SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE
RIGHTS OF AMERICANS
_______
BOOK III
_______
FINAL REPORT
OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
UNITED STATES SENATE
APRIL 23 (under authority of the order of April 14), 1976
THE FBI'S COVERT ACTION PROGRAM TO DESTROY THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY
INTRODUCTION
In August 1967, the FBI initiated a covert action program --
COINTELPRO -- to disrupt and "neutralize" organizations which the
Bureau characterized as "Black Nationalist Hate Groups." 1 The FBI
memorandum expanding the program described its goals as:
1. Prevent a coalition of militant black nationalist groups....
2. Prevent the rise of a messiah who could unify and electrify the
militant nationalist movement ... Martin Luther King, Stokely
Carmichael and Elijah Muhammad all aspire to this position....
3. Prevent violence on the part of black nationalist groups....
4. Prevent militant black nationalist groups and leaders from gaining
respectability by discrediting them....
5. . . . prevent the long-range growth of militant black nationalist
organizations, especially among youth. 2
The targets of this nationwide program to disrupt "militant black
nationalist organizations" included groups such as the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM),
and the Nation of Islam (NOI). It was expressly directed against such
leaders as Martin Luther King, Jr., Stokley Carmichael, H. Rap Brown,
Maxwell Stanford, and Elijah Muhammad.
The Black Panther Party (BPP) was not among the original "Black
Nationalist" targets. In September 1968, however, FBI Director J. Edgar
Hoover described the Panthers as:
"the greatest threat to the internal security of the country.
"Schooled in the Marxist-Leninist ideology and the teaching of Chinese
Communist leader Mao Tse-tung, its members have perpetrated numerous
assaults on police officers and have engaged in violent confrontations
with police throughout the country. Leaders and representatives of the
Black Panther Party travel extensively all over the, United States
preaching their gospel of hate and violence not only to ghetto
residents, but to students in colleges, universities and high schools
is well." 3
By July 1969, the Black Panthers had become the primary focus of the
program, and was ultimately the target of 233 of the total authorized
"Black Nationalist" COINTELPRO actions. 4
Although the claimed purpose of the Bureau's COINTELPRO tactics was to
prevent violence, some of the FBI's tactics against the BPP were
clearly intended to foster violence, and many others could reasonably
have been expected to cause violence. For example, the FBI's efforts to
"intensify the degree of animosity" between the BPP and the Blackstone
Rangers, a Chicago street gang, included sending an anonymous letter to
the gang's leader falsely informing him that the the Chicago Panthers
had "a hit out" on him. 5 The stated intent of the letter was to induce
the Ranger leader to "take reprisals against" the Panther leadership.
6
Similarly, in Southern California, the FBI launched a covert effort to
"create further dissension in the ranks of the BPP." 7 This effort
included mailing anonymous letters and caricatures to BPP members
ridiculing the local and national BPP leadership for the express
purpose of exacerbating an existing "gang war" between the BPP and an
organization called the United Slaves (US). This "gang war" resulted in
the killing of four BPP members by members of US and in numerous
beatings and shootings. Although individual incidents in this dispute
cannot be directly traced to efforts by the FBI, FBI officials were
clearly aware of the violent nature of the dispute, engaged in actions
which they hoped would prolong and intensify the dispute, and proudly
claimed credit for violent clashes between the rival factions which. in
the words of one FBI official, resulted in "shootings, beatings, and a
high degree of unrest in the area of southeast San Diego." 8
James Adams, Deputy Associate Director of the FBI's Intelligence
Division, told the Committee:
None of our programs have contemplated violence, and the instructions
prohibit it, and the record of turndowns of recommended actions in some
instances specifically say that we do not approve this action because
if we take it it could result in harm to the individual. 9
But the Committee's record suggests otherwise. For example, in May
1970, after US organization members had already killed four BPP
members, the Special Agent in Charge of the Los Angeles FBI office
wrote to FBI headquarters:
Information received from local sources indicate that, in general, the
membership of the Los Angeles BPP is physically afraid of US members
and take premeditated precautions to avoid confrontations.
In view of their anxieties, it is not presently felt that the Los
Angeles BPP can be prompted into what could result in an internecine
struggle between the two organizations. . . .
The Los Angeles Division is aware of the mutually hostile feelings
harbored between the organizations and the first opportunity to
capitalize on the situation will be maximized. It is intended that US
Inc. will be appropriately and discreetly advised of the time and
location of BPP activities in order that the two organizations might be
brought together and thus grant nature the opportunity to take her due
course. [Emphasis added.] 10
This report focuses solely on the FBI's counterintelligence program to
disrupt and "neutralize" the Black Panther Party. It does not examine
the reasonableness of the basis for the FBI's investigation of the BPP
or seek to justify either the politics, the rhetoric, or the actions of
the BPP. This report does demonstrate, however, that the chief
investigative branch of the Federal Government, which was charged by
law with investigating crimes and preventing criminal conduct, itself
engaged in lawless tactics and responded to deep-seated social problems
by fomenting violence and unrest.
A. The Effort to Promote Violence Between the Black Panther Party and
Other Well-Armed, Potentially Violent Organizations
The Select Committee's staff investigation has disclosed a number of
instances in which the FBI sought to turn violence-prone organizations
against the Panthers in an effort to aggravate "gang warfare." Because
of the milieu of violence in which members of the Panthers often moved
we have been unable to establish a direct link between any of the FBI's
specific efforts to promote violence, and particular acts of violence
that occurred. We have been able to establish beyond doubt, however,
that high officials of the FBI desired to promote violent
confrontations between BPP members and members of other groups, and
that those officials condoned tactics calculated to achieve that end.
It is deplorable that officials of the United States Government, should
engage in the activities described below, however dangerous a threat
they might have considered the Panthers; equally disturbing is the
pride which those officials took in claiming credit for the bloodshed
that occurred.
1. The Effort to Promote Violence Between the Black Panther Party and
the United Slaves (US), Inc.
FBI memoranda indicate that the FBI leadership was aware of a violent
power struggle between the Black Panther Party and the United Slaves
(US) in late 1968. A memorandum to the head of the FBI's Domestic
Intelligence Division, for example, stated:
On 11/2/68, BPP received information indicating US members intended to
assassinate Leroy Eldridge Cleaver ... at a rally scheduled at Los
Angeles on 11/3/68. A Los Angeles racial informant advised on 11/8/68
that [a BPP member] had been identified as a US infiltrator and that
BPP headquarters had instructed that [name deleted] should be killed.
During BPP rally, US members including one [name deleted], were
ordered to leave the rally site by LASS members (Los Angeles BPP
Security Squad) and did so. US capitulation on this occasion prompted
BPP members to decide to kill [name deleted] and then take over US
organization. Members of LASS . . . were given orders to eliminate
[name deleted] and [name deleted]. 11
This memorandum also suggested that the two US members should be told
of the BPP's plans to "eliminate" them in order to convince them to
become Bureau informants. 12
In November 1968, the FBI took initial steps in its program to disrupt
the Black Panther Party in San Diego, California by aggravating the
existing hostility between the Panthers and US. A memorandum from FBI
Director Hoover to 14 field offices noted a state of "gang warfare"
existed, with "attendant threats of murder and reprisals." between the
BPP and US in southern California and added:
In order to fully capitalize upon BPP and US differences as well as to
exploit all avenues of creating further dissention in the ranks of the
BPP, recipient offices are instructed to submit imaginative and hard-
hitting counterintelligence measures aimed at crippling the BPP. 13
As the tempo of violence quickened, the FBI's field office in San
Diego developed tactics calculated to heighten tension between the
hostile factions. On January 17, 1969, two members of the Black Panther
Party -- Apprentice "Bunchey" Carter and John Huggins -- were killed by
US members on the UCLA campus following a meeting involving the two
organizations and university students. 14 One month later, the San
Diego field office requested permission from headquarters to mail
derogatory cartoons to local BPP offices and to the homes of prominent
BPP leaders around the country. 15 The purpose was plainly stated:
The purpose of the caricatures is to indicate to the BPP that the US
organization feels that they are ineffectual, inadequate, and riddled
with graft and corruption. 16
In the first week of March, the first cartoon was mailed to five BPP
members and two underground papers, all in the San Diego area. 17
According to an FBI memorandum, the consensus of opinion within the BPP
was that US was responsible and that the mailing constituted an attack
on the BPP by US. 18
In mid-March 1969, the FBI learned that a BPP member had been
critically wounded by US members at a rally in Los Angeles. The field
office concluded that shots subsequently fired into the, home of a US
member were the results of a retaliatory raid by the BPP. 19 Tensions
between the BPP and US in San Diego, however, appeared to lessen, and
the FBI concluded that those chapters were trying "to talk out their
differences." The San Diego field office reported:
On 3/27/69 there was a meeting between the BPP and US organization. .
. . Wallace [BPP leader in San Diego] . . . concluded by stating that
the BPP in San Diego would not hold a grudge against the US members for
the killing of the Panthers in Los Angeles (Huggins and Carter). He
stated that lie would leave any retaliation for this activity to the
black community. . . .
On 4/2/69, there was a friendly confrontation between US and the BPP
with no weapons being exhibited by either side. US members met with BPP
members and tried to talk out their differences. 20
On March 27, 1969 -- the day that the San Diego field office learned
that the local BPP leader had promised that his followers "would not
hold a grudge" against local US members for the killings in Los Angeles
-- the San Diego office requested headquarters' approval for three more
cartoons ridiculing the BPP and falsely attributed to US. One week
later, shortly after the San Diego office learned that US and BPP
members were again meeting and discussing their differences, the San
Diego field office mailed the cartoons with headquarters' approval. 21
On April 4, 1969 there was a confrontation between US and BPP members
in Southcrest Park in San Diego at which, according to an FBI
memorandum, the BPP members "ran the US members off." 22 On the same
date, US members broke into a BPP political education meeting and
roughed up a female BPP member. 21 The FBI's Special Agent in Charge in
San Diego boasted that the cartoons had caused these incidents:
The BPP members ... strongly objected being made fun of by cartoons
being distributed by the US organization (FBI cartoons in actuality)
... [Informant] has advised on several occasions that the cartoons are
"really shaking up the BPP." They have made the BPP feel that US is
getting ready to move and this was the cause of the confrontation at
Southcrest Park on 4/4/69. 24
The fragile truce had ended. On May 23, 1969, John Savage, a member of
the BPP in Southern California, was shot and killed by US member Jerry
Horne, aka Tambuzi. The killing was reported in an FBI memorandum which
staked that confrontations between the groups were now "ranging from
mere harrassment up to and including beating of various individuals."
25 In mid-June, the San Diego FBI office informed Washington
headquarters that members of the US organization were holding firearms
practice and purchasing large quantities of ammunition:
Reliable information has been received ... that members of the US
organization have purchased ammunition at one of the local gun shops.
