Hamjatta, another brilliant masterpiece. I had wanted to talk about the
boycott issue again, but was a bit reluctant to do so. I said here on
several occasions that electioneering is not my forte. But did not go
through the trouble of explaining to our most recent subscribers or to those
of us with short memories, why I do not like talking about elections.
Therefore, I am indebted to you for giving the background you gave about the
various 'camps' on this List. I am particularly grateful for the way you
highlighted Saul Khan's role. It is important for some to understand the
relationship me, you and Saul share. The battles we fought together in the
past and continue to fight to this day both on G_L and elsewhere. There are
other people firmly in that 'camp' too but there is no need to get into that
here.

Let me reassure you again that I still believe in using ALL MEANS NECESSARY
to get rid of Yaya. This belief is what lead us (me, you, Saul and others in
our camp) to butt in where elections proponents leave a vacuum (in our
humble opinion). We want to use ALL the weapons in our arsenal. As I said on
numerous occasions, I wished the only postings I react to were postings from
Ebou Colly and postings dealing with the massacre of our children. Period.
Posting talking about 'radical' ways of getting rid of tyranny in our
society. But with all due respect to our brothers and sisters on the other
'camp', they tend to be willing to take a lot of hits from Yaya and his
cronies without a fight. This is not a knock. Maybe I am just more quick
tempered. I tend to overreact to criticism from the APRC camp directed
towards the Opposition. Another thing is that I just cannot stand injustice.
When injustice is meted at Darboe (for instance), I would rather defend him
if I can than tell him to defend himself or ask someone else to defend him.
After the fight is over, we would all wish that it would have been better
for Darboe to defend himself or have UDP stalwarts defend him. The same
thing goes for the whole Opposition. I would rather elections proponents
talk about elections. Having said that, even if I promise not to talk about
certain issues, I just cannot keep quite in the face of certain injustices.

In that vein Hamjatta, I wished the elections proponents did not have to
receive this wise counsel from you. I wished they had this end game at the
forefront of their minds at this stage. Together with the illustrations you
gave in Yugoslavia and Ivory Coast, I will also add two more somewhat
analogous examples: Peru and Senegal. Both Fujimori and Abdou Diouf did not
retire because of old age and they were fed up with their jobs. They saw the
futility in clinging to power when their people were telling them that they
were no longer tolerable leaders. You were spot on when you stated that the
situation has to be 'ripe' before the elections weapon can be effectively
utilized. You touched on certain things that can and cannot energize the
people to stop Yaya from stealing the elections. There are other strategies
that are best discussed in private with the Opposition as soon as a
coalition is formed to contest the October elections. Hamjatta, I will go on
record and say that IF the Opposition Parties play their cards right, I have
NO DOUBT in my mind that Yaya will be gotten rid of in October. There is a
road map out there that can lead us to sure victory in October. The jury is
out on our leaders on the ground. Would they engage the Diaspora
effectively? Would they recognize the flaws of 1996/97 and avoid them this
time around?

I will touch on some of the issues you highlighted about this boycott
debate. I will first deal with the IEC 'problem'. Another reason that is not
a winner (for even PDOIS) is that, if we want to use that issue effectively,
we have to articulate a coherent argument with an end result that is popular
with the Gambian masses and can energize Gambians. What is the end result
here? For a court to declare Johnson's sacking unconstitutional and
reinstate Johnson? You see the problem in stacking out this position? Most
people care less whether Johnson is reinstated. He is also an APRC crony. I
counsel PDOIS and others to scrutinize properly why Johnson was sacked. This
was about Pap Cheyassin Secka's bruised ego. Johnson was not sacked because
of his radical views and his desire to do his job properly against the
wishes of the APRC. Yaya is a moron and does not understand what went on
between Johnson, Pap Cheyassin Secka, Parliament and the courts. PDOIS, UDP
and NRP should be smart enough to decipher that. From day one we have been
warning the Opposition to stay away from this political dynamite. DO NOT
FIGHT FOR JOHNSON. He is not on our side. I can hear people arguing that we
are not fighting for Johnson. We are fighting for the principle that Yaya
should not be allowed to act unconstitutionally. Granted. But should we
allow that principle to work for the benefit of our enemies and to the
detriment of the ordinary Gambian citizen?

