First we need to be clear of what is virtually a foregone conclusion about
the elections - if they ever do take place. As sure as there is a calm after
every storm, you can bet your last tuppence on the fact that the APRC would
attempt to illegally influence the outcome of the elections. In short,  and
as things currently stand, there can never be free and fair elections in the
Gambia. That the elections would be illegally influenced - especially the
process leading to the elections - is not so much an empirical thing but
instinctual premonition based on past experiences of elections administered
under the APRC and the psyche or calibre of the APRC leadership. First, a
thumbnail sketch to briefly trace the historical perspective of the debates
developed, the positions staked and generally how we arrived where we are
today.

Once upon a time, in the debates that had engulfed this List about the
Gambia's political quagmire after the gruesome April incidents, out of the
thicket that ensued, emerged what i shall tentatively call - without any
undue attempts at dramatising - two main opposing view-point camps. The first
of such was an idealistic one.  It looked forward to an election which will
push the Dictatorship out of power. Convinced that the majority of the
Gambian peoples were just too disgusted with the APRC and most certainly on
the verge of giving them their final push whenever the general elections do
that place. Of course this was pretty much based on instinctual calculation,
mammoth optimism in the wisdom of a restless electorate that is fed up with
Jammeh to vote en masse against the APRC, logical deductions and scant
empiricism. It seems to me that  this is where the vast majority of members
of this List belong. If they had other arguments to add to this, then it was
just that international Diplomatic pressures from the international community
and perhaps targeted economic sanctions against the Dictatorship should help
in acting as catalysts to the beginning of the end of the peaceful
termination of the Dictatorship.

The second main opposing view-point camp that came out of the wood-work  we
shall call the Realist camp - or what others euphemistically called the
"Radical" camp. The Realist camp was virtually a minority opinion and found
skilfull treatment and indeed sympathetic audience from the likes Brothers
KB, Saul Khan and my humble self. True, most of the earlier consistency came
from the proflicacy of KB's pen whilst Saul and i more or less played
catch-up and or quibbled over some contentious issues like whether the
elections stand a good chance of being free and fair. I take note that i was
a late convert to this camp and had more to do with the Idealists than the
camp i set up my tent now. Be that as it may, this camp was of the view that
the way things are, elections will not bring normalcy back to the Gambia and
on occasions didn't mince their words in calling for a by-all-means-necessary
approach inorder to effectively rectify the political quagmire unilaterally
imposed upon the Gambia by Jammeh. To a degree, the Realist group did share
the Idealist camp's view that diplomatic pressures and or targeted economic
sanctions could inflict mortal blows to the dictatorship. Aside from their
desire to see the back of Jammeh, this is their meeting-point. Of course,
everything isn't as clear-cut as i have attempted to portray here. If
anything, there were complications in the definition of some shades of
opinion which were the indifferences of cynics, waverers, smug fatalists and
the club of the Doubting Abdous and Patehs.

Since those clarifying periods of early 2000 when the students were murdered
to late 2000 when seismic shifts, in form of political gerrymandering by the
APRC and the Opposition's lack of a resolute agenda in responding to these
amongst others, were beginning to change the political climate and in the
early parts of 2001 when by quirk twists of fate two UDP seats were the
subject of a by-election and the farce that eventually became of the process,
a lot of water has passed under the bridge.  Most of the trenchant views of
the Idealist camp's optimism that elections shall be the handmaiden of
Jammeh's fall has virtually dissipated with the farce that has become of the
by-elections and its concomitant effect of re-igniting the virtually doused
flames of the APRC's optimism and renewed its hopes of electoral victory come
October 2001. Indeed, whilst it was only written in codes, one can sense some
despair in the Idealist camp and the bemoaning of the apparent renewal of the
APRC's electoral fortunes. However, all these events have not dented much of
the Realist camp's position. Granted most Realists have occassionally taken
up the cudgel for some of the Opposition's position - especially where it
gets it wrong in interpreting the machinations of the APRC. As an effect,
these positionings softened the Realists rhetorics against holding elections.
This in the event has opened Realists like me's eyes to another score-card
that hitherto was largely unmentioned.

Shortly, after Milosevic's crack-pot Dictatorship was given its final death
knell in the streets of Belgrade, history by a quirk turn of fates managed to
repeat itself in virtually the same fashion in Ivory Coast where another
crack-pot Dictatorship was laid to rest by street agitators who adamantly
demanded that the soldiers relinquish power they were trying to cheat the
people of. This had enormous effect in the way i viewed things and was to a
great extent responsible for me to soften towards the holding of elections.
Of course, i have never changed my mind that elections in the Gambia - as
things stand - can be never be free and fair. The effect of the softened
stance on this hardened position is the coagulation of a shrewd Machiavellian
positioning that views the elections not as capable of ejecting the
Dictaorship per se but as a mere catalyst to set in stage motions that will
inevitably expose the Dictatorship to hitherto unheard of and unanticipated
vulnerabilities - from which anything is possible.

