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From:
Ebrima Ceesay <[log in to unmask]>
Reply To:
The Gambia and related-issues mailing list <[log in to unmask]>
Date:
Sun, 22 Apr 2001 13:07:18 -0000
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My Fellow Gambians !

In this posting, I shall talk about WHY we need a coalition (tactical
Alliance)of the Opposition parties in The Gambia to contest the forthcoming
elections.

I shall give some pointers as to HOW and WHEN to get the Alliance underway,
given that the elections are fast approaching.  I shall also talk about the
Alliance’s task in the post-Jammeh –Gambia.

Some of the issues are very complex, and I have endeavoured to use plain and
straightforward language in order to clarify these for the man and woman in
the street. As we have discussed many times before, there is an urgent need
for political education in our country, and I am hoping that my series of
messages to all Gambians, is going someway to meet this need.

Once again, I urge our readers in The Gambia to circulate these messages as
widely as possible – particularly in the provinces.  We have to use every
means in our power to spread the Opposition message, and to ensure that we
defeat Jammeh and his regime in the forthcoming elections.



WHY DO WE NEED AN ALLIANCE?


We all know the reasons why Jammeh and the APRC should be soundly defeated
in the elections:  these are matters that I have touched on and detailed in
my previous postings, and other contributors to the Gambia-L have also put
forward strong arguments to support the case against Jammeh.

Our once proud and confident nation is in the hands of a band of criminals
who are interested only in filling their own pockets:  The Gambia has fallen
into the doldrums under the mismanagement of Yahya.

It is the task of all Gambians to bring an end to this dreadful regime at
the first opportunity.

But let us be clear that the actual task of ending Jammeh’s rule through the
ballot box is not going to be easy.  Jammeh still has a strong groundswell
of support throughout the country:  he has been careful to ensure that his
people have been appointed to key and influential positions (for instance,
Divisional Commissioners, Mayors, Chiefs, Alkalos, District Elders and
Leaders); and with the whole machinery of state behind him, combined with
his control of the public purse strings, he is in a powerful position.

He is able to buy people’s loyalties, using public money, and the Kiang by
election showed us that he has no qualms about buying people’s votes.

The task for the Opposition parties is going to be immense:  they do not
have access to the machinery of state, nor do they have their fingers in the
public purse.

People in The Gambia, furthermore, have tended to mystify and mythologise
the presidency:  they bow without question to authority;  they believe that
the governance crisis is God-given rather than man-made.  They are yet to
understand that politicians are not superior beings – that they are our
servants whose task is to work on our behalf.

Our politicians are not our Lords and Masters.  People who are narrow minded
or shortsighted, believe that if Jammeh is removed from office, then there
will be even greater trouble in The Gambia, with fighting and resistance
from the APRC regime and its supporters.

Clearly, Jammeh is using the whole machinery of State in order to
consolidate his grasp on power.  He and his supporters have access to
government transport, to government fuel, to free telephone services, to the
national media, to the services of civil servants who are supposed to be
apolitical.

Now, with all these advantages which they use in their favour, Jammeh has a
huge political advantage as the incumbent candidate.

More importantly, the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), which is
supposed to be independent in the true and full sense of the word, has been
undermined by Jammeh and may no longer be relied upon to remain impartial.
The suspicion is that the APRC will use a supposedly independent IEC to
their own advantage.

In fact, by sacking the IEC Chairman, Bishop Johnson,  and replacing him
with an APRC man, Jammeh has set the scene for us all:  we know what to
expect, and it will certainly not be impartiality  and neutrality of the
IEC.

These are just some of the many hurdles facing the opposition groups in the
forthcoming elections.

We now have to ask what advantages there would be, if our Opposition parties
were to come together and work as a united Opposition to Jammeh and his
regime.  How would a united front, a coalition, an alliance be in a better
position to defeat Jammeh in the ballot boxes.

First and foremost, an alliance would restrict the possibility of vote
splitting.  If each political party were to put forward its own presidential
candidate, then it is apparent that votes could be split in more than two
ways.  Rather than just an APRC and an opposition candidate, we could see
three, four, five or more candidates in each constituency (APRC, UDP, NRP,
PDOIS, Independent).

