http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=40&ItemID=2980.
http://www.counterpunch.org/mahajan02062003.html
Responding To Colin Powell
by Rahul Mahajan; February 06, 2003
By If one believes everything Colin Powell said to the Security Council
yesterday, one's first response ought to be that there's no reason to fight
a war, since U.S. surveillance capabilities are so awesome that Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) can easily be found. And one's first
question should be why has the United States for over two months withheld
this apparently so damaging evidence from those weapons inspectors, who
could have verified conjectures and destroyed WMD stocks and production
facilities.
If indeed the evidence presented is of the character claimed by Powell,
then the United States has chosen to sabotage UN Security Council
Resolution 1441, clause 10 of which "Requests all Member States to give
full support to UNMOVIC and the IAEA in the discharge of their mandates,
including by providing any information related to prohibited programmes."
The actual evidence may not even warrant that conclusion. What Powell
served up to the Council was a sorry mess of fuzzy aerial photographs of
buildings, a cute "organizational chart" of supposed al-Qaeda operations in
Iraq, a couple of tape recordings that are capable of multiple
interpretations and, as before, a large number of undated reports by
unnamed Iraqi defectors.
Given the history of U.S. government use of disinformation to drum up
support for war, from relatively subtle measures like doctoring satellite
photos to convince the Saudi government that Iraq was massing troops for an
invasion of Saudi Arabia in 1990 to incredibly crude ones like the
continuing claims by officials from George W. Bush on down that
Iraq "expelled" weapons inspectors in 1998 (as covered in the press at the
time, the inspectors were withdrawn at the behest of the United States), a
skeptic need not actually accept any of the evidence as presented. Even so,
it's useful to go through it.
Evidence about Iraq and al-Qaeda
The weakest part of the whole presentation, and the most important, was the
claims trying to link Iraq with al-Qaeda operations. In the past, the link
depended on the claims about one man, Mohammed Atta, meeting with Iraqi
intelligence in Prague (we've since found out that he was almost certainly
in the United States at the time of the alleged meeting); now it depends on
one man, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.
Al-Zarqawi is apparently a high-level operative of an Islamist group called
Ansar al-Islam, which is operating in northern Iraq (currently an
autonomous region with a provisional Kurdish government that is aligned
with the United States). Although there is no evident link between this
organization and the Government of Iraq (GOI), Powell claims that the GOI
has a high-level agent in Ansar, who "offered al-Qaida safe haven" -
although apparently few if any accepted the offer, since the supposed
presence is in the part of Iraq not controlled by the GOI. The full extent
of the connection between al-Zarqawi himself and the GOI is apparently that
he got medical care in a hospital in Baghdad, hardly an indication of high-
level Iraqi complicity in terrorist attacks against American targets.
There is no attempt to link Ansar itself to the 9/11 attacks. In fact,
while apparently the mere presence of al-Zarqawi, a subordinate in Ansar,
in Iraq is sufficient reason for war, the head of Ansar, known as Mullah
Krekar, is living unmolested in Norway, and the United States has not even
made an extradition request. Krekar denies any connection of Ansar with al-
Qaeda.
Powell also claims that one al-Qaeda detainee has told them that Iraq
provided information about biological and chemical weapons to al-Qaeda
members. Given the condition al-Qaeda detainees are being held in and the
obvious incentives for them to tell a story the U.S. government wants to
hear, this is very far from being actual evidence. The claim also flies in
the face of common sense. Saddam Hussein has always been seen by al-Qaeda
as an enemy and has himself seen Islamists as the biggest internal threat
to his rule. To give them the ability to make chemical or biological
weapons, weapons he sees as essential to the survival of his regime (many
analysts think the primary reason the United States didn't
implement "regime change" in 1991 was the threat that the GOI would use its
stocks of chemical weapons in self-defense), potentially destabilizes his
own rule.
