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Subject:
From:
Joe Sambou <[log in to unmask]>
Reply To:
The Gambia and related-issues mailing list <[log in to unmask]>
Date:
Tue, 18 Nov 2003 19:48:37 +0000
Content-Type:
text/plain
Parts/Attachments:
text/plain (580 lines)
Mose, some folks just love to hear themselves and would do or say anything
for it.  Mose, I am really concerned about our progress as a people towards
solving our current problems with Yaya and the APRC.  What is more
disheartening is this love fest with long-windedness with nothing registered
by way of performance.  Just let Sidebeh be his best - let loose.  I do not
have time for his quibbles.  Reading his piece, one cannot fail to see the
real reason for that volume.  Was it a political analysis regarding Gambia,
or was it an attempt to discredit disguised in a facade at punditry?  You
tell me.
Mo, you did not have to go all that length just to get to me.  I am strong
enough to witstand a direct venom.

Chi Jaama

Joe Sambou


>From: Musa Jeng <[log in to unmask]>
>Reply-To: The Gambia and related-issues mailing list
><[log in to unmask]>
>To: [log in to unmask]
>Subject: Re: Coalition - Make or Break!
>Date: Tue, 4 Nov 2003 14:18:24 -0500
>
>Joe,
>
>  Mr. Sidibeh's piece  was generally a very insightful and good piece, and
>that's what made it so
>disappointing, when he decided to end it in such a fashion by being callous
>in his
>characterization of what you and other well meaning Gambians are trying to
>do. It is quite OK for
>him to have reservation on the importance given to fund raising, but the
>way he went about
>riduling it, and trivilizing your efforts by mocking you is definitely
>un-call for. The
>bottom-line is , we are all going to defer in our way we choose to
>contribute to what we consider
>a struggle to impact politics in the Gambia. Undoubtedly, people reserve
>the right to be critical
>with  methods used, but there is a  much more decent and effective way to
>coonvey such
>constructive crticism. It is obvious that resorting to name calling and
>mocking does not help in
>our efforts. Mr. Sidibeh has demonstrated on this list as a very
>insightful, and his contribution
>is very much needed for the struggle.. We all need to be helping ,
>encouraging and be critical in
>an effective manner, and I hope Mr. Sidibeh to take note of this.
>
>Thanks
>Mua Jeng
>
>Thanks
>Musa jeng
>
>Joe Sambou wrote:
>
> > Mo, thanks for your analyses of political meandering in The Gambia for
>the
> > past 20 years.  I agree with much of that analysis.
> >
> > "On the other hand some internet-based Diasporans have carved for
>themselves
> > no political role except as excitable financiers, jumping from funding
>one
> > emergency to the next. [Even as I write this after reading ten days of
> > accumulated mails this morning, I see that Joe Energy Sambou, is on the
>move
> > again. This time he says 3 cents a day will do]. That, indeed, is also a
> > role, because emergencies are what Gambia is going to acquire in giant
>doses
> > up to 2006, even if the rains give a sense of respite from one year to
>the
> > next. But the rest of us simply must reject that kind of non-committal
> > illusionary project and put something more concrete in its place."
> >
> > Mo, yes, call us illusionary and other such descriptions and reject what
>we
> > are doing outright, but anyone with a sense of what it takes to win an
> > election knows that rhetoric alone takes you no where.  I wish you and
>those
> > that wish to join you in this outright rejection of what we are trying
>to
> > accomplish here, success.  For your success is for all Gambians.  Mo, I
>can
> > easily do the same thing you are doing, write volumes and reject this
>and
> > that effort, but I have better ways of wasting my time.  I believe in
>the
> > market place of ideas and thus, will leave it to the stakeholders to
>decide
> > what they want to do.  Please do not attempt to distort what we are
>calling
> > for.  If you want to convince yourself that we view our role as
>"excitable
> > financiers, jumping from funding one emergency to the next", then by all
> > means be my guest and I am not going to say what we are trying to
>accomplish
> > the 1000th time, for folks on this and other lists know exactly what we
>are
> > calling for.  If you must, continue your campaign to discredit what some
>of
> > us are doing, but I think you should spend more time convincing the
> > stakeholders to join your outlook and not discredit us.
