Understanding Empire: Hierarchy, Networks and Clients 


by Prof. James Petras
 
Global Research, March 19, 2007 
James Petras Web Site  


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The structure of power of the world imperial system can best be 
understood through a classification of countries according to their 
political, economic, diplomatic and military organization.


Introduction:

The imperial system is much more complex than what is commonly 
referred to as the ?US Empire?. The US Empire, with its vast network of 
financial investments, military bases, multi-national corporations and 
client states, is the single most important component of the global 
imperial system (1). Nevertheless, it is overly simplistic to overlook 
the complex hierarchies, networks, follower states and clients that 
define the contemporary imperial system (2). To understand empire and 
imperialism today requires us to look at the complex and changing 
system of imperial stratification.

Hierarchy of Empire
 
The structure of power of the world imperial system can best be 
understood through a classification of countries according to their 
political, economic, diplomatic and military organization. The 
following is a schema of this system:

I. Hierarchy of Empire (from top to bottom)
A. Central Imperial States (CIS)
B. Newly Emerging Imperial Powers (NEIP)
C. Semi-autonomous Client Regimes (SACR)
D. Client Collaborator Regimes (CCR)

II. Independent States:
A. Revolutionary
Cuba and Venezuela
B. Nationalist
Sudan, Iran, Zimbabwe, North Korea

III. Contested Terrain and Regimes in Transition
Armed resistance, elected regimes, social movements 

At the top of the imperial system are those imperial states whose 
power is projected on a world scale, whose ruling classes dominate 
investment and financial markets and who penetrate the economies of the 
rest of the world.  At the apex of the imperial system stand the US, 
the European Union (itself highly stratified) and Japan.  Led by the US 
they have established networks of ?follower imperial states? (largely 
regional hegemons) and client or vassal states which frequently act as 
surrogate military forces.  Imperial states act in concert to break 
down barriers to penetration and takeovers, while at the same time, 
competing to gain advantages for their own state and multinational 
interests.   

Just below the central imperial states are newly emerging imperial 
powers (NEIP), namely China, India, Canada, Russia and Australia.  The 
NEIP states are subject to imperial penetration, as well as expanding 
into neighboring and overseas underdeveloped states and countries rich 
in extractive resources.  The NEIP are linked to the central imperial 
states (CIS) through joint ventures in their home states, while they 
increasingly compete for control over extractive resources in the 
underdeveloped countries.  They frequently ?follow? in the footsteps of 
the imperial powers, and in some cases take advantage of conflicts to 
better their own position.

For example China and India?s overseas expansion focuses on 
investments in extractive mineral and energy sectors to fuel domestic 
industrialization, similar to the earlier (1880-1950?s) imperial 
practices of the US and Europe.  Similarly China invests in African 
countries, which are in conflict with the US and EU, just as the US 
developed ties with anti-colonial regimes (Algeria, Kenya and 
Francophone Africa) in conflict with their former European colonial 
rulers in the 1950? and 1960?s.
 
Further down the hierarchy of the imperial system are the ?semi-
autonomous client regimes? (SACR).  These include Brazil, South Korea, 
South Africa, Taiwan, Argentina, Saudi Arabia, Chile and lately 
Bolivia.  These states have a substantial national economic base of 
support, through public or private ownership of key economic sectors.  
They are governed by regimes, which pursue diversified markets, though 
highly dependent on exports to the emerging imperial states.  On the 
other hand these states are highly dependent on imperial state military 
protection (Taiwan, South Korea and Saudi Arabia) and provide regional 
military bases for imperial operations.  Many are resource-dependent 
exporters (Saudi Arabia, Chile, Nigeria and Bolivia) who share revenues 
and profits with the multi-nationals of the imperial states.  They 
include rapidly industrialized countries (Taiwan and South Korea), as 
well as relatively agro-mineral export states (Brazil, Argentina and 
Chile). 

The wealthy oil states have close ties with the financial ruling 
classes of the imperial counties and invest heavily in real estate, 
financial instruments and Treasury notes which finance the deficits in 
the US and England. 

