Published in FOROYAA of 28 June - 1 July 1999
CASAMANCE
The Facts, The Fears, The Possibilities, The Dangers And The Way Forward
The first consultative meeting of the MFDC, the Movement of the Democratic
Forces of Casamance, held in Banjul at the Atlantic Hotel, ends on 25th June
1999.
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Momodou Lamin Sedat Jobe,
told the members of the movement at the opening ceremony that they were to
decide how best and on what platform they would approach their fraternal
talks with the government of their country, The Senegal.
Here Dr. Jobe conceives Casamance to be a part of Senegal.
In his opening speech Father Diamacoune Senghor referred to the history of
the struggle of MFDC and added +IBw-in effect, united as a single person, these
illustrious sons of our dear Casamance shared the same ideal and the same
love for their country, Casamance as had done before our valorous ancestors.
A Casamance which, after God, was their reason for living and acting as it
is and must be all the more for us today. They had given their persons to
Casamance as a gift. This is a cause for pride and patriotism for all the
people of Casamance+IB0-
Hence it is very clear from this that father Diamacoune is talking about an
Independent Casamance.
The fact still remains that Senegal sees Casamance as a part of her
territory. Peace according to Senegal is one based on the inviolability of
the territorial integrity of Senegal as conceived by her government.
On the other hand, the position of MFDC is that Casamance is the land of
their ancestors. Peace according to father Diamacoune Senghor must be based
on truth and justice and that is the recognition of the Independence of
Casamance.
The two positions have always been and still are diametrically opposed to
each other. How to harmonize the two positions is the fundamental task of
the peaceful negotiator. One may now ask what is Gambia+IBk-s role in
harmonizing the two positions?
According to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Jobe, +IBw-the
gathering is here today in pursuant to president Jammeh+IBk-s offer of mediation
in the long-drawn out crisis in the Casamance+IB0-
According to Dr. Jobe, the gathering constitutes +IBw-the beginning of a
determined will to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the Casamance issue in
the interest of the socio-economic development of the region as a whole with
the advent of permanent peace+IB0-
Hence as far as the Gambia government is concerned, it is assumed that an
environment is being provided to ensure the harmonization of the various
positions of the Casamance groups in preparation for peaceful talks.
The fears, however, are that the position of the Senegalese government for
maintaining Casamance within its territory and the position of the MFDC for
Independence may not harmonize. If that occurs the Gambia government would
be left in a confused situation. There is no doubt that the MFDC did bring
mentors of the movement together. Time will tell whether the movement has
been consolidated to negotiate for autonomy or independence.
It goes without saying that the Senegalese government has observers at the
talks. In this regard, it is now acquainted with all the personalities and
all the positions. Senegal will therefore not be caught by surprise by any
eventuality.
Suffice it to say, the two sides could come out of the Banjul talks to go
back to prepare for a more devastating war or for a more durable peace.
Nothing indicates that either is impossible.
THE POSSIBILITIES
The aim of a negotiation is to reconcile the positions of adversaries so as
to achieve an agreement on core issues. The aim of the talks in Banjul is
said to provide opportunity for the MFDC to develop a negotiating position.
One may now ask: Have the talks achieved the purpose? The answer lies in the
final resolution of 25th June 1999 of what was referred to as a congress of
MFDC. The Resolution reads:
CONGRESS OF THE MOVEMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC FORCES OF CASAMANCE
+ACI-FINAL RESOLUTION
+ACI-The Movement of Democratic Forces (MFDC) meeting in congress from the 21st
to the 25th June 1999, in Banjul, in the Republic of The Gambia, thanks to
the kindness of the republic of The Gambia, has examined the present
political and military situation which is of concern to it.
+ACI-In that regard, the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance considering
the unshakeable will of the secretary general Abbey Augustine Diamacoune
Senghor to establish unity and cohesion within the movement+ADs-
+ACI-Considering the solemn desire and commitment of Sidy Badgie, former chief
of staff of the fighting forces of the movement of Democratic Forces of
Casamance +IBw-ATIKA+IB0- to entirely subscribe to the line adopted by the Secretary
General+ADs-
+ACI-Considering that the new political situation has offered, in the supreme
interest of our nation, the creation of a provisional piloting committee and
the holding of talks in Banjul, the Gambia, from the 21st to the 25th June
1999+ADs-
+ACI-Considering that the conclusions of the deliberations of the provisional
piloting committee are largely within the frame work of the mission assigned
to him by the Secretary General of MFDC, Abbey Augustine Diamacoune Senghor+ADs-
+ACI-Considering the strong mobilization of the different delegates, as well as
the richness of their respective contributions are perfectly within the
logic of the directive of the Secretary General+ADs-
+ACI-Considering the difficulties of coordinating the different military
commands+ADs-
+ACI-The Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance takes note of the necessity
of restructuring and reforming its institutions+ADs-
+ACI-Within this perspective, the MFDC has examined and adopted its constitution
and rules and regulations, a national Charter of Casamance resistance and a
platform of demands.
