Colly, another masterpiece. Before I comment on the revelations about July
22, 1994, I would like to duel a little on your observations about the New
York Meeting organized by MRDG(NY). I anxiously await the formal report from
the Movement. In the meantime, suffice for me to say that it was very astute
of you to have unmasked the APRC cronies that were at the Meeting cheering
up PDOIS. We have a lot of those characters in our midst. APRC sympathizers
that are only out to fuel discord in the Opposition ranks. Their modus
operandi is to pit PDOIS against other Opposition parties. Remember how
Joseph Joof praised PDOIS' stance about the London Briefing? Again, at this
Meeting, the APRC cronies will only cheer Halifa Sallah when the latter
expresses the view that PDOIS is opposed to forming a coalition in the first
round of voting. To me this clearly indicates that the APRC supporters do
not want the Opposition to unite NOW and fight against Yaya. These APRC
supporters disguise as PDOIS supporters and want to convince the PDOIS
leadership that the PDOIS rank and file do not want a coalition. I hope the
PDOIS leadership realize what they are dealing with. I am yet to see one
single PDOIS supporter on G_L coming out to say that forming a coalition NOW
is a bad idea. It is APRC supporters that have that view. The PDOIS
leadership also has that view if one goes by the utterances of Halifa
Sallah. Mr. Sallah is on record on numerous times saying that PDOIS is open
to forming a coalition during the second round of voting. This clearly
indicates that PDOIS does not want to enter into a coalition NOW.

Arguments have been forwarded from various quarters to the effect that if we
do not have a coalition NOW, we might not even have a second round of
voting. The election is being rigged as we speak/write. A United Opposition
would have been in a better position to mount a campaign against APRC crimes
during the ongoing registration process. A United Opposition would have been
more effective raising funds (at this stage) for the October Election. I
wonder what PDOIS is going to say to its supporters come October and there
is no second round of voting. I believe the Diaspora can still work with
PDOIS and other Opposition parties to form the Coalition. However, we do not
have a lot of time in our hands. If there is no viable Coalition by the end
of June 2001, then we might as well forget about having a Coalition
constituting PDOIS, UDP and NRP.

Colly, I am also happy that you mentioned Ousainou Darboe's response about
the formation of a Coalition for the purposes of fighting the October
Elections. I hope this will silence UDP critics that were jumping all over
the place saying that UDP did not want to come to the United States because
UDP does not want to be part of a Coalition to defeat Yaya in October 2001.
When these UDP critics made that leap on the basis of UDP's decision to
'postpone' their American trip, I counseled them not to jump the gun. I
counseled them to find out the concrete facts before making certain
judgments. Like you, I hope some of the critics that were not in New York at
the Meeting, will go and buy the video tape from the Movement and see for
themselves what UDP has to say about the formation of a Coalition. Again, I
reiterate to some of our comrades in the Opposition that NO ONE in the
Opposition wins if we tear down our leaders unjustifiably. Let us be fair to
people and sit down and honestly and selflessly negotiate to form a
Coalition. We should avoid this grand-standing and finger-pointing. This is
NOT about one or two individuals or political parties or ideologies. This is
about the slaughter of defenseless and innocent children.

Moving back to July 22, 1994. Colly, another pathetic state of affairs. When
the moron (Yaya) and his side-kick (Singhateh) addressed you, they did not
even realize that he (Yaya) was engaged in the same despicable behavior he
was trying to accuse other GNA officers of. According to all the reports
(except the bogus biography doctored by the moron himself) it was Singhateh
and Sabally that thought of this diabolical deed. It was loose-canons like
the sick Singhateh and Sabally that 'master-minded' this 'coup'. I am using
quotations because I do not believe the morons (Singhateh and Sabally) sat
down and drew a comprehensive plan as to how to steal power from a
democratically elected government. This so-called coup was a mere fluke. The
vermin just stumbled into it. I think people have commented exhaustively on
the ineptitude of the PPP defense apparatus. Fifteen year olds could have
pulled a coup on July 22, 1994. The vermin did nothing heroic or
extraordinary on that fateful day. So when Yaya was talking about 'monkey
fend, Baboon eat' the moron did not even realize that he was the baboon and
Singhateh and Sabally were the monkeys. The 'chairmanship' of the AFPRC was
granted to the moron (Yaya) on a plate. What did he do in the 'planning
stage'? How many gun fights was he involved in on July 22, 1994? On the
contrary, what reports reveal is that Yaya ran to the PPP regime on numerous
occasions (while he was guarding Jawara) to rat on fellow Officers. Instead
of planning a coup, the snake was lying about fellow Officers saying that
those Officers were planning a coup.

