> G-L Community:
This is to wish each and all a Happy New Year, a new year of good health and all that you wish for yourselves, family, and loved ones.
I am re-posting the above document (unaltered) as it was posted on the G-L two years ago (2000) at a time of growing political tensions in our beloved country.
It appears that President Jammeh is opening a new chapter in his relations with the Gambian people, Sir Dawda Jawara and other self-exiled Gambians of the previous regime. Jammeh's amnesty to all these Gambians is remarkable and he deserves our commendation. This could indeed see the beginning of a well over due healing. But as the saying goes, it is better late than never.
As you look through the document, it is clear that a lot has been accomplished by our efforts on Gambia-L and the government at home. Yet, so much more remains to be done on the G-L and the newly installed President and his government.
We must rededicate our efforts, complimented with prayer to seeing a better Gambia for all. And in light of the limited coalition's decision to not contest the national assembly elections, a NATIONAL CONFERENCE becomes especially appropriate. Read on!
>
> It Is Time to Heal: Toward Truth Telling, National Reconciliation and Justice in The Gambia
>
> (A Position Paper written on Behalf of GAMBIA-L, An International Cyberspace Community of Gambians and Those Interested in The Gambia)
>
>
> Submitted to:
> His Excellency, Alhaji Yahya Jammeh, President of the Republic of the Gambia
>
> Leaders of Political Parties
> Leaders of Religious and Civic Organizations
> The Secretary-General of the Gambia Bar Association
> The Secretary- General of the Gambia Press Association
> The Secretary-General of the Gambia Trades Union
> The Secretary-General of the Gambia Students Association
> The Secretary-General of the Gambia Teachers Union
> The Director of the Center for Democracy and Human Rights Studies
> __________________________________________________________________________
> It is Time to Heal: Toward Truth Telling, National Reconciliation and Justice in The Gambia
>
> (A Position Paper written on Behalf of GAMBIA-L, An International Cyberspace Community of Gambians and those interested in The Gambia)
> _________________________________________________________________________
>
> 1.
>
> Confession, forgiveness, and reconciliation in the lives of nations are not just airy-fairy religious and spiritual things, nebulous and unrealistic. They are the stuff of practical politics. Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Chairperson of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
>
> The future belongs to those who chose to grasp it, embrace it, and become one with change. Excellence born of necessity dictates that our quests must be both moral and righteous. All covetousness, excessiveness, pettiness and obsessions must now be set aside, we be broken by the quakes and consumed by the thunder that is to come. Rodney Coates, Professor, Sociology, Gerontology, Anthropology and Director of the Black World Studies Program, Miami University.
>
>
>
> Despite the transition to "civilian" rule in 1996, the aftermath of military rule (1994-1996) in The Gambia continues to have a traumatizing effect on the lives of many Gambians. And while the 1996/1997 Presidential and National Assembly elections effectively reduced the more overtly repressive attributes of military rule, and set in motion a process of limited "democratization", repression and military involvement in The Gambia’s political process remain strong. Continued human rights abuses by the ruling Patriotic Re-orientation and Construction Party (APRC), coupled with declining transparency and accountability in matters of governance, recent revelations of official corruption, not withstanding, are dark reminders of the period of military rule. This post military rule era has, however, witnessed simultaneously, limited growth in freedoms for "legal" opposition parties and their leaders to sometimes criticize government policy and hold political rallies. Yet, in
> spite of this welcome "democratic" opening, the national press remains muzzled by undemocratic military decrees from the era of overt military rule. With a doctored constitution whose legitimacy remains contested, and the existing ban on the major political parties and politicians, The Gambia’s political landscape has descended precariously into another form of structured authoritarianism. In the latter, the rules of the game remain poorly defined, characterized by intrigue and political subterfuge of bizarre proportions. It is also a system where feelings of trust, tolerance and reconciliation, despite president Jammeh’s call for the latter after the 1996 elections, are persistently undermined and secondary to the pursuit of power, survival and self-aggrandizement.
