Editorial of Arabnews: The Road Map
2 May 2003

The Arab world would love to believe that the so-called road map which
President Bush has just sent to the Palestinian and Israeli authorities will
result in a state for the Palestinians and peace for the Middle East. But
Arabs are skeptical about its chances for two reasons. The first is that
although drafted by the European Union, Russia and the UN as well as the US,
it is Washington that is in the driving seat — and Arabs do not believe it
has the will to drive it through. There have been too many Mideast peace
initiatives in the past, all of them ending in failure. When push came to
shove, the US was not prepared to make the all-important effort. When the
going gets tough, Washington loses heart and interest.

The other problem is the forces at work in the region that will do
everything to make sure that the road map gets nowhere. The map is only as
good as its weakest points, and the weakest points are the militants on both
sides whose uncompromising visions of total victory are incompatible with
the compromises that are vital if there is to be a two-state solution. Those
militants are Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and an Israeli hard right
implacably opposed to the road map’s demands for the dismantling of Jewish
settlements erected since 2001 and, among the Palestinians, those equally
intransigent hard-liners in Hamas and Islamic Jihad who want no peace with
Israel and who know exactly how to exploit the furious sense of impotence
among ordinary Palestinians. No one can fail to notice that the incidence of
suicide attacks rises whenever there is movement on the political front. The
willing acceptance of martyrdom by young Palestinians is, without doubt, a
genuine expression of rage against an otherwise unbeatable enemy — but such
willingness to die has been used by calculating political activists out to
prevent solutions they do not like.

But the Palestinians by and large are enthusiastic about the plan. It is
Sharon who poses the far greater threat — and he knows how to turn up the
pressure on the Palestinians so as to create a new cycle of violence and
bitterness that could sweep away both the plan and the new Palestinian
government. Already he is trying to move the goalposts with his statement
that he has been sent the blueprint for “comments” on its wording. The road
map is not up for comment. It is to be accepted in whole.

The challenge for Washington is to put the heat on the Israeli leader so
that he accepts and implements it. That means doing something it has never
done before: Standing up to the Israelis. Most Arabs do not believe that
Bush will do it. They see the US presence in Iraq and the Israeli occupation
of Palestinian land as two sides of the same anti-Arab plot.

Bush has to deliver if the profound anti-Americanism that permeates the Arab
world is to dissipate. The ball is in his court. He says he is determined to
make the road map work. We shall see. If he can deliver, his image worldwide
will be totally recast. On the plus side, he has already proved his
determination with Iraq. The refusal to be deflected by the latest suicide
bomb is also positive sign. So too is the agreement to terminate US military
presence in Saudi Arabia. But on the minus side is Washington’s perennial
inability to crack the whip at the Israelis. Given the record, it is not
easy to be optimistic.

Map Poses Big Risks for Bush
Dana Milbank & Alan Cooperman, The Washington Post

WASHINGTON, 2 May 2003 — When President Bush released his long-awaited road
map to Middle East peace on Wednesday, he did not do it in a sun-dappled
Rose Garden ceremony or a televised East Room address. He issued a written
statement read by his spokesman.

That low-key sendoff can be seen as a metaphor for the hesitancy with which
Bush has accepted the role of peacemaker between Israelis and Palestinians.
In terms of domestic politics, political strategists say, Bush has more to
lose from pushing too hard for a Middle East peace deal than he does from
failing to win an agreement.

Bush’s closest political allies, religious conservatives, are fiercely
protective of Israel and would resist any signal that he was pressuring the
government of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. The biggest advocates of
the action Bush took Wednesday — Democrats and liberals — are unlikely to
support Bush in any case. And while Bush would obviously benefit from a
peace deal in his pocket when he campaigns for re-election next year, even
optimists regard that as a long shot.

“I don’t think he gets anything politically if he has a peace deal,’’
concludes Jack Abramoff, a pro-Israel Republican lobbyist who is close to
House leaders.

That reality helps to explain why many Middle East analysts do not have high
expectations for the road map. For Bush to produce a peace accord, they
figure, he must be willing to apply pressure to the Israelis. But that runs
counter to his own instincts and his domestic political environment.