But, by combining the opposition, you reduce the voting spread:  it becomes
just a "two horse race", and gives greater chances for the opposition to
defeat Jammeh.

Secondly, elections are expensive enterprises, especially when you face
incumbents who will be using state and public resources to hold onto power.
To fight this entrenched incumbency, individual opposition parties need
money and resources (manpower, logistics, vehicles, fuel etc.).

Therefore, by combining the Opposition parties – by them coming together to
work as one – there can then be a combination – a bringing together – of
their limited resources.  This combination of resources would go a long way
to matching the vast resources which Jammeh has already hijacked for his own
ends.

Thirdly, if the various opposition parties come together as one oppositional
group, it will be possible for them to cover the whole of the country, and
to do this very effectively. Each party can cover a good area of the country
and no area will remain uncovered by an opposition candidate and the
resources to support him or her.

In the past, with their limited resources, not every village or town in The
Gambia has been covered effectively. By sharing resources and manpower, and
by backing just one presidential candidate, it will be possible for the
Alliance to put a strong case in each and every constituency.

The identified and agreed Presidential candidate for the Opposition
Alliance, can then try to cover as many areas of the country as possible:
where he/she cannot visit, other members of the opposition will have covered
these areas.

Fourthly, it will be far tougher for Jammeh to oppose a strong, united
opposition alliance candidate, rather than individual party candidates.  The
psychological advantage to the opposition and against Jammeh would be
immense.  Knowing the APRC, they would be seriously worried by the strength
of a combined opposition.

In the past, we have had direct evidence of the way in which Jammeh falls to
pieces when strongly opposed or under public pressure:  the man lapses into
wild dreams and even wilder threats, and he tends to make a public buffoon
of himself when he is under pressure.

Psychologically, by working together as one oppositional unit, Jammeh would
as usual, lose his cool and start to act as a crazy man.  We have seen it in
the past, and we need to make this happen again in order that each and every
voter in The Gambia has a true picture of this dreadful man.

Fifthly, it will be easier for concerned Gambians at home and in particular
overseas, to raise funds for a united opposition rather than for individual
parties.  People want to donate generously, knowing what Jammeh represents
for the country.

Without an alliance, these donations would be much more thinly spread across
the existing opposition parties,  but  by coming together, we bring our
financial resources together and strengthen ourselves in opposition.

Sixthly, on the issue of unity and reconciliation amongst all of us who have
been Jammeh’s "victims", our strength lies in working together.  An alliance
would bring people together with a common purpose, uniting them against a
common enemy.  We would feel stronger by virtue of working together, and
this would be a very powerful weapon in our armoury against Yahya.


HOW DO YOU FORM AN ALLIANCE ?

We know that each political party has its own programmes, doctrines and
policies.  In other words, each political party has a manifesto, outlining
how The Gambia should be run if it were to assume leadership of the country.

Clearly, the programmes are different, the principles are different, the
underlying doctrines are different.  However,  there are times in life when
COMPROMISE is an absolute necessity in order to take a cause forward, and to
work for the general good.

It is understandable for parties to express fears about going into a
coalition, because the chemistry of the parties and their various members is
different and important.

And of course, there is no point in forming an alliance where the members of
it will always be at daggers drawn all the time. Therefore, if a political
party were to have anxieties about entering a political alliance, then that
is understandable.

BUT where there is both the will and determination, and where the need for
alliance is clearly understood, then there should surely be a way forward,
despite the differences in party programmes. At the end of the day, all
opposition parties in The Gambia are claiming to be working for the
betterment of Gambians and their country.

Having said that, yesterday my message to the Gambian people was "act now or
regret it for ever".

Today my message to the Opposition parties in The Gambia is "COMPROMISE NOW,
OR SINGLY LOSE OUT."

The awful destruction that has taken place in our country, warrants us to
come together tactically in order to rescue our country from its criminal
hijackers.

In the medium and long term, each party might and probably will have a
different agenda for The Gambia, but in the short term, and in order to see
the back of Jammeh through the ballot box, it is vital that we put these
differences to one side, and work together with a common platform, to rescue
our country.  If we do not do it, if we do not start to work together, then
our country will become ungovernable and beyond rescue.