The more I read your revelations, the more I believe what I heard earlier on
to the effect that Singhateh and Sabally thought that Yaya was a clown they
can manipulate. By making Yaya the leader, the sick duo of Singhateh and
Sabally thought that they were putting Yaya on the firing line. That way
when push comes to shove and the 'coup' is foiled, Yaya goes first. If the
'coup' succeeds, Singhateh and Sabally also lose nothing because Yaya was a
moron they could manipulate. Needless to say, this childish ploy backfired
on the sick duo. Few months after the 'coup' Yaya managed to portray Sabally
like the loose-canon he (Sabally) is. When Yaya pounced on Sabally everyone
was relieved. In no time Sabally was reduced into an impotent, captured,
incarcerated and tortured to the extent that he would wail until the whole
prison population will hear his sorry crying. I also understand that the
despicable vermin will also pee his pants when the sadists torture him. May
they all rot in Hell.

As far as Singhateh is concerned, Yaya side-lined him thanks to the Koro
Ceesay case. That heinous crime is what is haunting both Singhateh and
Yankuba Touray. Because of Singhateh's and Touray's participation in that
crime, Yaya can easily blackmail them. Yaya was not in the country when Koro
was slaughtered. According to reports that I got from people very close to
the AFPRC when Koro was murdered, Yaya did not give Singhateh and Touray the
order to kill Koro. Apparently, Singhateh and Touray were jealous that Koro
was becoming too close to Yaya and that Yaya was relying too much on Koro's
advise. Consequently, as soon as Yaya was out of the country, the two
Singhateh's together with Touray invited Koro to Touray's house and smash
his skull and then burn his body. Yaya knows all these facts. If he wanted,
he can order the arrest and trial of Edward Singhateh, Peter Singhateh and
Yankuba Touray for the murder of Koro Ceesay. But the vermin will not do
that. These murderers are more useful to him when they are out of jail. That
way, he can use their heinous behavior to blackmail them to be loyal to him.
But like all blackmailers, he does not realize that if one corners one's
blackmail victim, the victim will retaliate. The blackmailer does not also
realize that his commodity loses value if the blackmail victim realizes that
the blackmailer does not have a monopoly to that commodity. In this case,
once the murderers realize that not only Yaya knows about their crime, they
will downgrade what Yaya has against them. The only reason these murderers
are still kissing up to Yaya is because they know that no matter what the
Gambians know, only Yaya can ensure their arrest and conviction for this
heinous crime. In order to remove that power that Yaya holds against
Singhateh and Touray, Koro's family should bring international prosecutions
against these murderers. That way, as soon as they travel outside Gambia,
they will be arrested and tried for crimes against humanity. Yaya will no
longer be the sole custodian of the fate of Singhateh and Touray.

Colly, I look forward to your next installment where I hope you will show
how the vermin stabbed you and the other fine officers on the back.
Meanwhile let us allow the baboon (Yaya) to enjoy (while it lasts) what the
monkeys (Singhateh and Sabally) found.
KB



>From: ebou colly <[log in to unmask]>
>Reply-To: The Gambia and related-issues mailing list
><[log in to unmask]>
>To: [log in to unmask]
>Subject: COUP IN GAMBIA SIX
>Date: Sun, 3 Jun 2001 19:05:14 -0700
>
>   COUP IN GAMBIA SIX
>Well Saul, I am going to open the sixth segment of my
>narrative with a brief discussion aimed at
>enlightening your interesting friend who made that
>remark about Ndow Njie's command and its
>"Banjulian"-favored legacy.
