Tomaa,

Many thanks.

It would have been next to impossible to take up everything in one article.
I have also noted that a commentator at the Bantaba has promised to fry me
for being so disingenious,... heaping blames on the UDP/NRP while saying
nothing on the destructive roles of Waa Juwara and Omar Jallow. Frankly, I
know nothing about what O.J did that must have been so damaging. Waa on the
other hand made unfortunate attacks on the UDP for breaking up form NADD
while there still was a chance for a compromise. But like other comments, I
think those were effects rather than causes of the breakdown. I have had
access to information as to the reasons why Alhaji Assan Musa Camara left
NADD, but I was unable to confirm that independently.

Another damaging issue that I failed to take up was the conduction of
dialogue almost in public. If the deliberations were held behind closed
doors throughout between Halifa and Ousainou, they might have been able to
reach a compromise without any of them appearing publicly to have lost face.
Also, the fact that information about NADD EC meetings found their way out
to Pa Nderry Mbai as soon as the meetings were over, was just as damaging.

IMHO what one needs to focus on at the moment is the process of
reconciliation. That will doubtlessly prove pretty difficult. But I should
venture the opinion that UDP/NRP must have to take the first step in that
direction. To have waged a campaign against the person of Halifa Sallah
(just to secure his defeat) has hardly anyhting to do with political ideas
Halifa represented. That was just too serious a matter and the UDP/NRP needs
to acknowledge that if a healing process can begin.

Once again, thanks.
sidibeh




2007/2/18, Momodou Camara <[log in to unmask]>:
>
> Tooma,
> The opposition has another five years to put their house in order and I
> believe it will be a good step if they start acknowledging the failures you
> outlined in your article. Nevertheless, I think you seem to be harder on
> Halifa and Darboe but I it would be interesting to know what roles others
> like Waa Juwara and O.J played. Hassan Musa Camara also never stated his
> reason for leaving NADD.
>
> Thanks for a brilliant piece and keep up the good work.
>
> Momodou Camara
>
>
> On 16 Feb 2007 at 15:15, Momodou S Sidibeh wrote:
>
> > (Edited and corrected version)
> >
> > ANALYSES
> >
> > In his reply to Dr. Abdoulaye Saine's e-mail of April 2006 posted on
> > Gambia-L on July 13th, Halifa Sallah presented what is perhaps the best
> > document exposing the ideas behind the MoU. There certainly are many
> other
> > materials one may need to peruse in other to broaden one's perspective
> on
> > issues such as sovereign equality, building an umbrella party, the
> five-year
> > interim term, selection process of flag-bearer, and so on. Mr. Sallah's
> own
> > writings on these matters (representing the NADD position), speeches,
> and
> > interviews are too numerous to name and quote, and certainly impossible
> at
> > this point in time for me to attempt to research. So I had to
> discriminate
> > intentionally between materials I will be quoting in reference to what
> NADD
> > stood for as presented by Halifa Sallah.
> > That discrimination also must reflect the contentious issues which led
> to
> > NADD's breakdown. Let me be clear about this: NADD's goal as spelled on
> > Article 2 of the MoU is "…to put an end to self-perpetuating rule,
> ensure
> > the empowerment of the people so that they can participate in
> sustainable
> > development". This goal, like most of NADD's Strategic Objectives, can
> only
> > be put in place through Constitutional amendments, such as the National
> > Assembly could legislate. [In principle President Jammeh (since he is
> now
> > mad, as most people seem to believe) could introduce a bill to amend the
> > Constitution granting presidential term limits to two five-year terms
> only.
> > In which case NADD would have to rewrite its goal]. Only two of NADD's
> ten
> > Strategic Objectives could fall into what may be termed as tactical
> > objectives. These are in Article 3, Paragraph B, which deals with
> pulling
> > NADD's resources for the elections, and Paragraph C, which reads
> "…launch a
> > five-year transitional programme in order to ensure an open democratic
> > society based on the promotion of national unity, freedom, peace,
> prosperity
> > and justice for all". This is the only matter (the five-year transition)
> > from NADD's objectives that also came into contention (added to the
> obvious
> > issue of leadership) while attempts at reunion were pursued.
> >
> > Getting to the bottom of NADD's breakdown, it will be most instructive
> if we
> > study issues relating to the struggle for leadership inside the
> alliance.