The leaders of our political parties are intelligent people and their
parties have  members who are people with keen brains, so really, if they
are willing, they can handle and face the challenges that coalition will
almost certainly mean.  They can work together to govern our country in a
post Jammeh and post APRC setting, despite the differences in policy and
programmes.

If they really bring their heads together, they can surely work out ways in
which not only to accommodate each other, but to make the coalition a
working reality which will be durable in the post-Jammeh Gambia.

In the longer term, when the country has been rescued from its hijackers and
has been stabilised, then it will make sense for parties to split and work
on their own individual programmes.  It is going to take all our combined
efforts to bring about a restoration of true democracy in our country, but
we CAN and MUST do it.

The coalition is a short-term prescription to save our country from chaos,
and to rescue it from the clutches of miscreants like Yahya.

Once there is stability and signs of good governance, then the parties can
opt out of the alliance and pursue their own interests.

The question NOW, is HOW to get the alliance started.

Well, since in The Gambia we have three main opposition parties, they can
form a triumvirate, composed of either presidential candidates (Sidia Jatta,
Ousainou Darboe, Hamat Bah) or their representatives.  This triumvirate
could then meet and work out the best way to achieve an alliance.

A Summit, or Congress of these three parties can be held, and then delegates
to the Congress can elect/select a unanimously-agreed presidential candidate
who will be acceptable to all three parties.

Again, this will not be an easy process, but compromise is the word and the
way forward.

It is important however, that the coalition should be headed by a candidate
who is likely to draw more votes, who can unite his/her people and more
importantly who has the competence and know how to manage a coalition
government, who can minimise, if not prevent, differences.

Of course, ministerial posts in a coalition government will be shared
appropriately and as agreed, and each party would have its agreed quota of
Ministers.

At this point, we are not really talking about position, title or
competition:  it is about selecting and appointing a group of committed
Gambians whose task will be the betterment of The Gambia (and in no way
related to any political gain they could make).

The timescale is very short.  In order for a tactical alliance to be a
meaningful force in Gambian politics, then the formation of the alliance and
the modalities for it, have to be worked out and agreed upon by mid-August
2001 (if the election timetable goes according to schedule).

Within this time span, the Alliance Coalition will need to have agreed:

A. Their candidate for presidency

B. Their election platform

C. Their proposed governmental platform (policies)

D. Named candidates standing for each constituency in the National Assembly
elections.

These are points which would have to be worked on straight away


In simple terms, the alliance if it were set up in May, would have a three
month timetable to prepare for the presidential elections.  The specifics
will be:

1. Get a triumvirate to work out the modalities

2. Hold a Congress of supporters of the three main opposition parties

3. Elect/Select a unanimously agreed Presidential candidate representing all
opposition parties in the coalition

4. Support in every way its Presidential Candidate in the forthcoming
election

5. Draw up a campaign programme for the elections, ensuring that each area
of The Gambia is well covered.

6. Issue a joint Manifesto outlining what the coalition government would
do(its programmes)  in the short and medium term



Time is critical:  there is great urgency to get this process under way.
The Presidential elections are scheduled for October, and the parties need
to be ready to start their campaigning early in September.

Be in no doubt that it is already very late in the day, and that we need to
get a move on.

Who is going to be the INITIATOR ?

Well, it has to be a group of individuals who are seen as neutral and
acceptable to all parties.  The ideal group would be the Movement for the
Restoration of Democracy in the UK and in the USA:  they fit the bill, and
can definitely do the job from initiation through to successful fruition.


WHEN ???????



It has to be NOW.

There is no time to spare.

The timetable for the elections is short and we have to be ready and
prepared for action.

Basically, we are talking about a 12-14 week timetable from initiation to
the start of the Presidential election campaign.




My 25th Message to All Gambians will touch on the Alliance’s tasks in a
post-Jammeh Gambia, and the measures which will need to be taken in order to
consolidate the durability of the Alliance, so that it can at least succeed
in implementing its short term programmes.

Ebrima Ceesay,
Birmingham, UK.


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