On key issues such as imperial wars in the Middle East, the invasion 
of Haiti, destabilizing regimes in Africa, support for global neo-
liberal policies and imperial takeovers of strategic sectors, they 
collaborate with rulers from the CIS and the NEIP.  Nevertheless, 
because of powerful elite interests and in some cases of powerful 
national social movements, they come into limited conflicts with the 
imperial powers.  For example, Brazil, Chile and Argentina disagree 
with the US efforts to undermine the nationalist Venezuelan 
government.  They have lucrative trade, energy and investment relations 
with Venezuela.  In addition they do not wish to legitimize military 
coups, which might threaten their own rule and legitimacy in the eyes 
of an electorate partial to President Chavez.  While structurally 
deeply integrated into the imperial system, the SACR regimes retain a 
degree of autonomy in formulating foreign and domestic policy, which 
may even conflict or compete with imperial interests.
 
Despite their ?relative autonomy?, the regimes also provide military 
and political mercenaries to serve the imperialist countries.  This is 
best illustrated in the case of Haiti.  Subsequent to the US invasion 
and overthrow of the elected Aristide Government in 2004, the US 
succeeded in securing an occupation force from its outright client and 
?semi-autonomous? client regimes.  President Lula of Brazil sent a 
major contingent.  A Brazilian General headed the entire mercenary 
military force.  Chile?s Gabriel Valdez headed the United Nations 
occupation administration as the senior official overseeing the bloody 
repression of Haitian resistance movements.  Other ?semi-autonomous? 
clients, such as Uruguay and Bolivia, added military contingents along 
with soldiers from client regimes such as Panama, Paraguay, Colombia 
and Peru.  President Evo Morales justified Bolivia?s continued military 
collaboration with the US in Haiti under his presidency by citing its 
?peacekeeping role?, knowing full well that between December 2006 and 
February 2007 scores of Haitian poor were slaughtered during a full-
scale UN invasion of Haiti?s poorest and most densely populated slums. 
 
The key theoretical point is that given Washington current state of 
being tied down in two wars in the Middle East and West Asia, it 
depends on its clients to police and repress anti-imperialist movements 
elsewhere.  Somalia, as in Haiti, was invaded by mercenaries by 
Ethiopia, trained, financed, armed and directed by US military 
advisers.  Subsequently, during the occupation, Washington succeeded in 
securing its African clients (via the so-called Organization of African 
Unity according to the White House?s stooge, Ugandan Army spokesman 
Captain Paddy Ankunda) to send a mercenary occupation army to prop up 
its unpopular client Somali warlord ruler.  Despite opposition from its 
Parliament, Uganda is sending 1500 mercenaries along with contingents 
from Nigeria, Burundi, Ghana and Malawi.

At the bottom of the imperial hierarchy are the client collaborator 
regimes (CCR).  These include Egypt, Jordan, the Gulf States, Central 
American and Caribbean Island states, the Axis of Sub-Saharan States 
(ASS) (namely Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Ghana), Colombia, 
Peru, Paraguay, Mexico, Eastern European states (in and out of the 
European Union), former states of the USSR (Georgia, Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan, Latvia, etc), Philippines, Indonesia, North Africa and 
Pakistan.  These countries are governed by authoritarian political 
elites dependent on the imperial or NEIP states for arms, financing and 
political support.  They provide vast opportunities for exploitation 
and export of raw materials.  Unlike the SACR, exports from client 
regimes have little value added, as industrial processing of raw 
materials takes place in the imperial countries, particularly in the 
NEIP.  Predator, rentier, comprador and kleptocratic elites who lack 
any entrepreneurial vocation rule the CCR.  They frequently provide 
mercenary soldiers to service imperial countries intervening, 
conquering, occupying and imposing client regimes in imperial targeted 
countries.  The client regimes thus are subordinate collaborators of 
the imperial powers in the plunder of wealth, the exploitation of 
billions of workers and the displacement of peasants and destruction of 
the environment. 

The structure of the imperial system is based on the power of ruling 
classes to exercise and project state and market power,  retain control 
of exploitative class relations at home and abroad and to organize 
mercenary armies from among its client states.  Led and directed by 
imperial officials, mercenary armies collaborate in destroying 
autonomous popular, nationalist movements and independent states.

