Halifa,

In our last slot, we formulated the theoretical prerequisite of key
institutional frameworks as appurtenances of the secular Liberal State to
replace the mercantilist State without which the liberal and Capitalist order
cannot subsist. To refresh our minds on the salient points of that slot, i
shall briefly recap three major points that hold together the edifice i
attempted to erect in the last slot. First, we pointed out that whatever it
is that prevails in Africa and the Gambia, is not Capitalist and most
certainly doesn't resemble anything liberal. Second, we noted that the
fundamental problem in African economies is primarily that of what we
contended to be the desultory machinations of the colonial heritage of the
mercantilist State and its almost inextricable connections with commerce and
industry at the expense of economic and individual freedom and efficiency.
Third, we posited that in correcting such a status-quo, a liberal would first
of all dismantle the mercantilist State in all its manifestations and replace
it with a secular Liberal State whose appurtenances would be liberal
democratic politics buoyed by free institutions like a robustly independent
and free judiciary; that exist primarily to safe-guard the liberal order and
Rule Of Law without which the liberal order eventually gets decimated by the
likely renewal of political reactionaries and renegades who are opposed to
the liberal order and ultimately inimical to individual liberties.

To the aforementioned delineation, we now add the philosophical subtext: the
apotheosis of the secular Liberal State vis-a-vis its relationship with the
economic, social and political direction of a polity is to primordially act
as an enabler, mechanism and facilitator that organically evolves - as the
polity goes through similar evolution - from the Big to the Limited; as
opposed to an all-giver,   guarantor, all-powerful, be-all and end-all in the
polity's economic, political and social life. In short, the apotheosis of the
role of the secular Liberal State in a polity's economic, social and
political life is the gratification of responsible, methodological and
critical individualism.

Of course, as a matter of both political and economic expediency, it makes no
sense to be wedded to a theory that practical realities of a polity would
undermine if such inimical practical realities of the said polity are not
brought around to help the subsistence of such a theory. A liberal
prescription of the African plight will begin life by first recommending a
programme of substantial radical modification of social, economic and
political structures without which the Liberal and Capitalist order cannot
subsist and would be another failure in the attempt to make Africa better. To
the extent that this is true, an African renewal would require a substantial
transitionary phase which will in principle and indeed, grudgingly use the
State as vehicle to re-write the rules of engagement on a radical scale such
that there is clear demarcation of what ought to be private or what is best
kept privately; and what can acceptably be public or best left to public
ownership or direction. The ramifications of such a transition programme
would be a complete evolution of economic, political and social ownership in
the polity. The duration of such a transition is debatable; i.e., it's
life-span will primarily depend on the extent to which the unique-ness and
depth of each of the polity's economic, social and political infrastructures'
degeneration, and how empirical truth determines the scale to which
public-driven regeneration can conceivably be maintained without crowding-out
private investment or initiatives. In short, the liberal renewal would
initiatially take the form of cautious and empirically determined economic
incubation of all public companies and or micro-economies until such a time -
again empirically determined according to the unique-ness of each public
company and or micro-economy - when they are ready to be hatched for private
ownership.

Let us now proceed to give the skeleton some flesh. As an example of how we
ought to proceed, especially within the Gambian context, i shall recall the
Gamtel example. Here, we emphasise that because of lack Gambian material that
fulfils the task at hand, we resort to Gamtel as an example - that is to say
that Gamtel happens to be the best illustration, within the Gambian context,
of what we mean to say.  That Gamtel, once upon a time, was the most
important, successful and efficient corporation in the Gambia, is not in
doubt. This to a extent is understandable; Gamtel was very unique from other
public corporations in its ownership: the corporation was the making of a
very ingenious public-private initiative in the form of technological and
financial investments from a French company and the government of the Gambia
undertaking some odd-ball investment responsibility. This was a very delicate
arrangement and the fine line that had to be walked was walked with the
delicacy required of it and the result was a complete revolution of the
Gambia's telecom industry and ranking her amongst the best of the best in
world telecom indices - perhaps, only South Africa besting the Gambia in
telecom performance on the African continent.  The tragedy that befell Gamtel
was that when it reached its hatching period for the public ownership of the
corporation to be completely phased out, the political climate of the country
had changed. It is now a matter of historical speculation as to the fate
Gamtel would have undergone, had the PPP remained in power. Doubtless,
though, that the privatisation of Gamtel handled as the corporation's affairs
were delicately handled during its early life, had all the prospects or
ingredients of successful privatisation and - why not? - an
international/regional outlook in corporate expansion. Yet, it is also
debatable that even under the PPP, with Gamtel reaching maturity for
privatisation, such a state of affairs would never have chanced: for the PPP
also was presiding over a mercantilist State and enjoyed all its trappings at
the expense of economic efficiency.

