Folks the piece below is culled from Allafrica.com.

.......................................................................

Cherno Baba Jallow
Banjul, the Gambia

The case against Jammeh

It had come to this: In 1994, former President Sir Dawda Jawara embarked on
a month-long overseas trip. His prolonged stay came at the height of mass
despondency over the continued decrepitude of the political environment.

Jawara had got older, and with old age and incontinent lust for power, he
became detached from the miseries of the common man. Yet, mass agitation and
lugubriousness ratcheted up. The clamouring for political change, albeit
encompassed in reticence, reached its apogee by 1994. Gambians could no
longer stomach the pain and frustration unleashed on them by a leadership
averse to change. Jawara failed to acknowledge the dire need to relinquish
power. More than that: he failed to take corrective measures to stamp out
the pathologies inherent in the perpetuity of power and leadership: apathy,
indifference, redundancy, and a corrosion of capability to summon fresh
impetus and pragmatism for an amelioration of stagnation or worse,
decadence.

Jawara had long out-lived his usefulness to the majority of Gambians who
periodically returned him to power, and who by dint of continued support,
had expected him to rise to the challenges of effective leadership.

Instead, Jawara, unmoved by negligence, and incapable of visionary
leadership, watched as the political situation worsened. Corruption shot
through the roof. He failed to take action. Government became mightier and
unaccountable. Flamboyance and arrogance of power permeated the confines of
government. By 1994, it had become painfully clear that Jawara had neither
the leadership gumption nor the governmental capacity to resuscitate The
Gambia from its acute economic and political bankruptcies. It dawned on
Gambians that his total vacuity of governance, bordering on the
irremediable, was pushing the country to the fringes of political implosion.

Heightened optimism...

The arrival of then Army Lieutenant and now President, Yahya Jammeh, in 1994
spurred Gambians to a newfound optimism for a re-invigoration of the
political system. That Jammeh forced himself to power by way of a military
coup, undemocratically stopping what seemed democratically unstoppable,
plundering of matters of governance, bothered Gambians less in pale
comparison to the hopefulness that attended his rise to power. Indeed Jammeh
himself, sounding like a populist-man-of-the-people, exulted in promissory
declarations that rejuvenated mass participation in the over-hauling of the
political machinery. He promised to uphold accountability and transparency,
two missing ingredients for leadership effectiveness, of the PPP. To
prosecute past corruption, Jammeh instituted various commissions of inquiry.
Judges were recruited to unearth the wanton embezzlement and recover stolen
public resources from the past. Jammeh soon earned popular support not only
because of his adamantine attitude to rectify the wrongs of the past, but
also because of his seeming level-headedness to steer the country on a
genuine path to reform.

He advocated the need to put in place a two-term tenure for any future
president. This resonated well with the people because the former president
had over-stayed in power. Gambians could no longer afford another leader
hanging onto power perpetually. And Jammeh rendered a new cachet to Gambian
politics. He made his presence felt in public. Unlike his predecessor,
Jammeh sought to bring himself closer to the concerns of the people. He
opened new channels of communication for citizens to express their
viewpoints on matters of governance. In fact, Jammeh himself had urged
against praises for his regime but rather more constructive criticisms.

Paradoxically, the military coup, in its early aftermath, ushered in a
crescendo of civic participation of citizens. Soon there was an upsurge in
the dissemination of ideas and opinions. In what is characteristic of
democratic societies to harness the best thinking out of a convergence and
divergence of views, The Gambia in 1994 and a year later, witnessed a
cross-fertilisation of ideas for which, perhaps, there was no comparable
equivalence during the days of Jawara. Partly because the political
situation was dire, requiring society to summon its wit and wisdom for
collective survival, but partly also because Jammeh had suddenly represented
what seemed a complete divorce from the leadership lethargy and
unaccountability of yester years. Which must be Jammeh's only tangible
achievement. His emergence on the political scene in 1994 had succeeded if
temporarily, in spawning mass awareness of past neglect and the need for the
institutionalisation of meaningful changes to inject vitality in a corrupt
and malfunctioning political system. But this is an achievement no longer
defensible given the hopelessness of current-day Gambian political
realities.