Let us explore this further. Let us assume for a  moment that the courts
drag their feet and fail to rule on the Johnson case. A split Opposition
boycotts the election. Remember we still do not have a coalition. Where does
that leave the ordinary Gambian that is saddled with another five years of
Yaya's legitimized rule? How can PDOIS face its supporters and tell them
that they were fighting for a principle the net result of which benefits
APRC and their crony (Johnson)? In order for this issue to be a winner,
PDOIS has to give us tangible benefits this fight will bring to the people.
Is the same man (Johnson) that derailed the Local Government elections going
to do a good job in October? Is the same man that promulgated the
undemocratic rules in Sami going to ensure that the police stop the APRC
lawlessness during the presidential campaign, without curtailing the
Opposition's freedom of speech?

What guarantees do we even have that Johnson wants the job back? The man did
not even have the courage to protest his unlawful sacking. When he was first
approached for comment, he said that he would not talk because we were in a
religious/festive season. Since then, I have not heard a single comment from
the man that was critical of Yaya and the way Yaya unlawfully sacked him. Is
he fighting side by side with the Opposition on this case? If the courts
reinstate him, are there guarantees that Yaya and Joseph Joof cannot force
Johnson to tender his resignation and therefore render his unconstitutional
sacking moot? See the problems inherent in fighting for this man? We cannot
trust him. We can win him his case and he tenders his resignation or we can
win him his case and he goes in there and be even worse than Roberts. They
are all APRC cronies.

Now, if what the Opposition has a problem with, is the whole composition of
the IEC, that is another issue. But that issue is not on the table. We are
not suggesting that someone other than Johnson and Roberts be appointed as
head of the IEC. We are also not fighting particular rulings made by
Roberts. UDP fought Roberts on the issue of the site for the counting of
ballots in Kiang and Baddibu and Roberts retreated. It is issues like that
that could have been coupled with Roberts' unlawful appointment to make the
case that we will not tolerate Roberts under any circumstances. But as
things appear to me, Roberts and Johnson are made from the same cloth.
Roberts might have committed more fraud than Johnson, but basically we are
dealing with men that will not stand in Yaya's way if Yaya insists on
stealing the elections. We need a man in the caliber of Guie (election
commissioner) in Ivory Coast who would not declare false results even at
gun-point from Robert Guie (the Dictator). Johnson is not Guie. We have to
be smart about the principles we fight for. We have to look at the
opportunity cost to ordinary Gambians.

Hamjatta, as you mentioned, there is a way out of this cul-de-sac. The
Opposition should sit with the judge in this case, Joseph Joof, Johnson and
Roberts. Ask Johnson whether he really wants the job. I am almost certain he
will pass. Ask Joseph Joof to tell Yaya to revoke Johnson's dismissal letter
and Roberts appointment letter. Then ask Johnson to resign and backdate his
resignation letter. Ask Yaya to reappoint Roberts making the appointment
effective from the date Johnson's resignation took effect. After the
meeting, PDOIS gets what it wants. The legal niceties are taken care of.
Yaya also gets what he wants. He replaces one crony with another one. The
real fight then begins. Would we allow Roberts to help Yaya steal the
elections?

The scenario I stated above may appear sleek and machiavellian, but this is
exactly what is being sought from the courts. Think about it. What we are
asking the court to do, is to (1) declare that Johnson's sacking was
unconstitutional. We get this when Yaya revokes his termination letter sent
to Johnson. (2) we want Roberts removed. Yaya can simply revoke his letter
to Roberts. (3) we want Johnson reinstated. Here we have to be very careful.
The court cannot force Johnson to perform a job he does not want. This is
why it is important to ask Johnson whether he wants the job or not. If he
wants the job, the negotiations I stated above falls apart. But as I said,
all indications are that Johnson does not want the job. Even if he does, I
think he can be easily persuaded to resign the job in order to break a
deadlock at this early stage of the elections impasse. In short, we are
achieving through negotiations what we were going to achieve through
litigation. Is this end result worth boycotting the elections?

You also raised the issue about the re-registration of voters. Dynamite
issue. Just like the vote buying. Issue the Opposition should jump on right
away and stake out strong positions. Few days ago, I counseled them to take
Roberts on. Set the parameters NOW. Set up a mechanism to 'challenge' the
registration of ineligible voters. If that falls apart, pounce on the IEC
and the APRC. Don't wait until June after the deed is done and start crying
over spilt milk. Now is the time we draw a line in the sand. We would not
have legs to stand on later if we do not make our position clear from the
onset.