Client regimes form a crucial link in sustaining the imperial powers.  
They complement imperial occupation forces, facilitating the extraction 
of raw materials.  Without the ?mercenaries of color? the imperial 
powers would have to extend and over-stretch their own military forces, 
provoking high levels of internal opposition, and heightening overseas 
resistance to overt wars of re-colonization.  Moreover client 
mercenaries are less costly in terms of financing and reduce the loss 
of imperial soldiers.  There are numerous euphemistic terms used to 
describe these client mercenary forces:  United Nations, Organization 
of American States and Organization of African Unity ?peacekeepers?, 
the ?Coalition of the Willing? among others.  In many cases a few white 
imperial senior officers command the lower officers and soldiers of 
color of the client mercenary armies.

Independent States and Movements
 
The imperial system while it straddles the globe and penetrates deeply 
into societies, economies and states is neither omnipotent nor 
omniscient.  Challenges to the imperial system come from two sources: 
relatively independent states and powerful social and political 
movements.
 
The ?independent? states are largely regimes, which are in opposition 
to and targeted by the imperial states.  They include Venezuela, Cuba, 
Iran, North Korea, Sudan and Zimbabwe.  What defines these regimes as 
?independent? is their willingness to reject the policies of the 
imperial powers, particularly imperial military interventions.  They 
also reject imperialist demands for unconditional access to markets, 
resources and military bases. 

These regimes differ widely in terms of social policy, degree of 
popular support, secular-religious identities, economic development and 
consistency in opposing imperialist aggression.  All face immediate 
military threats and /or destabilization programs, designed to replace 
the independent governments with client regimes. 

Contested Terrain
 
The imperial hierarchy and networks are based on class and national 
relations of power.  This means that the maintenance of the entire 
system is based on the ruling classes dominating the underlying 
population ? a very problematical situation given the unequal 
distribution of costs and benefits between the rulers and the ruled.  
Today massive armed resistance and social movements in numerous 
countries challenge the imperial system. 

Contested terrain includes: Iraq, Afghanistan, Colombia, Somalia, 
Palestine, Sudan and Lebanon where armed resistance is intent on 
defeating imperial clients.  Sites of mass confrontations include 
Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Iran where the imperial powers are 
intent on overthrowing newly elected independent regimes.  Large scale 
social movements organized to combat client regimes and the imperial 
patrons have recently emerged in Mexico, Palestine, Lebanon, China, 
Ecuador and elsewhere.  Inside the imperial states there is mass 
opposition to particular imperial wars and policies, but only small and 
weak anti-imperialist movements.

The Anomaly:  Israel in the Imperial System
 
Israel is clearly a colonialist power, with the fourth or fifth 
biggest nuclear arsenal and the second biggest arms exporter in the 
world.  Its population size, territorial spread and economy however are 
puny in comparison with the imperial and newly emerging imperial 
powers.  Despite these limitations Israel exercises supreme power in 
influencing the direction of United States war policy in the Middle 
East via a powerful Zionist political apparatus, which permeates the 
State, the mass media, elite economic sectors and civil society (3a).  
Through Israel?s direct political influence in making US foreign 
policy, as well as through its overseas military collaboration with 
dictatorial imperial client regimes, Israel can be considered part of 
the imperial power configuration despite its demographic constraints, 
its near universal pariah diplomatic status, and its externally 
sustained economy.

Regimes in Transition
 
The imperial system is highly asymmetrical, in constant disequilibrium 
and therefore in constant flux ? as wars, class and national struggles 
break out and economic crises bring down regimes and raise new 
political forces to power.  In recent times we have seen the rapid 
conversion of Russia from a world hegemonic contender (prior to 1989), 
converted into an imperial client state subject to unprecedented 
pillage (1991-1999) to its current position as a newly emerging 
imperial state.  While Russia is one of the most dramatic cases of 
rapid and profound changes in the world imperialist system, other 
historical experiences exemplify the importance of political and social 
changes in shaping countries? relationship to the world imperial 
system.  China and Vietnam, former bulwarks as independent, anti-
imperialist states, have seen the rise of liberal-capitalist elites, 
the dismantling of the socialized economy and China?s incorporation as 
a newly emerging imperialist power and Vietnam as a semi-autonomous 
client regime. 