>But before all that I would like to add the names of
>two GNA officers that I left out in my last issue
>where I tabulated the names, ranks and positions of
>all the officers on active duty at the time of the
>coup. Captain P. Sanneh and Lieutenant F. Joof were
>serving as contingent commander, ECOMOG, Liberia and
>AHQ officer respectively. I missed them altogether,
>which I sincerely apologize for, especially to the
>officers.
>Coming back to our man Saul, because you called him a
>friend, I would also attempt to treat him as a friend,
>but as a very dangerous one indeed. I am however glad
>that he was talking to you, a person who has
>transcended that primitive mentality where Africans or
>Gambians are easily manipulated into believing that
>our differences, in nothing other than the languages
>we speak, should be a cause for irrationality enmity.
>These are the dangerous cynics found in the continent
>fueling crisis among brothers, friends, families and
>all kinds of good-willed groups.
>  Unfortunately however, Gambians like our friend are
>usually played down as mere bigots with serious
>limitations; nonetheless, their occasional remarks,
>uttered here and there especially in the company of
>their weak-minded targets often cause devastating harm
>to social harmony. And we don't need to fool
>ourselves, there are many Gambians like him who think,
>talk, see and feel the world purely from such
>retrogressive senses. I am even surprised that our
>friend did not say it in the exact way I have heard
>his kinds talked about this so-called Ndow Njie-bias
>syndrome. But there is no doubt in my mind that our
>friend was speaking from the same deplorable premise
>that Ndow Njie's administration was only in favor of
>Wollofs to the detriment of other ethnic groups in the
>GNA. Yes, when Banjulians are mentioned in this
>context it is usually the Wollofs under scrutiny. And
>most of the time these critics don't give concrete
>evidences or they usually overlook the facts or worst,
>are too dogmatic to make an objective analysis of
>their dangerous thoughts. These are people for
>instance who would hear someone's last name being
>called Jobe, Njie, Ceesay or Touray and dogmatically
>conclude that the person belonged to a particular
>ethnic group or another, not prepared to understand
>that these family names are found in most major ethnic
>groups. But the most dangerous ones are those who
>consciously use these baseless stigmata for their
>selfish interest, be it economic, political, religious
>or social.
>In the case of our friend, I believe he was
>politically attempting to feel your soft spot. If you
>had fallen for his cheap stuff, I bet the next time
>you hear from him he would be telling you that he does
>not like the UDP party because it is a Mandinka party
>bent on reviving the Mandinka empire destroyed by
>Jammeh. You ask him how or why, and he would say
>nothing to substantiate his statement.
>But refer him to Yaya's pathetic leadership profile
>and he would swear to you that he does not necessarily
>support him only that he doesn't like Ousainou Darbo,
>Sidia Jatta or Hamat Bah. Mere deception and
>dishonesty! Anyway, next time when you run into people
>like this, my advice is that regardless of how
>convincing they may sound about not being Yaya
>sympathizers just try to remind them all those
>ethnic-bias actions of Yaya's government and challenge
>them to bring anything close in similarity to it. In
>the past. Remind them how Yaya's government introduced
>the prejudicial policy of harassing, arresting and
>deporting Northern Senegalese from The Gambia while
>those from Southern Senegal/Cassamance are registered
>and allocated with Gambian I.D.Cards.  Was that a
>lesser crime than that of Ndow Njie's? I don't think
>so. These are the APRC hidden supporters appearing in
>different colors and modes but too timid or sneaky to
>face the world in their true selves.
