience gave a round of applause.
That's when Mr. Sallah came up with the big one. As I
heard it, the PDOI party believes in a
state-controlled economic system or socialism, which
is in total conflict with what, the other parties
believe in. He even quoted a statement he said was
said by Mr. Hamat Bah about his party's commitment to
capitalism.
My friends cheered again.
I felt hopeless.
When Mr. Darbo took the floor, he also made it clear
that his party honestly believes in private-sector
oriented economic system.
That made the whole issue a difference in fundamental
principles. To me, perhaps the UDP might be able to
make it with the NRP, but as for the PDOI party, I
could not see how it would be possible even in a
second round situation. Socialism and Capitalism in
their pure form don't mix. It's like mixing
combustible gas with pure oxygen.
I think it would be good for interested Gambians to
try and purchase the video clip of that meeting to get
the first hand picture of what transpired. It is also
of great importance for us to discuss this matter
especially the fund-raising activities and how the
various parties should benefit from it if they cannot
come together.
Anyway Saul I don't want us to lose track of our
theme.  What I was saying was that the APRC
sympathizers have to be watched. Most of them could
sense that Yaya's government has no future so they
take the clandestine path, which allows them the
periodical latitude to even condemn Yaya if the heat
is too much on them.
To conclude this discussion on NdowNjie's critics I
want to refer everybody to the role of the British
Army Training Team (BATT) in the army. I don't know
how people tend to forget that it was BATT that was
contracted by the government to establish the GNA in
1984, and that until 1992 when the Nigerians took over
that responsibility from them, they were still calling
the shots. But when things started falling apart,
everybody decided to trivialize the role of the
"toubabs" and heaped the blame on Ndow Njie.
The British could have put the proper standards in
place, especially in the officer corps. Everyone was
aware of their presence and how the Gambians depended
on them to build the army with little or no Senegalese
interference. It would be another long story to talk
about the BATT. But their role was as much critical.
Have you ever heard about Colonel Jim Shaw the last
BATT commander?
Let me now answer Dampha's last questions. About
whether there was any confrontation between the GNA
soldiers and the TSG guards at Denton Bridge when the
former were crossing, that's a big no. After Chongan
left for Banjul, Captain Swareh took charge. He
quietly allowed them to cross without any squabble.
There was no problem whatsoever. Dampha also wanted to
know how Yaya did in that GNA officers' test conducted
by the Nigerians. He was sill at the TSG then. He
transferred over to the GNA after.
Yundun Barracks was my last stop. We arrived there
between 3:00pm to 400:pm. The camp showed the evidence
of how disorganized the coup was in nature. In a
well-organized military operation, the norm is to have
your rear-operation base fully equipped and manned to
coordinate the efforts of those in the front line. I
thought I was going to find some officers in control
of the camp giving out the necessary orders and the
logistic supplies. Nothing close to that existed at
the barracks.
The first things that drew my attention were the
officers locked up in the soldier's cells. Major Davis
the number two man in the battalion, Lt. S. Gomez, the
adjutant and Lt. O Mbye were all in the cells. I went
to speak to them. I did not see Major Davis whom I
understood was sitting on the floor, but I spoke to
both lieutenants.
Lt. O. Mbye could not understand why he was singled
out among all the platoon commanders that morning and
arrested and thrown in the cells.
As for the adjutant Lt. S. Gomez, he told me his
harrowing confrontation with 2Lt Singhateh that
morning to get him surrender the keys of the armory.
Singhateh had almost killed him with a shot he fired
very close to him.
 As the adjutant he was always entrusted with the safe
keeping of the weapon-store keys. However, according
to the lieutenant, the keys were in the safe in his
office. He told Singhateh where they were but he would
not believe him. He tore apart his brief case and
fired a shot from his rifle after forcing him to kneel
on the ground. He was then ordered into the cell,
Mr. Gomez could not understand why. The two
lieutenants asked me to see whether I could get
someone to let them out of the cells and at least
allow them to stay in the officers mess.
I went into the camp toward the main admin office.