> >
> > Mo, the reason the "limited coalition" failed in the last elections was
>not
> > more so, because of Sheriff Dibba's boycott, but because of the
>exclusion of
> > PDOIS and NRP.  As you pointed out, PPP and UDP wrongly believed that
>they
> > were going to defeat the APRC and can do that with or without PDOIS and
>NRP.
> >   NCP was invited because UDP and NCP had the same following, but UDP
> > especially, believed that they just needed the other parties for
>cosmetics
> > reasons.  The PPP was in it because they knew they do not have a support
> > base, for almost all their support went to UDP or APRC while they were
> > silenced. UDP did not want PDOIS and the NRP to be included in the
>coalition
> > talks because they knew that they would not be able to put the fix they
> > intended for the NCP.  If the two exclusions were in, the NCP would not
>have
> > boycotted because the nomination would have followed due process and not
>be
> > an announcement hatched by Darbo, OJ, and Assan Musa.
> >
> > On the other hand, PDOIS also miscalculated the need for a coalition to
> > defeat Jammeh as they sincerely believed that with their message and
>ideas,
> > Gambians would finally see where their interest rest.  They were
>convinced
> > that it was important to go the first round solo and then contemplate a
> > coalition in the second round, and they cited the situation in Senegal
>with
> > Wade's victory.  Those of us calling for a four party coalition saw the
>flaw
> > in that optimism and tried to convince all of them to come together up
>until
> > the elections.  We all know what happened.
> >
> > Transitioning to the campaign  period (village to village, division to
> > division canvassing), the opposition was not visible because they were
>all
> > cash strapped and could only make appearances in few select places,
>while
> > Yaya crissed crossed every real estate of our landscape, especially up
> > country.  Our vision for the opposition was to come together, all four,
>and
> > use Darbo, Sidia, and Hamat, all three with no baggage from the first
> > republic to convince Gambians about the bad news that was the APRC.
>That
> > was a winning formula and any novice of politics knew that.  However,
>the
> > moment the APRC saw OJ and Assan Musa next to Darbo, they forgot about
>Darbo
> > and used the PPP card.  Thus, Gambians were falsely convinced that Darbo
>was
> > a front for the PPP and Jawara was a shadow that lurked in their minds,
>and
> > Jawara was indeed lurking in the shadows.  So, there are many minor
>reasons
> > why Jammeh stayed on, in addition to voter registration rigging.  Thus,
> > history tells us that we need to work with the opposition to bring about
>a
> > genuine coalition and craft a winning formula that is well financed.
>This
> > is what we are trying to do and not the baseless and outright falsehood
>you
> > try to paint.  That says more about you than about what we are about.  I
> > wish you success in your efforts to discredit our efforts, but I am
> > confident that the stakeholders will decide what is best for them.  Your
> > opinion of what we are about is one in a million.
> >
> > Chi Jaama
> >
> > Joe Sambou
> >
> > >From: Momodou S Sidibeh <[log in to unmask]>
> > >Reply-To: The Gambia and related-issues mailing list
> > ><[log in to unmask]>
> > >To: [log in to unmask]
> > >Subject: Coalition - Make or Break!
> > >Date: Sat, 1 Nov 2003 14:53:26 +0100
> > >
> > >Hi Everyone,
> > >
> > >I need to apologise for the delay in posting this opinion piece. Not
>just
> > >because I had intended to post it much earlier than now but also
>because,
> > >all other things being equal, drawing attention and interest to such
> > >mundane matters when many of us have our spiritual energies reserved
>for
> > >the requirements of Ramadan might be an added burden. Happily, Ramadan
>is
> > >also a period for deep reflection and self criticism, a way to cleanse
>our
> > >minds by auditing our circumstances and to, as a consequence, improve
>upon
> > >where we are weak.
> > >
> > >While I have been hard pressed to allocate time to contribute to the
>debate
> > >when it raged sweetest, there has been a beautiful and informative
>flurry
> > >of  opinion expressed in view of the current dearth of strategy towards
> > >removing Jammeh from power. Many, many thanks to brothers Omar Joof,
>Sanusi
> > >Owens, and sister Jabou Joh. But even if we accept Mr. Omar Joof's view
>on
> > >the intentions of Mr. Waa Juwara as regards his opinions about the
> > >coalition published in the Independent, designing a strategy for
>coalition
> > >building demands a return to the immediate past in order to attempt
> > >determining the probable structural defects that may plague such a huge
> > >project. The resolution of some of these problems, I think, are in fact
> > >fundamental to the success or failure of the collective attempt to
>unseat
> > >the APRC regime. As I shall argue here, much of it has to do with the
> > >constellation of opposition parties since the usurpation of power by
>the
> > >AFPRC in 1994.