>Last week I ran into two of them at the Gambian hall
>in the Bronx where Mr. Ousainou Dardo and Mr. Halifa
>Sallah had been speaking about the political situation
>at home. I was amazed to see these two guys pretending
>to be Mr. Sallah's sympathizers when in reality they
>were far from that. I don't remember how I first met
>them last year, but for a while we were close. We used
>to call each other regularly and even had visited each
>other's apartments. Then one day a woman named Absa
>called me from their apartment. She said she was
>working for the NIA at state house but had decided to
>visit America and wanted to seize the opportunity to
>desert and seek political asylum here. She asked for
>my help in the form of writing a testimonial for her
>for the INS. Her reason for leaving, she said, was
>that she was afraid for her personal security in the
>wake of the next presidential election. She was afraid
>there would be serious political trouble that could be
>dangerous to those of them working too close to the
>president.
>One of the gentlemen said that the lady was his
>sister.
>They came to my apartment next. Without doubt I could
>recognize her face as one of Yaya's aides. She was
>fond of wearing white veil. I think she was a born
>again Muslim. Anyway I did not know that she was
>called Absa and had never spoken to her before.
>I told her the implications of the process of seeking
>for asylum-the need to justify her fears of being
>persecuted if she should go back to The Gambia and the
>advantage of getting an immigration lawyer to do the
>process for her. She agreed to all my proposals, but
>that was it. The next thing I was told was that she
>had taken employment at a restaurant. If it was true I
>am sure she must have been illegally employed. Anyway
>I kept on monitoring her with my friends at a safe
>distance.
>Then a month or so later, Yaya came to America. It was
>that last visit he made here when the NY Gambian
>movement gave him the hell he deserved. During that
>period however, I was able to get some inside
>information about the activities of this Absa with the
>Yaya entourage. It was confirmed to me that she was
>always with them, sometimes accompanied by her
>brothers. I was most of the time their subject of
>discussion and the members of the movement who were
>behind the embarrassing demonstration against Yaya. So
>at one point, James Kujabi even assured them that I
>was marked for execution the moment I stepped my foot
>in The Gambia.
>Anyway these were the two old friends I saw at the
>meeting cheering Mr. Halifa Sallah especially when the
>PDOI spokesman said anything that seemed to challenge
>Mr. Darbo's position.
>I think it was the panel moderator Mr. Saul Mbenga who
>raised the critical subject of the much desired
>opposition coalition to hear the opinion of Mr. Darbo
>and Mr. Sallah. According to Mr. Darbo who first
>responded, he had seen no problem about it and that he
>strongly believed that the three parties coming
>together would give them a better chance of winning
>Yaya. Mr. Sallah also expressed his positive hopes in
>a united front but went on to argue that it is
>normally explored in the second rounds of presidential
>elections. He quoted Senegal and Ghana as typical
>examples.
>  Mr. Darbo however observed that given their limited
>resources at this moment when a first round funding
>was still inadequate it would not be too easy to
>finance two rounds anyway. Mr. Darbo explained that
>together, they could mobilize all their resources and
>their followers to defeat the APRC.
>Then Mr. Sallah questioned the criteria of choosing
>the leader.
>Here I saw my two friends cheering with fanatical
>enthusiasm.
>Mr. Darbo replied by saying that the parties could
>discuss the question of who should be the leader after
>agreeing to come together.
>The audience gave a round of applause.
>That's when Mr. Sallah came up with the big one. As I
>heard it, the PDOI party believes in a
>state-controlled economic system or socialism, which
>is in total conflict with what, the other parties
>believe in. He even quoted a statement he said was
>said by Mr. Hamat Bah about his party's commitment to
>capitalism.
>My friends cheered again.
>I felt hopeless.
>When Mr. Darbo took the floor, he also made it clear
>that his party honestly believes in private-sector
>oriented economic system.
>That made the whole issue a difference in fundamental
>principles. To me, perhaps the UDP might be able to
>make it with the NRP, but as for the PDOI party, I
>could not see how it would be possible even in a
>second round situation. Socialism and Capitalism in
>their pure form don't mix. It's like mixing
>combustible gas with pure oxygen.
>I think it would be good for interested Gambians to
>try and purchase the video clip of that meeting to get
>the first hand picture of what transpired. It is also
>of great importance for us to discuss this matter
>especially the fund-raising activities and how the
>various parties should benefit from it if they cannot
>come together.
