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Subject:
From:
Ousainou Ngum <[log in to unmask]>
Reply To:
The Gambia and related-issues mailing list <[log in to unmask]>
Date:
Wed, 21 Nov 2001 19:58:16 -0800
Content-Type:
text/plain
Parts/Attachments:
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Dr. Saine:

    This is quite an informative piece. It has the potential to serve as a
blue print for the realization of The Gambia we all aspire. Splendid job. I
only hope the the gov't takes due notice, for The Gambia is truly at a
crossroads as you've aptly pointed out. Thanks again.

Ous Ngum
Columbus, OH


On Wed, 14 Nov 2001 17:57:08 -0500, [log in to unmask] wrote:

>  G-L Community:
>  
>  Here are the last two sections of the paper I promised to send earlier.
>  For those interested in the longer paper, feel free to contact me
>  privately.  As
>  usual comments and criticisms are welcome.
>  
>  
>  "The Gambia and the Political Economy of Globalization: Prescriptions
>  for a "New Order in the Twenty-First Century."
>  
>  
>  III.   The Gambia At a Crossroads: Prescriptions for the Twenty-first
>  Century.
>  
>  
>  At the dawn of the Twenty-first century, The Gambia and Gambians find
>  themselves in an unenviable position both politically and economically.
>  The Gambia is at a crossroads in which the choices are simple and
>  clear.  The Gambia and Gambians can continue to leave their affairs of
>  state and economy to be managed from the outside by international
>  financial institutions or go back to the drawing board to create a new
>  vision of relative economic prosperity and political stability.  The
>  inherited economic and political structures from earlier centuries were
>  not the making of Gambians and thus, cannot be expected to serve them
>  well.  It would be equally naïve to expect the IMF and the World Bank,
>  in spite of their rhetoric and ideology to serve the interests of
>  Gambians and Africans alike.  They were not created to serve that
>  purpose.
>  
>  Since World War II, the propagation of Western values and interests have
>  
>  been so much a part of development discourse.  The unwitting adoption of
>  
>  this ideology by many Third World leaders and policy makers must change,
>  
>  and change it must in The Gambia.   This is because aid and technical
>  assistance continue to be framed in ethnocentric narratives.  It is also
>  
>  clear that Western aid, technical assistance and altruism disregard
>  Third World philosophical and moral assumptions and assume that failed
>  development policies initiated and imposed by the West are in the end
>  better that what “developing countries” would have otherwise initiated.
>  The West has enjoyed this hegemonic power and takes it ideas and
>  strategies as the only viable response to domestic global
>  circumstances.  Many Western policy-makers have also ceased to consider
>  alternative strategies appropriate for countries like The Gambia.  This,
>  
>  Gambians must do for themselves.
>  
>  Thus, The Gambia and its people must reclaim the power that was long
>  surrendered to outsiders and use it confidently to determine what
>  development and political arrangements most suit their needs and
>  interests.  After all, The Gambia and its people have been “independent”
>  
>  for over thirty years and must now decided and graduate from having
>  others decide for them. Technical assistance and economic aid will have
>  lasting positive effects only when it complements a well thought out and
>  
>  articulated national policy.  It is in this context that Gambians from
>  all walks of life must dialogue about the future course of the country
>  and take “the road less traveled.” This is not to suggest, however, that
>  
>  Western interest is always cynical or self-serving or do not have a role
>  
>  to play.  Rather, what I am arguing is that The Gambia and Gambians must
>  
>  move away from the footless posturing as spectators to the proactive
>  role of participants in decisions that will shape the future of The
>  Gambia and its peoples.
>  
>  At the helm must be a creative leadership that is willing to experiment
>  and possibly fail before a desirable outcome is realized.   A leadership
>  
>  sophisticated enough to debate and be informed by the resulting
>  information.  This could result in freshly developed visions for The
>  Gambia.  Consequently, the skills, knowledge of all Gambian, but
>  especially Gambian intellectuals and students must be utilized. The art
>  of debate and critical thinking in particular, the deconstruction of
>  relations of power, control in the domestic and international systems
>  must be made clear and understandable to all.  Increased awareness based
>  
>  on critical analysis and assessment of global forces are important.
>  Without it, the road traveled could be treacherous. This requires a
>  political system premised on freedom of expression and academic freedom
>  to challenge held dogma.  Gambians must rebuild a democracy based on the
>  
>  long cherished principle of  “debate” as reflected in the “Bantaba”
>  (Mandinka) or “Datte” ( 'ollof).  Improved political and economic
>  systems that have at their core the provision of basic needs for all
>  Gambians and all who may reside within its borders must be given
>  priority.   It is this caliber of leadership that is most suited to
>  guiding The Gambia into the twenty-first century.