+ACI-Considering however that the present congress is acting as a national
Bureau and in conformity with the provisions of the constitution and the
rules and regulations+ADs-
+ACI-The MFDC proclaims the retention of Abbey Augustine Diamacoune Senghor,
starting from this date, in his functions as Secretary General.
+ACI-The MFDC calls on its Secretary General to nominate an officer responsible
for internal affairs and an officer responsible for external affairs who
should form their respective executives in conformity with the provisions of
the constitution and rules and regulations.
+ACI-The congress recommends to the Secretary General of the MFDC to take
initiative of creating and establishing the necessary conditions of a
lasting peace in Casamance.
+ACI-The congress denounces the destabilisation manoeuvres by the Senegalese
army of occupation with a view to sabotaging our days of reflection.
+ACI-The congress energetically condemns the kidnappings, tortures, arbitrary
arrests, rapings, degrading treatments, humiliations and assassinations
perpetrated by the Senegalese army and its henchmen in Casamance.
+ACI-The congress demands from the Senegalese authorities the immediate
withdrawal of military and paramilitary forces in Casamance.
+ACI-The retention of only the military camps whose creation is anterior to 25th
December 1979 and the immediate closure of the camps and stations created
after this date.
+ACI-The non-reinforcement of troops of the Senegalese army in Casamance as well
as the holding of ceasefire on either sides in Casamance.
+ACI-The congress reaffirms its determination to go to the negotiating table.
+ACI-The congress congratulates itself for the active participation of observer
groups and renews its request for it not to spare any effort in bringing
about peace in Casamance.
+ACI-The congress renews its total trust in the brotherly people and high
authorities of Guinea Bissau as guarantors of the ceasefire agreements
signed between the MFDC and the Senegalese government.
+ACI-The congress expresses its gratitude to the brotherly people and high
authorities of the republic of the Gambia, particularly to H.E. President
Yahya Jammeh who, in addition to his constant and selfless action in the
service of peace in Casamance has kindly accepted, with a lot of friendship,
willingness and devotion, to host in his country the present talks.
+ACI-The congress solemnly demands from H.E. President Yahya Jammeh to work for
the release to freedom of the Secretary General and all officers and
militants of the MFDC as a priority, among other things, for negotiation
with the Senegalese government. His freedom to travel within and outside the
country.
+ACI-To rigorously respect the free movement of people and goods.
+ACI-Banjul, 25th June 1999.
+ACI-The Congress.+ACI-
What is now necessary is for all the players to become vigilant. There is no
doubt that if MFDC accepts autonomy or Senegal accepts independence a
peaceful settlement could be hatched which would have crowned the Gambia
government+IBk-s mediation efforts with success. However, if the positions
become hardened the Gambia government would become increasingly vulnerable.
Senegal is likely to compel it to close its doors to MFDC, extradite its
agents and offer no sanctuary to them. In that case the ease with which the
recent talks were held would disappear and MFDC would again have to meet
under a climate of clandestinity. The members of the movement should
therefore bear in mind that the free atmosphere they received in the Gambia
is only possible because of the hope that it will lead to a peaceful
settlement of the Casamance issue. Needless to say, once a peaceful
settlement becomes illusive, the Gambia government would be accused of
collaboration if it continues to accommodate MFDC. This could even lead to
retaliation on the side of Senegal.
Hence the Secretary General of the MFDC needs to understand international
politics. The talks took place in Banjul not because of President Jammeh+IBk-s
openness to MFDC but because President Jammeh is given a green card by
Senegal. Any day that Senegal gives a red card Gambia will become a no go
territory for MFDC.
President Jammeh has already been accused of collaboration with the forces
in Casamance. If the talks fail to be fruitful he is likely to distance
himself more than ever to prevent the destabilisation of his own government.
In this regard, members of the MFDC should understand the delicate situation
Gambia is in and the delicate balancing act that is taking place. Their
experience in Guinea Bissau, whose government was the guarantor of the
ceasefire accords of 31 May 1991 and 8 July 1993, should be a constant
reminder that accommodation of the MFDC in any country must not be taken for
granted. Nkrumah Sane, who was sent to Senegal from Guinea Bissau, knows
this very well.
There is no doubt that if MFDC is resolved for autonomy, it will continue to
enjoy the accommodation of the Government of The Gambia and Guinea Bissau.
However, once it is resolved on demanding independence, international
politics will compel the Government of The Gambia and Guinea Bissau to
distance themselves.
In this respect, Nkrumah Same may be more in tune with international
politics than Dr Jobe, who claims that Sane is out of touch with the
realities on the ground.