> >
> > From his reply to Dr. Saine (NADD'S POSITION ON THE CALL FOR UNITY AMONG
> THE
> > OPPOSITION), Halifa Sallah wrote:
> >
> >  "…suffice it to say that if the task of the first  meeting of the
> leaders
> > was restricted to the selection of a presidential and  vice presidential
> > candidate from parties which had this or that percentage in  a previous
> > election, we would not have signed a memorandum of understanding in
> > unanimity despite the diversity of interests and idiosyncrasies of the
> > leaders. What the leaders sought to do was to enhance ownership of NADD
> by
> > all parties by advocating for the principle of sovereign equality of all
> > parties.  It gave equal opportunity to all members to seek the mandate
> of
> > the people on the basis of consensus or through the holding of
> primaries".
> >
> > Halifa Sallah continues:
> >
> > "…It goes without saying that some of the critics have questioned why
> NADD
> > was
> > created as an umbrella party. The answer is simple. Since no single
> party
> > could remove the present regime the combined efforts of the parties were
> > deemed
> > necessary to achieve that aim. Most members of NADD acknowledged that if
> the
> >
> > combine efforts of all were to promote the candidature of one party, all
> the
> >
> > other parties will be marginalized during the period of promoting his or
> her
> >
> > candidature".
> > Sovereign equality is a principle of international relations that
> > establishes the equality of countries irrespective of their geographic
> size,
> > economic or military might, or their level of social development. But
> the
> > principle does not call for the surrender of individual sovereignty to a
> > higher organ. The UN is the best known organisation founded on sovereign
> > equality. Well, NADD's effort here is first and foremost, to establish
> > equality among its constituent members. It follows logically that if it
> is
> > required to establish this kind of equality at the onset, then there
> must
> > have been some presumptive element of inequality in the first place?
> What
> > else would that element be if not their sizes? So the question of size
> had
> > to be subdued from the onset so as to give "equal opportunity to all
> members
> > to seek the mandate of the people on the basis of consensus or through
> the
> > holding of primaries" and to eventually ensure that other parties are
> not
> > marginalised if one party sought to promote its own candidature!
> Otherwise,
> > there would have been no NADD! This must be true even if it is counter
> > argued that sovereign equality was principally desirable in order to
> prevent
> > posterior claims of organisational and political credit by one party.
> > True, the combined efforts of the opposition parties were required if
> the
> > dictator should be rid of through a transparent democratic process. It
> was
> > therefore inferred desirably that since no one party could dislodge the
> > dictatorship on its own, the credit for doing so must be shared equally
> by
> > the collective. But should that mean that the parties are equal in size,
> > influence, resources? Elsewhere this piece of fuzzy logic was extended
> to
> > put under contention even the numerical strengths of the parties in
> > question.
> >
> > Since all members are registered political parties vying for power
> through
> > the mandate of the voters any arrangement they subsequent enter into
> must
> > serve the interest of some or all of them. Obviously the only parties
> that
> > risked marginalisation are the smaller parties, and so it is no accident
> > that NADD split along those lines: the smaller parties on one side and
> the
> > two larger ones on the other.
> > Ladies and gentlemen the first quotation of Halifa Sallah above
> juxtaposed
> > with NADD's goal gives rise to a key question: If the overriding goal of
> > NADD is to put an end to self-perpetuating rule (a goal that can only be
> > achieved by a NADD government), why should the very EXISTENCE of the
> > alliance (signing of the MoU) be made contingent on the leaders'
> compliance
> > with the principle of sovereign equality? Why? Before venturing answers
> to
> > this question allow me first to read more of Halifa Sallah:
> >
> > "…At no time did any member put the issue of the percentage earned in
> > previous elections as a bargaining chip to contest elections. At no time
> did
> > any member call for a primary to determine candidature".
> >
> > "…It was envisaged that if each party surrenders its sovereignty to the
> > umbrella party for a transition period of five years all of them will
> retain
> > their
> > original size and political weight and would be guaranteed a level
> ground
> > for
> > contesting the next following elections. This is when the size of a
> > political party would matter".
> >
> > "…in short, before we agreed on the content of the MOU we set up a
> technical
> > committee comprising the experts of all the political parties. Your
> party
> > was represented by people of high intellectual calibre. Within the
> technical
> > committee were former permanent secretaries and people with PhD".
> >
> > The last quotation here is from an article (NADD and UDP/NRP view on
> Unity)
> > posted on Gambia-L on August 11.
> > One plausible, logical answer to the above key question is that everyone
> > accepted tacitly that leadership of NADD (because sovereign equality
> defined
> > the process of leadership selection) was more important than everything
> > else. An answer no one will ever agree with!