On 6/5/69, an individual identified as [name deleted] purchased 150
rounds of 9 MM ammunition, 100 rounds of .32 automatic ammunition, and
100 rounds of .38 special ammunition at a local gun shop. [Name
deleted] was tentatively identified as the individual who was
responsible for the shooting of BPP member [name deleted] in Los
Angeles on or about 3/14/69. 26
Despite this atmosphere of violence, FBI headquarters authorized the
San Diego field office to compose an inflammatory letter over the
forged signature of a San Diego BPP member and to send it to BPP
headquarters in Oakland, California. 27 The letter complained of the
killing of Panthers in San Diego by US members, and the fact that a
local BPP leader had a white girlfriend. 28
According to a BPP bulletin, two Panthers were wounded by US gunman on
August 14,1969, and the next day another BPP member, Sylvester Bell,
was killed in San Diego by US members. 29 On August 36, 1969, the San
Diego office, of US was bombed. The FBI believed the BPP was
responsible for the bombing. 30
The San Diego office of the FBI viewed this carnage as a positive
development and informed headquarters: "Efforts are being made to
determine how this situation can be capitalized upon for the benefit of
the Counterintelligence Program .... " 31 The field office further
noted:
In view of the recent killing of BPP member Sylvester Bell, a new
cartoon is being considered in the hopes that it will assist in the
continuance of the rift between BPP and US. 32
The San Diego FBI office pointed with pride to the continued violence
between black groups:
Shootings, beatings, and a, high degree of unrest continues to prevail
in the ghetto area of southeast San Diego. Although no specific
counterintelligence action can be credited with contributing to this
overall situation, it is felt that a substantial amount of the unrest
is directly attributable to this program. [Emphasis added.] 33
In early September 1969, the San Diego field office informed
headquarters that Karenga, the Los Angeles US leader, feared
assassination by the BPP. 34 It received permission front headquarters
to exploit this situation by sending Karenga a letter, purporting to be
from a US member in San Diego, alluding to an article in the BPP
newspaper criticizing Karenga and suggesting that he order reprisals
against the Panthers. The Bureau memorandum which originally proposed
the letter explained:
The article, which is an attack on Ron Karenga of the US organization,
is self-explanatory. It is felt that if the following letter be sent to
Karenga, pointing out that the contents of the article are
objectionable to members of the US organization in San Diego, the
possibility exists that some sort of retaliatory action will be taken
against the BPP . . . . 35
FBI files do not indicate whether the letter, which was sent to
Karenga by the San Diego office, was responsible for any violence.
In January 1970, the San Diego office prepared a new series of
counterintelligence cartoons attacking the BPP and forwarded them to
FBI headquarters for approval. 36 The cartoons were composed to look
like a product of the US organization.
The purpose of the caricatures is to indicate to the BPP that the US
Organization considers them to be ineffectual, inadequate, and
[considers itself] vitally superior to the BPP. 37
One of the caricatures was "designed to attack" the Los Angeles
Panther leader as a bully toward women and children in the black
community. Another accused the BPP of "actually instigating" a recent
Los Angeles Police Department raid on US headquarters. A third cartoon
depicted Karenga as an overpowering individual "who has the BPP
completely at his mercy . . . ." 38
On January 29, 1970, FBI headquarters approved distribution of these
caricatures by FBI field offices in San Diego, Los Angeles, and San
Francisco. The authorizing memorandum from headquarters stated:
US Incorporated and the Black Panther Party are opposing black
extremist organizations. Feuding between representatives of the two
groups in the past had a tendency to limit the effectiveness of both.
The leaders and incidents depicted in the caricatures are known to the
general public, particularly among the Negroes living in the
metropolitan areas of Los Angeles, San Diego and San Francisco.
The leaders and members of both groups are distrusted by a large
number of the citizen within the Negro communities. Distribution of
caricatures is expected to strengthen this distrust. 39
Bureau documents provided to the Select Committee do not indicate
whether violence between BPP and US members followed the mailing of
this third series of cartoons.
In early May 1970, FBI Headquarters became aware of an article
entitled "Karenga King of the Bloodsuckers" in the May 2, 1970, edition
of the BPP newspaper which "vilifies and debases Karenga and the US
organization." 40 Two field offices received the following request from
headquarters:
[s]ubmit recommendation to Bureau . . . for exploitation of same under
captioned program. Consider from two aspects, one against US and
Karenga from obvious subject matter; the second against BPP because,
inherent in article is admission by BPP that it has done nothing to
retaliate against US for killing of Panther members attributed to US
and Karenga, an admission that the BPP has been beaten at its own game
of violence. 41
In response to this request, the Special Agent in Charge in Los
Angeles reported that the BPP newspaper article had already resulted in
violence, but that it was difficult to induce BPP members to attack US
members in Southern California because they feared US members. 42 The
Los Angeles field office hoped, however, that "internecine struggle"
might be triggered through a skillful use of informants within both
groups:
The Los Angeles Division is aware of the mutually hostile feelings
harbored between the organizations and the first opportunity to
capitalize on the situation will be maximized. It is intended that US
Inc. will be appropriately and discretely advised of the time and
location of BPP activities in order that the two organizations might be
brought together and thus grant nature the opportunity to take her due
course. [Emphasis added.] 43
The release of Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense, from prison in
August 1970 inspired yet another counterintelligence plan. An FBI agent
learned from a prison official that Newton had told an inmate that a
rival group had let a $3,000 contract on his life. The Los Angeles
office presumed the group was US, and proposed that an anonymous letter
be sent to David Hilliard, BPP Chief of Staff in Oakland, purporting to
be from the person holding the contract on Newton's life. The proposed
letter warned Hilliard not to be around when the "unscheduled
appointment" to kill Newton was kept, and cautioned Hilliard not to
"got in my way." 44
FBI headquarters, however, denied authority to send the letter to
Hilliard. Its concern was not that the letter might cause violence or
that it was improper action by a law enforcement agency, but that the
letter might violate a Federal statute:
While Bureau appreciates obvious effort and interest exhibited
concerning anonymous letter ... studied analysis of same indicates
implied threat therein may constitute extortion violation within
investigative jurisdiction of Bureau or postal authorities and may
subsequently be embarrassing to Bureau. 45
The Bureau's stated concern with legality was ironic in light of the
activities described above.
2. The Effort To Promote Violence Between the Blackstone Rangers and
the Black Panther Party
In late 1968 and early 1969, the FBI endeavored to pit the Blackstone
Rangers, a heavily armed, violence-prone, organization, against the
Black Panthers. 46 In December 1968, the FBI learned that the
recognized leader of the Blackstone Rangers, Jeff Fort, was resisting
Black Panther overtures to enlist "the support of the Blackstone
Rangers." 47 In order to increase the friction between these groups,
the Bureau's Chicago office proposed sending an anonymous letter to
Fort, informing him that two prominent leaders of the Chicago BPP had
been making disparaging remarks about his "lack of commitment to black
people generally." The field office observed:
Fort is reportedly aware that such remarks have been circulated, but
is not aware of the identities of the individual responsible. He has
stated that he would "take care of" individuals responsible for the
verbal attacks directed against him.
Chicago, consequently, recommends that Fort be made aware that [name
deleted] and [name deleted] together with other BPP members locally,
are responsible for the circulation of these remarks concerning him. It
is felt that if Fort were to be aware that the BPP was responsible, it
would lend impetus to his refusal to accept any BPP overtures to the
Rangers and additionally might result in Fort having active steps taken
to exact some form of retribution toward the leadership of the BPP.
[Emphasis added.] 48
On about December 18, 1968, Jeff Fort and other Blackstone Rangers
were involved in a serious confrontation with members of the Black
Panther Party.
During that day twelve members of the BPP and five known members of
the Blackstone Rangers were arrested on Chicago's South Side. 49 A
report indicates that the Panthers and Rangers were arrested following
the shooting of one of the Panthers by a Ranger. 49a
That evening, according to an FBI informant, around 10:30 p.m.,
approximately thirty Panthers went to the Blackstone Rangerss'
headquarters at 6400 South Kimbark in Chicago. Upon their arrival Jeff
Fort invited Fred Hampton, Bobby Rush and the other BPP members to come
upstairs and meet with him and the Ranger leadership. 49b The Bureau
goes on to describe what transpired at this meeting:
. . . everyone went upstairs into a room which appeared to be a
gymnasium, where Fort told Hampton and Rush that he had heard about the
Panthers being in Ranger territory during the day, attempting to show
their "power" and he wanted the Panthers to recognize the Rangers
"power." Source stated that Fort then gave orders, via walkie-talkie,
whereupon two men marched through the door carrying pump shotguns.
Another order and two men appeared carrying sawed off carbines then
eight more, each carrying a .45 caliber machine gun, clip type,
operated from the shoulder or hip, then others came with over and under
type weapons. Source stated that after this procession Fort had all
Rangers present, approximately 100, display their side arms and about
one half had .45 caliber revolvers. Source advised that all the above
weapons appeared to be new.
Source advised they left the gym, went downstairs to another room
where Rush and Hampton of the Panthers and Fort and two members of the
Main 21 sat by a table and discussed the possibility of joining the two
groups. Source related that Fort took off his jacket and was wearing a .
45 caliber revolver shoulder holster with gun and had a small caliber
weapon in his belt.
Source advised that nothing was decided at the meeting about the two
groups actually joining forces, however, a decision was made to meet
again on Christmas Day. Source stated Fort did relate that the Rangers
were behind the Panthers but were not to be considered members. Fort
wanted the Panthers to join the Rangers and Hampton wanted the
opposite, stating that if the Rangers joined the Panthers, then
together they would be able to absorb all the other Chicago gangs.
Source advised Hampton did state that they couldn't let the man keep
the two groups apart. Source advised that Fort also gave Hampton and
Rush one of the above .45 caliber machine guns to "try out."
Source advised that based upon conversations during this meeting, Fort
did not appear over anxious to join forces with the Panthers, however,
neither did it appear that he wanted to terminate meeting for this
purpose. 49c
On December 26, 1968 Fort and Hampton met again to discuss the
possibility of the Panthers and Rangers working together. This meeting
was at a South Side Chicago bar and broke up after several Panthers and
Rangers got into an argument. 49d On December 27, Hampton received a
phone call at BPP Headquarters from Fort telling him that the BPP had
until December 28, 1968 to join the Blackstone Rangers. Hampton told
Fort he had until the same time for the Rangers to join the BPP and
they hung up. 49e
In the, wake of this incident, the Chicago office renewed its proposal
to send a letter to Fort, informing FBI headquarters:
As events have subsequently developed . . . the Rangers and the BPP
have not only not been able to form any alliance, but enmity and
distrust have arisen, to the point where each has been ordered to stay
out of the other territory. The BPP has since decided to conduct no
activity or attempt to do recruiting in Ranger territory. 50
The proposed letter read:
Brother Jeff:
I've spent some time with some Panther friends on the west side lately
and I know what's been going on. The brothers that run the Panthers
blame you for blocking their thing and there's supposed to be a hit out
for you. I'm not a Panther, or a Ranger, just black. From what I see
these Panthers are out for themselves not black people. I think you
ought to know what they're up to, I know what I'd do if I was you. You
might hear from me again.