What Sane realised, which was not realised by Dr Jobe, is that the
combatants in the field are for independence. Sane may have thought that
Father Diamacoune was coming to Banjul to discuss about autonomy. He may
have thought that Father Diamacoune would be isolated from the combatants if
he calls for autonomy at the Banjul talks. This may have been the reason why
he started giving excuses for Father Diamacoune by saying that he was out of
touch.
Hence, Nkrumah Sane envisaged failure of the talks for good reasons. Any
careful observer would know that if Father Diamacoune spoke about autonomy,
he would have been isolated from the combatants. If he speaks about
independence, he would be isolated from the Gambia Government and all
current members of the OAU. The Banjul talks, therefore, have not helped the
MFDC to resolve the question of autonomy or independence which is the key
question if there is to be a peaceful resolution of the Casamance crisis.
The delegates left Banjul with false hope because they have not been
properly guided on matters dealing with diplomacy and international
politics. The idea was for the Movement to deal with its internal
contradictions. They ended up drawing resolutions which dealt with their
relation with the Senegalese state.
The resolution should have dealt with their internal+ADs- matter and the steps
they wish to take to bring about a peaceful settlement.
In short, we have recommended the doctrine of positive neutrality for The
Gambia Government and that of progressive rapprochement between MFDC and the
Senegalese Government. If these foreign policy doctrines were adhered to,
The Gambia Government would not be in the trap it has put itself today.
THE WAY FORWARD
The Gambia Government needs to communicate with the MFDC to know their true
position. This should determine whether Gambia can play the role of a
negotiator or not. If it is clear that The Gambia Government cannot
influence MFDC to give up its claim to independence, then The Gambia should
play a neutral role and serve as host for refugees.
If there is possibility of MFDC accepting autonomy, the Gambia Government
could serve as a negotiator of the most comprehensive form of autonomy that
comes close to the exercise of right to self determination. In that regard,
it could begin by asking both sides to formulate their model structures in
preparation for peace talks.
It has given the impression that it would accommodate the MFDC under any
pretext when its precise intention is to accommodate Senegal's call for
autonomy. In this respect, false hopes have been given to the members of the
MFDC to think that they could rely on the Gambia Government under all
circumstances.
The doctrine of progressive rapprochement does not call for condemnations,
ultimatums and rigidities. It calls for mutual accommodation of positions,
cessation of hostilities, regrets of roles each has played in causing
suffering, humility and expression of common and equal desire to redress
past ills.
For example, the resolution at the end of the meeting could have called for
openness in their negotiations with Senegal. They could have called for the
freedom of movement of Father Diamacoune so that he could consult with
everyone to prepare a negotiating position, called for openness in their
negotiation with Senegal. They could have limited their demands from the
Senegalese Government to the granting of the freedom of movement of Father
Diamacoune so that he could consult with everyone and prepare the ground for
a negotiated settlement.
This would have been sufficient and reasonable as far as the doctrine of
progressive rapprochement is concerned. This policy calls for step by step
process in the building of trust between adversaries.
The Gambia Government needs to take the role of a negotiator with less
fanfare and more candour. A negotiator cannot stand aloof while situations
develop on their own. This leads to blame when things go out of control. A
negotiator must guide a process. They should have helped the MFDC to know
international politics and guide them to formulate realistic demands to get
to the next phase of the negotiation and avoid Senegal being motivated to
take rigid positions.
Hence, The Gambia Government is now required to discuss very frankly with
the MFDC to find out whether it could ever renounce its position for
independence. If that position is unnegotiable, then The Gambia Government
should know that it is not in a position to negotiate peace in Casamance. It
should then end the false impression that is given that Gambian territory
can be utilised by the MFDC to operate freely.
On the other hand, it is necessary for MFDC to realise that Casamance
refugees have found peace in The Gambia and any attempt to utilise Gambia
for its operations will draw Gambia into any armed confrontation with the
Senegalese regime. If their stand is for independence, they should be
honest enough to pursue their goal without drawing Gambia into the conflict.
They should not utilise a platform for peaceful negotiation as a platform to
pursue their own ends.
The MFDC talks are over, but it has not drawn us any closer to peace in
Casamance. The negotiating positions are as far apart as ever. The movement
cannot heal its wounds until it is decisive on autonomy or independence.
Once a position is taken, the rift will come. Hence, what has been done in
Banjul is to patch up differences and leave matters to be decided later.
This is simply a marriage of convenience. We hope the Senegalese regime will
not behave immaturely by over reacting to events in Banjul. We hope they
will see that Banjul is yet to know how to negotiate a settlement. They are
engaged in a trial and error diplomacy and should not be penalised for their
unseasoned approach to peaceful resolution of conflicts. We are all
interested parties and we will continue to play our part in the process.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L
Web interface at: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/gambia-l.html
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