Reaction to Wednesday’s release of the road map showed the perils for Bush
if he were to push hard for an agreement. The evangelist Pat Robertson,
normally a Bush supporter, said Bush was trying to “placate’’ British Prime
Minister Tony Blair and other Europeans. “Land for peace has never worked
yet, and I don’t think it’s going to work now,’’ he said.

Richard Land, another of Bush’s usual allies who leads the policy arm of the
Southern Baptist Convention, said the release of the road map is one of only
a few initiatives by the Bush administration that have distressed the
religious right. He said it was “not a wise thing’’ to get entangled with
the United Nations, as the road map would allow, and warned of a “real
problem’’ if it appeared that Israel is being pressured “to make concessions
that endanger its security.’’

Few people expect Bush to do any such thing. In the minds of many Jewish and
pro-Israel leaders, Bush made clear last year that he would not pressure
Israel to make concessions on territory or on settlements unless the
Palestinian leadership reformed itself and cracked down on violence. By
doing so, and by his earlier refusal to meet with Palestinian leader Yasser
Arafat, “he has built up a tremendous reservoir of goodwill within the
Jewish community,’’ said Matt Brooks, executive director of the Republican
Jewish Coalition. Changing that course “is unthinkable,’’ Brooks said, and
could quickly undermine Bush’s standing among Jewish donors and voters, whom
the GOP has targeted in recent years.

“He’s got more to risk by having the perception of pressuring Israeli policy
than he does by not taking (the peace process) on,’’ said one American
Jewish leader. “He didn’t come into the job to win the Nobel Peace Prize; he
came in to do what’s right for our allies.’’

By contrast, many of those in the Jewish community urging the administration
to push hard for peace are unlikely to back Bush’s re-election next year.
Jerome Segal, president of the Jewish Peace Lobby, released a letter
Wednesday from 100 rabbis encouraging the administration to go even further
and put forward a concrete peace proposal. But even if the White House does
what the rabbis want, he added, “I think the chances that they will vote for
Bush are quite small.’’ The administration and its allies say this has
nothing to do with domestic politics. “Not at all,’’ says Republican
consultant Ralph Reed, who is close to the White House. Reed points out that
the road map does not anticipate a resolution before 2005 — after Bush’s
re-election campaign.

Bush has long shown a reluctance to get involved in Middle East peacemaking.
He witnessed the difficulties encountered by his father and Secretary of
State James A. Baker III, when they antagonized Jewish groups by applying
pressure on the Israeli government. Bush was also determined not to “shoot
the moon,’’ as his spokesman put it, in an unsuccessful quest for Middle
East peace, as President Bill Clinton had done. Bush entered the fray only
last June, when spiraling violence made inaction untenable.

Indeed, the very notion of Wednesday’s road map was less a Bush idea than a
response to an Arab request for help. Several weeks after Bush stepped up
his involvement in Middle East policy, Bush heard a plea for Jordan’s King
Abdullah II in the Oval Office. “What we need is a road map,’’ Abdullah
said, according to a person in the room.

Bush turned to William Burns, the assistant secretary of state for the
region. “He wants a road map,’’ Bush said to Burns. “Can we give him a road
map?’’ The terms of the road map, formally released Wednesday, have been
widely known since last fall.

Bush will have some time before he is forced to choose between political
pressures at home and diplomatic pressures abroad. If the new Palestinian
prime minister, Mahmoud Abbas, fails to control violence, the road map will
be moot regardless of Bush’s actions.

“If the bombs keep blowing up, we won’t get to the first green light on this
road map,’’ said David Makovsky of the Washington Institute for Near East
Policy.

By contrast, if Abbas amasses true power and succeeds in restraining
violence and cracking down on terrorism, even hard-liners among pro-Israel
Americans will expect Israeli concessions.

“If he starts to demonstrate that he is a different kind of Palestinian
leader, the expectation is Prime Minister Sharon will deal with him and
President Bush will deal with him,’’ said Nathan Diamant, policy director
for the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations.

The test will come if the road map enters a “gray area,’’ according to Steve
Rosen of the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, in which Abbas
achieves some progress, and Europeans push for a “date certain’’ for a
Palestinian state despite continued violence. “I’d be astonished if George
Bush embraced the idea of moving toward a Palestinian state while a
terrorist organization is in full force,’’ Rosen said. “That would be a
confrontational situation, but I don’t see any chance of it occurring.’’