> > >
> > >President Jawara, during one of his most memorable speeches, derided
>the
> > >opposition for its inherent frailties, and ineffectual propaganda. In
> > >Georgetown in 1990 (?), when he dropped a bombshell saying he was going
>to
> > >resign as party chairman and therefore head of state, he threw his
>audience
> > >into laughter by saying that the GPP is splintered from the NCP which
> > >itself splintered off the PPP. He went on to say that "as for PDOIS,
>they
> > >are a party of malcontents"!
> > >[The mandinka word that approximates to splinter as a verb, "ka
>farasi",
> > >when used in a particular context conveys its meaning  with tons of
> > >humour].
> > >The president's assertion, insofar as it related to the GPP and the NCP
>was
> > >absolutely accurate. But it is not in fact the accuracy of the
>assertion
> > >that per se, is important in describing the identities of the parties.
> > >Since the APRC banned the PPP and the NCP prior to the 1996 elections,
>it
> > >inadvertently created a political void  that the UDP and the NRP
>emerged to
> > >fill. The UDP grew on the wreckage of the two former older parties.
>There
> > >leaderships notwithstanding, the mass base of the UDP and the APRC were
> > >mostly made up of former supporters of the two parties, with the APRC
> > >drawing its constituency largely from the anti-PPP opposition that
>swept
> > >across the country drawing immediate converts into the dizzying
>whirlwind
> > >of revolutionary vengeance and humiliation meted to former PPP royalty
>by
> > >instances such as the Algali commission. It was payback time for many,
>but
> > >only briefly.
> > >
> > >Once the 1996 elections were over and the former soldiers consolidated
> > >their positions of power and mastered the art of accumulating immense
> > >wealth while still holding onto political office, they began to disband
>the
> > >very structures that would have evolved into organs of popular power if
> > >their programmes were infused with sincere democratic content. This
>process
> > >is eerily analogous to Jerry Rawlings disarming of the PDCs and WDCs
> > >(People's/Workers  Defense Committees) in Ghana barely fourteen months
> > >after his second seizure of power, December 1981. These were the local
> > >village committees or wards for the defense of the revolution;
>structures
> > >designed by the party but under the control of the July 22 movement,
>active
> > >in the rice distribution scheme and operated as portals into the party.
>The
> > >APRC deliberately trimmed the winds in the sails of the July 22
>movement
> > >while it opened up itself to an influx of new blood. Very quickly,
>known
> > >and unknown PPP "yai kompins" and former NCP foot soldiers rushed onto
>the
> > >APRC gravy train. Yaa Fatou Badjan, a former backbone supporter and
> > >mobilizer for Jibou Jagne simply told Uncle Jibou that it was time that
>she
> > >and her followers  jumped ship. She quickly became the APRC's campaign
> > >chairwoman in Serre-Kunda East, responsible for distributing Ramadan
>sugar
> > >- annually supplied by the President - and campaign t-shirts to
>supporters
> > >and members of the party. Another high profile defection was that of
>Mrs.
> > >Nyimasata Sanneh Bojang, this time from the PPP. There are many similar
> > >comical instances in Gambian politics where people who were ardent
>rivals
> > >for years, suddenly find common cause under the patronising wings of
> > >vitriolic dictator.
> > >Without the charismatic nature and consistent work of O.J, the PPP, in
>most
> > >likelihood would have fizzled away, not unlike the NCP, from the
> > >constellation. As for the NCP, its leadership seems to have sold
>itself,
> > >body and soul, to the APRC. It is unclear to me where its support base
> > >migrated if at all it has not dissolved unnoticed into that vast
>emptiness
> > >of personal allegiances.