(sgd.) A black brother you don't know. [Emphasis added.] 51
The FBI's Chicago office explained the purpose of the letter as
follows:
It is believed the above may intensify the degree of animosity between
the two groups and occasion Forte to take retaliatory action which
could disrupt the BPP or lead to reprisals against its leadership.
Consideration has been given to a similar letter to the BPP alleging a
Ranger plot against the BPP leadership; however, it is not felt this
would be productive principally because the BPP at present is not
believed as violence prone as the Rangers to whom violent type activity
-- shooting and the like -- is second nature. 52
On the evening of January 13, 1969, Fred Hampton and Bobby Rush
appeared on a Chicago radio talk show called "Hot Line." During the
course of the program Hampton stated that the BPP was in the "process
of educating the Blackstone Rangers." 52a Shortly after that statement
Jeff Fort was on the phone to the radio program and stated that Hampton
had his facts confused and that the Rangers were educating the BPP.
52b
Oil January 16, Hampton, in a public meeting, stated that Jeff Fort
had threatened to blow his head off if he came within Ranger territory.
52c
On January 30, 1969, Director Hoover authorized sending the anonymous
letter. 53 While the Committee staff could find no evidence linking
this letter to subsequent clashes between the Panthers and the Rangers,
the Bureau's intent was clear. 54
B. The Effort To Disrupt the Black Panther Party by Promoting Internal
Dissension
1. General Efforts to Disrupt the Black Panther Party Membership
In addition to setting rival groups against the Panthers, the FBI
employed the full range of COINTELPRO techniques to create rifts and
factions within the Party itself which it was believed would
"neutralize" the Party's effectiveness."
Anonymous letters were commonly used to sow mistrust. For example, in
March 1969 the Chicago FBI Field Office learned that a local BPP member
feared that a faction of the Party, allegedly led by Fred Hampton and
Bobby Rush, was "out to get" him. 56 Headquarters approved sending an
anonymous letter to Hampton which was drafted to exploit dissension
within the BPP as well as to play on mistrust between the Blackstone
Rangers and the Chicago BPP leadership:
Brother Hampton:
Just a word of warning. A Stone friend tells me [name deleted] wants
the Panthers and is looking for somebody to get you out of the way.
Brother Jeff is supposed to be interested. I'm just a black man looking
for blacks working together, not more of this gang banging. 57
Bureau documents indicate that during this time an informant within
the BPP was also involved in maintaining the division between the
Panthers and the Blackstone Rangers. 57a
In December 1968, the Chicago FBI Field Office learned that a leader
of a Chicago youth gang, the Mau Mau's, planned to complain to the
national BPP headquarters about the local BPP leadership and questioned
its loyalty. 58 FBI headquarters approved an anonymous letter to the
Mail Mau leader, stating:
Brother [deleted] :
I'm from the south side and have some Panther friends that know you
and tell me what's been going. I know those two [name deleted] and
[name deleted] that run the Panthers for a long time and those mothers
been with every black outfit going where it looked like they was
something in it for them. The only black people they care about is
themselves. I heard too they're sweethearts and that [name deleted] has
worked for the man that's why he's not in Viet Nam. Maybe that's why
they're just playing like real Panthers. I hear a lot of the brothers
are with you and want those mothers out but don't know how. The
Panthers need real black men for leaders not freaks. Don't give up
'brothers. [Emphasis added.] 59
A black friend.
The FBI also resorted to anonymous phone calls. The San Diego Field
Office placed anonymous calls to local BPP leaders naming other BPP
members as "police agents." According to a report from the field
office, these calls, reinforced by rumors spread by FBI informants
within the BPP, induced a group of Panthers to accuse three Party
members of working for the police. The field office boasted that one of
the accused members fled San Diego in fear for his life. 60
The FBI conducted harassing interviews of Black Panther members to
intimidate them and drive them from the Party. The Los Angeles Field
Office conducted a stringent interview program
in the hope that a state of distruct [sic] might remain among the
members and add to the turmoil presently going on within the BPP. 61
The Los Angeles office claimed that similar tactics had cut the
membership of the United States (US) by 50 percent. 62
FBI agents attempted to convince landlords to force Black Panther
members and offices from their buildings. The Indianapolis Field Office
reported that a local landlord had yielded to its urgings and promised
to tell his Black Panther tenants to relocate their offices. 63 The San
Francisco office sent in article from the Black Panther newspaper to
the landlord of a BPP member who had rented an apartment under an
assumed name. The article, which had been written by that member and
contained her picture and true name, was accompanied by an anonymous
note stating, "(false name) is your tenant (true name)" 64 The San
Francisco office secured the eviction of one Black Panther who lived in
a public housing project by informing the Housing Authority officials
that she was using his apartment for the BPP Free Breakfast Program. 65
When it was learned that the BPP was conducting a Free Breakfast
Program "In the notorious Haight-Ashbury District of San Francisco,"
the Bureau mailed a letter to the owners of the building:
Dear Mr. (excised):
I would call and talk to you about this matter, but I am not sure how
you feel, and I do not wish to become personally embroiled with
neighbors. It seems that the property owners on (excised) Street have
had enough trouble in the past without bringing in Black Panthers.
Maybe you are not aware, but the Black Panthers have taken over
(address deleted). Perhaps if you drive up the street, you can see what
they are going to do to the property values. They have already
plastered a nearby garage with big Black Panther posters.
-- A concerned property owner. 66
The Bureau also attempted to undermine the morale of Panther members
by attempting to break up their marriages. In one case, an anonymous
letter was sent to the wife of a prominent Panther leader stating that
her husband had been having affairs with several teenage girls and had
taken some of those girls with him on trips. 67 Another Panther leader
told a Committee staff member that an FBI agent had attempted to
destroy his marriage by visiting his wife and showing photographs
purporting to depict him with other women. 68
2. FBI Role in the Newton-Cleaver Rift
In March 1970, the FBI initiated a concerted program to drive a
permanent wedge between the followers of Eldridge Cleaver, who was then
out of the country and the supporters of Huey P. Newton, who was then
serving a prison sentence in California. 69 An anonymous letter was
sent to Cleaver in Algeria stating that BPP leaders in California were
seeking to undercut his influence. The Bureau subsequently learned that
Cleaver had assumed the letter was from the then Panther representative
in Scandanavia, Connie Matthews, and that the letter had led Cleaver to
expel three BPP international representatives from the Party. 70
Encouraged by the apparent success of this letter, FBI headquarters
instructed its Paris Legal Attache to mail a follow-up letter, again
written to appear as if Matthews was the author, to the Black Panther
Chief-of-Staff, David Hilliard, in Oakland, California. The letter
alleged that Cleaver "has tripped out. Perhaps he has been working too
hard," and suggested that Hilliard "take some immediate action before
this becomes more serious." The Paris Legal Attache was instructed to
mail the letter:
At a time when Matthews is in or has just passed through Paris
immediately following one of her trips to Algiers. The enclosed letter
should be held by you until such an occasion arises at which time you
are authorized to immediately mail it in Paris in such a manner that it
cannot be traced to the Bureau. 71
In early May, Eldridge Cleaver called BPP national headquarters from
Algeria and talked with Connie Matthews, Elbert Howard, and Roosevelt
Hilliard. A Bureau report stated:
Various items were discussed by these individuals with Hilliard.
Connie Matthews discussed with Hilliard "those letters" appearing to
relate to the counterintelligence letters, which have been submitted to
Cleaver and Hilliard purportedly by Matthews ....
It appears ... that [Elbert Howard] had brought copies of the second
counterintelligence letter to David Hilliard with him to Algiers which
were then compared with the ... letter previously sent to Cleaver in
Algiers and that ... discussed this situation .... 72
The San Francisco Field Office reported that some BPP leaders
suspected that the CIA or FBI had sent the letters, while Others
suspected the Black Panther members in Paris. A subsequent FBI
memorandum indicated that suspicion had focused on the Panthers in
Europe. 73
On August 13 1970 -- the day that Huey Newton was released from prison
-- the Philadelphia Field Office had an informant distribute a
fictitious BPP directive to Philadelphia Panthers, questioning Newton's
leadership ability. 74 The Philadelphia office informed FBI
Headquarters that the directive:
stresses the leadership and strength of David Hilliard and Eldridge
Cleaver while intimating Huey Newton is useful only as a drawing card.
It is recommended this directive ... be mailed personally to Huey
Newton with a short anonymous note. The note would indicate the writer,
a Community Worker in Philadelphia for the BPP, was incensed over the
suggestion Huey was only being used by the Party after founding it, and
wanted no part of this Chapter if it was slandering its leaders in
private. 75
Headquarters approved this plan on August 19,1970. 76
FBI officials seized on several incidents during the following months
as opportunities to advance their program. In an August 1970 edition of
the BPP newspaper, Huey Newton appealed to "oppressed groups,"
including homosexuals, to "unite with the BPP in revolutionary
fashion." 77 FBI headquarters approved a plan to mail forged letters
from BPP sympathizers and supporters in ghetto areas to David Hilliard,
protesting Newton's statements about joining with homosexuals, hoping
this would discredit Newton with other BPP leaders. 78
In July and August 1970, Eldridge Cleaver led a United States
delegation to North Korea and North Vietnam. Ramparts editor Robert
Scheer, who had been a member of the delegation, held a press
conference in New York and, according to the Bureau, glossed over the
Panther's role in sponsoring the tour. 79 The New York office was
authorized to send an anonymous letter to Newton complaining about
Sheer's oversight to strain relations between the BPP and the "New
Left."'80 On November 13, 1970, the Los Angeles field office was asked
to prepare an anonymous letter to Cleaver criticizing Newton for not
aggressively obtaining BPP press coverage of the BPP's sponsorship of
the trip. 81
In October 1970, the FBI learned that Timothy Leary, who had escaped
from a California prison where he was serving a sentence for possessing
marijuana, was seeking asylum with Eldridge Cleaver in Algiers. The San
Francisco field office, noting that the Panthers were officially
opposed to drugs, sent Newton an anonymous letter calling his attention
to Cleaver "playing footsie" with Leary. 82 In January when Cleaver
publicly condemned Leary, FBI headquarters approved sending Newton a
bogus letter from a Berkeley, California commune condemning Cleaver for
"divorcing the BPP from white revolutionaries." 83
In December 1970, the BPP attempted to hold a Revolutionary Peoples'
Constitutional Convention (RPCC) in Washington, D.C. The Bureau
considered the convention a failure and received reports that most
delegates had left it dissatisfied. 84 The Los Angeles FBI field office
suggested a letter to Cleaver designed to
provoke Cleaver to openly question Newton's leadership ... It is felt
that distance and lack of personal contact between Newton and Cleaver
do offer a counterintelligence opportunity that should be probed.
