COUP
IN GAMBIA SEVEN
I am going to be rather brief in this piece because of
the tight schedule at my disposal . I was almost going
to call of any writing this week but considering the
last break, I thought another one could send a wrong
signal to my keen readers.
Anyway, I am going to start this week by giving a
serious warning to Dr. Sidat Jobe that he is
definitely playing with fire now in the Cassamance
conflict.
Cheyassin Secka, Yaya's latest victim in his double
standard games of forcing his blind loyalists to take
rigid positions on his behalf just to turn around and
disassociate himself from them or even sacrifice them
at the heat of things should have taught the foreign
affairs secretary of state all the lessons he needs to
about working for his boss.
From what I understand lately, when The Gambian papers
first reported the statement made by Dr. Jobe to the
MFDC rebels during their meeting in the country a
couple of weeks ago, the man quoted Yaya as being his
president whom he was speaking on his behalf. But when
the rebels reacted in an uncompromising manner to the
foreign affairs secretary's statement, it seemed,
nobody wanted to remember that Jobe clearly had told
the rebels that it was President Jammeh and not he who
wanted them to abandon the fighting option and take
the political alternative.
Yaya on the other hand whom I have repeatedly said
would never make his position clear as to whether
Cassamance should be totally separated from Senegal or
not has said nothing to defend Dr. Jobe at this
critical moment. So the whole blame now goes to Dr.
Jobe. And it is very unlikely that he would not call
on his deceptive boss to straighten out the records
while the issue is still hot. Instead it could be very
likely that Dr. Jobe would shoulder the entire
responsibility thinking that it would soon be another
APRC blonder of the past. Certainly this is what is
typically expected of Yaya's cohorts who have sold
their souls to their erratic leader in order to keep
their jobs secured.
However what Dr. Jobe fails to realize is that the
Cassamance insurgency has recently taken a more
dramatic and very dangerous turn. The rebels since the
demise of strong man General Ansumana Manneh and their
subsequent misfortunes with Kumba Yalla's government
in Bissau have now moved their active operations very
close to The Gambia's frontiers with the hope of
getting all the support they need from Yaya's
government. As a matter of fact with the last reported
armed robbery carried out by the rebels in Gambian
territory, led by one Sanyang Sanyang, one can very
well assert now that the rebel combatants known for
their looting spree of innocent people's properties
are present in the country.
One may argue that they are refugees, but that was the
same way they were treated in Bissau during General
Manneh's days until they almost brought that country
at its knees.. Being in mufti and not being seen in
possession of arms does not make such refugees
innocent civilians as they often claim to be.  The
rebel respects no uniform code and is termed a mere
bandit until the UN comes to endorse him as a freedom
fighter.
Would the UN ever recognize them as so in Cassamance?
I doubt it very much. There are international
standards at the UN for the organization to make such
endorsements, which among other things require the
combatants' success to show a significant portion of
occupied territory in the land being fought for, the
presence of an administrative structure that resembles
a viable government with schools and other serious
institutions in full operation and, above all, their
understanding and respect for international
humanitarian law.
Anyway after about two decades of fighting, the
Senegalese forces may though be questioned in their
ability to crush the rebellion, yet on the flip side
of the equation there is a bigger question we mostly
ignore. . How much of land did the rebels liberate
from the Senegalese forces after about 20 years of
guerilla warfare?  Of course none. This is to a large
extent an indication of a serious failure in the
rebellion.
The rebels therefore are getting more and more
desperate, frustrated by the ever tough stand taken by
the Senegalese governments-Joof first and now Wade-
against the separation of Northern Senegal from the
South.
So many people have died in the conflict both from the
rebel's side and the government troops' side, not
forgetting the numerous civilians dying from the nasty
war often waged by both sides. Each side is committed
to fight to the end. It's a serious matter of life and
death now Dr. Jobe. And I cannot see things getting
any better now or in the near future.
Anyway to cut a long story short, Dr. Jobe I am
warning you to be mindful of how far you want to go in
this senseless conflict to cover up Yaya's back. The
chances are if the situation turns a little more
worse than it is now, Yaya could sacrifice you. Not in
the way he did to Cheyassin but very likely in a more
drastic style.  Watch out for what happened to Koro
Ceesay.