> > >
> > >So here we are, with the UDP, NRP, NDAM, PPP and PDOIS with the
>potential
> > >of forming a coalition. The only party, that we can claim with
>certainty,
> > >stands ideologically apart from the rest is PDOIS. In spite of its
> > >pan-Africanist outlook, and militant inclinations, NDAM's political
>profile
> > >remains unclear to me. Counting PDOIS out, where concretely lie the
> > >differences between the other four? Are there ideological differences
>or
> > >considerations of political economy so prominent that one should vote
>PPP
> > >rather than UDP? Not just that they share a common anti-corruption
> > >position, vow to establish the rule of law, strengthen democratic
> > >institutions, and prioritise agriculture, these parties hardly evince
> > >opposing position on significant policy questions. I remain convinced
>that
> > >the major differences between them have little to do with politcal,
> > >economic, or cultural ideas. Herein lies the major difficulty of the
> > >proposed coalition. Given that the differences had to do with economic
> > >polices or principles of democracy for instance, the parties can
>appreciate
> > >each other's standpoints and negotiate with some flexibility on the
>bases
> > >of those differences in the interest of the common good even in the
>short
> > >term. But the differences between the parties seem to be based on
>fractured
> > >histories, personalised rivalries, and perhaps both ethnic and
>provincial
> > >considerations. Provided that the parties have active democratic
> > >structures, it is conceivable that backward leadership traits such as
> > >personal rivalries, could be eventually swept away. But these
>structures
> > >are either non-existent or hopelessly dormant. UDP vividly exposed this
> > >weakness when it failed to internally and democratically address the
> > >financial irregularities which led to Mr. Waa Juwara's resignation as
> > >propaganda secretary.
> > >
> > >It is at this point important to recall the most recent attempt at
> > >coalition building during the campaign towards the last elections. The
>APRC
> > >regime deliberately delayed repealing decree 89, that effectively
>banned
> > >politicians of the first republic and their parties from activity till
>July
> > >22, 2001. But even before that date PDOIS had, as a result of a party
> > >congress held in Wuli, declared its readiness to join a tactical
>alliance
> > >in preparation for the elections. The other parties joined the chorus,
>but
> > >despite calls for the newly franchised decree 89 parties to join forces
> > >with what was tactically labelled the Opposition, a broad-based
>coalition
> > >that was to field a single presidential candidate never materialised. A
> > >reasonably vocal group from Gambia-L campaigned all it could muster and
> > >called for the unity of the opposition and appealed to decree 89
> > >politicians to join the Opposition. An obviously notable difficulty in
>that
> > >process was Mr. Sheriff Dibba's claim that he was apparently sidelined
>in
> > >one of the more important deliberations, an incident that eventually
> > >supplied a convenient exegesis for his subsequent defection to the
>APRC.
> > >
> > >Immediately after the elections, Mr. Ousainou Darboe conceded defeat by
> > >congratulating the incumbent even before proper consultations with
>others
> > >in the UDP leadership on the party's official position regarding the
> > >elections.  Mr. Juwara's departure from UDP was anything but smooth.
>His
> > >fervid allegations against  Mr. Ousainou Darboe is a strong enough
>reason
> > >to suspect that problems of personal chemistries may severely affect
> > >efforts to build a coalition.
> > >
> > >Beside the problem of personalities, a coalition must agree on a common
> > >political platform that must at once espouse the profiles of all
>parties
> > >and yet appeal to the opposition as a whole. The constituent programmes
> > >within such a platform are what must give credibility to the idea of a
> > >coalition in the first place. Its mandate cannot solely extend to the
> > >question of peacefully defeating the incumbency. The question of what
>to
> > >replace the APRC regime with is at least as equally important. The
>entire
> > >opposition needs to be mobilised on and persuaded for the relevance of
> > >these programmes if a political vacuum is to be avoided; the sort of
>vacuum
> > >that a military coup purports to occupy, or because of which Senegal
>might
> > >intervene for reasons of its security. Needless to say, it is precisely
>in
> > >the debate about programmes for the coalition that citizens,
>card-carrying
> > >members, supporters and sympathisers of the different political parties
> > >should make their voices heard: how should the coalition take issue
>with
> > >the IEC, the registration of voters, the whole electoral process, the
> > >regime's desperate attempts to incinerate the critical press out of
> > >existence, reactionary amendments aimed at promulgating indemnity,
>issues
> > >of local democracy, and so on and so forth. These and many other issues
>are
> > >what even Diasporans like ourselves need to engage with, contribute to,
>and
> > >thereby exercise our right to participate in the democratic process.