> Clearly, such a political atmosphere does not lend itself to mass political participation and democracy, both of which are fundamental rights that all Gambians are entitled. For democracy and democratic procedures to take root in The Gambia, citizens must have the trust that those in power play by the rules enshrined in the constitution, despite its inherent weaknesses and work to reform it. Barring this, those in power are likely to perpetuate themselves through election engineering, as was the case in the 1996 presidential election. This must not be allowed to happen again in the forthcoming presidential election of 2001. Gambians must maintain the right to choose in free and fair elections the government of the day in order to avert a political crisis. This impending crisis stemming from The Gambia’s current political stalemate must be resolved politically. It is important that the APRC leadership, together with leaders of opposition parties, women’s and
> religious organizations, trade union and student activists and elders, begin a dialogue whose aim would be to initiate the process of truth telling, national reconciliation and justice in The Gambia. This is because, success in building a genuine participatory democracy, based on the rule of law, will depend upon a broad range of factors. These include participation of The Gambia’s collective leadership, an active civil society, a reasonably free mass media and the existence of a supportive international political and economic environment.
> The primary objective of this position paper is to suggest ways of unhinging the national political debate from its current impasse, by recommending strategies that would initiate a national dialogue whose fundamental aims are truth telling, national healing, reconciliation and justice. The proposals presented in this position paper are the culmination of long and sometimes heated debate in November, 1999, on GAMBIA-L (G-L), a cyberspace community of Gambians and persons interested in The Gambia throughout the world. Created by Dr. Katim Touray in 1996 and hosted by St. John’s University in the United States of America, G-L is a forum where issues of relevance to The Gambia and Africa are discussed openly. With a membership numbering a little over six hundred, G-L is a free, non-partisan forum, which aims to foster understanding through critical debate and analysis of challenges facing The Gambia. While no systematic research has been conducted to determine the
> characteristics of its members in terms of age, income, education etc., it is safe to assume that G-L’s membership is very diverse politically, with a mix of students, professionals, laypersons, governmental and non-governmental organizations. It is a microcosm of The Gambia in its ethnic, religious age and gender configuration, harboring all the positive and contradictory attributes of Gambia society. Also called the Bantaba, it is a strong vehicle of free expression. What unites its members as a community is a vision and commitment to making The Gambia a country where Gambians and other nationalities can pursue a livelihood in freedom and dignity. While the views expressed in support of this initiative on G-L were not unanimous, it seems that the overwhelming sentiment is to help resolve the current political stalemate and in so doing, assist in the building of a truly democratic society in The Gambia. The anticipated benefits of such a dialogue are likely to be many,
> but one overarching potential consequence and one that enjoys broad consensus, is that of helping to improve the lives of Gambians through economic empowerment and democracy.
> Empirical studies examining the link between economics and democracy gained much popularity in the 1950s. And with the advent of globalization, interest in this debate has once more resurfaced in the 1990s. Virtually without exception, these studies have shown that democracy works best when people enjoy at least a minimal level of prosperity. Thus, the link between prosperity and democracy rests on the twin assumptions that: (1) prosperity legitimizes democracy and gives citizens a stake in the system. Additionally, it alleviates despair; and (2) prosperity enhances political awareness, conditions usually associated with feelings of trust, tolerance and other factors important to democracy. More important, is that the link between economic empowerment and democracy is premised on the presumption that an equitable distribution of society’s wealth is a primary obligation of government. Unfortunately, post-independence government policy in The Gambia has created new and
> reinforced pre-existing social and economic inequalities.
> A lot has been written and said by researchers and journalists alike about the Jawara and Jammeh regimes. In fact, comparisons have been made as to their efficacy or lack thereof in upholding democracy and human rights. A detailed performance evaluation of these regimes is beyond the scope of this paper. Furthermore, this has been undertaken elsewhere. It would suffice to say, however, that after almost thirty years of Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) rule under Jawara, only marginal improvements in the lives of Gambians were registered. Under Jammeh, initial declarations not withstanding, the state of human rights and economic well being of most Gambians has deteriorated. Although, some infra-structural projects that could have long-term benefits, were undertaken by the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC) and APRC governments. The investigations of alleged corruption and abuse of power under Jawara by the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council, revealed
> instances of official graft at multiple levels of government. The Nigerian oil scandal, corruption at Gambia’s Co-operative Union, the Women’s Bureau and ghost workers whose salaries went to some top government officials were emblematic of deep rooted corruption under Jawara’s leadership. Thus, an important plank in building democracy in The Gambia involves truth telling and the acknowledgement of wrongdoing. These are necessary steps to national healing, reconciliation and justice. Otherwise, efforts of national healing and reconciliation would be of little consequence.