> > Another plausible answer is the fear of marginalisation of smaller
> parties.
> > Yet still a third plausible answer, linked to the second, is the desire
> to
> > secure a guarantee that NADD's Goals and Strategic Objectives will be
> > pursued irrespective of whom is selected as flag-bearer.
> >
> > Before going any further let me assert that there was indeed a fear of
> > marginalisation, as well as the suspicion that one party may assume a
> big
> > brother role for its own sake and finally, fear that the Strategic
> > Objectives could be derailed. These are genuine concerns I believe. This
> was
> > the reason, among others, why theoretical arguments were developed, put
> in
> > print in the MoU and sealed with signatures of all the five party
> leaders.
> > So there must have been some degree of mistrust as Ousainou Darboe
> claimed?
> > But let me quickly say that as a matter of principle it was right that
> these
> > fears were clearly spelled out, freely expressed, and consequently
> > recognised. So Mr. Darboe's claims of mistrust, unless referring to some
> > factors other than those I mentioned, and unless debate on these matters
> > were conducted surreptitiously, are without merit.
> > On the other hand, why must the interests of the smaller parties be
> pushed
> > so hard as to jeopardize the stability of the entire project? The larger
> > parties also have interests of their own!
> >
> > So our respectable coterie of intellectuals reason this way. Place all
> > political parties on an equal footing from the beginning; the parties
> remain
> > undissolved but they surrender sovereignty to the umbrella party; a
> leader
> > gets selected from one of them; NADD governs for five years; during that
> > period the individual parties (and their supporters) are all compelled
> to go
> > underground (!), only to emerge at the end of the five years with their
> > sizes and all, intact and constant like all the matter in the universe!
> I do
> > not know about you, but I find this quiet baffling, and I doubt if it
> can
> > indeed pass the laugh test anywhere. But this is serious business; and
> all
> > this line of reasoning repeatedly churned out, like the proverbial party
> > line, by no one other than Halifa Sallah of all people.
> >
> > That our political leaders and well educated Gambians can sign a
> coalition
> > document based on these premises seems incredible to me. This is about
> huge
> > political power; not a UN kind of thing (where we had a fabulously
> correct
> > Kofi Annan but who was in the main, quiet powerless!). Everyone knows
> that
> > the majority of Gambians do not cast their votes on account of
> convictions
> > on concrete issues, and so everyone must know that such a formula will
> be
> > untenable as soon as a leader is selected from inside NADD. The outcome
> > should be quite predictable. This ladies and gentlemen, is where they
> all
> > failed us. Brothers Mo Baldeh, Buharry Gassama and others, all saw that
> > happening. Why could Halifa Sallah and others not see it? For those
> > interested, read my short piece from the archives:
> >
> >
> http://listserv.icors.org/SCRIPTS/WA-ICORS.EXE?A2=ind0601&L=gambia-l&H=1&O=D
> > &F=P&X=712F7E5BF4ED613618&Y=sidibeh%40adamomail.se&P=29966
> >
> > They were all, without exception, beset with the idea of power. That a
> > seasoned lawyer and others broke agreements they signed previously, that
> > Hamat Bah disregarded basic principles of confidentiality in the midst
> of
> > negotiations, that there were instances of mandinka nationalism here and
> > there, are all largely effects of events; not their causes.
> > Finally, here is my explanation of Ousainou Darboe's behaviour:
> >
> > I think he went into all of this hesitantly, suspicious of the
> intentions of
> > the others, and possibly even feeling intimidated by Halifa Sallah's
> > involvement. [BTW NADD members or supporters (like myself) need to
> recognise
> > that Halifa's mere presence is intellectually intimidating for political
> > adversaries. The sad and very unfortunate fact that some will campaign
> > against his very person and put up a candidate just to secure his defeat
> is
> > an instance of intense dislike.This must be gravely considered by those
> who
> > value him so much]. After all the initial hiccups, and also realizing
> that
> > the idea of a coalition is the best chance of ridding Gambia of the
> > dictator, he agreed to join the coalition. I think Darboe realised the
> > dangers inherent in the MoU and its articles on leadership selection and
> > especially the interim five-year term. But he dismissed these as
> theoretical
> > matters only, hoping to renegotiate the term limit eventually. He
> persuaded
> > himself confidently that, when the chips are down, everyone else would
> come
> > to their senses and recognise that he, and no one else, ought to be flag
> > bearer on account of the size of the UDP.