The major transitions during the 1980?s ? 1990?s involved the 
conversion of independent anti-imperialist states into imperial client 
regimes.  In the Western hemisphere, these transitions include 
Nicaragua, Chile, Bolivia, Argentina, Jamaica and Grenada.  In Africa, 
they include Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Algeria, Ethiopia and 
Libya, all converted into kleptocratic client regimes.  In Asia similar 
processes are afoot in Indo-China.  Because of the disastrous 
consequences of imperial-centered policies administered by client 
regimes, the first decade of the new millennium witnessed a series of 
massive popular upheavals and regime changes, especially in Latin 
America.  Popular insurrections in Argentina and Bolivia led to regime 
shifts from client to semi-autonomous clients.  In Venezuela after a 
failed coup and destabilization campaign, the Chavez regime moved 
decisively from semi-autonomous client to an independent anti-
imperialist position.

Ongoing conflicts between imperial and anti-imperialist states, 
between client regimes and nationalist movements, between imperial and 
newly emerging imperial states, will change the structure of the 
imperial system.  The outcomes of these conflicts will produce new 
coalitions among the principal forces, which compose the imperial 
hierarchy and its adversaries.  What is clear from this account is that 
there is no singular omnipotent ?imperial state? that unilaterally 
defines the international or even the imperial system. 
  Even the most powerful imperial state has proven incapable of 
unilaterally (or with clients or imperial partners) defeating or even 
containing the popular anti-colonial resistance in Iraq or 
Afghanistan.  The major imperial political successes have occurred 
where the imperial states have been able to activate the military 
forces of semi-autonomous and client regimes, secure a regional (OAS, 
OAU and NATO) or UN cover to legitimate its conquests.  Collaborator 
elites from the client and semi-autonomous states are essential links 
to the maintenance and consolidation of the imperial system and in 
particular the US empire.  A specific case is the US?, intervention and 
overthrow of the Somali Islamic regime.

The Case of Somalia: Black Masks - White Faces
 
The recent Ethiopian invasion of Somalia  (December 2006) and 
overthrow of the de-facto governing Islamic Courts Union (ICU)or 
Supreme Council of Islamic Courts and imposition of a self-styled 
?transitional government? of warlords is an excellent case study of the 
centrality of collaborator regimes in sustaining and expanding the US 
empire. 
 
From 1991 with the overthrow of the government of Siad Barre until the 
middle of 2006, Somalia was ravaged by conflicts between feuding 
warlords based in clan-controlled fiefdoms (3).    During the US/UN 
invasion and temporary occupation of Mogadishu in the mid-1990?s there 
were massacres of over 10,000 Somali civilians and the killing and 
wounding of a few dozen US/UN soldiers (4).  During the lawless 1990?s 
small local groups, whose leaders later made up the ICU, began 
organizing community-based organizations against warlord depredations.  
Based on its success in building community-based movements, which cut 
across tribal and clan allegiances; the ICU began to eject the corrupt 
warlords ending extortion payments imposed on businesses and households 
(5).  In June 2006 this loose coalition of Islamic clerics, jurists, 
workers, security forces and traders drove the most powerful warlords 
out of the capital, Mogadishu.  The ICU gained widespread support among 
a multitude of market venders and trades people.  In the total absence 
of anything resembling a government, the ICU began to provide security, 
the rule of law and protection of households and property against 
criminal predators (6).  An extensive network of social welfare centers 
and programs, health clinics, soup kitchens and primary schools, were 
set up serving large numbers of refugees, displaced peasants and the 
urban poor.  This enhanced popular support for the ICU. 
 
After having driven the last of the warlords from Mogadishu and most 
of the countryside, the ICU established a de-facto government, which 
was recognized and welcomed by the great majority of Somalis and 
covered over 90% of the population  (7a).  All accounts, even those 
hostile to the ICU, pointed out that the Somali people welcomed the end 
of warlord rule and the establishment of law and order under the ICU.
 