For Palestinians, This Is Oslo by Another Name
Sa’id Ghazali, The independent

The release of the “road map” peace plan, and the appointment of the new
Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas are being seen around the world as
a new window of opportunity to resolve the Middle East conflict. But most
Palestinians, from those on the street to political leaders, do not think
the road map is a such a big deal — or that it will end their suffering and
meet their national aspirations.

The road map is no more than an entrance ticket to the dance hall where the
Israelis will play the same old tunes against “terror”. The Palestinian
officials, with their VIP cards and what’s left of their fancy cars, have
been readying themselves for the thrilling dance that will put them once
again at the center of international attention.

A careful reading of the road map predicts an unhappy ending. The peace plan
deals with the Israeli demand that the suicide bombings and other attacks by
the Palestinian militants end. But it does not give the demands of the
Palestinians equal importance. Why doesn’t the road map clearly and
unequivocally include the main demand, that Israel withdraw to its
internationally recognized pre-1967 borders? Instead, it refers back to UN
resolution 242, which Israel has ignored for a long time. What about the
future of Jerusalem’s Arab quarters and the city’s Muslim and Christian holy
sites? Where is the solution for the millions of Palestinian refugees across
the Middle East? The road map does not recognize the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict as the primary source of instability in the region. On the
contrary, everything is the fault of the Palestinians, who unleashed the
intifada against Israel.

In fact, the road map is no more than a phased security initiative for
Israel, opening the gate for the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Israelis
to work together to quell Hamas, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and the other
militant factions. The PA must do this first. Until it succeeds — no easy
task — there will be no steps forward from Israel. The Israeli Army will not
even pull back from the re- occupied Palestinian cities.

And if the PA succeeds? Then negotiation will commence over a Palestinian
state with provisional borders.The hard issues — permanent borders, what
happens to Jerusalem (which both sides want as a capital), the right of
return for Palestinian refugees — will all have to wait until after the
creation of the provisional state.

Ariel Sharon’s view of the size of this Palestinian state is only 42 percent
of the West Bank. Recently, he demanded that the Palestinians abandon their
demand for the right of return for the Palestinian people, forced to flee
their homes in what is now Israel in 1948, as a precondition for Israel even
to accept the road map.

But what matters here is not to make an argument against the road map. The
facts on the ground seen by the Palestinian people in their daily life are
more revealing. The conditions speak of the impossibility of creating an
independent Palestinian state, without dealing with the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict as the primary source of the problem.

The unwillingness of Israel, the US and Britain to see the changes on the
ground in the occupied territories does not mean that these changes do not
exist. The ever-spreading settlements and by-pass roads for the exclusive
use of settlers, the Israeli Army camps and training areas, the new
separation wall Israel is building to fence in the Palestinians in the West
Bank, the water resources under Israel’s control — these are the reality. I
spoke recently with one of the ministers in the new Cabinet of Abbas about
the road map. He admitted that he was not sure the peace plan would achieve
the withdrawal of the Israeli Army from all of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
He told me the landslide victory achieved by the US in Iraq is forcing the
PA to lower its head. For him, the road map is a diplomatic lifeline for the
PA. “We cannot reject it because we will face catastrophe,” he said.

But what is more catastrophic than the crushing load of 36 years of
occupation? Thirty-six years during which more than 200 settlements have
been constructed, and thousands of Palestinians killed. The PA was born out
of the failed Oslo experiment. Under the Oslo accords, statehood for the
Palestinians was meant to end the conflict. Now the Palestinians are asked
to view a state as yet another interim phase, through which they have to
jump into the unknown.

The Palestinians and Israelis have wasted precious time in negotiating these
substantive issues without any success. The outcome of seven years of
marathon negotiation under Oslo was zero. The same dynamic has been set up
deliberately in the road map. The PA has to accept in the end what Israel
will propose, or face being crushed again, as it was crushed by Israel
during the 30 months of the uprising. On the Palestinian street, you hear a
very different view from the PA’s line. In Nablus, I spoke with a
cross-section of people: A doctor, a carpenter, a grocer, a moderate prayer
leader in the local mosque and a former activist who lost his right hand in
an explosion.