> Since its seizure of power in 1994, a dark cloud of suspicion has loomed over the AFPRC and continues to affect public perceptions of the current APRC government. In particular, the sudden and mysterious death of former minister of the Interior Sadibu Haidara while in prison in June 1995 and the death of AFPRC’s Finance minister, Ousman "Korro" Ceesay, which occurred 19 days later in a burnt-out car, continues to fuel strong suspicion of culpability of some military members of the former AFPRC government. In fact, recent allegations by Ex-captain Ebou Jallow, a former spokesman of the AFPRC and now in exile in the United States of America, indicated an insidiously calculated murder by some military members of the AFPRC. Jallow’s allegations must, however, be taken with caution, as he, the current president, Yahya Jammeh, and some military members of the AFPRC are heavily implicated in a $35m embezzlement of a Taiwanese loan to The Gambia. Less talked about however,
> are the lives lost as a result of an alleged counter coup attempt against the AFPRC on November 11, 1994, that led to the death of about 40 soldiers and the alleged summary execution of many more. These deaths in particular, and the manner in which they occurred have left an indelible scar on The Gambia’s post-colonial history and on the collective memory of Gambians. Broken promises of government investigation to families of the deceased, recently prompted retired headmaster, Sainey Ceesay, Korro’s father, to urge government resumption of the investigations in goodfaith. The pleas by Cessay and others are indicative of national frustration and a plea for justice for all the families who lost their loved ones. These instances of gross human rights violations, including the disappearance of Waa Lamin Juwara, a leading member of the United Democratic Party (UDP) and instances of brutality against ordinary citizens must be investigated systematically and acknowledged. It is
> in this regard, that Truth and Reconciliation Commissions play a critical role in a country like The Gambia struggling to come to terms with a period in her history of gross human rights violations.
>
>
> What Is a Truth and Reconciliation Commission?
>
> Truth commissions as they are called generically, are bodies set up to investigate a past history of violations of human rights in a country. These could include violations by the military or civilian governments as was in Uganda for instance, under Idi Amin and Milton Obote in 1974 and 1986 respectively. In Africa, South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission after the 1994 elections and headed by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, is perhaps most widely know and recognized for its work. Yet, in 1992 and 1993 the African National Congress (ANC) set up internal truth commissions to investigate alleged internal human rights abuses of detainees at their camps in Zambia and other Frontline States. Similarly, truth commissions were also established in Zimbabwe (1985), Chad (1991), Rwanda (1993) and Ethiopia (1993) to name a few in Africa. In South America, truth commissions were set up in Bolivia (1982-1984), Argentina (1983-1984) and in Chile (1990-1991) in particular, to
> investigate human rights atrocities. Closer to home, in Chad a Commission of Inquiry on the Crimes and Misappropriations Committed by Ex-President Habre, his Accomplices and /or Accessories in 1991-1992 was also established. Truth commissions are typically set up by the executive branch of government and sometimes by the legislative branch. Alternatively, truth commissions can be set up by the United Nations (UN) as in Rwanda or by domestic non-governmental organizations (NGOs) whose impartiality is beyond reproach.
> In the end, they are set up to facilitate truth telling, national healing, reconciliation and justice. And depending on its mandate truth commissions are sometimes limited to issues of investigation, data analysis and not in prosecution or amnesty. South Africa’s truth and reconciliation commission under Tutu, however, was empowered to both prosecute and grant amnesty to those who failed to acknowledge or admitted to the commission of political crimes under apartheid. Ultimately, then, the defined mission and mandate of a truth commission, whatever its characteristics, is a political decision hatched by the political actors in a country and reflective of the political realities in that country.