The basis of the popular support for the Islam Courts during its short 
rule (from June to December 2006) rested on several factors.  The ICU 
was a relatively honest administration, which ended warlord corruption 
and extortion.  Personal safety and property were protected, ending 
arbitrary seizures and kidnappings by warlords and their armed thugs.  
The ICU is a broad multi-tendency movement that includes moderates and 
radical Islamists, civilian politicians and armed fighters, liberals 
and populists, electoralists and authoritarians (7).  Most important, 
the Courts succeeded in unifying the country and creating some 
semblance of nationhood, overcoming clan fragmentation.  In the process 
of unifying the country, the Islamic Courts government re-affirmed 
Somali sovereignty and opposition to US imperialist intervention in the 
Middle East and particularly in the Horn of Africa via its Ethiopian 
client regime.

US Intervention:  The United Nations, Military Occupation, Warlords 
and Proxies
 
The recent history of US efforts to incorporate Somalia into its 
network of African client states began during the early 1990?s under 
President Clinton (8).  While most commentators today rightly refer to 
Bush as an obsessive war-monger for his wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
they forget that President Clinton, in his time, engaged in several 
overlapping and sequential acts of war in Somalia, Iraq, Sudan and 
Yugoslavia.  Clinton?s military actions and the embargoes killed and 
maimed thousands of Somalis, resulted in 500,000 deaths among Iraqi 
children alone and caused thousands of civilian deaths and injuries in 
the Balkans.   Clinton ordered the destruction of Sudan?s main 
pharmaceutical plant producing vital vaccines and drugs essential for 
both humans and their livestock leading to a critical shortage of these 
essential vaccines and treatments (9).  President Clinton dispatched 
thousands of US troops to Somalia to occupy the country under the guise 
of a ?humanitarian mission? in 1994 (10).  Washington intervened to 
bolster its favored pliant war-lord against another, against the advice 
of the Italian commanders of the UN troops in Somalia.  Two-dozen US 
troops were killed in a botched assassination attempt and furious 
residents paraded their mutilated bodies in the streets of the Somali 
capital.  Washington sent helicopter gunships, which shelled heavily, 
populated areas of Mogadishu, killing and maiming thousands of 
civilians in retaliation. 

The US was ultimately forced to withdraw its soldiers as Congressional 
and public opinion turned overwhelmingly against Clinton?s messy little 
war.  The United Nations, which no longed needed to provide a cover for 
US intervention, also withdrew.  Clinton?s policy turned toward 
securing one subset of client warlords against the others, a policy 
which continued under the Bush Administration.  The current ?President? 
of the US puppet regime, dubbed the ?Transitional Federal Government?, 
is Abdullahi Yusuf.  He is a veteran warlord deeply involved in all of 
the corrupt and lawless depredations which characterized Somalia 
between 1991 to 2006 (12).   Yusuf had been President of the self-
styled autonomous Puntland breakaway state in the 1990?s.

Despite US and Ethiopian financial backing, Abdullahi Yusuf and his 
warlord associates were finally driven out of Mogadishu in June 2006 
and out of the entire south central part of the country.  Yusuf was 
holed up and cornered in a single provincial town on the Ethiopian 
border and lacked any social basis of support even from most of the 
remaining warlord clans in the capital (13).  Some warlords had 
withdrawn their support of Yusuf and accepted the ICU?s offers to 
disarm and integrate into Somali society underscoring the fact that 
Washington?s discredited and isolated puppet was no longer a real 
political or military factor in Somalia.  Nevertheless, Washington 
secured a UN Security Council resolution recognizing the warlord?s tiny 
enclave of Baidoa as the legitimate government.  This was despite the 
fact that the TFG?s very existence depended on a contingent of several 
hundred Ethiopian mercenaries financed by the US.  As the ICU troops 
moved westward to oust Yusuf from his border outpost ? comprising less 
than 5% of the country ? the US increased its funding for the 
dictatorial regime of Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia to invade Somalia (14). 