>Anyway Saul I don't want us to lose track of our
>theme.  What I was saying was that the APRC
>sympathizers have to be watched. Most of them could
>sense that Yaya's government has no future so they
>take the clandestine path, which allows them the
>periodical latitude to even condemn Yaya if the heat
>is too much on them.
>To conclude this discussion on NdowNjie's critics I
>want to refer everybody to the role of the British
>Army Training Team (BATT) in the army. I don't know
>how people tend to forget that it was BATT that was
>contracted by the government to establish the GNA in
>1984, and that until 1992 when the Nigerians took over
>that responsibility from them, they were still calling
>the shots. But when things started falling apart,
>everybody decided to trivialize the role of the
>"toubabs" and heaped the blame on Ndow Njie.
>The British could have put the proper standards in
>place, especially in the officer corps. Everyone was
>aware of their presence and how the Gambians depended
>on them to build the army with little or no Senegalese
>interference. It would be another long story to talk
>about the BATT. But their role was as much critical.
>Have you ever heard about Colonel Jim Shaw the last
>BATT commander?
>Let me now answer Dampha's last questions. About
>whether there was any confrontation between the GNA
>soldiers and the TSG guards at Denton Bridge when the
>former were crossing, that's a big no. After Chongan
>left for Banjul, Captain Swareh took charge. He
>quietly allowed them to cross without any squabble.
>There was no problem whatsoever. Dampha also wanted to
>know how Yaya did in that GNA officers' test conducted
>by the Nigerians. He was sill at the TSG then. He
>transferred over to the GNA after.
>Yundun Barracks was my last stop. We arrived there
>between 3:00pm to 400:pm. The camp showed the evidence
>of how disorganized the coup was in nature. In a
>well-organized military operation, the norm is to have
>your rear-operation base fully equipped and manned to
>coordinate the efforts of those in the front line. I
>thought I was going to find some officers in control
>of the camp giving out the necessary orders and the
>logistic supplies. Nothing close to that existed at
>the barracks.
>The first things that drew my attention were the
>officers locked up in the soldier's cells. Major Davis
>the number two man in the battalion, Lt. S. Gomez, the
>adjutant and Lt. O Mbye were all in the cells. I went
>to speak to them. I did not see Major Davis whom I
>understood was sitting on the floor, but I spoke to
>both lieutenants.
>Lt. O. Mbye could not understand why he was singled
>out among all the platoon commanders that morning and
>arrested and thrown in the cells.
>As for the adjutant Lt. S. Gomez, he told me his
>harrowing confrontation with 2Lt Singhateh that
>morning to get him surrender the keys of the armory.
>Singhateh had almost killed him with a shot he fired
>very close to him.
>  As the adjutant he was always entrusted with the safe
>keeping of the weapon-store keys. However, according
>to the lieutenant, the keys were in the safe in his
>office. He told Singhateh where they were but he would
>not believe him. He tore apart his brief case and
>fired a shot from his rifle after forcing him to kneel
>on the ground. He was then ordered into the cell,
>Mr. Gomez could not understand why. The two
>lieutenants asked me to see whether I could get
>someone to let them out of the cells and at least
>allow them to stay in the officers mess.
>I went into the camp toward the main admin office.
>There was a lot of commotion at the soldier's
>television hall. I found out that it was full of
>arrested TSG guards. Lt. Dibba was one of them. I
>spoke to him briefly to find out who brought them
>there but he could not explain anything.