>  
>  International institutions and partners who can help achieve these goals
>  
>  would be welcome, but the policy-makers must critically analyze the aid
>  and technical services provided.  Aid must not be accepted just because
>  it is rendered, especially if it has potential of distorting national
>  goals and objectives.  More importantly, The Gambia must get off the
>  international welfare line and break the cycle of dependence on
>  handouts.  This “culture of dependence” stunts creativity and saps
>  national-self-reliance initiatives. Gambians are a proud and hardworking
>  
>  people who have been failed by their leaders and time has come when
>  their interests take priority.
>  
>  The new leadership’s first priority must be to reestablish fundamental
>  freedoms, rehabilitate the economy and once more provide opportunities
>  for self-improvement.  This must not be left to market forces alone.
>  While the latter has encouraged some important productivity gains, it is
>  
>  by no means clear that laissez-fair capitalism is the only, or the most
>  effective, way to provide for human security and democracy.  Moreover,
>  neoliberal strategies often minimize deliberate efforts to reduce
>  inequities that result from social and economic arrangements.  In fact,
>  neoliberal policies have often exacerbated rather than alleviated
>  suffering and pain of the poor (Scholte, 2000).  And unlike economic
>  policy of both republics, new government policy must be active in
>  rooting out gross inequalities.  If these important national priority
>  objectives are left to the forces of globalization alone, it would more
>  than likely serve the interests of the privileged and undermine the
>  position of the weak.
>  
>  A redirection of globalization away from neoliberal policies is
>  therefore desirable and notwithstanding the rhetoric, substantial
>  possibilities exist to develop policy tools and political support to
>  pursue alternatives to globalization.  The answer may lie in a dual and
>  somewhat paradoxical strategy that involves the expansion of democracy
>  and democratic norms to change the policy structures of international
>  agencies and fora while at the same time increasinging the scale of
>  production in order to institute self-management nationally and
>  locally.  Increasing the scale of production would entail among other
>  things, a shift toward more inward looking economic strategies, but also
>  
>  forming new economic relations of cooperation with Senegal and
>  neighboring states in the sub-region.  Powerful minds, people and
>  institutions must be changed and resources be committed to this
>  endeavor.  Approaches to globalization and restructuring could be
>  reoriented internally so as to give priority to the provision of health,
>  
>  food security, shelter, employment and human dignity.  Debt relief
>  monies could target these national goals.  The Gambia’s relatively small
>  
>  size, ethnic harmony, abundant human and natural resources are a good
>  basis upon which to build a solid foundation to achieving these national
>  
>  goals.  The democratic process must be enhanced to give voices to the
>  marginalized.  A new leadership must not only be committed to removing
>  the crippling vestiges of gender inequality, archaic cultural practice
>  and exploitation, but the government must be perceived to be active in
>  bringing about their end.
>  
>  The program of reform sketched out here represents a viable but by no
>  means the only alternative to neoliberalism and unchecked
>  globalization.   Yet, there are powerful advocates who support the
>  continuance of the status quo with fundamentalist fervor.  These vested
>  interests cannot be easily moved and it will take clarity of vision,
>  creativity and the goodwill of Gambians at home, the Diaspora and its
>  international supporters to see these reforms through.  Institutional
>  capacity is of the essence.  Today, unlike the immediate period after
>  independence, Gambian nationals are trained in all the professions and
>  have acquired and continue to acquire skills and sophistication to be
>  effectively utilized in this period of national reconstruction.
>  Inducements to these individuals to return home must be made attractive
>  by government.  But the political and other infrastructure must be put
>  in place to earn the confidence of this population.  Those that cannot
>  return immediately could share their knowledge as technical experts.
>  
>  Ultimately, the encouragement by government must be for Gambians abroad
>  to be more active in promoting development in the country of their
>  birth.  A thoughtful, stable and people-focused, domestic policy
>  framework for the twenty-first century, is the surest way of  attracting
>  
>  Gambians in the Diaspora to both invest hard earned financial capital
>  and skills.  This is one way for The Gambia to benefit from the process
>  of globalization.  To be sure, implementing an alternative development
>  strategy and vision for The Gambia could face major political obstacles
>  from groups in society, powerful states and global institutions that
>  have vested interests in keeping the status quo.  It will take skill,
>  confidence, not arrogance and honesty to sell this alternative strategy
>  and vision.