Despite the setbacks, scores of US military advisers prepared the 
Ethiopian mercenaries for a large-scale air and ground invasion of 
Somalia in order to re-impose their puppet-warlord Yusuf.  Meles 
Zenawi, the Ethiopian dictator, depends heavily on US military and 
police weaponry, loans and advisors to retain power for his ethnic 
?Tigrayan? based regime and to hold onto disputed Somali territory.  
The Tigrayan ethnic group represents less than 10% of the Ethiopian 
multi-ethnic population.  Meles faced growing armed opposition form the 
Oromo and Ogandese liberation movements (15).   His regime was despised 
by the influential Amhara population in the capital for rigging the 
election in May 2005, for killing 200 student protesters in October 
2006 and jailing tens of thousands (16).  Many military officials 
opposed him for engaging in a losing border war with Eritrea.   Meles, 
lacking popular backing, has become the US most loyal and subservient 
client in the region.  Embarrassingly parroting Washington?s imperial 
?anti-terrorist? rhetoric for his attack on Somalia, Meles sent over 
15,000 troops, hundreds of armored vehicles, dozens of helicopters and 
warplanes into Somalia (17).  Claiming that he was engaged in the ?war 
against terrorism? Meles terrorized the people of Somalia with aerial 
bombardment and a scorched earth policy.  In the name of ?national 
security? Meles sent his troops to the rescue of the encircled war lord 
and US puppet, Abdullahi Yusuf.

Washington co-coordinated its air and naval forces with the advance of 
the invading Ethiopian military juggernaut.  As the US advised-
Ethiopian mercenaries advanced by land, the US air force bombed fleeing 
Somalis killing scores, supposedly in hunting ?Al Queda; sympathizers 
(18).  According to reliable reports, which were confirmed later by US 
and Somali puppet sources, US and Somali military forces have failed to 
identify a single Al Queda leader after examining scores of dead and 
captured fighters and refugees (19).  Once again the pretext to invade 
Somalia used by Washington and its Ethiopian client ? that the ICU was 
attacked because it sheltered Al Queda terrorists - was demonstrated to 
be false.  US naval forces illegally interdicted all ships off the 
coast of Somalia in pursuit of fleeing Somali leaders.  In Kenya, 
Washington directed its Nairobi client to capture and return Somalis 
crossing the border.  Under Washington?s direction both the United 
Nations and the Organization of African ?Unity? (sic) agreed to send an 
occupation army of ?peace-keepers? to protect the Ethiopian imposed 
puppet Yusuf regime. 

Given Meles precarious internal position, he could not afford to keep 
his occupying army of 15,000 mercenaries in Somalia for long (20).  
Somali hatred for the Ethiopian occupiers surged from the first day 
they entered Mogadishu.  There were massive demonstrations on a daily 
basis and increasing incidents of armed resistance from the re-grouped 
ICU fighters, local militants and anti-Yusuf warlords (21).  The US 
directed Ethiopian occupation was followed in its wake by the return of 
the same warlords who had pillaged the country between 1991-2005 (22).

Most journalists, experts and independent observers recognize that 
without the presence of ?outside? support ? namely the presence of at 
least 10,000 US and EU financed African mercenaries (?peacekeepers?) 
the Yusuf regime will collapse in a matter of days if not hours.  
Washington counts on an informal coalition of African clients ? a kind 
of ?Association of Sub-Saharan Stooges? (ASS) ? to repress the mass 
unrest of the Somali population and to prevent the return of the 
popular Islamic Courts.  The United Nations declared it would not send 
an occupation army until the ?ASS? military contingents of the 
Organization of African Unity had ?pacified the country (23).

The ASS, however willing their client rulers in offering mercenary 
troops to do the bidding of Washington, found it difficult to actually 
send troops.  Since it was transparently a ?made-in-Washington? 
operation it was unpopular at home and likely to set ASS forces against 
growing Somali national resistance.  Even Uganda?s Yoweri Musevent, 
Washington?s subservient client, encountered resistance among his 
?loyal? rubber-stamp congress (24).  The rest of the ASS countries 
refused to move their troops, until the EU and US put the money up 
front and the Ethiopians secured the country for them.  Facing passive 
opposition from the great majority of Somalis and active militant 
resistance from the Courts, the Ethiopian dictator began to withdraw 
his mercenary troops.  Washington, recognizing that its Somali puppet, 
?President Yusuf?, is totally isolated and discredited, sought to co-
opt the most conservative among the Islamic Court leaders (25).  Yusuf, 
ever fearful of losing his fragile hold on power, refused to comply 
with Washington?s tactic of splitting the ICU.