Evidence about Iraq's WMD
The heart of the presentation, however, was claims about Iraq's violation
of UNSCR 1441 and about its attempts to acquire WMD. This included evidence
like a photograph of a shed and a truck next to a bunker, followed by a
claim that such a configuration of truck and shed (the truck is apparently
a "decontamination" truck) is an infallible indicator that the bunker has
chemical weapons in it, and even a photograph of what an Iraqi UAV
(unmanned aerial vehicle) "would look like."
Powell claimed that Iraq was reviving attempts to acquire a nuclear weapon,
telling us that two out of three elements were in hand. The third element,
fissile material, is and has always been the stumbling block. According to
Powell, "we have more than a decade of proof that he [Hussein] remains
determined to acquire nuclear weapons," but no acknowledgment that in more
than a decade he has been entirely unable to do so.
Nor was there acknowledgment of the assessment that Mohammed el-Baradei,
chief of the IAEA team charged with Iraq's nuclear disarmament, delivered
to the Council:
"No evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear or nuclear-related activities
has been detected to date Nor have the inspections thus far revealed signs
of new nuclear facilities or direct support to any nuclear activity. The
IAEA expects to be able, within the next few months, barring exceptional
circumstances and provided there is sustained proactive cooperation by
Iraq, to provide credible assurance that Iraq has no nuclear weapons
programme."
He also resurrected claims that Iraq's attempts to acquire certain aluminum
tubes show that it is trying to make centrifuges for production of fissile
material, disputing the IAEA's conclusion that those tubes are better
suited to conventional artillery.
Most of the other "evidence" was unsourced or from one of the legion of
defectors that has always conveniently cropped up when the United States
has needed them.
The most compelling evidence was audio recordings of two conversations
apparently showing Iraqi attempts to conceal evidence from inspectors. It's
not possible to know whether the tapes are real, whether they are recent or
from the previous inspection regime, or what exactly they are referring to.
Forgetting all of these caveats, it's quite likely that the Iraqis are
trying to hide not actual WMD but minor things that didn't make it into the
December 7 declaration (for example, the empty chemical munitions that were
recently discovered) and are trying to eliminate those discrepancies
surreptitiously instead of letting the inspectors find them.
In the whole presentation, there was no acknowledgment of the true state of
affairs regarding chemical and biological weapons, as concluded by the
UNSCOM inspectors in 1998 and confirmed by UNMOVIC more recently. That is
simply this:
There are records of how much in the way of chemical agents, biological
growth medium, and other components Iraq imported from Western firms
(particularly American and German ones). There is evidence of how much
inspectors destroyed. There are Iraqi claims about how much was used in the
war with Iran and how much was unilaterally destroyed by them. Iraq is
unable to produce sufficient evidence for the inspectors to match up those
different numbers. So there is some discrepancy in terms of chemical
munitions - for example, Iraq claims 550 mustard-filled shells were lost
after the Gulf War, but it can't prove this. There is discrepancy in terms
of biological growth medium and if you take this discrepancy and make the
entirely unrealistic stipulation that Iraq's fermenters were constantly and
continually used for all these past years, you can get high numbers for the
amounts of biological agents like anthrax that Iraq theoretically might
have.
These discrepancies are enough that inspectors could not close the book on
chemical or biological weapons (although they essentially did on nuclear
weapons). They presumably owe at least in part to the fact that Iraq, after
undergoing eight years of war with Iran, the most devastating air
bombardment in history in the Gulf War, and twelve years of crippling
sanctions, doesn't have all of its records nicely intact.
Is there an Iraqi threat?
It is undoubtedly true that in the past Iraq went to considerable lengths
to avoid cooperating with inspections. It's possible that that is happening
again - some of Powell's evidence might be real.
But missing from the entire presentation was any serious talk about a
threat posed by Iraq, either to the United States or even to any country in
the region. Mere possession of WMD, even if established, is not exactly
evidence of aggressive intent. And in fact Iraq has been the recipient of
aggression frequently since the Gulf War (bombings by the U.S. and U.K.,
periodic invasions in the north by Turkey, virtual Kuwaiti annexation of
Iraqi land in the south), but has not itself seriously threatened any.