In view of the BPP's unsuccessful attempt to convene a Revolutionary
People's Constitutional Convention (RPCC), it is suggested that each
division which had individuals attend the RPCC write numerous letters
to Cleaver criticizing Newton for his lack of leadership. It is felt
that, if Cleaver received a sufficient number of complaints regarding
Newton it might . . . create dissension that later could be more fully
exploited. 85
FBI headquarters approved the Los Angeles letter to Cleaver and asked
the Washington field office to supply a list of all organizations
attending the RPCC. 86 A barrage of anonymous letters to Newton and
Cleaver followed:
Two weeks later, the San Francisco office mailed Newton an anonymous
letter, supposedly from a "white revolutionary," complaining about the
incompetence of the Panthers who had planned the conference. 86a The
New York office mailed a complaint to the BPP national headquarters,
purportedly from a black student at Columbia University who attended
the RPCC as a member of the University's student Afro-American Society.
86b The San Francisco office sent a letter containing an article from
the Berkeley Barb to Cleaver, attacking Newton's leadership at the
RPCC. Mailed with the article was a copy of a letter to Newton
criticizing the RPCC and bearing the notation:
Mr. Cleaver,
Here is a letter I sent to Huey Newton. I'm sincere and hope you can
do something to set him right and get him off his duff. 86c
In January 1971, the Boston office sent a letter, purportedly from a
"white revolutionary," to Cleaver, stating in part:
Dear Revolutionary Comrade:
The people's revolution in America was greatly impeded and the stature
of th Black Panther Party, both nationally and internationally,
received a major setback as an outcome of the recent Revolutionary
People's Constitutional Convention. . . .
The Revolutionary People's Constitutional Convention did little, if
anything, to organize our forces to move against the evils of
capitalism, imperialism and racism. Any unity or solidarity which
existed between the Black Panther Party and the white revolutionary
movement before the Convention has now gone down the tube. . . .
The responsibility of any undertaking as meaningful and important to
the revolution . . . should not have been delegated to the haphazard
ways of [name deleted] whose title of Convention Coordinator . . .
places him in the . . . position of receiving the Party's wrath . . .
Huey Newton himself (should) have assumed command . . . .
The Black Panther Party has failed miserably. No longer can the Party
be looked upon as the "Vanguard of the Revolution."
Yours in Revolution,
Lawrence Thomas,
Students for a Democratic Society.
Memorandum from Boston Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/8/71. This
letter was sent to Cleaver through Oakland BPP headquarters to
determine whether the BPP in California would forward the letter to
him. (Ibid.)
One letter to Cleaver, written to appear as if it had come from Connie
Matthews, Newton's personal secretary read in part:
Things around headquarters are dreadfully disorganized with the
comrade commander not making proper decisions. The newspaper is in a
shambles. No one knows who is in charge. The foreign department gets no
support . . . I fear there is rebellion working just beneath the
surface . . . .
We must either get rid of the Supreme Commander [Newton] or get rid of
the disloyal members. 87
In a January 28, 1971, evaluation, FBI headquarters noted that Huey
Newton had recently disciplined high BPP officials and that he prepared
"to respond violently to any question of his actions or policies." The
Bureau believed that Newton's reaction was in part a "result of our
counterintelligence projects now in operation."
The present chaotic situation within the BPP must be exploited and
recipients must maintain the present high level of counterintelligence
activity. You should each give this matter priority attention and
immediately furnish Bureau recommendations . . . designed to further
aggravate the dissention within BPP leadership and to fan the apparent
distrust by Newton of anyone who questions his wishes. 88
The campaign was intensified. On February 2, 1971, FBI headquarters
directed each of 29 field offices to submit within eight days a
proposal to disrupt local BPP chapters and a proposal to cause
dissention between local BPP chapters and BPP national headquarters.
The directive noted that Huey Newton had recently expelled or
disciplined several "dedicated Panthers" and
This dissention coupled with financial difficulties offers an
exceptional opportunity to further disrupt, aggravate and possibly
neutralize this organization through counterintelligence. In light of
above developments this program has been intensified ... and selected
offices should ... increase measurably the pressure on the BPP and its
leaders. 89
A barrage of anonymous letters flowed from FBI field offices in
response to the urgings from FBI headquarters. A fictitious letter to
Cleaver, signed by the "New York 21," criticized Newton's leadership
and his expulsion of them from the BPP. 90 An imaginary New York City
member of the Youth Against War and Facism added his voice to the
Bureau's fictitious chorus of critics of Newton and the RPCC. 91 An
anonymous letter was sent to Huey Newton's brother, Melvin Newton,
warning that followers of Eldridge Cleaver and the New York BPP chapter
were planning to have him killed. 92 The FBI learned that Melvin Newton
told his brother he thought the letter had been written by someone "on
the inside" of the BPP organization because of its specificity. 93 Huey
Newton reportedly remarked that he was "definitely of the opinion there
is an informer in the party right in the ministry." 93a
On February 19, 1971, a false letter, allegedly from a BPP official in
Oakland, was mailed to Don Cox, a BPP official close to Cleaver in
Algeria. The letter intimated that the recent death of a BPP member in
California was the result of BPP factionalism (which the Bureau knew
was not the case.) The letter also warned Cleaver not to allow his
wife, Kathleen, to travel to the United States because of the
possibility of violence. 94
A letter over the forged signature of "Big Man" Howard, editor of the
BPP newspaper, told Cleaver:
Eldridge:
[Name deleted] told me Huey talked with you Friday and what he had to
say. I'm disgusted with things here and the fact that you are being
ignored.... It makes me mad to learn that Huey now has to lie to you.
I'm referring to his fancy apartment which he refers to as the throne.
. . .
I can't risk a call as it would mean certain expulsion. You should
think a great deal before sending Kathleen. If I could talk to you I
could tell you why I don't think you should. 95
The San Francisco office reported to headquarters that because of the
various covert actions instituted against Cleaver and Newton since
November 11, 1970:
fortunes of the BPP are at a low ebb.... Newton is positive there is
an informant in Headquarters. Cleaver feels isolated in Algeria and out
of contact, with Newton and the Supreme Commander's [Newton's]
secretary (Connie Matthews) has disappeared and been denounced. 96
On April 8, 1976 in Executive Testimony Kathleen Cleaver testified
that many letters, written to appear as if they had come from BPP
members living in California caused disruption and confusion in the
relationship between the Algerian Section and the BPP leadership in
Oakland. She stated:
We did not know who to believe about what, so the general effect, not
only of the letters but the whole situation in which the letters were
part was creating uncertainty. It was a very bizarre feeling. 96a
On February 26, 1971, Eldridge Cleaver, in a television interview,
criticized the expulsion of BPP members and suggested that Panther
Chief of Staff David Hilliard be removed from his post. As a result of
Cleaver's statements, Newton expelled him and the "Intercommunal
Section of the Party" in Algiers, Algeria. 97
On March 25, 1971, the Bureau's San Francisco office sent to various
BPP "Solidarity Committees*' throughout Europe bogus letters on
"fascsimiles of BPP letterhead," stating:
To Black Panther Embassies,
You have received copies of February 13, 1971 issue of The Black
Panther declaring [three BPP members] as enemies of the People.
The Supreme Servant of the People, Huey P. Newton, with concurrence of
the Central Committee of the Black Panther Party, has ordered the
expulsion of the entire Intercommunal Section of the Party at Algiers.
You are advised that Eldridge Leroy Cleaver is a murderer and a punk
without genitals. D.C. Cox is no better.
Leroy's running dogs in New York have been righteously dealt with.
Anyone giving any aid or comfort to Cleaver and his jackanapes will be
similarly dealt with no matter where they may be located.
[Three BPP international representatives, names deleted] were never
members of the Black Panther Party and will never become such.
Immediately report to the Supreme Commander any attempts of these
elements to contact you and be guided by the above instructions.
Power to the People
David Hilliard, Chief of Staff
For Huey P. Newton
Supreme Commander. 98
On the same day, FBI headquarters formally declared its
counterintelligence program aimed at "aggravating dissension" between
Newton and Cleaver a success. A letter to the Chicago and San Francisco
Field Offices stated:
Since the differences between Newton and Cleaver now appear to be
irreconcilable, no further counterintelligence activity in this regard
will be undertaken at this time and now new targets must be
established.
David Hilliard and Elbert "Big Man" Howard of National Headquarters
and Bob Rush of Chicago BPP Chapter are likely future targets....
Hilliard's key position at National Headquarters makes him an
outstanding target.
Howard and Rush are also key Panther functionaries; and since it was
necessary for them to affirm their loyalty to Newton in "The Black
Panther" newspaper of 3/20/71, they must be under a certain amount of
suspicion already, making them prime targets.
San Francisco and Chicago furnish the Bureau their comments and
recommendations concerning counterintelligence activity designed to
cause Newton to expel Hilliard, Howard and Rush. 99
C. Covert Efforts To Undermine Support of the Black Panther Party and
to Destroy the Party's Public Image
1. Efforts To Discourage and To Discredit Supporters of the Black
Panthers
The Federal Bureau of Investigation's program to "neutralize" the
Black Panther Party included attempts to deter individuals and groups
from supporting the Panthers and, when that could not be accomplished,
often extended to covert action targeted against those supporters.
The Bureau made a series of progressively more severe efforts to
destroy the confidence between the Panthers and one of their major
California supporters, Donald Freed, a writer who headed an
organization of white BPP sympathizers called "Friends of the
Panthers." In July 1969, the Los Angeles Field Office sent the local
BPP office a memorandum bearing Freed's name and address to "Friends of
the Panthers." Written in a condescending tone and including a list of
six precautions whites should keep in mind when dealing with Panthers,
the memorandum was calculated to cause a "rift between the Black
Panther Party and their assisting organizations." 100 A few days later,
the Bureau had leaflets placed in a park near a BPP-sponsored national
conference in Oakland, California, alleging that Freed was a police
informant. 101
The FBI viewed with favor an intensive local investigation of Freed
for "harboring" and "possession of illegal firearms."
It is felt that any prosecution or exposure of either Freed or [name
deleted] will severely hurt the BPP. Any exposure will not only deny
the Panthers money, but additionally, would cause other white
supporters of the BPP to withdraw their support. It is felt that the
Los Angeles chapter of the BPP could not operate without the financial
support of white sympathizers. 102
The Bureau's Los Angeles Division also arranged for minutes of a BPP
support group to be provided to the BPP when it was learned that
statements of members of the support group were critical of Panther
leaders. 103
The FBI attempted to disaffect another BPP supporter, Ed Pearl of the
Peace and Freedom Party, by sending him a cautionary letter bearing a
fictitious signature. A Bureau memorandum describing the letter says:
The writer states that although he is not a member of the BPP, he is a
Mexican who is trusted by BPP members. The writer advises that he has
learned from BPP members that certain whites in the PFP who get in the
way of the Panthers will be dealt with in a violent manner. The object
sought in this letter is to cause a breach between the PFP and the BPP.