The Somali Invasion:  the Empire and its Networks
 
The Somali case illustrates the importance of client rulers, warlords, 
clans and other collaborators as the first line of defense of strategic 
geo-political positions for extending and defending the US empire.  The 
Somali experience underlines the importance of the intervention by 
regional and client rulers of neighboring states in defense of the 
empire.  Client regimes and collaborator elites greatly lower the 
political and economic cost of maintaining the outposts of empire.  
This is especially the case given the overextension of US ground forces 
in Iraq, Afghanistan and in their impending confrontation with the 
Islamic Republic of Iran.
 
Given the ?over-extension? of the US ground forces, the empire relies 
on air and sea assaults combined with regional mercenary ground forces 
to oust an independent regime with popular backing.
 
Without the Ethiopian invasion, the puppet Somali warlord Abdullahi 
Yusuf would have been easily driven out of Somalia, the country unified 
and Washington would no longer control the coastal areas facing a major 
maritime oil transport route.  The loss of a Somali puppet regime would 
have deprived Washington of a coastal platform for threatening Sudan 
and Eritrea.
 
From a practical perspective however, Washington?s strategic plans for 
control over the Horn of Africa are deeply flawed.  To secure maximum 
control over Somali, the White House chose to back a deeply detested 
veteran warlord with no social base in the country and dependent on 
discredited warring clans and criminal warlords.  Isolated and 
discredited puppet rulers are a fragile thread on which to construct 
strategic policies of regional intervention (military bases and 
advisory missions).  Secondly Washington chose to use a neighboring 
country (Ethiopia) hated by the entire Somali population  to prop up 
its Somali puppet.  Ethiopia had attacked Somali as late as 1979 over 
the independence of Ogadan, whose population is close to Somalis.  
Washington relied on the invading army of a regime in Addis Ababa, 
which was facing increasing popular and national unrest and was clearly 
incapable of sustaining a prolonged occupation.  Finally, Washington 
counted on verbal assurances from the ASS regimes to promptly send 
troops to protect its re-installed client.  Client regimes always tell 
their imperial masters what they want to hear even if they are 
incapable of prompt and full compliance.  This is especially the case 
when clients fear internal opposition and prolonged costly overseas 
entanglements, which further discredit them.
 
The Somali experience demonstrates the gap between the empire?s 
strategic projection of power and its actual capacity to realize its 
goals.  It also exemplifies how imperialists, impressed by the number 
of clients, their ?paper? commitments and servile behavior, fail to 
recognize their strategic weakness in the face of popular national 
liberation movements.
 
US empire building efforts in the Horn of Africa, especially in 
Somalia, demonstrate that even with elite collaborators and client 
regimes, mercenary armies and ASS regional allies, the empire 
encounters great difficulty in containing or defeating popular national 
liberation movements.  The failure of the Clinton policy of 
intervention in Somalia between 1993-1994 demonstrated this. 

The human and economic cost of prolonged military invasions with 
ground troops has repeatedly driven the US public to demand withdrawal 
(and even accept defeat) as was proven in Korea, Indochina and 
increasingly in Iraq.

Financial and diplomatic support, including UN Security Council 
decisions, and military advisory teams are not sufficient to establish 
stable client regimes.  The precariousness of the mercenary-imposed 
Yusuf warlord dictatorship demonstrates the limits of US sponsored UN 
fiats.
 
The Somali experience in failed empire-building reveals another even 
darker side of imperialism: A policy of ?rule or ruin?.  The Clinton 
regime?s failure to conquer Somalia was followed by a policy of playing 
off one brutal warlord against another, terrorizing the population, 
destroying the country and its economy until the ascent of the Islamic 
Courts Union.  The ?rule or ruin? policy is currently in play in Iraq 
and Afghanistan and will come into force with the impending Israeli-
backed US air and sea attack on Iran. 
 
