For your reading pleasure.
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Madiba.
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Subject: IMPLICATIONS OF COUP IN IVORY COAST FOR AFRICA
Centre for Democracy & Development's
Position Paper on the Putsch in Cote d'Ivoire
...........................
Joining the Instability Cycle:
The Coup d'Etat in Cote d'Ivoire must be condemned
Introduction
On Christmas day 1999, a military rebellion in the West African state of
la Côte d'Ivoire swept aside the Parti Démocratique de la Côte
d'Ivoire-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain Government of President Henri
Konan Bédié and installed a military junta headed by former Army Chief of
Staff, General Robert Guei. Looting and arson by ill-disciplined soldiers
have been going on in the commercial capital, Abidjan, as the
long-suffering civilian population begins paying twice for irresponsible
civilian governance and the start of military misrule. At the same time,
some civilians have been celebrating the exit of an irresponsible
government. Like most countries in the West African sub-region, where
state institutions have been reduced by graft and rent-seeking politics
into empty shells, it was enough to take advantage of mutiny by a section
of the Ivorian army for poor service conditions to subvert the
constitutional order. CDD unreservedly condemns the coup d'etat in Cote
d'Iviore and calls on the Ivorien people, the West African and
international community to isolate the military junta and pressurise it to
immediately restore the rule of law in la Cote d'Ivoire.
The Legacy of Houphouet Boigny
The late President Felix Houphouet Boigny, who reluctantly led the former
French colony to independence in 1960, came to symbolise the very essence
of the Ivorian nation. To France and the West at large, he represented
the ideal image of post-colonial Africa: His conservative politics,
including advocating dialogue with the former apartheid South Africa,
supporting the Biafra secessionist war in Nigeria and opposing closer
African integration, fit in with the wishes of the former colonial
masters. On the economic front, President Houphouet Boigny's uncritical
adherence to the free market and the dictates of the IMF and French
economic prescriptions endeared him to the existing patron-client economic
order.
Benefiting from Cold War-induced handouts, the Ivorian economy was held up
as the beacon of hope for the sub-region and the country was seen as the
oasis of stability. Beneath the apparent macro-economic growth, however,
lay mass poverty, an emaciated labour movement and mass illiteracy.
Dissent was crushed under the boots of the military - both local and
French. Thus, while the mass of the population was denied basic medical
care, President Boigny could spend hundreds of millions of dollars
transforming his native town, Yamoussoukro, into the new capital with a
replica Basilica to boot. He was the father of a patrimonial society, and
as such untouchable. Houphouet Boigny's death in 1990 changed all that.
Releasing Pent-up Anger
Since President Konan Bédié took over the reign of government, governance
in Côte d'Ivoire has been reduced to an act of crisis management aimed at
damage limitation. The economy has been in free fall while the hitherto
enfeebled civil society has become bolder and more vocal. Meanwhile Konan
Bédié lacked both the political astuteness and charisma of his predecessor
on the one hand, and the unconditional support of France on the other.
Since 1990 the Ivorian economy, still heavily dependent on cocoa and a few
agro-based product exports despite years of dicing with the Paris Club,
has nose-dived. Faced with difficult presidential elections in 1995, the
government spent millions of dollars of donor assistance to buy votes,
corrupt politicians and induce the restless army to put down mass
disturbances in the aftermath of rigged elections. In 1997, corrupt state
officials embezzled close to 20 billion CFA francs in EU aid. This led to
the suspension of over US$700 million of combined IMF and World Bank
credit facilities, with the donors demanding a full inquiry. 1997
therefore saw widespread industrial and student unrest as workers went for
months without pay and students were priced out of higher institutions
against the backdrop of falling educational standards. Only 30% of high
school students passed the 1997 baccalaureate exams. The army, until now
the beneficiaries of generous state handouts, also began to feel the pinch
of economic collapse and austerity. The discomfort of the army was clearly
evident in discussions with senior officials attending a colloquium on
civil military relations in Cote d'Ivoire's capital Abidjan, earlier this
month. October 2000 Elections
Thus, the ruling PDCI-RDA dynasty looked forward to next October's
presidential elections with trepidation. Alassane Dramane Ouattara, a
former Prime Minister under President Houphouet Boigny, had emerged as the
most likely candidate to win the elections. Until recently the deputy to
the outgoing IMF Managing Director- French national, Michel Camdessus,
Ouattara could not be labelled as anti-Paris and anti-market. Instead of
countering legitimate claims of inequality with government measures aimed
at redressing the appalling conditions of the poor, President Konan Bédié
resorted to xenophobia as his last card. As it is now customary, in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, former and present leaders Mobutu Sese Seko
and Laurent Kabila declared the local Tutsi as aliens; in Zambia,
President Chiluba has declared Kenneth Kaunda, who led the country to
independence, a foreigner. President Bédié took a leaf from this practice,
classifying Allasane Quattara as a Burkinabe who could therefore not
contest the forthcoming elections. His government had also threatened
long term residents from neighbouring Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria and
Mali with expulsion, blaming them for the economic and political malaise
in the country. It was no surprise that the military took advantage of
this situation to usurp power on 25 December and even those he expected to
come to his rescue quickly pledged loyalty to the junta leaders because of
the groundswell of opposition in the country against the country's
political and economic direction.
