Hi!
    Find below a piece I wrote in September 2004. Some of the issues raised are coming into play. Sorry I did not finish it then. Have a good evening.
                                                                                                                                                                                                    Buharry.

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Posted on Gambia-l on:
 Mon, 13 Sep 2004 16:17:56 +0200

Hi!
   The recent coalition victories in Jarra and Bakau, coupled with the recent announcements by Yaya Jammeh stating that no opposition will win against him and that developments slated for the next ten years will be greater than developments seen in the last, have made me think about the political situation in Gambia and the possibilities for the coalition in the 2006 elections. Whilst the momentum gathered by the coalition these past few months might give a feeling of invincibility, can one truly conclude that the few victories can be used to gauge their possibilities come 2006? Can the opposition win the 2006 elections? In order to answer this question, one needs to look at various factors.

The first set of factors will look at the APRC's possibilities and advantages that might hamper the coalition's efforts. It is important to look at the APRC as a viable force to be reckoned with and not just a party on its way to losing the 2006 elections. Many people have the tendency to conclude that just because Gambia is going through tough times, the days are numbered for the APRC. Whilst this might be a consoling sentiment, it is not rooted in reality. What is rooted in reality is that the APRC, despite all its failings is still a powerful force in Gambian politics privileged with many resources. In looking at the advantages of the APRC, one needs to first of all look at the party's position as a party in power and all the benefits incumbency entails especially in African politics. One of the most important
benefits is control of the media. Even if the government does not deliberately try to manipulate or tilt television, radio and newspaper coverage in its favour, the mere fact that government ministers, officials or the president himself, carrying out their normal public functions, get more media coverage, disadvantages the coalition. This will give them the opportunity to sell their platform and achievements especially if there are projects that are launched or finished around election time. Things will get worse regarding the media if the government decides to manipulate the public media in its favour. This will give it the lion's share of television, radio
and to a large extent print media. The coalition's ability to spread its programs will thus suffer.

Another important advantage the APRC has as a party in power is the vast resources of the state at its disposal. This includes both financial and material resources. Whilst it is in the letter of the law not allowed to take money from national coffers to finance the election campaign of any individual party, the APRC included, what is to stop the inclusion of such financing being entered as miscellaneous expenditure in some ministry or parastatal somewhere? What is to stop heads of parastatals from making "donations" as was done for the tenth anniversary of the A(F)PRC ? Money aside, the other resources of the state such as transportation, fuel etc. can be used to a great advantage. Whilst the coalition will need to hire transport and stand for the cost unless supporters provide such, the APRC has the advantage of using public transportation to transport its supporters around the country to attend rallies and beef up support. Private individuals and corporations that have a vested interest in seeing the continued control of the APRC are also a source of revenue and resources for the ruling party. These individuals or corporations might in some way want to preserve the status quo to protect their investments or might want to get contracts and other opportunities. They might then reason that being seen to be supporters and contributors will increase their chances or protect their investments.

The APRC can also engage in less subtle activities to increase its chances. It can use the law and security services to hamper the coalition's efforts. One of the most devastating of such tactics would be to stage a security scare such as a coup attempt, declare a state of emergency and postpone the elections. This has been done several times in other African countries. Another tactic would be use the law to disqualify certain individual politicians. Yet another tactic would be gerrymandering where constituency boundaries would be redrawn to suit the APRC and increase its chances of getting more favourable results. Raw harassment of and brutality against candidates and supporters and the rejection of permits for rallies by the coalition can also be used with devastating consequences for the coalition.

Given the homogeneous nature of the Senegambia people and the porous border, unqualified voters from Senegal (especially Casamance) can be furnished with
Gambian papers and used as a tipping block wherever the APRC feels threatened. This was lamented over during the previous elections when the opposition charged that residents of Casamance were smuggled into the country to vote despite the fact that they were not citizens.

Yet another tactic would be to annul the election results if the opposition is seen to have won on election day or just afterwards. This has happened in such places as Algeria where the military stepped in to cancel the results when it became obvious that Islamic candidates were on the verge of winning the elections. This has however tragically led to a civil war with devastating consequences.

All these methods and many more, at the hands of the APRC prove that it will be foolhardy to think that the APRC can be easily defeated. With so much to
lose, the party will predictably fight tooth and nail to stay in power.

Having looked at the factors surrounding the APRC as a viable player in the 2006 elections, let us now look at the coalition. Despite the fact that the coalition is the underdog in terms of resources and finance, many realities on the ground favour it. The deteriorating economic situation, the level of insecurity and the general sense of apathy can, if properly harnessed, bring about positive results. It is worth pointing out however that just taking these things for granted can result in a terrible shock for the coalition. This is because the same situation was prevalent in the previous elections but due to among other things, the opposition's failure to make practical use of it, the result was disappointment for them.

With the potential for the opposition to do things different this time around, the result can be different. The formation of the coalition to contest the by-elections was promising. However, there are many factors that the coalition will have to take into consideration in order to make an impact in the elections. Among these factors are the following.