> In many instances truth commissions tend to confirm what to many is common knowledge. Thus, what they often do in earnest is to help the process of acknowledgement. Acknowledgement of the truth implies that the state and its agents own up to the crimes and human rights violations committed in its name. Indeed, it is this official acknowledgement that initiates the national healing and reconciliation process. And depending on the mandate of the commission, compensation for victims or their families are disbursed. In other instances an apology is all that is mandated or both.
> In setting up a truth commission, it is important that it be perceived as neutral by the public and hence less susceptible to executive and /or legislative manipulation and directives. Often commissioners are citizens of good moral standing who reflect the social, economic, religious, gender and sometimes regional composition of a country. And all are distinguished by their years of committed service to a country. It is also not unusual to have within these commissions reputable legal scholars and practitioners whose sole objective is to unearth the truth.
> A compelling concern, however, is whether truth commissions help promote healing and reconciliation or whether as some would argue, deepen resentment by digging up old issues. Others still argue that national healing and reconciliation could occur in the absence of a truth commission and that those implicated in human rights abuses are likely to oppose its creation. Similarly, support is likely to be strong among those marred by human right abuse. When judiciously conducted, however, truth commissions could empty old wounds of all infection and begin the healing process. If Gambians were to establish a truth and reconciliation commission to investigate violations of human rights under the AFPRC and APRC governments, its success would depend on the role played by domestic actors and the support received from the international community. In The Gambia’s case, the limited availability of material resources could be a serious impediment to the creation of a truth
> commission. This is because the commission, commissioners and their support staff must be availed the tools to do an effective job and be adequately compensated. It is here that domestic organizations, both governmental and non-governmental could play a decisive role and make a contribution to healing, reconciliation and justice. If a truth commission were to be established in The Gambia, it would have to be set up by the state or an act of the National Assembly to ensure transparency. Nominations to the truth commission would be invited from all quarters of society. And once a truth commission is in place, various issues including, but not limited to these need to be decided:
> (1) Objective(s) of the commission, its duration and periods to be investigated;
> (2) Type of human rights abuses the commission is mandated to investigate; and
> (3) Time for the submission of the final report to the state and/ or National Assembly.
>
> It should be noted that truth commissions are only one avenue, albeit, an important one toward national reconciliation, healing and renewal. Also, for truth commissions to have a lasting effect, other institutional reforms in the judiciary, military and the constitution to reduce the likelihood of future abuse must accompany them. Truth telling, national healing, reconciliation and justice must also be extended to the economic domain to investigate firms and/or persons that may have benefited illegally by their association with the regime or government officials. Conversely, individuals and firms that have been adversely impacted economically by capricious government policy action(s) must be compensated for their loss. The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) contends that the closure by the Jammeh government of Citizen FM Radio in February 1998, the sacking of two leading journalists, Demba Jawo and Theophilus George and the purchase of the Daily Observer
> newspaper by Amadou Samba, a businessman believed to be close to the APRC, constituted gross violations of human rights. These contentions by the CMAG need to be investigated accordingly by a truth commission, in addition to the causes leading to the deportation of Kenneth Best, a former proprietor and founder of the Daily Observer newspaper in The Gambia.
> Commissions of inquiry are not alien to The Gambia’s legal and political culture. Indeed, they have been routinely used at various times by the Jawara and Jammeh administrations to look into extant allegations of maleficence. What distinguishes the latter from truth commissions, however, is that truth commissions focus on the past and are generally allowed greater access to information, greater security or protection to dig into sensitive issues. Admittedly, and in reality, the distinction between the two is thin and can become blurred depending on their mandate and scope.