As the Gamtel case showed, public corporations under the tutelage of
experienced private investment are far more efficient and profitable than
those that are run by inept politicians and their political appointees.
Certainly, the experience is also that public corporations that started life
out on what i shall call here "the Gamtel principle" - that is a public
corporation nurtured under the tutelage of both public and private led
initiatives with the ultimate intention of shelving public ownership as soon
as it is economically feasible - are easier to transfer to private ownership.
Against such backdrop, the liberal renewal in the Gambia, would invoke the
"Gamtel principle" in the drive towards market liberalism of the economy.
Ditto, all Gambian public corporations and or micro-economies that the
cumbersome and grubby hands of the State still holds sway - from GPTC to
NAWEC - would pass through the economic incubation phase we have given the
local buzz phrase of "the Gamtel principle". The only possible exception that
comes to mind is the SSHFC; which economic imperative and logic dictates that
the farthest public control can be wrested from the corporation is to let it
remain a public-private venture - even if it reached a period where it is
fattened enough to be privatised. With the SSHFC, we will radically advocate
for a demerger of the corporation by privatising its Housing and Finance
divisions whilst Social Security retains a modicum of public tutelage without
completely crowding-out private investments and initiatives.

For the transition to translate into genuine free market liberalism, "the
Gamtel principle" cannot be decoupled from the dismantling of the
mercantilist State. The two processes ought to go in tandem together or else
each would turn out to be an exercise in futility. In short, economic
liberalism is political liberalism. I take note they are not exactly blood
brothers. Yet, few would doubt that an individual that is politically
liberated, is - all things being equal - on his way to translating his
political liberties into economic liberties and vice versa. Let Milton
Friedman explain:

 "Viewed as a means to the end of political freedom, economic arrangements
are important because of their effect on the concentration or dispersion of
power. The kind of economic organisation that provides economic freedom
directly, namely, competitive capitalism, also promotes political freedom
because it seperates economic power from political power and in this way
enables the one to offset the other. Historical evidence speaks with a single
voice on the relation between political freedom and a free market. I know of
no example in time or place of society that has been marked by a large
measure of political freedom, and that has not also used something comparable
to a free market to organize the bulk of economic activity.
.........The relation between political and economic freedom is complex and
by no means unilateral. In the early nineteenth century, Bentham and the
Philosophical Radicals were inclined to regard political freedom as a means
to economic freedom. They believed that the masses were being hampered by the
restrictions that were being imposed upon them, they would do what was good
for them, which was to vote for laissez faire. In retrospect, one cannot say
they were wrong. There was a large measure of political reform that was
accompanied by economic reform in the direction of a great deal of laissez
faire. An enormous increase in the well-being of the masses followed this
change in economic arrangements." [Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom,
pp 9-10, The University of Chicago Press, 1982]

Overall, the extent to which the proposed transition phase can be declared a
success or said to have reach maturity would be determined by the gloss on
the polity's index of political and economic freedoms; i.e., the gradual
withdrawal of the State from ALL economic spheres that are best left to
individual initiatives and private investors; the decentralisation and
dispersion of political power from the centre; the entrenchment of free
institutions; the wedding of the polity to Karl Popper's concept of the "Open
Society" of responsible individuals and a critical public;  the entrenchment
of individual and civil liberties. Hereunder, trade policy, price and wage
rules, labour market structures, intellectual and property rights, foreign
investment rules, taxation, government expenditure and intervention,
regulation policy, banking system, monetary and fiscal policy etc, etc, shall
all reflect political and economic liberalism.

I will, however, grant that regeneration of the farming crisis can
demonstrably be difficult to pigeonhole into industrial and commercial market
liberalism. For this reason, i shall shelve the liberal regeneration of the
farming crisis for the next slot, where i will do a critique of PDOIS'
Economic Programme. Yet that concession doesn't corrode my conviction that in
the long run, and after radical dismantling of all forms of economic
impediments and substantial structural modifications, farming fits
beautifully every jot and tittle of market and free trade liberalism.

All the best,

Hamjatta Kanteh

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