The former organization had been furnishing money and support to the
latter. 104
Famous entertainment personalities who spoke in favor of Panther goals
or associated with BPP members became the targets of FBI programs. When
the FBI learned that one well-known Hollywood actress had become
pregnant during in affair with a BPP member, it reported this
information to a famous Hollywood gossip columnist in the form of an
anonymous letter. The story was used by the Hollywood columnist. 105 In
June 1970, FBI headquarters approved an anonymous letter informing
Hollywood gossip columnist, Army Archerd that actress Jane Fonda had
appeared at a BPP fund-raising function, noting that "It can be
expected that Fonda's involvement with the BPP cause could detract from
her status with the general public if reported in a Hollywood 'gossip
column.'" 106 The wife of a famous Hollywood actor was targeted by the
FBI when it discovered that she was a financial contributor and
supporter of the BPP in Los Angeles. 107 A caricature attacking her was
prepared by the San Diego FBI office. 108
A famous entertainer was also targeted after the Bureau concluded that
he supported the Panthers. Two COINTELPRO actions against this
individual were approved because FBI headquarters "believed" they:
would be an effective means of combating BPP fund-raising activities
among liberal and naive individuals. 109
The Bureau also contacted the employers of BPP contributors. It sent a
letter to the President and a Vice-President of Union Carbide in
January 1970 after learning that a production manager in its San Diego
division contributed to the BPP. The letter, which centered around a
threat not to purchase Union Carbide stock, stated in part:
Dear Mr. [name deleted]:
I am writing to you in regards to an employee in your San Diego
operation, [name deleted]. . . .
I am not generally considered a flag-waving exhibitionist, but I do
regard myself as being a loyal American citizen. I, therefore, consider
it absolutely ludicrous to invest in any corporation whose ranking
employees support, assist, and encourage any organization which openly
advocates the violent overthrow of our free enterprise system.
It is because of my firm belief in this self-same free enterprise,
capitalistic system that I feel morally obligated to bring this
situation to your attention.
Sincerely yours,
T. F. Ellis
Post Office Box ---
San Diego, California 110
The response of Union Carbide's Vice President was reported in a San
Diego Field Office memorandum:
On 3/21/70, a letter was received from Mr. [name deleted], Vice
President of the Union Carbide Corporation, concernIng a previously
Bureau-approved letter sent to the Union Carbide Corporation objecting
to the financial and other support to the BPP of one of their
employees, [name deleted]. The letter indicated that Union Carbide has
always made it a policy not to become involved in personal matters of
their employees unless such activity had an adverse affect upon that
particular employee's performance. 111
One of the Bureau's prime targets was the BPP's free "Breakfast for
Children" program, which FBI headquarters feared might be a potentially
successful effort by the BPP to teach children to hate police and to
spread "anti-white propaganda." 112 In an admitted attempt "to impede
their contributions to the BPP Breakfast Program," the FBI sent
anonymous letters and copies of an inflammatory Black Panther Coloring
Book for children to contributors, including Safeway Stores, Inc.,
Mayfair Markets, and the Jack-In-The-Box Corporation. 113
On April 8, 1976 in Executive Testimony a former member of the BPP
Central Steering Committee stated that when the coloring book came to
the attention of the Panther's national leadership, Bobby Seale ordered
it destroyed because the book "did not correctly reflect the ideology
of the Black Panther Party . . ." 114
Churches that permitted the Panthers to use their facilities in the
free breakfast program were also targeted. When the FBI's San Diego
office discovered that a Catholic Priest, Father Frank Curran, was
permitting his church in San Diego to be used as a serving place for
the BPP Breakfast Program, it sent an anonymous letter to the Bishop of
the San Diego Diocese informing him of the priest's activities. 115 In
August 1969, the San Diego Field Office requested permission from
headquarters to place three telephone calls protesting Father Curran's
support of the BPP program to the Auxiliary Bishop of the San Diego
Diocese:
All of the above calls will be made from "parishioners" objecting to
the use of their church to assist a black militant cause. Two of the
callers will urge that Father Curran be removed as Pastor of the
church, and one will threaten suspension of financial support of the
church if the activities of the Pastor are allowed to continue..
Fictitious names will be utilized in the event a name is requested by
the Bishop. It is felt that complaints, if they do not effect the,
removal of Father Curran . . . will at least result in Father Curran
becoming aware that his Bishop is cognizant of his activities and will
thus result in a curtailment of these activities. 116
After receiving permission and placing the calls, the San Diego office
reported: "the Bishop appeared to be . . . quite concerned over the
fact that one of his Priests was deeply involved in utilization of
church facilities for this purpose. 117
A month later, the San Diego office reported that Father Curran had
been transferred from the San Diego Diocese to "somewhere in the State
of New Mexico for permanent assignment."
In view of the above, it would appear that Father Curran has now been
completely neutralized.
The BPP Breakfast Program, without the prompting of Father Curran, has
not been renewed in the San Diego area. It is not anticipated at this
time that any efforts to re-establish the program will be made in the
foreseeable future. 118
In another case, the FBI sent a letter to the superior of a clergyman
in Hartford, Connecticut who had expressed support for the Nlack
Panthers, which stated in part:
Dear BISHOP:
It pains me to have to write this letter to call to your attention a
matter which, if brought to public light, may cause the church a great
deal of embarrassment. I wish to remain anonymous with regard to the
information because in divulging it I may have violated a trust. I
feel, however, that what I am writing is important enough that my
conscience is clear.
Specifically, I'm referring to the fact that Reverend and Mrs. [name
deleted] are associating with leaders of the Black Panther Party. I
recently heard through a close friend of Reverend [name deleted] that
he is a revolutionist who advocates overthrowing the Government of the
United States and that he has turned over a sizable sum of money to the
Panthers. I can present no evidence of fact but is it possible Reverend
[name deleted] is being influenced by Communists? Some statements he
has made both in church and out have led me to believe he is either a
Communist himself, or so left-wing that the only thing he lacks is a
card.
I beseech you to counsel with Reverend [name deleted] and relay our
concern over his political philosophies which among other things
involves association with a known revolutionist, [name deleted], head
of the Black Panther Party in New Haven. I truly believe Reverend [name
deleted] to be a good man, but his fellow men have caused him to go
overboard and he now needs a guiding light which only you can provide.
Sincerely,
A Concerned Christian. 119
Anonymous FBI mailings were also sent to public officials and persons
whose help might sway public opinion against the BPP. In December 1969,
the FBI mailed Bureau-reproduced copies of BPP "Seasons Greetings"
cards to ten FBI field offices 120 with the following instructions:
Enclosed for each office are 20 copies of reproductions of three types
of Black Panther Party (BPP) "seasons greetings cards" which depict the
violent propensities of this organization. You should anonymously mail
these cards to those newspaper editors, public officials, responsible
businessmen, and clergy in your territory who should be made aware of
the vicious nature of the BPP. 121
The San Francisco office mailed its cards to several prominent local
persons and organizations. 122
The Bureau also targeted attorneys representing Black Panther members.
In July 1969, the Los Angeles Field Office suggested that a break
between the BPP membership and Charles Garry, an attorney who
frequently represented BPP members, might be accomplished by planting a
rumor that Garry, Bobby Seale, and David Hilliard were conspiring to
keep BPP leader Huey Newton in jail. 123 This proposal was rejected by
FBI headquarters out of concern that the Bureau might be recognized as
the source of the rumor. 124 Headquarters did suggest, however:
Los Angeles should review the ideas set forth ... especially as they
pertain to Charles Garry, Bobby Seale, and David Hilliard, and prepare
a specific counterintelligence proposal designed to create a breach
between the BPP and Garry. Consider such things as anonymous
communications and anonymous telephone calls as well as cartoons and
other logical methods of transporting your idea. 125
When the San Francisco Division learned that Garry intended to
represent Bobby Seale at the Chicago 7 trial, it sent the Chicago
office transcripts of hearings before the House Committee on Un-
American Activities and the California State Senate's Report on Un-
American Activities, which allegedly showed that Garry was connected
with the Communist Party. It was intended to distribute this material
"to cooperative news media in that City." 126
Similarly, when two local BPP leaders filed suit against the San Diego
Police Department charging harassment, illegal arrest, and illegal
searches, the San Diego Field Office reviewed its files
to determine if any public source information is available which
describes [the attorney's] activities in behalf of CP (Communist Party)
activities. If so, an appropriate request will be forwarded to the
Bureau concerning a possible letter to the editor and/or an editorial.
127
The FBI also sought to destroy community support for individual BPP
members by spreading rumors that they were immoral. This idea was
originally advanced in an August 1967 memorandum from FBI headquarters
to all major field offices:
Many individuals currently active in black nationalist organizations
have backgrounds in immorality, subversive activity, and criminal
records. Through your investigation of key agitators, you should
endeavor to establish their unsavory backgrounds. Be alert to determine
evidence of misappropriation of funds or other types of personal
misconduct on the part of militant nationalist leaders so any practical
or warranted counterintelligence may be instituted. 128
An example of "successful" implementation of this program was a 1970
report from the San Diego Field Office that it had anonymously informed
the parents of a teenage girl that she was pregnant by a local Panther
leader:
The parents showed extreme concern over a previously unknown situation
and [name deleted] was forced to resign from the BPP and return home to
live. It also became general knowledge throughout the Negro community
that a BPP leader was responsible for the difficulty being experienced
by [name deleted]. 129
The field office also considered the operation successful because the
mother of another girl questioned the activities of her own daughter
after talking with the parent the agents had anonymously contacted. She
learned that her daughter, a BPP member, was also pregnant, and had her
committed to a reformatory as a wayward juvenile. 130
Efforts To Promote Criticism of the Black Panthers in the Mass Media
and To Prevent the Black Panther Party and Its Sympathizers from
Expressing Their Views
The FBI's program to destroy the Black Panther Party included a
concerted effort to muzzle Black Panther publications to prevent
Panther members and persons sympathetic to their aims from expressing
their views, and to encourage the mass media to report stories
unfavorable to the Panthers.
In May 1970, FBI headquarters ordered the Chicago, Los Angeles, Miami,
Newark, New Haven, New York, San Diego, and San Francisco field offices
to advance proposals for crippling the BPP newspaper, The Black
Panther. Immediate action was deemed necessary because:
The Black Panther Party newspaper is one of the most effective
propaganda operations of the BPP.
Distribution of this newspaper is increasing at a regular rate thereby
influencing a greater number of individuals in the United States along
the black extremist lines.
Each recipient submit by 6/5/70 proposed counterintelligence measures
which will hinder the vicious propaganda being spread by the BPP.
