Tooma,
The opposition has another five years to put their house in order and I believe it will be a good step if they start acknowledging the failures you outlined in your article. Nevertheless, I think you seem to be harder on Halifa and Darboe but I it would be interesting to know what roles others like Waa Juwara and O.J played. Hassan Musa Camara also never stated his reason for leaving NADD.

Thanks for a brilliant piece and keep up the good work.

Momodou Camara


On 16 Feb 2007 at 15:15, Momodou S Sidibeh wrote:

> (Edited and corrected version)
> 
> ANALYSES 
> 
> In his reply to Dr. Abdoulaye Saine’s e-mail of April 2006 posted on
> Gambia-L on July 13th, Halifa Sallah presented what is perhaps the best
> document exposing the ideas behind the MoU. There certainly are many other
> materials one may need to peruse in other to broaden one’s perspective on
> issues such as sovereign equality, building an umbrella party, the five-year
> interim term, selection process of flag-bearer, and so on. Mr. Sallah’s own
> writings on these matters (representing the NADD position), speeches, and
> interviews are too numerous to name and quote, and certainly impossible at
> this point in time for me to attempt to research. So I had to discriminate
> intentionally between materials I will be quoting in reference to what NADD
> stood for as presented by Halifa Sallah. 
> That discrimination also must reflect the contentious issues which led to
> NADD’s breakdown. Let me be clear about this: NADD’s goal as spelled on
> Article 2 of the MoU is “…to put an end to self-perpetuating rule, ensure
> the empowerment of the people so that they can participate in sustainable
> development”. This goal, like most of NADD’s Strategic Objectives, can only
> be put in place through Constitutional amendments, such as the National
> Assembly could legislate. [In principle President Jammeh (since he is now
> mad, as most people seem to believe) could introduce a bill to amend the
> Constitution granting presidential term limits to two five-year terms only.
> In which case NADD would have to rewrite its goal]. Only two of NADD’s ten
> Strategic Objectives could fall into what may be termed as tactical
> objectives. These are in Article 3, Paragraph B, which deals with pulling
> NADD’s resources for the elections, and Paragraph C, which reads “…launch a
> five-year transitional programme in order to ensure an open democratic
> society based on the promotion of national unity, freedom, peace, prosperity
> and justice for all”. This is the only matter (the five-year transition)
> from NADD’s objectives that also came into contention (added to the obvious
> issue of leadership) while attempts at reunion were pursued.
> 
> Getting to the bottom of NADD’s breakdown, it will be most instructive if we
> study issues relating to the struggle for leadership inside the alliance. 
> 
> From his reply to Dr. Saine (NADD’S POSITION ON THE CALL FOR UNITY AMONG THE
> OPPOSITION), Halifa Sallah wrote:
> 
>  “…suffice it to say that if the task of the first  meeting of the leaders
> was restricted to the selection of a presidential and  vice presidential
> candidate from parties which had this or that percentage in  a previous
> election, we would not have signed a memorandum of understanding in
> unanimity despite the diversity of interests and idiosyncrasies of the
> leaders. What the leaders sought to do was to enhance ownership of NADD by
> all parties by advocating for the principle of sovereign equality of all
> parties.  It gave equal opportunity to all members to seek the mandate of
> the people on the basis of consensus or through the holding of primaries”.
> 
> Halifa Sallah continues:
> 
> “…It goes without saying that some of the critics have questioned why NADD
> was 
> created as an umbrella party. The answer is simple. Since no single party 
> could remove the present regime the combined efforts of the parties were
> deemed 
> necessary to achieve that aim. Most members of NADD acknowledged that if the
> 
> combine efforts of all were to promote the candidature of one party, all the
> 
> other parties will be marginalized during the period of promoting his or her
> 
> candidature”.
> Sovereign equality is a principle of international relations that
> establishes the equality of countries irrespective of their geographic size,
> economic or military might, or their level of social development. But the
> principle does not call for the surrender of individual sovereignty to a
> higher organ. The UN is the best known organisation founded on sovereign
> equality. Well, NADD’s effort here is first and foremost, to establish
> equality among its constituent members. It follows logically that if it is
> required to establish this kind of equality at the onset, then there must
> have been some presumptive element of inequality in the first place? What
> else would that element be if not their sizes? So the question of size had
> to be subdued from the onset so as to give “equal opportunity to all members
> to seek the mandate of the people on the basis of consensus or through the
> holding of primaries” and to eventually ensure that other parties are not
> marginalised if one party sought to promote its own candidature! Otherwise,
> there would have been no NADD! This must be true even if it is counter
> argued that sovereign equality was principally desirable in order to prevent
> posterior claims of organisational and political credit by one party.
> True, the combined efforts of the opposition parties were required if the
> dictator should be rid of through a transparent democratic process. It was
> therefore inferred desirably that since no one party could dislodge the
> dictatorship on its own, the credit for doing so must be shared equally by
> the collective. But should that mean that the parties are equal in size,
> influence, resources? Elsewhere this piece of fuzzy logic was extended to
> put under contention even the numerical strengths of the parties in
> question. 