...And betrayal of trust

The growing despondency of Gambians by 1994 had left them yearning in hushed
anticipation for a redeemer. In fact, their predicament, a consequence of
bad leadership, had compelled them to mull the archaic prayers of a bygone
era:"Oh God, send us a good king." Unfortunately, God doesn't always send
good kings. And that has become a rude awakening for Gambians in seven years
of Jammeh's leadership. It is undeniable, contrary only to the hopelessly
unenlightened, that Jammeh has proved no better than Jawara. In fact he is
worse. He is a wrecker not a builder.

Ascending to power at a time of tremendous national frustration, and riding
on a crest-wave of heightened optimism in 1994, Jammeh promised to be
accountable and transparent. But seven years later, his promises have been
more cavalier than real; he is more unaccountable than Jawara ever was. To
insulate himself and his colleagues from any accountability for any
infringement committed in the past, Jammeh shoved into the new constitution
an indemnity act.

In April of 2000, paramilitary troops, in Bokassa-style, fired upon
demonstrating students, killing scores of them, arresting others. Yet, the
government has failed to administer justice for the victims. It rejected the
findings of an inquiry that some security forces were responsible and should
be brought to justice.

Jammeh used his party's numerical superiority in the National Assembly to
thwart efforts to investigate a dubious crude oil deal with the late
Nigerian dictator Sanni Abacha. Jammeh also has not cleared his name in a
swelter of allegations that he has siphoned millions of dollars to bank
accounts in Switzerland. The bill to investigate the president has long died
in the Assembly, still leaving a populace wondering what is the involvement
of their president in this secret deal. A leader who cares about legitimacy
would be interested to submit to public scrutiny.

But Jammeh also reneged on his promise to institute presidential
term-limits. When the final draft of the constitution was promulgated,
Gambians were shocked to realize that there were no presidential
term-limits, even though the majority of them had consented to the idea of
term-limit presidencies. This was by no means, a sabotage of Gambian public
opinion, and a troubling zest on the part of Jammeh to stay in power as long
as he continues to take advantage of a helplessly uninformed citizenry. His
predecessor stayed in power for close to three decades; is Jammeh hoping to
repeat the same feat? Today, press freedom is hard to come by in The Gambia.
The paucity of freedom enjoyed by the press has not come about because the
government has encouraged it to happen but because of the dogged struggle of
the press to remain free and independent in the face of constant onslaught
by the APRC government. Ironically, the authoritarianism of our times has
given an immense fillip to the vibrancy of the press and the outspokenness
of opinions, which in fairness to Jammeh's time, was largely absent during
the days of Jawara.

But personally and on principle, Jammeh has not been a supporter of press
freedom. He is averse to dissent. Numerous journalists have been in and out
of detention; foreign journalists have been hounded out numerous times. Even
as they remain strong-willed, journalists in The Gambia continue to face the
explicit and tacit wrath of government.

Injurious Politics

Return to democratic, civilian rule has translated only in cosmetic
institutional not attitudinal changes. Jammeh remains ever a soldier, never
a democrat. The tender mercies of civilianism have failed, in large measure,
to pacify the tendentiousness of his militaristic tendencies. Democracy is
anathema to him. Elections have returned to The Gambia; illiberal democracy,
too. The human rights situation is still appalling. Continued detention
without recourse to speedy justice still remains the order of the day. It
should provoke a wonder why Jammeh apparently cannot be persuaded of the
harm of his assaults on democratic traditions. A clause in the constitution
has been overturned to give him the power to appoint chiefs; the local
population can no longer elect their own traditional rulers. Jammeh is also
vowing to dismantle the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). Military
decrees still ban all former government ministers from holding political
office. The politics of outrage and bitterness plagues the political system.
The opposition is harassed. Government supporters, shielded against the
process of judicial justice, take the law into their own hands, threatening
and bullying opposition figures. In some cases, kidnapping and long
detention without trial, have been used to silence opponents or critics of
the government. And in return, the opposition has taken to vituperation to
ward off government attacks. In the process, Gambians have found it hard to
submit themselves to a sobering enlightenment on the real issues, which lie
smothered under topsy-turvy politics.

It is hard to fathom how in seven years of APRC rule that The Gambia still
cannot come to grips with the decorum of political behaviour of those
seeking to lead. And it is also unthinkable how true Jammeh can
institutionalise democracy when he thrives on the politics of fear and when
public consciousness is disconnected from reality. The Gambian political
scene is mired in atrophy. On the one hand, it is a multitude of politicians
bereft of leadership fibre; on the other, it is a helpless citizenry, forced
to remain ignorant and unenlightened about matters of governance. Seven
years of APRC rule have only aggravated not ameliorated, this anomaly.