I asked them what they thought of the road map. The answers were terse:
“Another Oslo.” “Meaningless.” “A failing new experiment, a rotten meat.”
“Even a collaborator would not accept it.”

Arab News Opinion 2 May 2003

Abu Mazen’s Position Is Not at All Enviable
Uri Avnery

TEL AVIV1 May 2003 — My first impression of Abu Mazen was of a serious,
methodical, somewhat aloof introvert. He reminded me of a high school
principal, very different from Arafat, the impulsive extrovert, prone to
personal gestures, exuding warmth to all around him.

I met Abu Mazen for the first time some 28 years ago. We were secretly in
Tunis to meet Yasser Arafat. There were three of us: Matti Peled, a general
in the reserves, Ya’acov Arnon, a former director general of the Treasury
and I. We met Abu Mazen first to prepare practical proposals for joint
actions, to be put before the “Old Man”, as Arafat — then 54 — was called.

I had first heard mention of the name Abu Mazen nine years earlier, with my
first secret contacts with senior PLO officials. They told me that the Fatah
leadership had appointed a committee of three for contacts with Israelis.
They were the “three Abus” (as I called them): Abu AmMar (Yasser Arafat),
Abu Iyad (Salah Halaf) and Abu Mazen (Mahmud Abbas).

Abu Mazen was directly responsible for the contacts that started in 1974. At
the first stage, they were conducted with me personally, but, from the
autumn of 1976 on, the Israeli partner was the “Israeli Council for
Israeli-Palestinian Peace”.

The Palestinians who met us were Sa’id Hamami and Issam Sartawi — who were
both murdered by the Iraqi-supported Palestinian archterrorist, Abu Nidal, a
mortal enemy of Arafat.

When Arafat and Abu Mazen were both present at meetings with us, I got a
clear picture of their mutual standing. The detailed discussions were
conducted by Abu Mazen, who had a good knowledge of things Israeli, but it
was Arafat who, in the end, made the decisions. More than once I had the
impression that the senior PLO leaders were quite content to leave to Arafat
the responsibility for the courageous, dangerous and unpopular decisions
that led up to the agreement with Israel.

Now there is a new situation. Now Abu Mazen is prime minister. (The very
fact that the whole world, and Israel too, have welcomed the Palestinian
“government” and “prime minister” is a big step toward the establishment of
the State of Palestine. In Oslo Israel still strenuously resisted terms like
“president”, “government” and “Parliament” for the Palestinians.)

Abu Mazen has taken upon himself a great responsibility vis-a-vis his own
people and the world. He has put himself in a well-nigh impossible position.

Sharon & Co. demand that he first of all put an end to “terrorism” (“armed
struggle” in Palestinian parlance), liquidate the “terrorist organizations”
collect their arms and prevent “incitement”. Only after the successful
completion of all this can real negotiations begin. Freezing the
construction of settlements, of course, should not even be mentioned at this
stage.

The Palestinian public, on the other hand, demands that first of all the
Israeli Army leave the Palestinian towns, stopping “targeted
assassinations”, settlement activity, the demolition of homes and all other
acts of oppression, and start real negotiations for the establishment of the
State of Palestine.

This threatens to become a deadlock.

If the US and Europe exert massive pressure on Sharon, the way they have put
massive pressure on Arafat, the deadlock might be broken. The Israeli Army
would withdraw, the situation in the Palestinian territories would change
completely, the Palestinians would be able to breathe again and Abu Mazen
would appear as a leader who had already attained a great achievement. The
popularity of the extreme organizations would decline.

Even if this happened, Abu Mazen could not dream of making mass arrests,
destroying the organizations and confiscating their weapons. There is
nothing the Palestinians fear more than fratricidal war. However, the
pressure of Palestinian public opinion would lead, at least, to an effective
armistice. Even the extreme organizations are sensitive to the attitudes of
their public – if it wants quiet, there will be quiet. That has already
happened in the first period after the Oslo agreement.

Let’s assume that this happens. The attacks stop almost completely (there
will always be some individuals and local groups who feel they have to act
on their own). The Abu Mazen government functions well in the Palestinian
towns and villages. Then what?

After the publication of the road map, Sharon will propose dozens of
“corrections”. Even now the “map” is strongly tilted towards Sharon. While
the Palestinians gave up 78 percent of the country in Oslo and accepted the
remaining 22 percent for building their own state, and have declared that
they want to live in peaceful coexistence with Israel, Sharon talks about
“painful concessions” without spelling out what he really means.