> > >Equally, these and questions of the economic collapse are best dealt
>with
> > >on a national basis. Not that Mr. Juwara of NDAM has no right to take
> > >initiatives on issues of national political relevance; but to insist
>that
> > >such issues are best dealt with in consultation with other members of
>the
> > >opposition, collectively combining their propaganda efforts and
>exerting
> > >combined strength to demand for peaceful protests against APRC's
>disastrous
> > >economics. In times as hard and tough as these in Gambia, coordination
>of
> > >the activities of, and consultation amongst the opposition parties
>provide
> > >the ready psychological and concrete bases for a coherent and strong
> > >coalition. Consultations will not just help do away with much of the
> > >personal tensions that accumulated over the years, it also provides
>strong
> > >signals to the grassroots that we are all in the same damn, sinking,
>boat.
> > >
> > >Two years ago debate about the problems within the coalition were felt
>to
> > >be an exercise in destructive forensics. Prissy abstractions could not
>be
> > >allowed to derail the all too important rush towards unseating Jammeh;
> > >political expediency was felt to be best served by overlooking the
>enormous
> > >problems a coalition could be subdued by. All this inspite of
>misgivings
> > >and warnings by, especially,  sister Jabou Joh. The elections were so
>close
> > >that clamouring for an unprincipled unity seemed to override all
> > >considerations of what that unity should rest upon. The concentrated
>focus
> > >on wresting power from the hands of the APRC induced neglect of
>critical
> > >issues that needed to be put under scrutiny. While the APRC was
>celebrating
> > >numerous cases of high profile defections to its ranks, many of us
> > >dismissed GRTS broadcast of these river-crossings as misinformation
>ploys.
> > >So when rumours of secret meetings between Mr. Dibba and Mr. Jammeh
>were
> > >circulating, it was still derided by many on Gambia-L as yet another
> > >furtive sting to divide the Opposition. The leaders on the ground, i.e
>some
> > >of them at any rate, sensed what was going on. Perhaps they mistrusted
>Mr.
> > >Dibba's secret consultations with president Jammeh so greatly that they
> > >deliberately left him out from a meeting. So the coalition broke down.
>The
> > >rest is history.
> > >
> > >Current actualities in Gambia demand interventions of many forms. While
>a
> > >diasporan like me should never encourage people to take to the streets
>for
> > >anything, I should in all humility, ask Mr.Waa Juwara, in his capacity
>as a
> > >leader seeking political office, to mobilise his unique experience and
> > >organisational skills to take the lead in initiating consultations with
>ALL
> > >the opposition parties (if that indeed was not done prior to Waa's call
>for
> > >a peaceful demonstration), so that they may collectively draw out a
> > >strategy to deal with the disastrous consequence of the current
>economic
> > >and social malaise. It will hardly help if one leader or party attempts
>to
> > >take on the regime individually in a physically risky show of defiance.
> > >True, one can make powerful statements as a leader, but unless those
> > >statements are backed-up with the continuity of a committed,
>disciplined
> > >and strong organisation, they will eventually fail in their declared
> > >intentions; and that failure makes future efforts at reorganising that
>much
> > >more difficult. Furthermore the failure to consult with others may
> > >reinforce mutual suspicions that have their roots in the past.
> > >We Diasporans, in our capacity as Gambian citizens(!) and concerned
> > >individuals must demand of our leaders that they must get ahead and
>work
> > >out their differences, concretely start negotiating on a coalition
> > >programme that will be acceptable to their constituencies.
> > >On the other hand some internet-based Diasporans have carved for
>themselves
> > >no political role except as excitable financiers, jumping from funding
>one
> > >emergency to the next. [Even as I write this after reading ten days of
> > >accumulated mails this morning, I see that Joe Energy Sambou, is on the
> > >move again. This time he says 3 cents a day will do]. That, indeed, is
>also
> > >a role, because emergencies are what Gambia is going to acquire in
>giant
> > >doses up to 2006, even if the rains give a sense of respite from one
>year
> > >to the next. But the rest of us simply must reject that kind of
> > >non-committal illusionary project and put something more concrete in
>its
> > >place.
> > >
> > >Ramadan Mubarak to you all,
> > >
> > >Momodou S Sidibeh
> > >
> > >~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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