Accelerated Collapse of la Côte d'Ivoire?
While we understand the groundswell of opposition to the government of
President Bedie, the experience of West Africa with military regimes
cautions against indiscriminate endorsement of military do-gooders who
have come in the garb of a national salvation agenda. In this vein, CDD is
strongly of the view that what is required is focussed and unambiguous
condemnation of the coup d'etat on all sides. In arguing for outright
condemnation of the coup and non-cooperation by the civil society, we are
not oblivious of the space the military take-over offers politicians and
activists hitherto excluded from past governments, but we are cautioning
against misconstruing repackaged space for controlled clientelistic
politics as a new space for genuine democratic endeavour for opposition
politicians. We are also aware that President Bedie and his government
blocked all avenues for peaceful resolution of the Ivorien crisis and the
people were left with no alternative than to support any means of the
government's removal.
Even so, the scenario has always been the same in Africa. General Guei
who is no green horn in politics will attract key opposition members into
his government for legitimacy and credibility, promise to hold elections
soon and allow political parties to be formed, including one on whose
crest he would run and win elections as a transformed military leader.
The stage is already being set for this with current talks between General
Guei and the opposition parties. The outcome of this would be yet another
electoral democracy, which has no basis in popular will and another basis
for the politics of exclusion in the land. It is our hope that opposition
politicians will temper personal ambition with judicious popular demands
for genuine politics of meaning. The military in West Africa has always
taken advantage of genuine civilian grievances against governments and
intervened in politics only to make matters worse. The putschists in Côte
d'Ivoire owe their people and the international community an explanation
for their action: What has transformed them overnight from the instrument
of oppression against Ivorian citizenry into their redeemers? What is
their programme for societal transformation? With whose mandate are they
going to make decisions for the country?
Experience from the sub-region shows that, if not contained immediately,
the military intervention will only speed up the disintegration of Côte
d'Ivoire. The Ivorian army has no history of direct state intervention
except when it has been called upon to suppress civil unrest. The history
of the country is dotted with massacres committed by the army on behalf of
the government. The veteran opposition politician, Laurent Gbagbo of the
Front Populaire Ivoirien, has spent the post-independence years in the
country either as a detainee or under constant surveillance. With the
help of the military and gendarmérie, pro-democracy activists and students
have over the years been incarcerated or hounded into exile. The struggle
of the people against institutional graft and irresponsible governance
cannot be usurped by the military, especially a praetorian army. It does
not require any stretch of imagination to know that it is only a matter of
time before the army turns its guns against the people it purports to have
come to save. It should be recalled that General Guei was detained in
1995 for an alleged coup plot in the wake of the 1995 elections and was
removed as Chief of Army Staff as a result.
For those who have lost out in the current struggle for power, it is no
wolf crying to predict a determined effort to engineer instability in the
country from their bases in exile, further lurching a hapless population
into a cycle of instability among hungry power seekers. The outcome of
this unfolding development is one that cannot be easily captured at this
stage. Suffice it to say that its implications would reach further than
the borders of Cote d'Ivoire given the fluid nature of the region's
population and the fragile state of democratisation in the rest of the
region.
The Implications for the West African sub-region
The coup could have far reaching consequences on the fragile
democratisation process and the security landscape of West Africa beyond
the threat of state collppse in the country. From the standpoint of
governance and conflict management in West Africa since independence in
1960, two archetypal forms of state existed in the period between
independence in the sixties and the end of the Cold War. One half loosely
grouped the states that were internally and externally dynamic but wracked
by internal instability - Nigeria, Ghana, Benin, Guinea and, to some
extent Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. The other half was seen as moderate,
conservative and a paragon of tranquillity - Senegal, la Côte d'Ivoire,
Togo, Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Gambia.
While countries such as Ghana, Nigeria, Benin and Mali cannot as yet lay
claim to political stability, it is evident that civil society groups in
these communities have matured with the spate of past instability, adapted
to the environment and proven to be adept at managing conflict and change
relatively peacefully. Ironically, the opposite has been the case in the
'stable' countries of the past at the end of the Cold War. Liberia and
Sierra Leone have virtually collapsed. The war in Casamance is
threatening state dislocation in Senegal while the coup in Côte d'Ivoire,
if not carefully managed, could usher in a cycle of violence and
instability and Togo, fast becoming a haven for discredited and ousted
potentates, remains perched on the precipice of instability as well.