The BPP newspaper has a circulation in excess of 100,000 and has
reached the height of 139,000. It is the voice of the BPP and if it
could be effectively hindered it would result in helping to cripple the
BPP. Deadline being set in view of the need to receive recommendations
for the purpose of taking appropriate action expeditiously. 131
The San Francisco Field Office submitted an analysis of the local
Black Panther printing schedules and circulation. It discouraged
disruption of nationwide distribution because the airline company which
had contracted with the Panthers might lose business or face a law suit
and recommended instead:
a vigorous inquiry by the Internal Revenue Service to have "The Black
Panther" report their income from the sale of over 100,000 papers each
week. Perhaps the Bureau through liaison at SOG [seat of government]
could suggest such a course of action. It is noted that Internal
Revenue Service at San Francisco is receiving copies of Black Panther
Party funds and letterhead memoranda.
It is requested that the Bureau give consideration to discussion with
Internal Revenue Service requesting financial records and income tax
return for "The Black Panther." 132
The San Diego Field Office, while noting that the BPP newspaper had
the same legal immunity from tax laws and other state legislation as
other newspapers, suggested three California statutes which might be
used against The Black Panther. One was a State tax on printing
equipment; the second a "rarely used transportation tax law"; and the
third a law prohibiting business in a residential area. 133
The San Diego Field Office had a more imaginative suggestion however;
spray the newspaper printing room with a foul smelling chemical:
The Bureau may also wish to consider the utilization of "Skatol",
which is a chemical agent in powdered form and when applied to a
particular surface emits an extremely noxious odor rendering the,
premises surrounding the point of application uninhabitable.
Utilization of such a chemical of course, would be dependent upon
whether an entry could be achieved into the area which is utilized for
the production of "The Black Panther." 134
The San Diego Division also thought that threats from another radical
organization against the newspaper might convince the BPP to cease
publication:
Another possibility which the Bureau may wish to consider would be the
composition and mailing of numerous letters to BPP Headquarters from
various points throughout the country on stationary [sic] containing
the national emblem of the Minutemen organization. These letters, in
several different forms, would all have the common theme of warning the
Black Panthers to cease publication or drastic measures would be taken
by the Minutemen organization....
Utilization of the Minutemen organization through direction of
informants within that group would also be a very effective measure for
the disruption of the publication of this newspaper. 135
On another occasion, however, FBI agents contacted United Airlines
officials and inquired about the rates being charged for transporting
the Black Panther magazine. A Bureau memorandum states that the BPP was
being charged "the General Rate" for printed material, but that in the
future it would be forced to pay the "full legal rate allowable for
newspaper shipment." The memorandum continued:
Officials advise this increase . . . means approximately a forty
percent increase. Officials agree to determine consignor in San
Francisco and from this determine consignees throughout the United
States so that it can impose full legal tariff. They believe the
airlines are due the differences in freight tariffs as noted above for
past six to eight months, and are considering discussions with their
legal staff concerning suit for recovery of deficit. . . . (T)hey
estimate that in New York alone will exceed ten thousand dollars. 136
In August 1970, the New York Field Office reported that it was
considering plans:
directed against (1) the production of the BPP newspaper; (2) the
distribution of that newspaper and (3) the use of information contained
in particular issues for topical counterintelligence proposals.
The NYO [New York Office] realizes the financial benefits coming to
the BPP through the sale of their newspaper. Continued efforts will be
made to derive logical and practical plans to thwart this crucial BPP
operation. 137
A few months later, FBI headquarters directed 39 field offices to
distribute copies of a column written by Victor Riesel, a labor
columnist, calling for a nationwide union boycott against handling the
BPP newspaper.
Enclosed for each office are 50 reproductions of a column written by
Victor Riesel regarding the Black Panther Party (BPP).
Portions of the column deals with proposal that union members refuse
to handle shipments of BPP newspapers. Obviously if such a boycott
gains national support it will result in effectively cutting off BPP
propaganda and finances, therefore, it is most desirable this proposal
be brought to attention of members and officials of unions such as
Teamsters and others involved in handling of shipments of BPP
newspapers. These shipments are generally by air freight. The column
also deals with repeated calls for murder of police that appear in BPP
paper; therefore, it would also be desirable to bring boycott proposal
to attention of members and officials of police associations who might
be in a position to encourage boycott.
Each office anonymously mail copies of enclosed to officials of
appropriate unions, police organizations or other individuals within
its territory who could encourage such a boycott....
Handle promptly and advise Bureau of any positive results noted. Any
publicity observed concerning proposed boycott should be brought to
attention of Bureau.
Be alert for any other opportunities to further exploit this proposal.
138
Bureau documents submitted to the Select Committee staff do not
indicate the outcome of this plan.
On one occasion the FBI's Racial Intelligence Section concocted a
scheme to create friction between the Black Panthers and the Nation of
Islam by reducing sales of the NOI paper, Muhammed Speaks:
While both papers advocate white hate, a noticeable loss of revenue to
NOIT due to decreased sales of their paper caused by the BPP might well
be the spark to ignite the fuel of conflict between the two
organizations. Both are extremely money conscious.
We feel that our network of racial informants, many of whom are
directly involved in the sale of the NOI and BPP newspapers, are in a
position to cause a material reduction in NOI newspaper sales. Our
sources can bring the fact of revenue loss directly to NOI leader,
Elijah Muhammad, who might well be influenced to take positive steps to
counteract the sale of BPP papers in the Negro community. We feel that
with careful planning and close supervision an open dispute can be
developed between the two organizations. 139
FBI headquarters promptly forwarded this suggestion to the field
offices in Chicago, New York, and San Francisco with the express hope
that Elijah Muhammed might be influenced "to take positive steps to
counteract the sale of BPP newspapers in the Negro community." 140 The
following month, the Chicago Field Office advised against using
informants for this project because animosity was already developing
between the BPP and NOI, and any revelation of a Bureau attempt to
encourage conflict might serve to bring the BPP and NOI closer
together. 141
Numerous attempts were made to prevent Black Panthers from airing
their views in public. For example, in February 1969, the FBI joined
with the Chicago police force to prevent the local BPP leader, Fred
Hampton, from appearing on a television talk show. The FBI memorandum
explaining this incident states:
the [informant] also enabled Chicago to further harass the local BPP
when he provided information the afternoon of 1/24/69 reflecting that
Fred Hampton was to appear that evening at local TV studio for video
tape interview. . . . The tape was to be aired the following day.
Chicago was aware a warrant for mob action was outstanding for Hampton
in his home town and the above information . . . was provided the
Maywood Police Department with a suggestion that they request the
Chicago Police Department to serve this arrest warrant. This was
subsequently done with Hampton arrested at television studio in
presence of 25 BPP members and studio personnel. This caused
considerable embarrassment to the local BPP and disrupted the plans for
Hampton's television appearance. 142
Headquarters congratulated the Chicago Field Office on the timing of
the arrest "under circumstances which proved highly embarrassing to the
BPP." 143
The Bureau's San Francisco office took credit for preventing Bobby
Seale from keeping a number of speaking engagements in Oregon and
Washington. In May 1969, while Seale was traveling from a speaking
engagement at Yale University to begin his West Coast tour, a bombing
took place in Eugene, Oregon which the FBI suspected involved the Black
Panthers. The San Francisco Field Office subsequently reported:
As this was on the eve of Seale's speech, this seemed to be very poor
advance publicity for Seale. . . . It was . . . determined to telephone
Mrs. Seale [Bobby Seale's mother] claiming to be a friend from Oregon,
bearing the warning that it might be dangerous for Seale to come up.
This was done.
Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Seale reported this to BPP headquarters,
claiming an unknown brother had sent a warning to Bobby front Oregon.
Headquarters took this very seriously and when Bobby arrived shortly
thereafter, he decided not to go north with "all the action going on up
there." He subsequently cancelled a trip to Seattle. It is believed
that the above mentioned telephone call was a pivotal point in
persuading Seale to stay home. 144
The San Francisco office reported that not only had Seale been
prevented from making his appearances, but that he had lost over $1,700
in "badly needed" fees and that relations between Seale and "New Left"
leaders who had been scheduled to appear with him had become strained.
In December 1969, FBI headquarters stressed to the San Francisco Field
Office the need to prevent Black Panther speaking engagements:
Several recent communications received at the Bureau indicate tile BPP
is encouraging their branches to set up speaking engagements at schools
and colleges and the showing of films in order to raise money . . . San
Francisco should instruct [local FBI] office covering to immediately
submit to the Bureau for approval a counterintelligence proposal aimed
at preventing the activities scheduled. . . .
The BPP in an effort to bolster its weak financial position is now
soliciting speaking engagements and information has been developed
indicating they are reducing their monetary requirements for such
speeches. We have been successful in the past through contacts with
established sources in preventing such speeches in colleges or other
institutions. 145
In March 1970, a representative of a Jewish organization contacted the
San Francisco FBI Field Office when it learned that one of its local
lodges had invited David Hilliard, BPP Chief-of-Staff, and Attorney
Charles Garry to speak. San Francisco subsequently reported to
headquarters:
Public source information relating to David Hilliard, Garry, and the
BPP, including "The Black Panther" newspaper itself, was brought to
[source's] attention. He subsequently notified the [FBI] office that
the [name deleted] had altered their arrangements for this speech and
that the invitation to Hilliard was withdrawn but that Charles Garry
was permitted to speak but his speech was confined solely to the recent
case of the Chicago 7. 146
The FBI exhibited comparable fervor in disseminating information
unfavorable to the Black Panthers to the press and television stations.
A directive from FBI headquarters to nine field offices in January 1970
explained the program:
To counteract any favorable support in publicity to the Black Panther
Party (BPP) recipient offices are requested to submit their
observations and recommendations regarding contacts with established
and reliable sources in the television and/or radio field who might be
interested in drawing up a program for local consumption depicting the
true facts regarding the BPP.
The suggested program would deal mainly with local BPP activities and
data furnished would be of a public source nature. This data could be
implemented by information on tile BPP nationally if needed. . . .