On another commentary, I did read Jatta defending me
against some weird person arguing that because I had
in the past served in The Gambia Armed forces during
the APRC administration I was not justified to dissent
from the system and expose it. What an interesting
thinking! I guess this man who sounded too narrow was
also sending a frightening message to the serving
members of the GNA, especially those in the officer
corps .  Most officers in the GNA however are simple
professional soldiers having little to do with
politics and hope to carry on with their jobs well
after Yaya is long gone.
They should instead be encouraged to maintain a
neutral attitude, especially in the wake of the up
coming elections. Hardly do the opposition forces
discuss the fate of the armed forces in a post APRC
government. It may not be treated as a relevant
subject in the on going political campaign; but
believe in me folks they should be on top of the
priorities in any future government of the country.
Some critics occasionally recommend the drastic
measure of disbanding the army in particular
forgetting that the British did the same thing to
their forebears in 1958 to be substituted by the
Gambia Field Force.
I don't have much time to go into that historical
blonder.
Anyway for our weird friend, I would recommend that he
reads THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH by William
L .Shirer. Considered to be the definitive history of
National Socialism in Germany, this monumental
bestseller examines how Adolf Hitler nearly succeeded
in conquering the world.
Anyway as the picture unfolds from the birth of the
NAZI party and Youth of Adolf Hitler to the
disintegration of the NAZI Empire amid the rubbles of
Berlin one could see how dissidents once loyal to the
mad man helped genuinely to destroy the devil. As late
as the summer of 1944 some of Hitler's most decorated
war heroes including Field Marshal Rommel the Desert
fox and Colonel Ribbentrop another fine soldier got
executed for attempting to assassinate Hitler at his
bonkers.
Historians had agreed that that last attempt on
Hitler's life by the German military officers was the
greatest lost opportunity for the Germans to save
their country and reputation from the madness that
NAZISM brought them. But no, the monsters and
opportunists who at the time had sold their souls to
the devil failed to grasp the chance which led to
almost all of them going down with Hitler to hell.
People with conscience and have faith in god may by
chance follow a wrong path, but sooner or later  they
would discover the truth and  abandon the course
without sin. I have without doubt served in the GNA
but records could also show that my professionalism
was never compromised.  I never abused my powers,
neither had I carried out any unlawful orders.
However, back to July 23rd 1994, it was the second day
of the coup. It started with a heavy down pour of rain
that seemed to have delayed our actions that morning.
But no it was not only the rain. In reality the slow
start was primarily caused by the confusion generated
by the overwhelming military crowd in the state house
that had no idea as to what we were suppose to do.
Yaya was the only one we could account for his
presence in the early morning hours. Edward Singhateh
was also visible for a while but he soon disappeared
with his guards.
For a quick reminder, it would be recalled that my
presence and that of Captain Cham's at the state house
was as a result of Lt. Barrow's recommendation that
the two of us should stay and help the young officers
who seized power. Too bad that it was the last time I
saw or spoke to Barrow. Five days later I was arrested
and by the time I was released from jail ten months
later Barrow was dead.
Yaya however was quietly withdrawn under a shed in a
role of an observer-like participant. I was very close
to him since he confessed to me that all that
monkey-baboon protest he regrettably made the previous
day was directed against Captain Sonko. He told me how
the soldiers wanted to put Captain Sonko in the
soldiers' cells in Yundum just before their march to
state house, but that he ordered the captain by force
to join them.
Anyhow, the way I saw it, Captain Sonko's role showed
his actions equally or even more risky than all of
them trying to down play it. But the hidden truth was
later proven in their first moves to ensure that only
officers of the lowest ranks took control of the
government. This suspicious concept was further
consolidated by the reception they gave to the
Farafenni unit that arrived from Barra the following
morning. Captain Sam Gibba arrived at the state house
with his men including Yankuba Touray. The captain was
in total guilt marked all over his face when he found
me sitting with Yaya. He perhaps thought that I was
among those in charge. However it was Yankuba who gave
the report about their tedious journey under the
directive of Colonel Akogi. He also added the part of
his battalion commander's defiance of my
recommendations for them to take the south bank
instead of the north.