> Alternatively, a national conference or in conjunction with a truth commission could be an important vehicle in resolving The Gambia’s current political impasse. Used more extensively in Francophone Africa, the national conference involves a broad coalition of leaders from all sectors of society. And similar to the truth commission, its members include elders, religious leaders, women’s groups, labor and student activists and the ruling and opposition political leaders. Together, a national gathering is convened at the country’s capital to debate and deliberate the contours of a new democratic political order. At its best, the national conference replicates at the national political level the ubiquitous Bantaba where mostly male participants have the right to voice an (and less often her) opinion. And decisions are made only when agreed upon by every participant. The use of the principles that underpin the Bantaba could serve as the basis of an evolving, albeit,
> embryonic political system similar to the Kgotla in Botswana. The success of this vehicle in Benin, in particular, suggests that it is an effective instrument in addressing a national political stalemate or crisis. More than eighteen years of authoritarian rule under Mathieu Kerekou were peacefully overcome by a 488-member national conference that lasted ten days. While Kerekou was ousted in the process, he returned a few years later as president under free and fair elections. If tailored well, the national conference could help establish fair rules of the game, a level playing field for all parties and politicians and in so doing, provide a legitimate political governance framework for The Gambia.
> There is general agreement in the international community that The Gambia’s current political arrangement does not bode well for peace, stability and development. This is because Gambians are largely excluded from participation in the very policies that are intended to improve their lives. Furthermore, the political machinery is skewed disproportionately in favor of Jammeh and the APRC. Thus, G-L agreed to the formation of a " Group of 10" to monitor, recommend, commend and if necessary condemn government action or inaction. Additionally, it was agreed that the same scrutiny be made of other political parties and their leaders, citizens, and residents in The Gambia, whose acts and/or activities threaten the "national interest" not of the state necessarily, but of ordinary Gambians.
> What follows is a summary of various proposals and strategies from members of GAMBIA-L. They are supportive of the call for truth telling, national healing/reconciliation and justice. The proposals are reflective of our commitment to positively engage president Jammeh, his government, the national assembly, political parties, civic groups, and other organizations in civil society. We share and support the concerns and sentiments expressed by the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) held in Durban South Africa in November 1999 and call upon President Yahya Jammeh, his government, opposition political party leaders and members of civic and religious organizations to:
>
> * Convene a national conference to determine The Gambia’s future political framework;
> * Establish a truth and reconciliation commission to investigate past violations of human rights in order to facilitate truth telling, national healing and reconciliation;
> * Unban all political parties and politicians to ensure free and fair elections in 2001/02 and a government based on the rule of law;
> * Review the constitution, introduce a clause for term-limits for all politicians, including the presidency;
> * Obey electoral laws and regulations enacted by the Independent Electoral Commission so as to ensure a level playing field for all political parties and their candidates;
> * Provide equal access to media outlets such that all political parties have their platform(s) known to the public;
> * Create an atmosphere where fear of retribution is not a constraint to the free expression of one’s beliefs, in print and/or verbally; and
> * Train army, police and other security agents of the state to both defend and promote the human rights of Gambians, other nationalities and specifically journalists.
>
> It is our ardent hope that these short-term proposals are acted upon soon in preparation for the forthcoming presidential and national assembly elections of 2001/02.
> In the long-term, we also call upon President Yahya Jammeh or the government of the day to:
> * Create an enabling economic environment such that Gambians and other nationalities resident in The Gambia can pursue a livelihood in/with dignity irrespective of ethnicity, gender, age, religion, political affiliation and social standing; and
> * Work toward and vigorously support gender equality and other activities that empower women and young girls.
>
> We call upon the The Gambia’s Development Partners, the United Nations (UN), the Commonwealth, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the United States Congress, the Black Caucus of the
> United States Congress and Amnesty International for their support and help us to create
> in The Gambia, a truly democratic political framework.
>
>
> CONCLUSION
>
> At a time when many countries in Africa are moving away from authoritarian rule in favor of democratization and democracy, The Gambia can not remain isolated and insulated for long from this global wave. And in light of the many social and economic challenges that face Gambians as a people, it is important that solutions be found to avert what otherwise could be a bleak and brutal future. While we can not predict the future, we can begin to prepare for it. Also, as we witness the dawn of a new millennium our call for reform and change becomes more urgent. The Gambia, already disadvantaged because of its relatively small size and undiversified economy, must create a niche for herself in the global economy so as to attract needed investments from within and abroad. We must embrace the future in order to face, what in The Gambia’s case are daunting challenges. Clearly, while the long-term proposals recommended herein may take longer to achieve, those of a short-term
> nature are more readily achievable by 2001/02. Together, these proposals harbor important ingredients for the much-needed tasks of truth telling, national healing, reconciliation, justice and democracy.