All offices should give this matter their prompt consideration and
submit replies by letter. 147
Soon afterward, the Los Angeles office identified two local news
reporters whom it believed might be willing to help in the effort to
discredit the BPP and received permission to
discreetly contact [name deleted] for the purpose of ascertaining his
amenability to the preparation of a program which would present the
true facts about the Black Panther Party as part of a
counterintelligence effort. 148
Headquarters also suggested information and materials to give to a
local newsman who expressed an interest in airing a series of prograins
against the Panthers. 149
In July 1970, the FBI furnished information to a Los Angeles TV news
commentator who agreed to air a series of shows against the BPP,
"especially in the area of white liberals contributing to the BPP." 150
In October, the Los Angeles Division sent headquarters a copy of an FBI-
assisted television editorial and reported that another newsman was
preparing yet another editorial attack on the Panthers. 151
In November 1970, the San Francisco Field Office notified the Director
that Huey Newton had "recently rented a luxurious lakeshore apartment
in Oakland, California." The San Francisco office saw "potential
counterintelligence value" in this information since this apartment was
far more elegant than "the ghetto-like BPP 'pads' and community centers
utilized by the Party." It was decided not to "presently" leak "this
information to cooperative news sources," because of a "pending special
investigative technique." 152 The information was given to the San
Francisco Examiner, however, in February 1971, and an article was
published stating that Huey P. Newton, BPP Supreme Commander, had moved
into a $650-a-month apartment overlooking Lake Merritt in Oakland,
California, under the assumed name of Don Penn. 153 Headquarters
approved anonymously mailing copies of the article to BPP branches and
ordered copies of the, article for "divisions with BPP activity for
mailing to newspaper editors." 154
The San Francisco office informed FBI headquarters later in February
that
BPP Headquarters was beseiged with inquiries after the printing of the
San Francisco Examiner article and the people at headquarters refuse to
answer the news media or other callers on this question. This source
has further reported that a representative of the Richmond, Virginia,
BPP contacted headquarters on 2/18/71, stating they had received a
xeroxed copy of . . . the article and believed it had been forwarded by
the pigs but still wanted to know if it was true. 155
D. Cooperation Between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Local
Police Departments in Disrupting the Black Panther Party
The FBI enlisted the cooperation of local police departments in
several of its covert action programs to disrupt and "neutralize" the
Black Panther Party. The FBI frequently worked with the San Diego
Police Department, supplying it with informant reports to encourage
raids on the homes of BPP members, often with little or no apparent
evidence of violations of State or Federal law. 156
Examples are numerous. In February 1969, the San Diego Field Office
learned that members of the local BPP chapter were following each other
to determine if police informants had infiltrated their organization.
The field office passed this information to the San Diego police with
the suggestion that BPP members engaged in these surveillances might be
followed and arrested for violations of "local Motor Vehicle Code
laws." 157 When the San Diego Field Office received reports that five
BPP members were living in the local BPP headquarters and "having sex
orgies on almost a nightly basis," it informed the local police with
the hope that a legal basis for a raid could be found. 158 Two days
later, the San Diego office reported to headquarters:
As a result of the Bureau-approved information furnished to the San
Diego Police Department regarding the "sex orgies" being held at BPP
Headquarters in San Diego, which had not previously been known to the
Police Department, a raid was conducted at BPP Headquarters on
11/20/69. [Name deleted], San Diego Police Department, Intelligence
Unit, advised that, due to this information, he assigned two officers
to a research project to determine if any solid basis could be found to
conduct a raid. His officers discovered two outstanding traffic
warrants for [name deleted], a member of the BPP, and his officers used
these warrants to obtain entry into BPP Headquarters.
As a result of this raid [6 persons] were all arrested. Seized at the
time of the arrests were three shotguns, one of which was stolen, one
rifle, four gas masks and one tear gas canister.
Also as a result of this raid, the six remaining members of the BPP in
San Diego were summoned to Los Angeles on 11/28/69.... Upon their
arrival, they were informed that due to numerous problems with the BPP
in San Diego, including the recent raid on BPP Headquarters, the BPP
Branch in San Diego was being dissolved.
Also, as a direct result of the above raid [informants] have reported
that [name deleted] has been severely beaten up by other members of the
BPP due to the fact that she allowed the officers to enter BPP
Headquarters the night of the raid. 159
A later memorandum states that confidential files belonging to the San
Diego Panthers were also "obtained" during this raid. 160
In March 1969, the San Diego Field Office informed Bureau
headquarters:
information was made available to the San Diego Police Department who
have been arranging periodic raids in the hope of establishing a
possession of marijuana and dangerous drug charge [against two BBP
members]. . . .
The BPP finally managed to rent the Rhodesian Club at 2907 Imperial
Avenue, San Diego, which will be utilized for a meeting hall. A request
will be forthcoming to have the San Diego Police Department and local
health inspectors examine the club for health and safety defects which
are undoubted by [sic] present. 161
The San Diego office also conducted "racial briefing sessions" for the
San Diego police. Headquarters was informed:
It is also felt that the racial briefing sessions being given by the
San Diego Division are affording tangible results for the
Counterintelligence Program. Through these briefings, the command
levels of virtually all of the police departments in the San Diego
Division are being apprised of the identities of the leaders of the
various militant groups. It is felt that, although specific instances
cannot be attributed directly to the racial briefing program, police
officers are much more alert for these black militant individuals and
as such are contributing to the over-all Counterintelligence Program,
directed against these groups. 162
The Committee staff has seen documents indicating extensive
cooperation between local police and the FBI in several other cities.
For example, the FBI in Oakland prevented a reconciliation meeting
between Huey Newton's brother and former Panthers by having the Oakland
police inform one of the former Panthers that the meeting was a "set
up." The San Francisco office concluded:
It is believed that such quick dissemination of this type of
information may have been instrumental in preventing the various
dissidents from rejoining forces with the BPP. 163
Another Bureau memorandum reflected similar cooperation in Los
Angeles:
The Los Angeles office is furnishing on a daily basis information to
the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office Intelligence Division and the
Los Angeles Police Department Intelligence and Criminal Conspiracy
Divisions concerning the activities of the black nationalist groups in
the anticipation that such information might lead to the arrest of
these militants. 164
Information from Bureau files in Chicago on the Panthers was given to
Chicago police upon request, and Chicago Police Department files were
open to the Bureau. 165 A Special Agent who handled liaison between the
FBI's Racial Matters Squad (responsible for monitoring BPP activity in
Chicago) and the Panther Squad of the Gang Intelligence Unit (GIU) of
the Chicago Police Department from 1967 through July 1969, testified
that he visited GIU between three and five times a week to exchange
information. 166 The Bureau and Chicago Police both maintained paid
informants in the BPP, shared informant information, and the FBI
provided information which was used by Chicago police in planning raids
against the Chicago BPP. 167
According to an FBI memorandum, this sharing of informant information
was crucial to police during their raid on the apartment occupied by
several Black Panther members which resulted in the death of the local
Chairman, Fred Hampton, and another Panther:
[Prior to the raid], a detailed inventory of the weapons and also a
detailed floor plan of the apartment were furnished to local
authorities. In addition, the identities of BPP members utilizing the
apartment at the above address were furnished. This information was not
available from any other source and subsequently proved to be of
tremendous value in that it subsequently saved injury and possible
death to police officers participating in a raid ... on the morning of
12/4/69. The raid was based on the information furnished by the
informant . . . " 168 [Emphasis added.]
Footnotes:
1 For a description of the full range of COINTELPRO programs, see the
staff report entitled "COINTELPRO: The FBI's Covert Action Programs
Against American Citizens."
2 Memorandum from G. C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan, 2/29/68, pp. 3-4.
3 New York Times, 9/8/68.
4 This figure is based on the Select Committee's staff study of
Justice Department COINTELPRO "Black Nationalist" summaries prepared by
the FBI during the Petersen Committee inquiry into COINTELPRO.
5 Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/13/69.
6 Ibid.
7 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Baltimore Field Office (and 13
other offices), 11/25/68.
8 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
1/16/70.
9 James Adams testimony. 11/19/75, Hearings, Vol. 6, p. 76.
10 Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
5/26/70, pp. 1-2.
11 Memorandum from a. C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan, 11/5/68.
12 Ibid. An earlier FBI memorandum had informed headquarters that
"sources have reported that the BPP has lot a contract on Karenga [the
leader of US] because they feel lie has sold out to the
establishment.'' (Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI
Headquarters, 9/25/68, p. 1.)
13 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Baltimore Field Office (and 13
other field offices), 11/25/68.
14 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
1/20/69.
15 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
2/20/69.
16 Ibid.
17 See memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
3/12/69.
18 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters.
3/12/69, p. 4.
19 Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
3/17/69.
20 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters.
4/10/69.
21 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
3/27/69.
22 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
4/10/69, p. 4.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 6/5/69,
p. 3.
26 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
6/13/69.
27 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Diego Field Office,
6/17/69.
28 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
6/6/69.
29 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
8/20/69.
30 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
9/18/69.
31 Ibid, p. 3.
32 Ibid., p. 1.
33 Ibid., p. 2.
34 Memorandum from San Diego Meld office to FBI Headquarters, 9/3/69.
35 Memorandum from San Diego Meld Office to FBI Headquarters,
11/12/69.
36 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
1/23/70.
37 Ibid., P. 1.
38 Ibid., p. 2.
39 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Diego Field Office,
1/29/70.
40 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles and San Francisco
Field Offices, 5/15/70.
41 Ibid.
42 Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
5/26/70.
43 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
44 Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
8/10/70.
45 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles Field Office,
9/30/70.
46 There is no question that the Blackstone Rangers were well-armed
and violent. The Chicago police had linked the Rangers and rival gangs
in Chicago to approximately 290 killings from 1965-69. Report of
Captain Edward Buckney, Chicago Police Dept., Gang Intelligence Unit,
2/23/70, p. 2. One Chicago police officer, familiar with the Rangers,
told a Committee staff member that their governing body, the Main 21,
was responsible for several ritualistic murders of black youths in
areas the gang controlled. (Staff summary of interview with Renault
Robinson, 9/25/75.)
47 Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/16/68.
Forte also had a well-earned reputation for violence. Between September
1964 and January 1971, he was charged with more than 14 felonies,
including murder (twice), aggravated battery (seven times), robbery
(twice), and contempt of Congress. (Select Committee staff interview of
FBI criminal records.) A December 1968 FBI memorandum noted that a
search of Forte's apartment had turned up a .22 caliber, four-shot
derringer pistol. (Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI
Headquarters, 12/12/68, p. 2.)
48 Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/16/68,
p. 2.
49 Letter Head Memorandum, 12/20/68.
49a From confidential FBI interview with inmate at the House of
Correction, 26th and California St. in Chicago, 11/12/69.
49b Letterhead Memorandum, 12/20/68,
49c Ibid., pp. 3-4.
49d FBI Special Agent Informant Report, 12/30/68.
49e Ibid.
50 Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/10/69.
51 Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/13/69,
p. 1.
52 Ibid.
52a Memorandum from Special Agent to SAC, Chicago, 1/15/69.
52b Ibid.
52c Memorandum from Special Agent to SAC, Chicago, 1/28/69, reporting
on informant report.
53 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office, 1/30/69.
54 There are indications that a shooting incident between the Rangers
and the Panthers on April 2, 1969, in a Chicago suburb may have been
triggered by the FBI. According to Bobby Rush, coordinator of the
Chicago BPP at the time, a group of armed BPP members had confronted
the Rangers because Panther William O'Neal -- who has since surfaced as
an FBI informant -- had told them that a Panther had been shot by
Blackstone Rangers and had insisted that they retaliate. This account,
however, has not been confirmed. (Staff summary of interview with Bobby
Rush, 11/26/75.)
55 The various COINTELPRO techniques are described in detail in the
Staff Report on COINTELPRO.
56 Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/24/69.
57 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office, 4/8/69.
57a Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
1/28/69.
58 Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
12/30/68.
59 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office, 1/30/69.
60 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
3/12/69.
The FBI had success with this technique in other eases. For example,
the FBI placed another anonymous call to Stokely Carmichael's residence
in New York City. Carmichael's mother was informed falsely that several
BPP members were out to kill her son, and that he should "hide out."