We are on the same wavelength about how the election weapon should be used.
Which is why we share the view that we need to form a coalition right away
and identify our next president. After that, we will get to work privately
and publicly to ensure that come October 2001 Gambians will NOT settle for
anything less than seeing that man in the State House. To me that is the
easy part. The difficult part is getting the coalition together. Once we do
that, removing Yaya in October will be a piece of cake. Think about it. What
does Yaya have going for him? He cannot talk about his record. He cannot
talk about his vision for the future. All he can do, is steal the elections.
As you rightly pointed out, our task is to ensure that Gambians do not
tolerate that stealing. One way we do that is by talking in a unified voice
and convincing Gambians that there is no way Yaya can win a free and fair
elections. We cannot do that if we have in our midst Opposition members that
rationalize the nonsense and mayhem Yaya is engaged in. For instance, we
will point to vote buying and they will point to APRC 'projects' or UDP
'weaknesses' to explain an election debacle. Let us not deal with the man.
Our leaders should never be seen talking to the vermin or shaking his hand.
Set the bar very high for Yaya. That way, people will not be impressed with
their token 'projects' or their selective application of the laws of the
land.

Hamjatta, I thank you again for sending this piece at this time. I hope the
Opposition learn from this and benefit from it in October. I hope people
read between the lines of some of the things we have said here. This is not
the forum to discuss certain elections strategies. In conclusion I would
just say that as far as the boycott is concerned, it is a timing issue for
me at this stage. Should we be talking about a boycott at this stage or
should we be busy setting the stage for a bigger showdown? Are the issues
ripe yet? Should we allow Johnson to deny us the opportunity of using the
elections (to the maximum) and any other means necessary in October to get
rid of Yaya?
KB