If Sharon’s “corrections” are even partly accepted, the plan will lose most
of what content it still has. Abu Mazen will stand there with empty hands,
the negotiations will stagnate as in previous rounds. Gradually, the
Palestinians will be forced to the conclusion that they can achieve nothing
without violence, the fighting organizations will regain the initiative and
the armed struggle will resume.

Sharon and Bush will blame the Palestinians, of course. They will say that
Abu Mazen “has not delivered the goods”. The Palestinians, for their part,
will say that Abu Mazen is naive, that he has fallen into an
American-Israeli trap. He will resign, Arafat’s prestige will rise to new
heights.

The next chapter can be foreseen. The Christian fundamentalists and Zionist
neocons, who control Washington at this time, will demand that Sharon be
given a free hand. The Palestinians will embark on the third intifada, more
extreme than the two before. Blood and fire and columns of smoke.

It could be different. For example: The US stops treating the Quartet with
contempt, pressure is put on Sharon, Bush is not re-elected, the
negotiations bear fruit, the peace camp wins in Israel, the Palestinian
state is founded in peace.

In the Holy Land, miracles have happened before. But in the meantime, don’t
envy Abu Mazen.

(Uri Avnery, award-winning Israeli journalist and writer, three-time member
of Knesset and a columnist for the Ma’ariv daily is a founding member of the
Gush Shalom peace movement.)


Washington Shaping Up to Be a Pretty Inept Occupier
Jonathan Freedland, The Guardian

LONDON — There are three ways you know the war in Iraq is meant to be over.
First, George Bush is due to declare combat operations formally at an end
this week. Second, Tony Blair has started talking about public services —
domestic bread-and-butter — again. Third, Toyah’s eating ants on I’m a
Celebrity, Get Me Out of Here! Would they dare engage in such frivolity if
British troops were still in action?

So the conflict must be over. Surely we are now in the “aftermath”, that
less spectacular phase of war confined to the inside pages and worthy
foreign policy seminars. The rest of us can doubtless tune out, unwind after
a stressful few months and get ready for summer.

Not so fast. President Bush may want to rush out his victory declaration,
but there is still plenty of unfinished business from this war. For one
thing, there is the irritating matter of the war’s official cause: Iraq’s
weapons of mass destruction. Until they turn up, the nagging doubt will
remain that both Bush and Blair talked up a threat to justify an unnecessary
conflict. The damage Operation Iraqi Freedom has wrought to the US
relationship with Europe goes on, too: Just the other day, the anti-war
quartet of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg announced a new European
security and defense union, separate from NATO and pointedly excluding
pro-war countries such as Britain. And the strategic reverberations of the
second Gulf War are just beginning to be felt: Now we learn that the US is
to shift the bulk of its Gulf forces to tiny Qatar. It surely can’t be long
before it decides the ideal location is newly won Iraq.

But you don’t have to search so far into the future for evidence that this
story is far from over. For its next and, in some ways, most dramatic
chapter is being played out right now. It is the American occupation of Iraq
that could prove even more fraught with danger than the war itself.

Officially, it’s all plain sailing. “Every day, life in Iraq improves,” a
sunny Bush told a cheering Arab-American crowd in Michigan on Monday. But
the reality on the ground is not quite so rosy.

While Bush was at his podium, US troops were firing into a crowd of
demonstrators in the Iraqi town of Falluja, killing 13 of them. The Pentagon
says the Americans were fired on first, but eyewitnesses insist the
protesters were unarmed. Apparently they were trying to reclaim a local
school that US forces had taken over.

Falluja is now at least the third Bloody Sunday-style incident in Iraq in as
many weeks: Twice at Mosul Americans also killed demonstrators said to be
unarmed. Of course, there will be no Bloody Sunday-style outcry — after all,
the victims were not US citizens — but this latest episode does suggest an
alarming pattern. To put it at its mildest, America is shaping up to be a
pretty inept occupier.