>
> Sources Consulted
>
> Jamal Benomar, " Confronting the Past: Justice After Transitions," Journal of Democracy (January 1993).
>
> Jamal Benomar, Coming to Terms with the Past: How Emerging Democracies Cope With a History of Human Rights Violations (Carter Center of Emory University, 1 July 1992).
>
> Richard Carver, "Called to Account: How African Governments Investigate Human Rights Violations," African Affairs, Vol. 89 (1990).
>
> David Cook and Arnold Hughes, "The Politics of Economic Recovery: The Gambia’s Experience of Structural Adjustment, 1985- 94," Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 35, No. 1 (March 1997).
>
> John Harbeson and Donald Rothchild (eds.) Africa in World Politics: The African State System in Flux (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000).
>
> Priscilla Hayner, " Fifteen Truth Commissions-1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study," Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 16(1994).
>
> Monte Palmer, Political Development: Dilemmas and Challenges (Itasca, Illinois: F.E. Peacock, Inc., 1997).
>
> Nicoli Nattrass, "The Truth and Reconciliation Commission on Business and Apartheid: A Critical Evaluation," African Affairs, Vol. 98, No. 392 (1999).
>
> Abdoulaye Saine, " The Coup d’Etat in The Gambia, 1994: The End of the First Republic,"Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 23, No.1 (1996)
>
> Abdoulaye Saine, "The 1996/1997 Presidential and National Assembly Elections in The Gambia," Electoral Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4. (1997).
>
> Abdoulaye Saine, "The Military’s Managed Transition to "Civilian Rule" in The Gambia," Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Winter 1998).
>
> Abdoulaye Saine, "The Political Economy of Human Rights: State Sovereignty and International Humanitarian Military Intervention in the Post Cold War Era," International Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (December 1999).
>
> Abdoulaye Saine, "The Soldier-Turn Presidential Candidate: A Comparison of Flawed "Democratic" Transitions in Ghana and The Gambia," Journal of Political and Military Sociology (March 2000).
>
> Abdoulaye Saine, "The Military and Human Rights in The Gambia: 1994-1999," Journal Of Third World Studies, (March 2000).
>
> Abdoulaye Saine, "Gambia’s Foreign Policy Since the Coup: 1994-1999," Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, (July 2000)
>
> Jeremy Sarkin, "The Trials and Tribulations of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission," South African Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 12 (1996).
>
> Jeremy Sarkin, "Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Rwanda," Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 3 (1999).
>
> Peter Schraeder, African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation (Boston: St. Martin’s, 2000).
>
> John Wiseman and Elizabeth Vidler, "The July 1994 Coup d’Etat in The Gambia," The Roundtable, Vol. 333 (1995).
>
> John Wiseman, "Military Rule in The Gambia: An Interim Assessment," Third World Quarterly, Vol. 17 (1996).
>
> John Wiseman, "The Gambia from Coup to Elections," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 8 (1998).
>
>
>
>
> Acknowledgements:
> I wish to thank members of the entire GAMBIA-L cyberspace community and its managers for their invaluable input, suggestions, criticisms and spirited debate since the subject of national healing and reconciliation were first raised on November 11, 1999. The proposals and recommendations in this paper were generated as a result of these activities. I however, take responsibility for any errors.
>
>
> * Abdoulaye Saine, Ph.D., teaches African Politics and International Relations at Miami University.
>
> Address for correspondence: Abdoulaye Saine, Department of Political Science, 218 Harrisson Hall, Miami University, Oxford, OH 45056, USA.
> Phone: (513) 529-2489; Fax: (513) 529-1709;E-mail: [log in to unmask]
>
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