Seen within this context, flawed as the whole electoral gearing might be, we
shouldn't throw our towels in - just yet. For if we agree on the largely
instinctual premise that the elections are going to be rigged anyway, then
this by itself is a weapon the Dictatorship hands over to us to whip up
emotion against it from both home and abroad. If Jammeh steals the election -
as i expect him to - then we have all the reason in the world to use such
unfortunate unfolding of things as a catalyst to bring the country to a
complete halt.  This is a valid reason for us to go along with the elections
flawed as they are.

Be all that as it may be, the only time boycotting elections far outweigh
than going ahead with it, then we must extricate ourselves immediately from
it. Here i must pause to look at the reasons spelt out so far by certain
members as to why we should boycott the elections. Central on the list cited
as reasons for boycotting the elections was the illegality of Roberts and
another commission member who were illegally appointed by Jammeh shortly
after he unconstitutionally fired Johnson et al. This, one hastens to add
does no longer command enough clout to have desired effect in the event that
is becomes the reason why the Opposition calls it a day. True, in the case of
the PDOIS, this is still  an honourable position to stake; legally, morally
and political defensible. But with the UDP and arguably the NRP, this is a
no-winner for the moral and legal backbone that had in the early days of the
crisis fortified their case has been decimated by their participation in the
by-elections administered by Roberts whose legality they are still contesting
in the courts. Suffice for me to say here that the participation of the UDP
and the NRP in these by-elections and their acceptance of the result(s) has
TACITLY legitimised Roberts. Even, with the PDOIS position, one can argue
that in practical terms, they are heading towards a cul-de-sac. It remains to
be seen what is practically achievable by their stance.

 The IEC issue by itself, is incapable of galvanising the momentum needed to
paralyse the system. Two things were responsible for this. First,  despite
the Opposition's noble spirit in crying foul over Jammeh's unilateral
wet-dream and challenging it in the courts, it was not relentlessly pursued
and the original position adopted was not consistently adhered to. My
understanding is that such international figures like Clare Short, Britain's
Development Secretary, was prepared to go that extra mile with Jammeh and
haul his butt in front on the Commonwealth's Ministerial Action Group where
things could implode to a tug-of-war  or war of words that could also
degenerate to levels where things can go out of control for Jammeh and expose
him to vulnerabilities. Sadly and regretably, the Opposition position was to
be weakened by inconsistency - bar the PDOIS - and relentlessness in all the
case of all the parties. Secondly, participating in the elections, as the UDP
and the NRP did, only made the IEC case to fizzle right in front of them -
morally, politically and legally.

Besides, i have a hunch that the IEC case lacks the energy needed to whip up
emotions that would it enable to capture the nations and the rest of the
world's imaginations and galvanise them into agitation. The IEC case was more
likely to capture the imagination of chattering class types obsessed with
ethics. So it was not possible for it to be that big a political grenade that
can act as a catalyst to bring the regime to its knees. In my opinion, the
only likely issue that i suspect to crop up that can capture both the
imaginations of the nation and the rest of world is the likelyhood of Darbo
et al's pending"murder" trial starts and climaxes in the midst of the run up
to the general election, which could be used to bar him from contesting the
elections. Now, this is a political grenade. This has the energy to engage
the imaginations of all Gambians - lettered and unlettered -  and the rest of
the world. It is capable of seizing an emotional attachment that has the
propensity of inciting people to go out in the streets and agitate for an end
to the barbarous philistinism of Jammeh. There and then, a boycott would be
productive to our long term interests.  Another issue that can give vent to
agitation frenzies is the re-registration of voters. As news reaching us keep
confirming, Jammeh through such proxies like Ablie Kujabi of the NIA, are
illegally registering refugees from Casamance and issuing Gambian ID cards to
them which in the event can qualify them for a voters card and hence eligible
to vote. Nothing new there. Similar ploys were utilised in the 1996
elections. How this becomes important depends largely how far we pursue it
and make it an issue soon as concrete evidence indicts the APRC machinery. It
would be an issue that will sell with our friends in the rest of the world
and the section of the Gambia electorate sophisticated enough to see through
the scam but unlikely to sell well with the ordinary voter who might not
comprehend the significance of all this. Other issues might also come up
unpredictably that also have the capacity to incite mass agitation.

In the very end, if the political calculation is to participate in elections
that are - strictly speaking - free and fair; devoid of illegal influencing
peddling of the outcome of such elections; a level playing field capable of
generating a conducive environ for  genuine votes to be casted without
rigging and any or other electoral malpractice, then i'm afraid we are gonna
have to extricate ourselves from the process. Because such a scenario is
never to chance in the Gambia as things stand. If on the other hand, we
cannily view these elections as a catalyst to a total breakdown of the
functioning of the system, then by all means let stick with the plans. For
elections by themselves CANNOT get rid of Jammeh. They can, however, provide
a catalyst that can render his whole aparatus chaotic and expose him to
vulnerabilities that hitherto he had managed so well to cope with. When push
comes to shove, Jammeh stands no chance against an agitated Gambian populace.
Mark you this is worst nightmare. The elections can provide these for us. It
is ultimately a tragic choice, when one calculates the sacrifices entailed. A
tragic choice that is ultimately a noble one. Historical antecedent and
instinctual premonition informs us that there is no credible alternative to
this in effectively dealing with the Dictatorship - as things stand.

Hamjatta Kanteh

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