Yaya immediately ordered Capt. Gibba to go back to
Farafenni and wait there until things were settled to
deal with his case. Yankuba was asked to stay.
Twenty-four hours later, he was co-opted as council
member.
I don't still know but I believe that Yaya's quick
decision to send Captain Sam Gibba was to save him
from the wild arrests of officers soon started by
Sabally and Haidara. And interestingly, with all his
bad records in the GNA, Capt. Gibba was one of the
very few officers who were altogether spared in the
arrests.
Anyway while we were thinking about how to get to
General Dada to advice us on how or what we should do
next, Sabally and Haidara arrived in Pajero vehicles
armed with all sorts of weapons and overloaded with
over-excited soldiers. As usual Sabally came down
yelling all of threats to open fire and destroy
everything if people were not careful of their
activities. No one seemed to understand what the
little man was upset about.
Then suddenly he started screaming about the police
officers at the police headquarters. Before we could
say anything he had mobilized his guards and called on
Haidara to follow him to the police headquarters where
Chongan was found and arrested to Mile Two Central
Prisons.
By the time he came back, Captain Mamat Cham had
already left to Fajara to talk to General Dada.
The angry Nigerian commander was very cooperative. He
advised us to first invite the religious leaders
within Banjul and environ that same evening followed
by the diplomatic community the next day for briefing.
Captain Cham took up the responsibility of going to
all the religious leaders' homes to invite them to the
meeting at state house that evening.
The religious leaders responded in big number that
evening. We met them at the same room the officers had
their first meeting the day before. The religious
leaders though showed their appreciation of the
consideration we showed them by inviting them first,
still warned us to be mindful of offending innocent
people. Betrayal was also an ungodly thing we were
warned to watch out for. Then they offered us prayers
and left for their dusk prayers.
While they were leaving, a soldier came to tell me
that Major McClain the US defense attaché was outside
asking to talk to me. The major told me that he was
sent by Ambassador Winters who wanted to have an
urgent discussion with the coup leaders. I told him
that there was no coup leader yet as far as I could
read the situation, but if he did not care we could go
together to find out from the young officers.
The ambassador wanted help for two US navy personnel
who were stranded in the Kombos and had no means of
going back on board of the vessel which was anchored
off stream. He wanted permission to have the vessel
sent a small boat to the beach around the ambassador's
residence in Bakau where the men could be picked up;
or for them to be escorted to the Gambia Marine Unit
base in Banjul where they could be provided with a
means of transportation to the ship.
Edward Singhateh rejected the former but approved the
latter. He was definitely the one calling the shots.
Just after Major McClain's departure, the worrisome
report started reaching us that the Senegalese Armed
forces had amassed their troops around our borders
with a very likely intent of intervening like they did
in 1981. The unexpected story put us through a long
night of negotiation with the Senegalese Ambassador
Muktarr Kebbeh whom for the best part of our efforts
refused to even meet us when we went to see him at his
residence. But we stayed there coaxing his guards
until the ambassador  relented. After talking to us he
clearly confessed to us that he was given a wrong
information about what was happening. To him, he was
given the impression that the coup organizers were
from the lowest ranks of the army and that they were
just going around looting people's properties and
causing havoc to the nation. But he was now satisfied
with us after the short meeting. He assured us that he
would call Dakar and feed them with the correct
situation report.
We extended an invitation to him to come to the state
house the next morning to meet some of the other
officers before the scheduled meeting with the
diplomats.
Anyway just wait until you run into the documentary
video Yaya made about that encounter with the
Senegalese ambassador and how he said he conditioned
the Senegalese forces to withdraw from our borders by
force. It was like an infant fantasizing over some
fairy tales.
By the time Mr. Kebbeh arrived at the state house the
next day, 24th July , the young officers had finally
met, organized their council, gave it a name and chose
a leader. I was not present at the meeting but Capt.