>From: Hamjatta Kanteh <[log in to unmask]>
>Reply-To: The Gambia and related-issues mailing list
><[log in to unmask]>
>To: [log in to unmask]
>Subject: Boycott the Elections?
>Date: Mon, 7 May 2001 19:37:33 EDT
>
>First we need to be clear of what is virtually a foregone conclusion about
>the elections - if they ever do take place. As sure as there is a calm
>after
>every storm, you can bet your last tuppence on the fact that the APRC would
>attempt to illegally influence the outcome of the elections. In short,  and
>as things currently stand, there can never be free and fair elections in
>the
>Gambia. That the elections would be illegally influenced - especially the
>process leading to the elections - is not so much an empirical thing but
>instinctual premonition based on past experiences of elections administered
>under the APRC and the psyche or calibre of the APRC leadership. First, a
>thumbnail sketch to briefly trace the historical perspective of the debates
>developed, the positions staked and generally how we arrived where we are
>today.
>
>Once upon a time, in the debates that had engulfed this List about the
>Gambia's political quagmire after the gruesome April incidents, out of the
>thicket that ensued, emerged what i shall tentatively call - without any
>undue attempts at dramatising - two main opposing view-point camps. The
>first
>of such was an idealistic one.  It looked forward to an election which will
>push the Dictatorship out of power. Convinced that the majority of the
>Gambian peoples were just too disgusted with the APRC and most certainly on
>the verge of giving them their final push whenever the general elections do
>that place. Of course this was pretty much based on instinctual
>calculation,
>mammoth optimism in the wisdom of a restless electorate that is fed up with
>Jammeh to vote en masse against the APRC, logical deductions and scant
>empiricism. It seems to me that  this is where the vast majority of members
>of this List belong. If they had other arguments to add to this, then it
>was
>just that international Diplomatic pressures from the international
>community
>and perhaps targeted economic sanctions against the Dictatorship should
>help
>in acting as catalysts to the beginning of the end of the peaceful
>termination of the Dictatorship.
>
>The second main opposing view-point camp that came out of the wood-work  we
>shall call the Realist camp - or what others euphemistically called the
>"Radical" camp. The Realist camp was virtually a minority opinion and found
>skilfull treatment and indeed sympathetic audience from the likes Brothers
>KB, Saul Khan and my humble self. True, most of the earlier consistency
>came
>from the proflicacy of KB's pen whilst Saul and i more or less played
>catch-up and or quibbled over some contentious issues like whether the
>elections stand a good chance of being free and fair. I take note that i
>was
>a late convert to this camp and had more to do with the Idealists than the
>camp i set up my tent now. Be that as it may, this camp was of the view
>that
>the way things are, elections will not bring normalcy back to the Gambia
>and
>on occasions didn't mince their words in calling for a
>by-all-means-necessary
>approach inorder to effectively rectify the political quagmire unilaterally
>imposed upon the Gambia by Jammeh. To a degree, the Realist group did share
>the Idealist camp's view that diplomatic pressures and or targeted economic
>sanctions could inflict mortal blows to the dictatorship. Aside from their
>desire to see the back of Jammeh, this is their meeting-point. Of course,
>everything isn't as clear-cut as i have attempted to portray here. If
>anything, there were complications in the definition of some shades of
>opinion which were the indifferences of cynics, waverers, smug fatalists
>and
>the club of the Doubting Abdous and Patehs.
>
>Since those clarifying periods of early 2000 when the students were
>murdered
>to late 2000 when seismic shifts, in form of political gerrymandering by
>the
>APRC and the Opposition's lack of a resolute agenda in responding to these
>amongst others, were beginning to change the political climate and in the
>early parts of 2001 when by quirk twists of fate two UDP seats were the
>subject of a by-election and the farce that eventually became of the
>process,
>a lot of water has passed under the bridge.  Most of the trenchant views of
>the Idealist camp's optimism that elections shall be the handmaiden of
>Jammeh's fall has virtually dissipated with the farce that has become of
>the
>by-elections and its concomitant effect of re-igniting the virtually doused
>flames of the APRC's optimism and renewed its hopes of electoral victory
>come
>October 2001. Indeed, whilst it was only written in codes, one can sense
>some
>despair in the Idealist camp and the bemoaning of the apparent renewal of
>the
>APRC's electoral fortunes. However, all these events have not dented much
>of
>the Realist camp's position. Granted most Realists have occassionally taken
>up the cudgel for some of the Opposition's position - especially where it
>gets it wrong in interpreting the machinations of the APRC. As an effect,
>these positionings softened the Realists rhetorics against holding
>elections.
>This in the event has opened Realists like me's eyes to another score-card
>that hitherto was largely unmentioned.
>
>Shortly, after Milosevic's crack-pot Dictatorship was given its final death
>knell in the streets of Belgrade, history by a quirk turn of fates managed
>to
>repeat itself in virtually the same fashion in Ivory Coast where another
>crack-pot Dictatorship was laid to rest by street agitators who adamantly
>demanded that the soldiers relinquish power they were trying to cheat the
>people of. This had enormous effect in the way i viewed things and was to a
>great extent responsible for me to soften towards the holding of elections.
>Of course, i have never changed my mind that elections in the Gambia - as
>things stand - can be never be free and fair. The effect of the softened
>stance on this hardened position is the coagulation of a shrewd
>Machiavellian
>positioning that views the elections not as capable of ejecting the
>Dictaorship per se but as a mere catalyst to set in stage motions that will
>inevitably expose the Dictatorship to hitherto unheard of and unanticipated
>vulnerabilities - from which anything is possible.
>
>Seen within this context, flawed as the whole electoral gearing might be,
>we
>shouldn't throw our towels in - just yet. For if we agree on the largely