>In the adjutant's office however I was a bit relieved
>to find Captain M. Badjie and Lt. B. Barrow. Despite
>being the only officers in the barracks, it did not
>take me long to know that they were not in control of
>anything. But they did not want to say so. They could
>not tell me why there were three officers in the
>soldier's cells, or why they could not be released
>immediately since there was no problem in the coup
>operation. I thought they could be out to help
>stabilize the situation better. Moreover, I discussed
>with them the urgent need to start planning what to
>tell the Gambian people, since the government had been
>overthrown. It was apparent that the longer the
>situation remained uncertain, the more likely it was
>for troublemakers to exploit it. It was therefore
>important to at least make a radio announcement
>explaining what had happened and to assure the
>population that everything was under control. Every
>one of them agreed about the urgency of the moment and
>the danger of a protracted silence. But as for the
>officers in the cells they finally told me to try and
>see Sergeant Major Ebrima Bah. He was said to be at
>the "B" or "C" Company office. On my way out of the
>office, I noticed two civilians in the adjacent
>office. It was the office of Major Davis. They were
>the permanent secretary ministry of defense Mr. B Jack
>and Mr. Kebba Ceesay director general NSS. Both were
>arrested and brought to the camp. They asked me to
>help them to go home to their families. I told them
>that I was not part of the coup and had nothing to do
>with their arrest but that I was going to see the
>person said to be responsible. They did not seem to
>believe that I was not part of the conspiracy.
>I met the sergeant major and he complimented me
>accordingly but would not cooperate with me on the
>issue of releasing the arrested officers and two
>civilians. He said he could not release anyone unless
>he was given orders from the right persons. He would
>not tell me who the right persons were either.
>I went back to the cells and explained to the officers
>the problem I was facing to obtain their release. I
>promised them that I would keep on trying.
>It was outside that building where I met Sergeant
>Major Gibril Saye. When I asked him what happened, he
>cleared himself of any involvement in the mutiny. He
>told me how he resisted it until he was locked up in
>the cells too. But when they realized that they could
>not assemble the heavy weapons without him, they later
>brought him out and begged him to cooperate. It was
>the same Saye who was later commissioned as lieutenant
>and murdered.
>I went back to the main office and explained to Mr.
>Jack and Mr. Ceesay what happened. They were
>devastated.
>Surprisingly, when I returned to the adjutant's office
>Captain Sonko and Lieutenant Barrow had left Banjul.
>Captain Badjie was alone in the office.
>I asked him how I could get a weapon. He called one of
>the NCOs to get me one from the armory. He brought me
>one AK47 rifle and two magazines full of ammo. It was
>really reassuring to be armed. I could not tell what
>was going to happen, but the air of trouble was
>looming thick in the atmosphere.
>It was not long when a corporal came to tell us that
>all officers were required to report to the state
>house for a general meeting. The corporal had a stolen
>van and certainly had no driver's license. But he
>drove us to the state house.
>On the way at around Westfield Clinic, we heard the
>first radio announcement made by Lt. Barrow and Capt.
>Sonko at Radio 1 F.M. On the whole that was where they
>had gone to after they left us at Yundum.
>We also found Sabally and Haidara mounting a
>checkpoint by the JIMPEX junction. He stopped our
>vehicle and began to ask stupid questions. We told him
>that we were told to report to the state house. He was
>noticeably hyperactive and incoherent. After stopping
>two or three more vehicles driven by over excited
>soldiers he finally told us to go.
>The state house was chaotic. Soldiers were driving in
>and out of the place in different kinds of vehicles,
>most of them seized from their owners or government
>departments. There was no speed limit. Some of the
>soldiers were carrying officer's ranks as high as
>lieutenants.
>The first officer we met when we walked into the main
>building where the meeting was scheduled to take place
>was 2Lt. Singhateh. He spoke to me in an upset tone
>about why I told them that the Americans had planned
>to intervene when it was not so. He said he asked
>Major McClain but the American defense attaché denied
>any involvement of US troops.
>I asked him what the fuss was all about when their
>objective was achieved without any complication. He
>mumbled some words in anger and walked away.
>By 6:00pm, most of the officers in large numbers, GNA
>and TSG arrived at the state house. The meeting room
>was a fairly wide space on the ground level of the
>state house building.
>To name a few of those present we had Major Malick
>Njie (Doctor), Major Antouman Saho, Major Sheriff Mbye
>(TSG), Captain Mamat Cham, Captain Ndure (TSG) Captain
>S. Sarr, Captain M. Sonko, Captain M. Badjie, Lt. Yaya
>Jammeh, 2Lt. Singhateh, Lieutenant Barrow, 2lt Bajinka
>(TSG) and many more officers. The hall was almost
>full.