> 
> Since all members are registered political parties vying for power through
> the mandate of the voters any arrangement they subsequent enter into must
> serve the interest of some or all of them. Obviously the only parties that
> risked marginalisation are the smaller parties, and so it is no accident
> that NADD split along those lines: the smaller parties on one side and the
> two larger ones on the other. 
> Ladies and gentlemen the first quotation of Halifa Sallah above juxtaposed
> with NADD’s goal gives rise to a key question: If the overriding goal of
> NADD is to put an end to self-perpetuating rule (a goal that can only be
> achieved by a NADD government), why should the very EXISTENCE of the
> alliance (signing of the MoU) be made contingent on the leaders’ compliance
> with the principle of sovereign equality? Why? Before venturing answers to
> this question allow me first to read more of Halifa Sallah:
> 
> “…At no time did any member put the issue of the percentage earned in
> previous elections as a bargaining chip to contest elections. At no time did
> any member call for a primary to determine candidature”.
> 
> “…It was envisaged that if each party surrenders its sovereignty to the 
> umbrella party for a transition period of five years all of them will retain
> their 
> original size and political weight and would be guaranteed a level ground
> for 
> contesting the next following elections. This is when the size of a 
> political party would matter”.
> 
> “…in short, before we agreed on the content of the MOU we set up a technical
> committee comprising the experts of all the political parties. Your party
> was represented by people of high intellectual calibre. Within the technical
> committee were former permanent secretaries and people with PhD”.
> 
> The last quotation here is from an article (NADD and UDP/NRP view on Unity)
> posted on Gambia-L on August 11.
> One plausible, logical answer to the above key question is that everyone
> accepted tacitly that leadership of NADD (because sovereign equality defined
> the process of leadership selection) was more important than everything
> else. An answer no one will ever agree with!
> Another plausible answer is the fear of marginalisation of smaller parties.
> Yet still a third plausible answer, linked to the second, is the desire to
> secure a guarantee that NADD’s Goals and Strategic Objectives will be
> pursued irrespective of whom is selected as flag-bearer. 
> 
> Before going any further let me assert that there was indeed a fear of
> marginalisation, as well as the suspicion that one party may assume a big
> brother role for its own sake and finally, fear that the Strategic
> Objectives could be derailed. These are genuine concerns I believe. This was
> the reason, among others, why theoretical arguments were developed, put in
> print in the MoU and sealed with signatures of all the five party leaders.
> So there must have been some degree of mistrust as Ousainou Darboe claimed? 
> But let me quickly say that as a matter of principle it was right that these
> fears were clearly spelled out, freely expressed, and consequently
> recognised. So Mr. Darboe’s claims of mistrust, unless referring to some
> factors other than those I mentioned, and unless debate on these matters
> were conducted surreptitiously, are without merit.
> On the other hand, why must the interests of the smaller parties be pushed
> so hard as to jeopardize the stability of the entire project? The larger
> parties also have interests of their own!
> 
> So our respectable coterie of intellectuals reason this way. Place all
> political parties on an equal footing from the beginning; the parties remain
> undissolved but they surrender sovereignty to the umbrella party; a leader
> gets selected from one of them; NADD governs for five years; during that
> period the individual parties (and their supporters) are all compelled to go
> underground (!), only to emerge at the end of the five years with their
> sizes and all, intact and constant like all the matter in the universe! I do
> not know about you, but I find this quiet baffling, and I doubt if it can
> indeed pass the laugh test anywhere. But this is serious business; and all
> this line of reasoning repeatedly churned out, like the proverbial party
> line, by no one other than Halifa Sallah of all people.
> 
> That our political leaders and well educated Gambians can sign a coalition
> document based on these premises seems incredible to me. This is about huge
> political power; not a UN kind of thing (where we had a fabulously correct
> Kofi Annan but who was in the main, quiet powerless!). Everyone knows that
> the majority of Gambians do not cast their votes on account of convictions
> on concrete issues, and so everyone must know that such a formula will be
> untenable as soon as a leader is selected from inside NADD. The outcome
> should be quite predictable. This ladies and gentlemen, is where they all
> failed us. Brothers Mo Baldeh, Buharry Gassama and others, all saw that
> happening. Why could Halifa Sallah and others not see it? For those
> interested, read my short piece from the archives:
> 
> http://listserv.icors.org/SCRIPTS/WA-ICORS.EXE?A2=ind0601&L=gambia-l&H=1&O=D
> &F=P&X=712F7E5BF4ED613618&Y=sidibeh%40adamomail.se&P=29966
> 
> They were all, without exception, beset with the idea of power. That a
> seasoned lawyer and others broke agreements they signed previously, that
> Hamat Bah disregarded basic principles of confidentiality in the midst of
> negotiations, that there were instances of mandinka nationalism here and
> there, are all largely effects of events; not their causes.