The evidence about Iraq's intent to attack seems to run something like
this - Saddam "gassed his own people" in 1988, therefore there is an
imminent threat that he will attack us in 2003. The imminent threat is not,
however, so severe as to keep us from having a full year of warmongering
and bellicose rhetoric before we actually attack.
This conveniently ignores the central fact about Hussein's record of
aggression. Without exception, his worse crimes were committed with full
U.S. support, both material and diplomatic. The war on Iran, the massacre
of Kurds in the Anfal campaign of the late 1980's, even the bloody
suppression in 1991 of the "Iraqi intifada" all involved explicit measures
of support from the United States - providing military intelligence,
approving export of chemical and biological agents,
providing "agricultural" credits, disarming rebels, and much more. The
invasion of Kuwait was done in the deliberately fostered belief that the
United States would not mind. Without U.S. support, Hussein knows well that
he can only be a threat to his internal political enemies.
Powell did not deal with these facts, but essentially admitted the lack of
any evidence of a real Iraqi threat when he fell back on the "pre-emption"
argument - "should we take the risk that he will not someday use these
weapons at a time and a place and in a manner of his choosing, at a time
when the world is in a much weaker position to respond?" Of course, in the
absence of concrete evidence, any country can make this argument against
any other, which is why "pre-emption" is clearly not consistent with
international law.
What if Iraq isn't cooperating?
If Iraq is not cooperating fully with inspections right now, it's important
to understand why. The first round of weapons inspections started to fall
apart in 1998 for one reason - the United States refused to commit to
lifting the sanctions once Iraq was disarmed. This refusal was an
abrogation of its own commitment under UNSCR 687.
This time, it's even worse. The United States is steadily bombing Iraq, in
an escalating pattern that is no longer even vaguely linked to enforcement
of the illegal "no-fly zones" but is clearly part of the suppression of air
defense with which U.S. wars begin. It is building a massive military
presence in the Gulf. And it is declaring openly, to all with the ears to
hear it, that it will go to war with Iraq no matter what Iraq does, whether
the Security Council is with it or against it.
In fact, at least one columnist, Bill Keller ("What to Expect when you're
Inspecting," New York Times, November 16, 2002) has pointed out that
inspections are a wonderful prelude to war because they "can significantly
diminish Saddam's arsenal," thus making it easier for the United States to
fight without fear of retaliation and because "inspections immobilize Iraq
while we deploy."
So Iraq is in the bizarre position of being called on to disarm while being
attacked by another country, and then being reviled by the "international
community" for partial compliance.
It is becoming increasingly likely that the United States will obtain a
Security Council resolution authorizing war. And if it does, its main
argument will be that it must go to war with Iraq to uphold international
law. It's important to understand ahead of time just how obscene that
argument is. It's not just because the United States has systematically
undermined international law with regard to Iraq, by refusing to
acknowledge the basis (disarmament) for lifting the sanctions, by
committing repeated acts of illegal aggression against Iraq (like the
Desert Fox bombing), and by deliberately making the sanctions bite Iraqi
society as hard as possible for purely political reasons (see "Economic
sanctions as a weapon of mass destruction," Joy Gordon, Harper's, November
2002). It's not just because the United States enforces a double standard,
in which itself and favored allies are exempt from legal requirements while
states it decided to target are not.
It's because this war is a violation of the ultimate international law. It
is a "crime against peace," a war of aggression. It was decided on long ago
in the White House, and the only reason other countries may vote in support
of it is the repeated statements that the war will happen whether they want
it or not. It is the United States holding not just Iraq but the entire
world hostage.
Rahul Mahajan is a member of the Nowar Collective
(www.nowarcollective.com). He is author of "The New Crusade: America's War
on Terrorism" (April 2002, Monthly Review Press) and the forthcoming "The
U.S. War on Iraq: Myths, Facts, and Lies." He can be reached at [log in to unmask]
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