Buhary, you have raised very important issues of national importance and
in your Part 2, the Alternative is actively tackling nearly all the
apsects you've touched on.  With time, that importantant announcement will
be made.  They are working hard at forming a concensus.

As to the financing of the campaign, that responsibility should rightfully
fall on people like you an I.  It is the diasporans that should foot that
bill for the most part.  In the Jarra elections, the APRC spent at least
D3,000,000 compared to the Alternative that spent a little over $4,000
(approximately D120,000).  More than 3/4 of that was from donors like you
and I in the form of STGDP and other diaspora based orgs.  The bulk of
that money was spent on mass mobilization and transportation.  The
difference in that elections was approximately 1,000 votes, the same
amount of people that were transported from the urban areas to jarra to
legally vote.  There is a correlation to those two numbers folks.  That
momentum carried the day in Bakau too.  This is what our resources can do
for Gambia, folks, if we transcend form analysis to financial
contributions.  As I write, the STGDP owes the Alternative D40,000 that we
need to refund them for their expenditures, which they borrowed.
Currently, we have raised 80% of that amount.  However, this fight is not
the job of only 10 people but an entire nation.  So, are we ready to do
our part, financially, in this contract with Gambia, that is the question.
 The Alternative is doing their part, what are we doing to meet them half
way?  The STGDP strategists project that we would need to raise at the
very minimum $150,000.  This is where folks can help.  Please pledge to
this effort today and send in your contributions.  When Dr. Saine first
offered us this vehicle, there were skeptics abound, ranging from lack of
trust to the ineffectiveness of the method.  Well, that same method funded
the last two victories we all celebrated.  But remember, some folks some
where donated to the funding of that victory.  If you were one of those
individuals I say thank you for your contribution and hope you continue to
do so for the cause for 2006.  If you missed that opportunity, well you
still have another shot to stand up and be counted.  Please join the STGDP
to make history for the Gambia.  I shall address the fine points of your
part 1 in due course.  Very fine analysis indeed.