There was a lot of commotion at the soldier's
television hall. I found out that it was full of
arrested TSG guards. Lt. Dibba was one of them. I
spoke to him briefly to find out who brought them
there but he could not explain anything.
In the adjutant's office however I was a bit relieved
to find Captain M. Badjie and Lt. B. Barrow. Despite
being the only officers in the barracks, it did not
take me long to know that they were not in control of
anything. But they did not want to say so. They could
not tell me why there were three officers in the
soldier's cells, or why they could not be released
immediately since there was no problem in the coup
operation. I thought they could be out to help
stabilize the situation better. Moreover, I discussed
with them the urgent need to start planning what to
tell the Gambian people, since the government had been
overthrown. It was apparent that the longer the
situation remained uncertain, the more likely it was
for troublemakers to exploit it. It was therefore
important to at least make a radio announcement
explaining what had happened and to assure the
population that everything was under control. Every
one of them agreed about the urgency of the moment and
the danger of a protracted silence. But as for the
officers in the cells they finally told me to try and
see Sergeant Major Ebrima Bah. He was said to be at
the "B" or "C" Company office. On my way out of the
office, I noticed two civilians in the adjacent
office. It was the office of Major Davis. They were
the permanent secretary ministry of defense Mr. B Jack
and Mr. Kebba Ceesay director general NSS. Both were
arrested and brought to the camp. They asked me to
help them to go home to their families. I told them
that I was not part of the coup and had nothing to do
with their arrest but that I was going to see the
person said to be responsible. They did not seem to
believe that I was not part of the conspiracy.
I met the sergeant major and he complimented me
accordingly but would not cooperate with me on the
issue of releasing the arrested officers and two
civilians. He said he could not release anyone unless
he was given orders from the right persons. He would
not tell me who the right persons were either.
I went back to the cells and explained to the officers
the problem I was facing to obtain their release. I
promised them that I would keep on trying.
It was outside that building where I met Sergeant
Major Gibril Saye. When I asked him what happened, he
cleared himself of any involvement in the mutiny. He
told me how he resisted it until he was locked up in
the cells too. But when they realized that they could
not assemble the heavy weapons without him, they later
brought him out and begged him to cooperate. It was
the same Saye who was later commissioned as lieutenant
and murdered.
I went back to the main office and explained to Mr.
Jack and Mr. Ceesay what happened. They were
devastated.
Surprisingly, when I returned to the adjutant's office
Captain Sonko and Lieutenant Barrow had left Banjul.
Captain Badjie was alone in the office.
I asked him how I could get a weapon. He called one of
the NCOs to get me one from the armory. He brought me
one AK47 rifle and two magazines full of ammo. It was
really reassuring to be armed. I could not tell what
was going to happen, but the air of trouble was
looming thick in the atmosphere.
It was not long when a corporal came to tell us that
all officers were required to report to the state
house for a general meeting. The corporal had a stolen
van and certainly had no driver's license. But he
drove us to the state house.
On the way at around Westfield Clinic, we heard the
first radio announcement made by Lt. Barrow and Capt.
Sonko at Radio 1 F.M. On the whole that was where they
had gone to after they left us at Yundum.
We also found Sabally and Haidara mounting a
checkpoint by the JIMPEX junction. He stopped our
vehicle and began to ask stupid questions. We told him
that we were told to report to the state house. He was
noticeably hyperactive and incoherent. After stopping
two or three more vehicles driven by over excited
soldiers he finally told us to go.
The state house was chaotic. Soldiers were driving in
and out of the place in different kinds of vehicles,
most of them seized from their owners or government
departments. There was no speed limit. Some of the
soldiers were carrying officer's ranks as high as
lieutenants.
The first officer we met when we walked into the main
building where the meeting was scheduled to take place
was 2Lt. Singhateh. He spoke to me in an upset tone
about why I told them that the Americans had planned
to intervene when it was not so. He said he asked
Major McClain but the American defense attaché denied
any involvement of US troops.
I asked him what the fuss was all about when their
objective was achieved without any complication. He
mumbled some words in anger and walked away.
By 6:00pm, most of the officers in large numbers, GNA
and TSG arrived at the state house. The meeting room
was a fairly wide space on the ground level of the
state house building.