>instinctual premise that the elections are going to be rigged anyway, then
>this by itself is a weapon the Dictatorship hands over to us to whip up
>emotion against it from both home and abroad. If Jammeh steals the election
>-
>as i expect him to - then we have all the reason in the world to use such
>unfortunate unfolding of things as a catalyst to bring the country to a
>complete halt.  This is a valid reason for us to go along with the
>elections
>flawed as they are.
>
>Be all that as it may be, the only time boycotting elections far outweigh
>than going ahead with it, then we must extricate ourselves immediately from
>it. Here i must pause to look at the reasons spelt out so far by certain
>members as to why we should boycott the elections. Central on the list
>cited
>as reasons for boycotting the elections was the illegality of Roberts and
>another commission member who were illegally appointed by Jammeh shortly
>after he unconstitutionally fired Johnson et al. This, one hastens to add
>does no longer command enough clout to have desired effect in the event
>that
>is becomes the reason why the Opposition calls it a day. True, in the case
>of
>the PDOIS, this is still  an honourable position to stake; legally, morally
>and political defensible. But with the UDP and arguably the NRP, this is a
>no-winner for the moral and legal backbone that had in the early days of
>the
>crisis fortified their case has been decimated by their participation in
>the
>by-elections administered by Roberts whose legality they are still
>contesting
>in the courts. Suffice for me to say here that the participation of the UDP
>and the NRP in these by-elections and their acceptance of the result(s) has
>TACITLY legitimised Roberts. Even, with the PDOIS position, one can argue
>that in practical terms, they are heading towards a cul-de-sac. It remains
>to
>be seen what is practically achievable by their stance.
>
>  The IEC issue by itself, is incapable of galvanising the momentum needed
>to
>paralyse the system. Two things were responsible for this. First,  despite
>the Opposition's noble spirit in crying foul over Jammeh's unilateral
>wet-dream and challenging it in the courts, it was not relentlessly pursued
>and the original position adopted was not consistently adhered to. My
>understanding is that such international figures like Clare Short,
>Britain's
>Development Secretary, was prepared to go that extra mile with Jammeh and
>haul his butt in front on the Commonwealth's Ministerial Action Group where
>things could implode to a tug-of-war  or war of words that could also
>degenerate to levels where things can go out of control for Jammeh and
>expose
>him to vulnerabilities. Sadly and regretably, the Opposition position was
>to
>be weakened by inconsistency - bar the PDOIS - and relentlessness in all
>the
>case of all the parties. Secondly, participating in the elections, as the
>UDP
>and the NRP did, only made the IEC case to fizzle right in front of them -
>morally, politically and legally.
>
>Besides, i have a hunch that the IEC case lacks the energy needed to whip
>up
>emotions that would it enable to capture the nations and the rest of the
>world's imaginations and galvanise them into agitation. The IEC case was
>more
>likely to capture the imagination of chattering class types obsessed with
>ethics. So it was not possible for it to be that big a political grenade
>that
>can act as a catalyst to bring the regime to its knees. In my opinion, the
>only likely issue that i suspect to crop up that can capture both the
>imaginations of the nation and the rest of world is the likelyhood of Darbo
>et al's pending"murder" trial starts and climaxes in the midst of the run
>up
>to the general election, which could be used to bar him from contesting the
>elections. Now, this is a political grenade. This has the energy to engage
>the imaginations of all Gambians - lettered and unlettered -  and the rest
>of
>the world. It is capable of seizing an emotional attachment that has the
>propensity of inciting people to go out in the streets and agitate for an
>end
>to the barbarous philistinism of Jammeh. There and then, a boycott would be
>productive to our long term interests.  Another issue that can give vent to
>agitation frenzies is the re-registration of voters. As news reaching us
>keep
>confirming, Jammeh through such proxies like Ablie Kujabi of the NIA, are
>illegally registering refugees from Casamance and issuing Gambian ID cards
>to
>them which in the event can qualify them for a voters card and hence
>eligible
>to vote. Nothing new there. Similar ploys were utilised in the 1996
>elections. How this becomes important depends largely how far we pursue it
>and make it an issue soon as concrete evidence indicts the APRC machinery.
>It
>would be an issue that will sell with our friends in the rest of the world
>and the section of the Gambia electorate sophisticated enough to see
>through
>the scam but unlikely to sell well with the ordinary voter who might not
>comprehend the significance of all this. Other issues might also come up
>unpredictably that also have the capacity to incite mass agitation.
>
>In the very end, if the political calculation is to participate in
>elections
>that are - strictly speaking - free and fair; devoid of illegal influencing
>peddling of the outcome of such elections; a level playing field capable of
>generating a conducive environ for  genuine votes to be casted without
>rigging and any or other electoral malpractice, then i'm afraid we are
>gonna
>have to extricate ourselves from the process. Because such a scenario is
>never to chance in the Gambia as things stand. If on the other hand, we
>cannily view these elections as a catalyst to a total breakdown of the
>functioning of the system, then by all means let stick with the plans. For
>elections by themselves CANNOT get rid of Jammeh. They can, however,
>provide
>a catalyst that can render his whole aparatus chaotic and expose him to
>vulnerabilities that hitherto he had managed so well to cope with. When
>push
>comes to shove, Jammeh stands no chance against an agitated Gambian
>populace.
>Mark you this is worst nightmare. The elections can provide these for us.
>It
>is ultimately a tragic choice, when one calculates the sacrifices entailed.
>A
>tragic choice that is ultimately a noble one. Historical antecedent and
>instinctual premonition informs us that there is no credible alternative to
>this in effectively dealing with the Dictatorship - as things stand.
>
>Hamjatta Kanteh
>
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