The first is to clearly define the intent of the various parties in coming together as a block to contest the elections. Whilst this might seem matter-of-fact, the failure to reach a clear understanding at this stage can have unwanted repercussions during or after the elections. The coalition must decide whether it is a temporary tactical alliance formed with the sole purpose of defeating the APRC and setting in place mechanisms to ensure free and fair elections or a strategic, systematic alliance with wider and more long-term goals. The coalition must therefore clearly state all arrangements and agreements in such a way that no room will be left for doubts or misinterpretation. A draft should be made available to each party to take stock of at the party's decision-making level and enough time should be given to enable the parties to thoroughly analyse all aspects of the document. If after assessing the document, individual parties have questions or issues, these should be worked out and compromises should be reached to enable the coalition to get off the ground on a solid footing.

The second factor is identification and resolution of potential stumbling blocks. These can be numerous given the diversity of individuals and policies of the various parties. One of the most important of these is the identification of the coalition's election platform. The guiding word here should be compromise. All the parties must realise that the elections will not be contested on individual party lines but rather as a collective. This means that individual parties should not selfishly drive their agendas at the expense of the others as this will create problems. Large parties should not take advantage of their size and resources and small parties should also be flexible. What the parties should realise is if any individual party had the ability to defeat the APRC on its own, it would not be part of the coalition. It is the inability to individually defeat the APRC and the inevitable need to join forces with others to achieve this aim that is the guiding force behind the coalition. All parties should therefore enter and deal with negotiations as equal partners realising that the race can be so tight that the party most underestimated can be the deciding force.

Distribution of candidates across constituencies can also be a stumbling block and failure to strategically place candidates based on realistic factors can frustrate the coalition's ambitions. It must therefore decide on practical criteria that can be used not only to reasonably satisfy its members, but also to provide viable means to bring about success. In this vein, issues such as whether the number of candidates fielded should relate to the party's size or whether the chosen candidates should be deemed most electable for a particular constituency should be handled. 

Having the potential to be the most divisive issue, the selection of the presidential candidate to represent the coalition should be handled with care. Power play, secret deals, unfair tactics and other methods can all creep into play if caution is not practiced. How is the candidate to be chosen? Should he be chosen based on a party's size? In other words, should the largest party automatically have the right to choose its leader as the presidential candidate? Are there any personal, professional or other criteria that should be considered? Is there a mechanism in place to ensure that the wishes of the small parties are dealt with regarding this issue? Are there limitations on the presidential candidate to ensure his / her election would not mean the usurpation of power and nullification of the coalition as an entity? How will the president act if elected and how do important appointments take place? Is the president going to be the one to have the sole authority to appoint and fire important public figures or is there a mechanism that will ensure power-sharing when it comes to these and other important questions? Are there any safeguards to ensure that the president will not abuse power? All these and many more questions should be addressed.

Should the potential cabinet and other important positions be distributed now or should one wait until after the elections? This and the composition of the cabinet are other potential causes of contention. How should the ministries be allocated? Which party gets the important positions? Based on what? Can the distribution of cabinet positions be linked to the presidential candidate? If a party gets the presidential candidate, can it compromise on the other important positions? Concrete negotiations and the desire to compromise are needed to deal with the contentious issues likely to arise out of the question of distribution of cabinet and other positions. These are just a few issues that have the potential to be contentious and it is in the interests of the coalition's cohesiveness and survival to thoroughly and explicitly deal with them.

Stumbling blocks aside, there are more factors to take into account to increase the coalition's chances in the coming elections. One of the most important of these is identification of strategic issues and ways to highlight and make them issues during the campaign period. As alluded to earlier, the coalition is favoured by the economic, security etc. situations prevalent in the country that have resulted in despair and destitution among the populace. Will it however do a good job of using this situation and turning it to its favour? It all depends on how strategic an approach is used. The general economic decline and destitution is nationwide but there are region-specific issues that must be identified and hammered home. This should be done after either analyses or studies of the various constituencies and their needs or problems. This will ensure that targeted areas are approached with region-specific information. Where national issues are appropriate, these should also be taken up. Identifying region-specific issues will mean for example, that farming issues will be primarily targeted to areas where farming is carried out and not Banjul for instance. The problem of bumpsters will be targeted to areas where tourism is topical and not areas where people have probably never seen a tourist. This does not mean a strict delineation when some issues have national importance.

Another relevant factor is finance and resources. Since the coalition does not have the resources of the state at hand, it must create means of financing its activities and co-ordinating the activities of the various parties to avoid duplication of efforts. This means for example that two parties would not organise separate rallies in one village at the same time or within a few days of each other. The ideal would be for the various parties to pool their resources and co-ordinate their activities to ensure efficiency. Clear financial guidelines should be designed to delineate fiscal responsibility. 
                                                                                    
                                                                                                                                            BUHARRY.

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