>Yaya and Singhateh were sitting beside each other
>facing the crowd. It seemed like we were waiting for
>Sabally and Haidara to arrive. For a while everyone
>was just sitting quietly waiting to hear from the
>first speaker. Then suddenly Yaya got up on his feet
>drawing everyone's attention. However to everybody's
>surprise and shock, he started using abusive language
>swearing to all of us to know that that it was not a
>monkey-work-baboon- eat thing. He swore that they were
>not going to allow any "bastard to come and enjoy this
>with us when they had not played any part in the
>struggle."
>He was on his feet for almost five minutes virtually
>insulting everyone, repeating the same phrase of "not
>a monkey work baboon eat thing."
>I could not take it after a while. I challenged him
>for his rudeness and told him to spare us his
>primitive ideas and tell us what we could do in that
>volatile confusion. I asked him what he had specially
>done after all to claim this so-called big victory
>when by all indication, the TSG that was supposed to
>resist made it so easy for them. It was clear that
>they both played equal roles in bring it to a peaceful
>end. So all we expected of them was to tell us what
>they had planned next and not some monkey and baboon
>story.
>After I was arrested the police CID wanted to build a
>case against me from that confrontation with Yaya. A
>senior police officer Jatta Baldeh asked me at the
>board reviewing the case of the detainees why I was
>rude to the chairman of the council at the state house
>on the 22nd July. It was simple to answer. I told him
>that at time he was nothing. There was no chairman
>until two days later.
>Anyway we all had our rifles in hand fully loaded,
>cocked and saved.
>At that point, Singhateh got up and held Yaya back
>while Majors Njie and Saho held me back too.
>"Listen to me gentlemen to tell you the background of
>this coup", said Singhateh after talking Yaya to sit
>down.
>He told us that the coup was originally organized by
>five of them: he, Lieutenant Barrow, 2Lt. Kanteh, 2Lt.
>Kinteh and 2Lt. Sabally. "Lieutenant Jammeh was not
>even part of it", he went on.
>"But we were betrayed by Barrow, Kinteh and Kinteh',
>he said.
>I looked at Barrow where he was sitting beside Capt.
>Sonko, but he was well composed and very quiet.
>Singhateh explained further how the two of them alone,
>he and Sabally, pursued the course to the end and that
>it was in the last days when they invited in Jammeh
>and Haidara.
>Yaya said nothing.
>In conclusion, Singhateh said that he even did not
>think that a meeting about what they should do next
>should be held in the absence of Sabally and Haidara.
>Major Saho turned around to me and said, "you heard
>that my brother? It is clear that the show belongs to
>the young officers, so we should allow them to finish
>their business."
>That statement froze all my spirit into a brick of
>ice.
>Lt. B. Barrow was the next to speak. He accepted being
>part of those who planned the coup in the beginning
>but disagreed with the statement that he betrayed the
>group. He said he was just not too comfortable with
>the timing.
>He however appealed to Singhateh to please let Capt.
>Mamat Cham and myself stay around to help forge ahead
>because of our experience and knowledge. It was
>endorsed by all.
>Just before the officers dispersed, Sabally arrived
>threatening to start a fight for having a meeting in
>his absence. He was yelling and screaming asking why
>there was a meeting in his absence.
>I think it was Singhateh who finally calmed him down.
>Before going home to see my family and change into a
>proper outfit for the operation, I had a brief meeting
>with Capt. Cham. In the end we decided that we were
>not going to fool ourselves. We did not have any idea
>about coups or what to do after. So we decided that
>General Dada who was still at his official residence
>angry with the government should be consulted to
>advice us.
>Anyway, I spent the night at the state house with all
>the monkeys and baboons.
>The following day, Sabally and Haidara started the
>wave of arrests and detention of officers. No reason
>was given for the madness.
>Till next time!
>
>Ebou Colly
>
>
>
>
>
>__________________________________________________
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