Cham attended. According to the captain, the
leadership was selected on seniority basis. Yaya the
full lieutenant took the chairmanship; Sabally the
most senior second lieutenant had the vice-chairman's
position. And next it was Haidara, then Edward and
Touray last. I think Yankuba was even higher in the
army seniority list than Singhateh, but because the
former was co-opted, his rights were limited.
At that moment however Edward had also appointed
himself minister of defense while Haidara took the
interior ministry portfolio.
We were not yet given any positions.
That evening we met the diplomatic community in the
state house. Only the Sierra Leonean ambassador spoke
in total support of the coup, referring it to the
situation very similar to what they had at home as
Captain Valentine revolution. The Senegalese
ambassador spoke too but in a manner not to betray the
confidential consultation we had had with him.
Mr. Andrew Winters the US ambassador did not hold back
much about how his government will stop every kind of
support the Gambia government was enjoying from
Washington if the coup was not reverted. He therefore
asked to meet the leaders of the coup in order to
discuss a proposal he had that would bring about
something possibly acceptable in Washington.
After the meeting three of us met Mr. Winters and his
political officer Mr. James Knight to hear the
ambassador's new idea. Captain Cham, Edward Singhateh
and myself met them.
The ambassador first told us that he was still holding
every report to Washington that the problem in the
country was a coup. If he did, the US congress would
slam the country with stiff sanctions that would be
impossible to lift for a long time. The Gambia would
no longer be termed an ally of the USA.
However to prevent that, he suggested that the coup
leaders must allow President Jawara to return under
agreed terms that would at least allow him to share
the powers of government with the officers in charge.
Edward Singhateh was not happy about that, but he told
the diplomats that the council members would look into
it. When they left the idea was killed instantly.
That same night, Ambassador Kebbeh provided us with
the phone number to President Abdou Joof's palace in
Dakar. Yaya spoke to Joof for about twenty minutes at
about 8.00 p.m. It was a discussion conducted in the
friendliest manner imaginable. Yaya even promised the
Senegalese president his plan for the new government
to put back in place the confederal solidarity that
had existed between the two countries that "was
destroyed by Jawara out of selfishness".
But again, look for the documentary film of Yaya on
this telephone issue produced by Mr. Ebou Waggeh of
GRTS in July 1999. It was a documentary meant to tell
his heroic deeds in the 1994 coup, but I don't think
GRTS would ever play that junk again.
Oh, I almost forgot about that famous telephone
conversation between President Jawara and Edward
Singhateh. The reason for bringing this up is to
reinforce my assertion that it was Edward and not Yaya
who was actually in charge. When Mr. Winters came to
negotiate for the coup leader to talk to President
Jawara by phone, Yaya was already selected chairman.
He seriously thought he could go and talk to Sir
Dawda, but was told by Edward that he, the minister of
defense was the one to talk to the "former president".
Knowing that Edward was not treating him with much
respect coupled with wild Sabally becoming ever more
too stupid and dangerous, Yaya soon began to surround
himself with his former gendermarie colleague who were
even close body guards to Sir Dawda. Prominent among
them was Musa Jammeh one of his present hit men.
Sabally by now had arrested Captain Sonko, Major
Sheriff Mbye and Captain Ndure. No reason was given
for their arrests and detention at Mile Two Prisons.
The following day he arrested Captains Wilson and
Johnson too.
When you asked Yaya why Sabally was arresting officers
he seemed to have had no answers to explain.
However to get a well written speech for the chairman
to read to the Gambian people about what the coup was
all about, was one of our headaches that day. In the
end we decided to contact Mr. Swaebou Conteh to help
us. In actual fact we had wanted him to come to the
state house and work it out with us. But when Capt.
Cham approached him at his house he pleaded to be left
alone out of it. Anyway with the heavily armed troops
that escorted the captain to the journalist's house he
was left with no choice but to scribble a draft for
Cham. That was the ingredient of that maiden speech
Yaya has now put on display at ARCH 22 with his name
stamped on it as the author.

Ebou Colly



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