> Finally, here is my explanation of Ousainou Darboe’s behaviour:
> 
> I think he went into all of this hesitantly, suspicious of the intentions of
> the others, and possibly even feeling intimidated by Halifa Sallah’s
> involvement. [BTW NADD members or supporters (like myself) need to recognise
> that Halifa’s mere presence is intellectually intimidating for political
> adversaries. The sad and very unfortunate fact that some will campaign
> against his very person and put up a candidate just to secure his defeat is
> an instance of intense dislike.This must be gravely considered by those who
> value him so much]. After all the initial hiccups, and also realizing that
> the idea of a coalition is the best chance of ridding Gambia of the
> dictator, he agreed to join the coalition. I think Darboe realised the
> dangers inherent in the MoU and its articles on leadership selection and
> especially the interim five-year term. But he dismissed these as theoretical
> matters only, hoping to renegotiate the term limit eventually. He persuaded
> himself confidently that, when the chips are down, everyone else would come
> to their senses and recognise that he, and no one else, ought to be flag
> bearer on account of the size of the UDP.
> The nomination of O.J must have shocked him, realizing that going into
> primaries would be a mere formality, since unless there was internal
> rebellion within some parties, the village or ward representatives will
> simply vote on instigation from their leaders. With equal representation, he
> could not possibly win, with PDOIS, PPP, and NDAM votes stacked against his
> chances. Also, it is possible that Waa Juwara was not particularly kind to
> him during their numerous EC meetings, given their history of personal
> discord. He felt badly hoodwinked by the whole process. So he withdrew as
> gracefully (!) as he possibly could, and time stood still.
> As a lawyer of vast experience, what could he say? Having signed the MoU
> willingly, he could not possibly admit that he was tricked into doing it. It
> would be exceedingly humiliating. A Mandinka proverb calls it “tying
> someone’s hands to a tree”. So his followers, all over the place (including
> Gambia-L) remained speechless despite Joe Sambou and others pummelling them
> about their lawyer-leader breaking the rules of engagement! They will remain
> defenceless on that score forever. Should we accept Mr. Darboe’s behaviour
> even if we understand it? Not at all.
> All this has been a liberal interpretation of NADD’s breakdown. 
> 
> CONCLUSION
> 
> A progressive interpretation of what happened needs to be even more
> rigorous. Reading through most of what Halifa Sallah, i.e NADD wrote on
> different issues relating both to the founding of the coalition and
> subsequent attempts at reunification, one cannot escape the impression that
> there was a clear discrepancy between language and the existing political
> reality. It is as if the nature of NADD was to be found not in its agenda
> but in the language it deployed to define itself. Even though some of the
> democratic questions it resolved to address were perhaps radical in content,
> NADD itself is far from being a radical organisation. Its basic principles
> were built on the premises to organise and agitate for reforms within the
> existing political context. Progressives inside NADD (members of PDOIS and
> NDAM, to be hopeful) needed to recognise the petit-bourgeois identity of the
> UDP leadership and engage with them on that basis. Sprouting from the
> vacuous remnants of the older PPP, GPP, and the NCP, it contained, not only
> Gambia’s largest waramba community of Friday muslims, but also the party
> with the broadest mass base in the entire opposition. There was hardly any
> reason to doubt that the UDP was and is still interested in democratic
> reforms. The key question is whether it could mobilise at will the capacity
> implement these reforms.
> There were present in NADD all the ingredients for a democratic revolution
> (a common minimum program, and an alliance of all forces bent on bringing to
> an end the excesses of a truly oppressive state) with one exception: a
> strong and well-structured mass organisation. 
> What then should progressives do in such a situation?
> 
> They needed first to establish a common trench with all democratic forces
> and concretise the minimum programme. There should have been no issue
> whatsoever about the UDP providing a flag bearer. On the other hand
> negotiations needed to be centred on the composition of a NADD government.
> With progressives in government, the possibilities of bringing about truly
> democratic reforms would have been immeasurably enhanced. With a
> theoretically equipped vanguard, student unions could be activated out of
> social indifference, and the trade unions pulled out of their bureaucratic
> slumber. Government could look into taking control of the peanut trade to
> free our peasants from the caprices of unserious businessmen, and quickly
> enforce mandatory testing of HIV/AIDS. (Recall what Thomas Sankara did in
> Burkina Faso about polio during his very short time)! As we say, the
> possibilities would have been almost endless. 
> 
> But what do we have left? A Titanic with a witch-doctor as captain, with the
> NADD MoU tossed overboard long ago as flotsam and jetsam.
> 
> Many, many thanks
> 
> © Momodou S Sidibeh
> P.S
> I am exhausted and disillusioned by it all. So please if I am unable to
> answer questions or argue again take it not as discourtesy from my part. I
> am all too aware that I might have made mistakes here and there. Just
> correct me, in that case. This is OUR history, and I am no trained
> historian.I have simply tried to respond as best as I could to brother Omar
> Joof's wise counsel that we should all think on our own, and also to Joe
> Sambou's encouragement that my opinion may have some value after all.
> Thank you.
> 
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