The FBI memorandum reporting this incident said that Mrs. Carmichael
sounded "shocked" on hearing the news and stated that she would tell
Stokely when he came home. The memorandum observed that on !the next
day, Stokely Carmichael left New York for Africa. (Memorandum from New
York Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/9/68, p. 2.)
61 Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
3/17/69, p. 1.
62 Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
2/3/69.
63 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/8/69.
The FBI discovered that the Indianapolis BPP would have difficulty in
new quarters because of its financial plight, a fact which was
discovered by monitoring its bank account. (Memorandum from
Indianapolis Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 9/23/69.)
64 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
9/15/69.
65 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
10/21/70.
66 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
10/22/70.
67 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
11/26/68.
68 The Bureau documents presented to the Committee do not record of
this contact.
69 In September 1969, FBI Headquarters had encouraged the field
offices to undertake projects aimed at splitting the BPP on a
nationwide basis. (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Newark, New
York, and San Francisco Field Offices, 9/18/69.)
70 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Legat, Paris and San Francisco
Field Office, 4/10/70.
71 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
72 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
5/8/70.
73 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters
5/28/70.
74 Memorandum from Philadelphia Field Office to FBI Headquarter,,;,
8/13/70.
75 Ibid. pp. 1-2.
76 Memorandum from FBI Headquarter,,, to Philadelphia and San
Francisco Field Offices, 8/19/70.
77 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
8/31/70.
78 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office,
9/9/70.
79 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
10/21/70.
80 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco and New York
Field Office, 10/29/70
81 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles Field Office,
11/3/70.
82 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
10/28/70.
83 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco and New York
Field Offices, 2/5/71.
84 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles, San Francisco, and
Washington Field Offices, 12/15/70.
85 Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
12/3/70, p. 2.
86 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles, San Francisco, and
Washington Field Offices, 12/15/70. A list of 10 organizations whose
members attended the RPCC was forwarded to the FBI offices in Atlanta,
Boston, Chicago, Detroit, New York, and San Francisco. (Memorandum from
FBI Headquarters to Atlanta (and 5 other Field Offices), 12/31/70.)
There is no indication concerning how the Bureau obtained this list.
86a Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office,
12/16/70.
86b Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
12/14/70.
86c Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office,
1/6/71.
87 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
1/18/70. FBI headquarters authorized this letter on January 21, 1971
stating that the Bureau must now seize the time and "immediately" send
the letter, (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field
Office, 1/21/71, p. 2.) Shortly afterward, a letter was sent to Cleaver
from alleged Puerto Rican political allies of the BPP in Chicago, The
Young Lords.
What do we get. A disorganized Convention, apologetic speakers and
flunkys who push us around, no leadership, no ideas, no nothing.... [Y]
our talk is nice, but your ideas and action is nothing.... You are
gone, those you left behind have big titles but cannot lead, cannot
organize, are afraid to even come out among the people. The oppressed
of Amerikka cannot wait. We must move without YOU.... (Memorandum from
Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/19/71; memorandum from FBI
Headquarters to Chicago and San Francisco Field Offices, 1/27/71.)
88 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Boston, Los Angeles, New York,
and San Francisco Field Offices, 1/28/71.
89 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to 29 Field Offices, 2/2/71.
90 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York and San Francisco
Field Offices, 2/3/71.
91 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to New York Field Office, 2/3/71.
92 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office,
2/10/71.
93 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
2/12 71.
93a The FBI was able to be specific because of its wiretaps on the
phones of Huey Newton and the Black Panther headquarters.
94 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office,
2/19/71.
95 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office,
2/24/71. The phone call from Cleaver to Newton mentioned in this letter
had been intercepted by the FBI. An FBI memorandum commented that the
call had been prompted by an earlier Bureau letter purporting to come
from Connie Matthews: "The letter undoubtedly provoked a long distance
call from Cleaver to Newton which resulted in our being able to place
in proper perspective the relationship of Newton and Cleaver to obtain
the details of the Geronimo [Elmer Pratt] Group and learn of the
disaffections and the expulsion of the New York group." (Memorandum
from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters. 2/25/71.)
96 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
2/25/71.
96a Kathleen Cleaver testimony, 4/8/76, p. 34.
97 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
3/2/71. FBI headquarters instructed the SAC, San Francisco to mail
Cleaver a copy of the March 6 edition of the BPP newspaper which
announced his expulsion from the BPP, along with an anonymous note
saying, "This is what we think of punks and cowards." (Memorandum from
FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office, 3/10/71.)
98 This letter was contained in a memorandum from San Francisco Field
Office to FBI Headquarters, 3/16/71, pp. 1-2.
99 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco and Chicago Field
Offices, 3/25/71.
100 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles Field Office,
7/25/69.
101 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
7/28/69.
102 Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
9/24/69.
103 Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
9/29/69, p. 1.
104 Memorandum from G. C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan, 12/27/68.
105 Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office, to FBI Headquarters,
6/3/70.
106 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles Field Office,
6/25/70.
107 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
2/3/70.
108 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
3/2/70.
109 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office,
3/5/70.
110 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
1/22/70. The name "T. F. Ellis" is completely fictitious and the Post
Office Box could not have been traced to the FBI.
111 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
6/1/70.
112 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office,
7/30/69.
113 Ibid.; Memorandum from San Francisco Meld Office to FBI
Headquarters, 11/30/70.
114 K. Cleaver, 4/8/76, p. 16.
115 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
8/29/69; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Diego Field Office,
9/9/69.
116 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
8/29/69.
117 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
9/18/69.
118 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
10/6/69, p. 3.
119 Memorandum from New Haven Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
11/12/69, p. 3.
120 The offices were Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Kansas City, Los
Angeles, Newark, New Haven, New York, San Diego, and San Francisco.
121 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Baltimore (and 9 other Field
Offices), 12/24/69, p. 1.
122 These included the Mayor; the Glide Foundation (church foundation)
Catholic Archdiocese of San Francisco; Episcopal Diocese of California;
Lutheran Church; Editor, San Francisco Chronicle; Editor, San Francisco
Examiner; United Presbyterian Church, San Francisco Conference of
Christians and Jews; San Francisco Chamber of Commerce; San Francisco
Bar Association; and San Francisco Board of Supervisors. (Memorandum
from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/12/70.)
123 Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
7/1/69.
124 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles Field Office,
7/14/69.
125 Ibid.
126 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
10/6/69.
127 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
1/2/70.
128 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Albany (and 22 other Field
Offlees), 8/25/67, p. 2.
129 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
2/17/70, p. 3.
130 Ibid., p. 5.
131 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago (and seven other Field
Offices), 5/15/70.
132 memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
5/22/70.
133 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
5/20/70.
134 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
5/20/70, p. 2.
135 Ibid., p. 3.
136 Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters and San
Francisco Field Office, 10/11/69.
137 Memorandum from New York Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
8/19/70.
138 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to SAC's in 39 cities, 11/10/70.
139 Memorandum from G. C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan, 6/26/70.
140 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago, New York, and San
Francisco Field Offices, 6/26/70.
141 Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
7/15/70.
142 Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
2/10/69.
143 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Chicago Field Office,
2/20/69.
144 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
5/26/69.
145 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office,
12/4/69.
146 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
3/18/70.
147 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office
(and 8 other offices), 1/23/70. The San Diego office had already made
efforts along the lines proposed in this memorandum. In November 1969
it requested permission from headquarters to inform two newscasters
"for use in editorials" that the sister and brother-in-law of a
Communist Party member were believed to be members of the local Black
Panthers. The office also proposed preparing "all editorial for
publication in the Copley press." (Airtel from SAC, San Diego to
Director, FBI, 11/12/69.) The San Francisco office had also leaked
information to a San Francisco Examiner reporter, who wrote a front-
page story complete with photographs concerning "the conversion by the
BPP of an apartment into a fortress." (Memorandum from San Francisco
Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 1/21/70.)
148 Memorandum from Los Angeles Meld Office to FBI Headquarters,
2/6/70; memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles Field Office
3/5/70 (this memorandum bears Director Hoover's initials).
149 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to Los Angeles and San Francisco
Field Offices, 5/27/70.
150 Memorandum front Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
9/10/70, p. 2.
151 Memorandum from Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
10/23/70.
152 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
11/24/70.
153 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
2/12/71.
154 Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San Francisco Field Office,
2/8/71.
155 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
2/18/71. In a February 1971 report on recent COINTELPRO activity, the
San Francisco Division described the San Francisco Examiner article as
one of its "counterintelligence activities." This report said that
because of the article, Newton had given an interview to another San
Francisco daily to try to explain his seemingly expensive lifestyle.
The report also states that copies of the article were sent to "all BPP
and NCCF [National Committee to Combat Fascism] offices in the United
States and to three BPP contacts in Europe." (Memorandum from San
Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 2/25/71.)
156 The suggestion of encouraging local police to raid and arrest
members of so-called "Black Nationalist Hate Groups" was first put
forward in a February 29, 1968 memorandum to field offices. This
memorandum cited as an example of successful use of this technique:
"The Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), a pro-Chinese Communist
group, was active in Philadelphia, Pa., in the summer of 1967. The
Philadelphia office alerted local police who then put RAM leaders under
close scrutiny. They were arrested on every possible charge until they
could no longer make bail. As a result, RAM leaders spent most of the
summer in jail and no violence traceable to RAM took place."
(Memorandum from G. C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan, 2/29/68, p. 3.)
157 The San Diego office reported to headquarters: "As of one week
ago, the BPP in San Diego was so completely disrupted and so much
suspicion, fear, and distrust has been interjected into the party that
the members have taken to running surveillances on one another in an
attempt to determine who the 'Police agents' are. On 2/19/69, this
information was furnished to the San Diego Police Department with the
suggestion that possibly local Motor Vehicle Code laws were being
violated during the course of these surveillances.' " (Memorandum from
San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters 2/27/69.)
158 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
11/10/69. Headquarters told the San Diego office that if there was no
legal basis for a raid, it should "give this matter further thought and
submit other proposals to capitalize on this information in the
counterintelligence field." (Memorandum from FBI Headquarters to San
Diego Field Office, 11/18/69, p. 1.)
159 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
12/3/69, pp. 2-3.
160 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
2/17/70.
161 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
3/26/69.
162 Memorandum from San Diego Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
12/15/69.
163 Memorandum from San Francisco Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
4/21/69.
164 Memorandum Los Angeles Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/1/69.
165 Special Agent deposition, 2/20/75. p. p. 90.
166 Special Agent deposition, 2/26/75, p. 84. The Agent also testified
that other FBI agents in the Racial Matters Squad were also involved in
the "free flow of information between the Racial Matters Squad and
GIU," and that at one time or another, every agent had exchanged
information with GIU.
167 Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters, 12/3/69.
p. 2; memorandum from Special Agent to Chicago Field Office, 12/12/69.
168 Memorandum from Chicago Field Office to FBI Headquarters,
12/8/69.
Transcription and html by Paul Wolf, 2002.
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