Disaster, economic disaster

The economic situation in seven years of APRC governance has only worsened.

Abject poverty, until 1994, cushioned by a modicum of economic growth under
Jawara, is hitting harder at the majority of Gambians. In a 1999 ILO study,
the Secretary of State for Finance and Economic Affairs Famara Jatta
revealed that the number of Gambians subsisting below the poverty line had
increased to 69% in 1998. This reveals a decline in the living standards of
the majority of Gambians. Their purchasing power has fallen by the wayside,
whilst the prices of basic needs have galloped, and public taxation
continues to drain their scant incomes. In the 2000 budget, fuel prices per
litre jumped from D7.75 to D8.95. In the following year, it jumped further
to D9.75.

In 1993, the Dalasi was pegged at D9.129 to the US dollar. In 1996, it took
a slight climb to D9.875. But five years since, the dollar now exchanges for
over D16.00. This represents a steady devaluation of the Gambian currency.

The most immediate consequence has been skyrocketing prices of imports; and
by all accounts, a devalued Dalasi ought to have brought much needed foreign
exchange in terms of cheaper exports. But The Gambia's major export-crop
peanuts, has not done well over the years partly because of falling terms of
trade and also because of marketing bottlenecks inside The Gambia.

Credit buying in The Gambia continues to force tons of groundnuts to cross
the border into neighbouring Senegal.

With a huge devaluation of the CFA Franc since 1994, making Senegalese goods
more competitive and with an official Senegalese position to limit or
eliminate re-export trade across the borders, The Gambia's export base has
been hurt tremendously. With more imports, especially foodstuff, and lesser
exports, The Gambia continues to endure crushing trade deficits. In 1999,
the trade deficit stood at a whopping D2.4 billion. In 2000 SoS Jatta
revealed that the value of Gambian indebtedness had increased from 390
million dollars in 1992 to a staggering 566 million dollars in 2000. Almost
half of the national budget is being disbursed for debt servicing.

With a country heavily dependent on imports not only for domestic
consumption but also as a fount of revenue, the government's BIVAC
programme, a pre-shipment inspection policy to bar "sub-standard" goods from
importation, had rippling effects on the economy. The volume of imports
plummeted. And government revenue derived from customs duties, a
much-sought-after source of revenue for a troubled Gambian economy, receded.

Caught between crushing trade deficits and enormous debts, the Gambian
economy and by extension, the people have witnessed an economic disaster
un-cushioned by wasteful government spending on cars, military hardware and
superfluous salaries and allowances. While the people scamper after basic
necessities, the leadership exhilarates in unearned luxury. The APRC
government does not have a sound strategy to steer The Gambia out of its
bottomless pit of economic morass. Heavy dependence on foreign aid and
loans, and ill-intentioned expansionary fiscal policies, have only pummelled
the livelihoods of the ordinary people.

Jammeh as a boondoggler

Jammeh's supporters point to a string of projects as evidence of his good
leadership. Much to Jammeh's credit, a new airport has been built. Gambians
now claim a national TV of their own. Hospitals have sprouted in various
parts of the country. An arch stands erect in the city of Banjul. These are
the yardsticks by which Jammeh's leadership have been measured.

In truth, these projects represent wasteful spending by Jammeh, contributing
little to national development. The July 22nd Arch built at the whopping
cost of D10 million only for personal glorification does nothing to assuage
the economic misery of the people. Hospitals are only good if they have
medicines and doctors to cater for the public. A national television is only
good if it reports objectively on societal realities, gives voice to
opposing views, celebrates success and dissects failure. The Gambia
television station is more of a government rather than public, institution.

The July 22nd 'revolution' has simply come to represent grandiosity, of
spending, of wishful thinking, of a chunk of policies that have held at bay,
Gambian yearnings and aspirations for a society enlivened by political
nutritiousness and economic vitality. Time was, in 1994, when Jammeh raked
in national euphoria. He epitomised ebullient leadership, thought to be a
harbinger of momentous changes, but today, the July 22nd 1994 military coup
has become a poisoned chalice.

Its seventh anniversary should be seen in that light.





_________________________________________________________________
Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L
Web interface at: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/gambia-l.html
You may also send subscription requests to [log in to unmask]
if you have problems accessing the web interface and remember to write your full name and e-mail address.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------