Chi jaama

Joe




> PART 2
>
> With the potential for the opposition to do things different this time
> around, the result can be different. The formation of the coalition to
> contest the by-elections was promising. However, there are many factors
> that the coalition will have to take into consideration in order to make
> an impact in the elections. Among these factors are the following.
>
> The first is to clearly define the intent of the various parties in
> coming together as a block to contest the elections. Whilst this might
> seem matter-of-fact, the failure to reach a clear understanding at this
> stage can have unwanted repercussions during or after the elections. The
> coalition must decide whether it is a temporary tactical alliance formed
> with the sole purpose of defeating the APRC and setting in place
> mechanisms to ensure free and fair elections or a strategic, systematic
> alliance with wider and more long-term goals. The coalition must
> therefore clearly state all arrangements and agreements in such a way
> that no room will be left for doubts or misinterpretation. A draft
> should be made available to each party to take stock of at the party's
> decision-making level and enough time should be given to enable the
> parties to thoroughly analyse all aspects of the document. If after
> assessing the document, individual parties have questions or issues,
> these should be worked out and compromises should be reached to enable
> the coalition to get off the ground on a solid footing.
>
> The second factor is identification and resolution of potential
> stumbling blocks. These can be numerous given the diversity of
> individuals and policies of the various parties. One of the most
> important of these is the identification of the coalition's election
> platform. The guiding word here should be compromise. All the parties
> must realise that the elections will not be contested on individual
> party lines but rather as a collective. This means that individual
> parties should not selfishly drive their agendas at the expense of the
> others as this will create problems. Large parties should not take
> advantage of their size and resources and small parties should also be
> flexible. What the parties should realise is if any individual party had
> the ability to defeat the APRC on its own, it would not be part of the
> coalition. It is the inability to individually defeat the APRC and the
> inevitable need to join forces with others to achieve this aim that is
> the guiding force behind the coalition. All parties should therefore
> enter and deal with negotiations as equal partners realising that the
> race can be so tight that the party most underestimated can be the
> deciding force.
>
> Distribution of candidates across constituencies can also be a stumbling
> block and failure to strategically place candidates based on realistic
> factors can frustrate the coalition's ambitions. It must therefore
> decide on practical criteria that can be used not only to reasonably
> satisfy its members, but also to provide viable means to bring about
> success. In this vein, issues such as whether the number of candidates
> fielded should relate to the party's size or whether the chosen
> candidates should be deemed most electable for a particular constituency
> should be handled.
>
> Having the potential to be the most divisive issue, the selection of the
> presidential candidate to represent the coalition should be handled with
> care. Power play, secret deals, unfair tactics and other methods can all
> creep into play if caution is not practiced. How is the candidate to be
> chosen? Should he be chosen based on a party's size? In other words,
> should the largest party automatically have the right to choose its
> leader as the presidential candidate? Are there any personal,
> professional or other criteria that should be considered? Is there a
> mechanism in place to ensure that the wishes of the small parties are
> dealt with regarding this issue? Are there limitations on the
> presidential candidate to ensure his / her election would not mean the
> usurpation of power and nullification of the coalition as an entity? How
> will the president act if elected and how do important appointments take
> place? Is the president going to be the one to have the sole authority
> to appoint and fire important public figures or is there a mechanism
> that will ensure power-sharing when it comes to these and other
> important questions? Are there any safeguards to ensure that the
> president will not abuse power? All these and many more questions should
> be addressed.
>
> Should the potential cabinet and other important positions be
> distributed now or should one wait until after the elections? This and
> the composition of the cabinet are other potential causes of contention.
> How should the ministries be allocated? Which party gets the important
> positions? Based on what? Can the distribution of cabinet positions be
> linked to the presidential candidate? If a party gets the presidential
> candidate, can it compromise on the other important positions? Concrete
> negotiations and the desire to compromise are needed to deal with the
> contentious issues likely to arise out of the question of distribution
> of cabinet and other positions. These are just a few issues that have
> the potential to be contentious and it is in the interests of the
> coalition's cohesiveness and survival to thoroughly and explicitly deal
> with them.
>
> Stumbling blocks aside, there are more factors to take into account to
> increase the coalition's chances in the coming elections. One of the
> most important of these is identification of strategic issues and ways
> to highlight and make them issues during the campaign period. As alluded
> to earlier, the coalition is favoured by the economic, security etc.
> situations prevalent in the country that have resulted in despair and
> destitution among the populace. Will it however do a good job of using
> this situation and turning it to its favour? It all depends on how
> strategic an approach is used. The general economic decline and
> destitution is nationwide but there are region-specific issues that must
> be identified and hammered home. This should be done after either
> analyses or studies of the various constituencies and their needs or
> problems. This will ensure that targeted areas are approached with
> region-specific information. Where national issues are appropriate,
> these should also be taken up. Identifying region-specific issues will
> mean for example, that farming issues will be primarily targeted to
> areas where farming is carried out and not Banjul for instance. The
> problem of bumpsters will be targeted to areas where tourism is topical
> and not areas where people have probably never seen a tourist. This does
> not mean a strict delineation when some issues have national importance.
>
> Another relevant factor is finance and resources. Since the coalition
> does not have the resources of the state at hand, it must create means
> of financing its activities and co-ordinating the activities of the
> various parties to avoid duplication of efforts. This means for example
> that two parties would not organise separate rallies in one village at
> the same time or within a few days of each other. The ideal would be for
> the various parties to pool their resources and co-ordinate their
> activities to ensure efficiency. Clear financial guidelines should be
> designed to delineate fiscal responsibility.
>
>                                                                                                                                             BUHARRY.
> ***************************************************** TO BE CONTINUED
> ********************************************************


--
Chi Jaama
Joe Sambou

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