>  
>  IV Conclusion
>  
>  This paper sought to assess The Gambia’s prospects and limits for
>  development in an increasingly integrated world economy.  It addresses
>  the “new thinking” needed in The Gambia to arrest and reverse, the
>  country’s deepening poverty and “culture of dependence” on “development
>  partners,” the IMF and World
>  Bank.  It contends that the incorporation of the Senegambia region and
>  The Gambia, in particular, into the global capitalist economy of the
>  mid-1800s, must be the starting point of any serious analysis of the
>  country’s post-colonial political and economic challenges.  The paper
>  also contends, paradoxically, that The Gambia needs to position herself
>  to leverage the opportunities from  “globalization.”  For this to occur,
>  
>  however, a new leadership is required, a leadership that is both
>  assertive and creative to think “outside the box” of received dogma to
>  satisfy the basic needs of the Gambian populace.  This comes at a time
>  when The Gambia is going through major crises, and finds itself at a
>  crossroads between two stark choices.  The first choice is to continue
>  in its current development trajectory and harvest the same woes that
>  have
>  afflicted it since independence.  The second choice is to chart a new
>  course of development action that has at its core the needs and
>  interests of Gambians, and convince The Gambia’s true “development
>  partners” to support this new vision.  This is important, because the
>  current neoliberal rhetoric of open markets and a minimalist state
>  system often
>  reinforce existing suffering and pain for the most vulnerable in poor
>  countries.
>  
>  Additionally, the state must take an active role in social and economic
>  policy to ameliorate pre-existing and continuing vestiges of inequality
>  and exploitation.  Regrettably, neither the first republic under Jawara,
>  
>  nor the second under Jammeh, sought to overcome these problems despite
>  the promises of the “Gateway Project” and the rhetoric of “Vision
>  2020.”  These development schemes could never have had their intended
>  outcomes because of their unrealistic basic assumptions.  This is
>  because, the economic experience of most African countries since
>  independence has been rooted in their continued dependence on exporting
>  agricultural commodities or minerals whose prices have fluctuated
>  frequently on the world market (Khapoya, 1994).  This must be reversed
>  and gradually replaced with an inward looking strategy derived from
>  Gambian norms and culture.  Furthermore, an important reason why these
>  projects("Gateway" and "Vision 2020") have not succeeded, is because
>  their underlying assumptions are alien to the social and economic system
>  
>  they sought to improve (Saine, 1997).  The time has come for The Gambia
>  to be assertive about what it wants as opposed to being dictated to by
>  lending agencies that reduce her policy-makers to bystanders.  Also,
>  Western ethnocentrism as reflected in both the ideology and practice of
>  development aid must be countered by alternative and practicable visions
>  
>  of development. This is where new thinking is most needed and all
>  Gambians have an important role in this task.
>  
>  In this regard, it is crucial that a culture of open expression, debate,
>  
>  tolerance of different views and critical thinking be engendered to
>  overcome decades of intellectual dependence and unproductivity.  And to
>  encourage discussion and dialogue that aims at deconstructing power
>  relationships in the domestic and global political economy in order to
>  make them understandable to the populace.  Because these reforms are
>  bound to be opposed by domestic and international voices that have a
>  stake in their maintenance.  And because the reforms will require
>  sacrifices, the population’s support and understanding of underlying
>  goals would be crucial to success.
>  
>  Today, unlike any other time in its history, The Gambia stands at a fork
>  
>  on the road.  Gambians can take the easy way out or take “the road less
>  traveled.”  But unlike the years following independence, today Gambians
>  at home and abroad have amongst them well trained professionals who,
>  together with the new leadership, can begin to put in place reforms to
>  avert an impending disaster.  Government must, therefore, establish
>  programs to induce Gambians abroad to return home to share their varied
>  talents and to enable those that cannot relocate immediately to consult
>  and share their expertise in their chosen professions.
>  
>  The time is long gone to continue to think of The Gambia as a poor
>  country.  Size notwithstanding, the country is endowed with human,
>  water, marine and other resources that when wisely utilized can begin to
>  
>  turn around the tide of underdevelopment.  And unlike many countries in
>  the world, The Gambia is not riddled with bloody ethnic, religious,
>  racial and other tensions or severe social inequalities.  These serves
>  as a good foundation on which to build this new vision and strategy.
>  The Gambia’s location, and its water and marine resources unlike Chad’s
>  for instance, is a major boon for development.   And contrary to the
>  generally held view, there is no evidence to suggest that countries
>  better endowed on the continent are any better of socially and
>  economically.  In fact, in many of these countries in Africa and
>  elsewhere, abundant wealth has been the fuel for civil wars and ethnic
>  cleansing.  Additionally, there is little evidence to suggest a positive
>  
>  correlation between wealth and happiness, or between how much wealth one
>  
>  accumulates and personal happiness.  And as we enter this twenty-first
>  century, it is important to determine what is truly important both at
>  the personal and national levels.  For The Gambia, the answers could lie
>  
>  in sensible political, economic and social policies that build upon our
>  most cherished values, i.e., belief in God, love of family and progress
>  through hard work.
>  
>  Abdoulaye Saine
>  Department of Political Science
>  Miami University
>  Oxford, OH 45056
>  (513) 529-2489(O)
>  (513) 529-1707(fax)
>  
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