The origins of ?rule or ruin? policies are rooted in the fact that 
conquests by imperial armies do not result in stable, legitimate and 
popular regimes.  Originating as products of imperial conquest, these 
client regimes are unstable and depend on foreign armies to sustain 
them.  Foreign occupation and the accompanying wars on nationalist 
movements provoke mass opposition.  Mass resistance results in imperial 
repression targeting entire populations and infrastructure.  The 
inability to establish a stable occupation and client regime leads 
inevitable to imperial rulers deciding to scorch the entire country 
with the after thought that a weak and destroyed adversary is a 
consolation for a lost imperial war.
 
Faced with the rise of Islamic and secular anti-imperialist movements 
and states in Africa and possessing numerous client regimes in North 
Africa and the ASS grouping, Washington is establishing a US military 
command for Africa.  The Africa Command will serve to tighten 
Washington?s control over African military forces and expedite their 
dispatch to repress independence movements or to overthrow anti-
imperialist regimes.  Given the expanded, highly competitive presence 
of Chinese traders, investors and aid programs, Washington is 
bolstering its reliable allies among the African client elites and 
generals (26).

-James Petras? latest book is The Power of Israel in the United States 
(Clarity Press: Atlanta).  His articles in English can be found at the 
website ?  www.petras.lahaine.org  and in Spanish at -  www.rebellion.
org.

Footnotes

1. Petras, James and Morris Morley.  Empire or Republic (NY: 
Routledge, 1995); Petras, J. and M. Morley:  ?The Role of the Imperial 
State? in US Hegemony Under Siege (London? Verso Books 1990).
2. Petras, James and Morris Morley.  ?The US imperial State? in James 
Petras et al Class State and Power in the Third World (Allanheld, 
Osmin: Montclair NJ, 1981).
3. (3A) see Petras, James The Power of Israel in the United States 
(Clarity: Atlanta 2006)
3. see Andrew England ?Spectre of Rival Clans Returns to Mogadishu?, 
Financial Times (London), ) December 29, 2006 p.3)
4. Financial Times January 22, 2007 p.12.
5. Financial Times December 29, 2006 p.3.
6. William Church: ?Somalia: CIA Blowback Weakens East Africa? Sudan 
Tribune Feb 2, 2007.
7. (7A) The Transitional government was restricted to Baldoa, a small 
town and its survival depended on Addis Abbaba. Financial Times 
December 29, 2006 p.3
7. Financial Times January 31, 2007 p.2.
8. Stephan Shalom ?Gravy Train: Feeding the Pentagon by Feeding 
Somalia? Z Magazine February 1993.
9. Clinton claimed the pharmaceutical plant was producing biological 
and chemical weapons ? a story which was refuted by scientific 
investigators.
10. Shalom ibid.
11. Mark Bowden Black Hawk Down (Signet: New York 2002)
12. FT December 31, 2006 p.2
13. FT January 5, 2007 p. 4
14. William Church ibid.
15  ?Somalia? Another War Made in the USA? interview with Mohamed 
Hassan ([log in to unmask])
16 ibid
17. FT January 5, 2007 p.5; FT December 29, 2006 p. 3
18. BBC News ?US Somali Air Strikes ?Kill Many??, January 9, 2007; 
aljazeera.net ?US Launches Air Strikes on Somalia? January 9, 2007
19. FT February 5, 2007 p.5 ??there has been no confirmation yet of 
targeted al-Queda suspects according to Meles Zenawi, Ethiopian Prime 
Minister.?
20. aljazeera.net January 23, 2007; BBC News ?More Ethiopians to Quit 
Somalia? January 28, 2007.
21. aljazeera.net December 29, 2006; aljazeera.net January 6, 2007; 
BBC News January 26, 2007; Aljazeere.net January 28, 2007, aljazeera.
net February 11, 2007
22. ?Looting and shooting broke out as soon as the Islamic fighters 
left the crumbling capital as militias loyal to the local clans moved 
on to the streets.? FT December 29, 2006
23. BBC News January 25, 2007; BBC January 30, 2007; BBC January 5, 
2007/
24. People?s Daily Online ?Ugandan Parliament halts bid to rush 
deployment of peacekeepers to Somalia?.  February 2, 2007
25.Financial Times January 26, 2007 p.6
26.aljazeera.net  February 7, 2007

 

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