To name a few of those present we had Major Malick
Njie (Doctor), Major Antouman Saho, Major Sheriff Mbye
(TSG), Captain Mamat Cham, Captain Ndure (TSG) Captain
S. Sarr, Captain M. Sonko, Captain M. Badjie, Lt. Yaya
Jammeh, 2Lt. Singhateh, Lieutenant Barrow, 2lt Bajinka
(TSG) and many more officers. The hall was almost
full.
Yaya and Singhateh were sitting beside each other
facing the crowd. It seemed like we were waiting for
Sabally and Haidara to arrive. For a while everyone
was just sitting quietly waiting to hear from the
first speaker. Then suddenly Yaya got up on his feet
drawing everyone's attention. However to everybody's
surprise and shock, he started using abusive language
swearing to all of us to know that that it was not a
monkey-work-baboon- eat thing. He swore that they were
not going to allow any "bastard to come and enjoy this
with us when they had not played any part in the
struggle."
He was on his feet for almost five minutes virtually
insulting everyone, repeating the same phrase of "not
a monkey work baboon eat thing."
I could not take it after a while. I challenged him
for his rudeness and told him to spare us his
primitive ideas and tell us what we could do in that
volatile confusion. I asked him what he had specially
done after all to claim this so-called big victory
when by all indication, the TSG that was supposed to
resist made it so easy for them. It was clear that
they both played equal roles in bring it to a peaceful
end. So all we expected of them was to tell us what
they had planned next and not some monkey and baboon
story.
After I was arrested the police CID wanted to build a
case against me from that confrontation with Yaya. A
senior police officer Jatta Baldeh asked me at the
board reviewing the case of the detainees why I was
rude to the chairman of the council at the state house
on the 22nd July. It was simple to answer. I told him
that at time he was nothing. There was no chairman
until two days later.
Anyway we all had our rifles in hand fully loaded,
cocked and saved.
At that point, Singhateh got up and held Yaya back
while Majors Njie and Saho held me back too.
"Listen to me gentlemen to tell you the background of
this coup", said Singhateh after talking Yaya to sit
down.
He told us that the coup was originally organized by
five of them: he, Lieutenant Barrow, 2Lt. Kanteh, 2Lt.
Kinteh and 2Lt. Sabally. "Lieutenant Jammeh was not
even part of it", he went on.
"But we were betrayed by Barrow, Kinteh and Kinteh',
he said.
I looked at Barrow where he was sitting beside Capt.
Sonko, but he was well composed and very quiet.
Singhateh explained further how the two of them alone,
he and Sabally, pursued the course to the end and that
it was in the last days when they invited in Jammeh
and Haidara.
Yaya said nothing.
In conclusion, Singhateh said that he even did not
think that a meeting about what they should do next
should be held in the absence of Sabally and Haidara.
Major Saho turned around to me and said, "you heard
that my brother? It is clear that the show belongs to
the young officers, so we should allow them to finish
their business."
That statement froze all my spirit into a brick of
ice.
Lt. B. Barrow was the next to speak. He accepted being
part of those who planned the coup in the beginning
but disagreed with the statement that he betrayed the
group. He said he was just not too comfortable with
the timing.
He however appealed to Singhateh to please let Capt.
Mamat Cham and myself stay around to help forge ahead
because of our experience and knowledge. It was
endorsed by all.
Just before the officers dispersed, Sabally arrived
threatening to start a fight for having a meeting in
his absence. He was yelling and screaming asking why
there was a meeting in his absence.
I think it was Singhateh who finally calmed him down.
Before going home to see my family and change into a
proper outfit for the operation, I had a brief meeting
with Capt. Cham. In the end we decided that we were
not going to fool ourselves. We did not have any idea
about coups or what to do after. So we decided that
General Dada who was still at his official residence
angry with the government should be consulted to
advice us.
Anyway, I spent the night at the state house with all
the monkeys and baboons.
The following day, Sabally and Haidara started the
wave of arrests and detention of officers. No reason
was given for the madness.
Till next time!

Ebou Colly





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