The calm in Côte d'Ivoire, just like the stability in Senegal, Sierra
Leone and Liberia, was too eerie and obscene to be natural. Below the
surface, the populations were subjected to mass poverty, alienation and a
denial of basic necessities - health and decent education. Above all,
they were denied a voice in matters of governance. Meanwhile, the ruling
civilian elite, usually in tandem with the co-opted military top brass,
presided over state machinery that rewarded institutional graft, patronage
and manipulated ethnic differences to keep the people divided and
incapable of collective resistance. Signs of restlessness among the
population have always been crushed with the help of the establishment's
military and external agencies. In the case of Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire,
French military bases often acted as additional prop for the Elysée's
client rulers - former Presidents Leopold Sédar Senghor and Houphouet
Boigny respectively.
Two developments have changed the situation and stacked the odds against
the ruling elite in these societies: Firstly, the end of the Cold War and
the supremacy of the liberal market have drastically reduced the value of
former prized states in the sub-region. Finally, the abdication of
Senghor and the death of Boigny - two key disciples and sacred cows of
Paris - have rendered the current ruling elite more dispensable.
Immediately, however, the coup in Côte d'Ivoire could impact on the
security of the sub-region in two distinct ways.
1. If the generals decide to cling on to power against the wishes of the
population, Cote d'Ivoire could implode adding to the refugee crisis in
the sub-region. At present, the country is home to several thousand
migrant peasants, workers and traders from the sub-region. In addition,
thousands more who have fled the wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone have
sought refuge in the country. The consequences of another war on the
sub-region cannot be overemphasised.
2. West Africa is fast becoming a region of pseudo-democracy where
soldiers usurp power, manipulate the democratisation process and entrench
themselves in power by swapping their military fatigues for suits. At
present the leaders of Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, the Gambia, Niger,
Nigeria, Guinea-Conakry, Guinea-Bissau and Togo are all former or serving
military officers who have legitimised their rule with constitutions
and/or stage-managed elections. La Cote d'Ivoire could follow suit if the
voices of reason and resistance are not clear and unambiguous in their
condemnation of what has happened. In many respects, this constitutes a
set-back to the democratisation drive in the region. The relative
political 'stability' that such arrangements bestow on the society is only
guaranteed by the threat of the gun and hardly underpinned by consent.
This should caution us against seeing these transitions as teleological
progressions that are hardly reversible especially in situations where
prolonged authoritarian rule has reduced the quality of civil society
input into the framework of democratisation.
The Role of France
It is no secret that the presence of French troops in Senegal and Cote
d'Ivoire has contributed in no small way in shoring up the regimes in
these countries. France maintains a defence pact with Côte d'Ivoire
dating back to 1961. France has a force of some 500 troops based in Port
Bouet. France, thus, could foil the coup if it had so wished. Claims of
its Ivorien based troops running out of ammunitions would seem too
convenient for us to swallow. Against this background, it is pertinent to
ask whether its acquiescence to the putsch is promoting or frustrating the
cause of democracy in Africa within the framework of the EU
Conflict-Prevention package for Africa.
What Must Be Done?
In analysing the remote and immediate causes of the brewing conflict in
Cote d'Ivoire, the Centre for Democracy & Development has put the current
conflict in perspective, with a view to proposing sustainable
conflict-management strategies for the country. Even as it exposes the
irresponsible governance under the Konan Bédié regime, the Centre wishes
to register its unreserved condemnation of the coup led by General Guei.
We call on the Ivorian people, ECOWAS, OAU and the rest of the
international community to condemn the coup and isolate the Guei junta
till such time that it restores constitutional order in the country.
Concretely, CDD calls for the following:
1. The non-recognition of the Guei junta by all state entities and the
immediate suspension of Côte d'Ivoire's membership of ECOWAS, the OAU and
La Francophonie pending the restoration of constitutional order.
2. Non-cooperation with the junta by the Ivorian people and their
community/civil society organisations.
The minimum basis for limited co-operation with the junta should be its
acceptance of the following demands:
3. The formation of a national unity government to organise the
following: q A national conference/Assemblée Nationale by the Ivorian
people to put together a new governance arrangement that ensures genuine
participation, association and representation.
An investigation into past violations and corruption in the country.
The holding of fresh elections by the original date of October 2000.
CDD, London, 26 December 1999.
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About the Centre for Democracy and Development
The Centre for Democracy and Development is a not for profit,
non-governmental, independent research, information and training
institution for democratic development, conflict management and
peace-building in the West African sub-region.
The Centre's work is grounded in an appreciation of the practical problems
that have inhibited democratic reform in the region, and the need to
strengthen civic organisations in their work, through the development of
the capacity to understand, anticipate, plan and forecast holistic
solutions to the problems of democracy and development in the region. It
provides information, conducts research and co-ordinates training aimed
towards the establishment and consolidation of an environment where
democratic institutions are strong, resilient and responsive to the needs
of the voting public.
For further information on this and other publications, please call the
Research and Publications Department, CDD on +44 (171) 407 0772; Fax: +44
(171) 407 0773. E-mail: [log in to unmask] Internet Website:
http://www.cdd.org.uk
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