> > The nomination of O.J must have shocked him, realizing that going into
> > primaries would be a mere formality, since unless there was internal
> > rebellion within some parties, the village or ward representatives will
> > simply vote on instigation from their leaders. With equal
> representation, he
> > could not possibly win, with PDOIS, PPP, and NDAM votes stacked against
> his
> > chances. Also, it is possible that Waa Juwara was not particularly kind
> to
> > him during their numerous EC meetings, given their history of personal
> > discord. He felt badly hoodwinked by the whole process. So he withdrew
> as
> > gracefully (!) as he possibly could, and time stood still.
> > As a lawyer of vast experience, what could he say? Having signed the MoU
> > willingly, he could not possibly admit that he was tricked into doing
> it. It
> > would be exceedingly humiliating. A Mandinka proverb calls it "tying
> > someone's hands to a tree". So his followers, all over the place
> (including
> > Gambia-L) remained speechless despite Joe Sambou and others pummelling
> them
> > about their lawyer-leader breaking the rules of engagement! They will
> remain
> > defenceless on that score forever. Should we accept Mr. Darboe's
> behaviour
> > even if we understand it? Not at all.
> > All this has been a liberal interpretation of NADD's breakdown.
> >
> > CONCLUSION
> >
> > A progressive interpretation of what happened needs to be even more
> > rigorous. Reading through most of what Halifa Sallah, i.e NADD wrote on
> > different issues relating both to the founding of the coalition and
> > subsequent attempts at reunification, one cannot escape the impression
> that
> > there was a clear discrepancy between language and the existing
> political
> > reality. It is as if the nature of NADD was to be found not in its
> agenda
> > but in the language it deployed to define itself. Even though some of
> the
> > democratic questions it resolved to address were perhaps radical in
> content,
> > NADD itself is far from being a radical organisation. Its basic
> principles
> > were built on the premises to organise and agitate for reforms within
> the
> > existing political context. Progressives inside NADD (members of PDOIS
> and
> > NDAM, to be hopeful) needed to recognise the petit-bourgeois identity of
> the
> > UDP leadership and engage with them on that basis. Sprouting from the
> > vacuous remnants of the older PPP, GPP, and the NCP, it contained, not
> only
> > Gambia's largest waramba community of Friday muslims, but also the party
> > with the broadest mass base in the entire opposition. There was hardly
> any
> > reason to doubt that the UDP was and is still interested in democratic
> > reforms. The key question is whether it could mobilise at will the
> capacity
> > implement these reforms.
> > There were present in NADD all the ingredients for a democratic
> revolution
> > (a common minimum program, and an alliance of all forces bent on
> bringing to
> > an end the excesses of a truly oppressive state) with one exception: a
> > strong and well-structured mass organisation.
> > What then should progressives do in such a situation?
> >
> > They needed first to establish a common trench with all democratic
> forces
> > and concretise the minimum programme. There should have been no issue
> > whatsoever about the UDP providing a flag bearer. On the other hand
> > negotiations needed to be centred on the composition of a NADD
> government.
> > With progressives in government, the possibilities of bringing about
> truly
> > democratic reforms would have been immeasurably enhanced. With a
> > theoretically equipped vanguard, student unions could be activated out
> of
> > social indifference, and the trade unions pulled out of their
> bureaucratic
> > slumber. Government could look into taking control of the peanut trade
> to
> > free our peasants from the caprices of unserious businessmen, and
> quickly
> > enforce mandatory testing of HIV/AIDS. (Recall what Thomas Sankara did
> in
> > Burkina Faso about polio during his very short time)! As we say, the
> > possibilities would have been almost endless.
> >
> > But what do we have left? A Titanic with a witch-doctor as captain, with
> the
> > NADD MoU tossed overboard long ago as flotsam and jetsam.
> >
> > Many, many thanks
> >
> > (c) Momodou S Sidibeh
> > P.S
> > I am exhausted and disillusioned by it all. So please if I am unable to
> > answer questions or argue again take it not as discourtesy from my part.
> I
> > am all too aware that I might have made mistakes here and there. Just
> > correct me, in that case. This is OUR history, and I am no trained
> > historian.I have simply tried to respond as best as I could to brother
> Omar
> > Joof's wise counsel that we should all think on our own, and also to Joe
> > Sambou's encouragement that my opinion may have some value after all.
> > Thank you.
> >
> *******************************************************
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