It’s not just the military’s knack for inflaming a tense situation into a
deadly one. Nor is it the bumbling rhetorical efforts of Pro-Consul Jay
Garner, who’s good enough at serving up treacly, sub-Clinton platitudes —
“let’s do this for the children of Iraq” — but who has failed to get a basic
grip on the country he is meant to run. Electricity is still out for most of
the day, there is no police force to speak of, workers remain unpaid and
disorder is widespread. The leitmotif of all this is, inevitably, Iraq’s
ransacked museums: A trove of antiquities denuded in what one archaeologist
calls the greatest cultural disaster of the last 500 years.

The common thread is not malignancy, so much as unpreparedness. How could
the US have been surprised either by the museum looting — which happened
during the 1991 war, too — or by the wider anarchy? It should have been
obvious that the toppling of Saddam would leave a power vacuum. This was not
the fall of communism, despite the frequent invocations of 1989. In Eastern
Europe, the top layer of leadership was removed, but the governing apparatus
remained intact: The ship of state could stay afloat. But here the entire
machine was the target for elimination, making lawlessness inevitable. Now
the coalition faces a lose-lose choice: Either they impose order and police
the streets of Baghdad themselves, or they bring back the men of the old
regime to do it for them.

But politics, like nature, abhors a vacuum, so other forces are beginning to
fill it. Chief among them is Shiite leaders, who can claim the allegiance of
60 percent of the Iraqi population. Where order exists, it is the Shiites
who are providing it — the mosques have even sent out volunteers to act as
traffic cops. Once again, this should have been easily predicted. Oppressive
regimes in Islamic countries leave only one place where people can assemble
and organize: The mosque. That’s what happened in 1970s Iran under the Shah
and that’s what’s happening now.

And Iran is a key player in this new drama. Iraqi-born clerics exiled in
Iran have been crossing the border, determined to make Najaf once again the
Shiite spiritual center (perhaps as a moderate alternative to Iran’s
Khomeinist hub of Qom). The Iranian television station, Al-Alam, has become
must-see TV in those Iraqi homes lucky enough to have power, while the
coalition’s own TV channel — beamed via military plane — is said to be poor,
with fuzzy reception, showing nothing worth seeing.

In other words, the US and Britain have ripped a big hole in Iraq and it is
Shiite Islam, which is stepping through it. Gen. Garner may demand that
there be no “out of country” (referring to Iran) influence on the new Iraq —
apparently forgetting that he and his fellow Americans are hardly
native-born Baghdadis — but this is the fast-emerging reality.

The US response is to plead for patience. Sit tight, they say, a
transitional government is on the way: A national conference should convene
to pick it in a month’s time. That could be tricky, with some Shiite leaders
still boycotting the process. And what about after the transition? If Iraqis
have a simple, winner-takes-all election, then Shiites could remain in
permanent power, freezing out Sunnis and Kurds. Fair elections might bring
victory to an Islamist party. (Wouldn’t that be an irony, US-liberated Iraq
home to the new Taleban?)

Donald Rumsfeld was reported as saying that’s “not going to happen” at the
weekend. But if Iraq is going to be a democracy, as London and Washington
insist, it’s hard to see how that can be ruled out. No wonder Geoff Hoon was
squirming last week, when asked if Iraq’s future elections would be of the
one-person, one-vote variety. The system would be “representative,” was all
Hoon would promise. In other words, Iraqis are to have a Henry Ford
election: They can have whatever color they want so long as it’s black.

- Arab News Opinion 1 May 2003

With the very best of good wishes,
Musa Amadu Pembo
Glasgow,
Scotland
UK.
[log in to unmask]
Da’wah is to convey the message with wisdom and with good words. We should
give the noble and positive message of Islam. We should try to emphasize
more commonalities and explain the difference without getting into
theological arguments and without claiming the superiority of one position
over the other. There is a great interest among the people to know about
Islam and we should do our best to give the right message.
May Allah,Subhana Wa Ta'Ala,guide us all to His Sirat Al-Mustaqim (Righteous
Path).May He protect us from the evils of this life and the hereafter.May
Allah,Subhana Wa Ta'Ala,grant us entrance to paradise .
We ask Allaah the Most High, the All-Powerful, to teach us that which will
benefit us, and to benefit us by that which we learn. May Allaah Subhanahu
Wa Ta'ala grant blessings and peace to our Prophet Muhammad and his family
and
companions..Amen.




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