Halifa,

The way i see it, the central plank in PDOIS' Economic Programme is an urgent
sense of renewal. It is a renewal of the type you have never seen wholly
implemented in the Gambia before - even if in practice, it rhymes with some
key elements of the PPP's economic edifice or strategy, especially as it
relates to agriculture. I hasten to add that the PPP i speak of is the PPP in
its formative and idealist years, especially in the early days of its
existence when it was quite rightly labelled as 'mildly socialist'. The
rhyming is more of a tacit structural and consequential resonance than, say,
approach and outlook or tactical and philosophical emphasis. Perhaps, i ought
to add further that the rhyming is more of an unwitting semblance than
wittingly piggy-banking from the old and repudiated agricultural economics of
the 'mildly socialist' PPP. It is worth a precious moment's pause to explain
this supposition.

The point here is not so much the similarities - in both design or intent -
between the 'mildly socialist' PPP's old and repudiated agricultural
economics and the central plank of the PDOIS' Economic Programme. Far from
it. The point, though, is that by its prognosis and diagnosis and placing so
much emphasis on an 'informal' farming-led resuscitation of the dillapidated
Gambian economy, the PDOIS Economic Programme would fall in the same
consequential and structural trap that eventually befell the PPP. How do we
know this? When the PPP completely took over the reins of the country, they
inherited more or less a very rusticated economy; some 85-90% of the Gambian
economy was rural and the population dispersal pretty much matched this. To
the extent that this is correct, the PPP naturally embarked upon something we
might as well call rural economics in order to effectively respond to this
reality. The result of this rural economics was to collectivise through
"cooperative" societies - then very much in vogue and not yet repudiated -
with government as a default inter-market for all agricultural yields. Thus
the emergence of such publicly financed bogey-corporations and marketing
oultets like GPMB, Gambia Cooperative Union, etc, etc. We all know the
fateful histories of these bogey-corporations. However, contrary to popular
myth, GPMB and Cooperative didn't fail  simply because of endemic corruption.
Admittedly, endemic corruption was what eventually break the camel's back in
these bogey-corporations. The problem lied mainly in how they were structured
and this primarily was telling in their ultimate consequences. The much
highlighted endemic corruption was as a result of these very structures and
the pork-barrel politics that sustained the corruption and corrupt officials.
And understandably so. If corporations are structured in such an economically
inefficient way - as GPMB et al were - corruption is inevitable. Worse, when
the structures assume monopolist traits and form a sybiotic relationship with
the mercantilist State, the choice of producers vis-a-vis the marketing of
their produce is drastically limited - especially if it is politically
sanctioned monopoly.

 However, the biggest indictment against such public corporation bogeys like
GPMB is how they crowd-out much needed investments that agriculture and these
corporations need very badly, especially when the gov't has other priorities
or as circumstances keep changing. The result is subsidised inefficient,
corrupt and unprofitable public corporations feeding from the troughs of
never-ending tax-payer led rescue packages. Until, of course, the gov't -
largely because of its skyrocketing external debt - is literally forced to
stop the subsidies and privatise. Never has solved the problem; because in
any event, all these privatisations are ill-thought out and never factor the
structural and consequential problems that have always dogged politically
sanctioned corporations. To be sure, PDOIS' Economic Programme doesn't
resemble an exact replica of this caricature. However, as i pointed out
earlier, the point is how the PDOIS programme unwittingly tinkers with the
very structures that the PPP initiated some three decades ago and - despite
the altruism and dedication we can always expect from a PDOIS led gov't - how
as an economic consequence, the PDOIS programme is also prone to a similar
economic fate as the PPP.

Let us closely examine the evidence before us. This is how you, Halifa
Sallah, described the synopsis of the PDOIS' Economic Programme:

"Today, the country has no public sector or
private sector led growth. Only 11% of the work forces are employed by
government, parastatals and private sector. This is why we say that we need
a productive public sector to generate income rather than rely entirely on
taxation. We maintain that the private sector should be productive according
its capacity. We argue that since 57% of the work force rely on agriculture
the informal sector holds the key to the national economy. *In our view, if a
company can rely on 1000 acres of land to make millions in producing fruits
vegetables we can organise a cooperative system where those engaged in
horticulture can be provided with bore holes to produce and share their
income as well as to contribute to the provision of services to their
villages. We therefore stand for the building of co-operatives to enhance
personal income and promote community development.* This is one way of
developing the informal sector."

Needless to say that such weasel- words as "cooperatives" are nothing but
State contrived collectivisation at the expense individual enterprise and
initiatives. Don't get me wrong. Free market liberals might be reluctant to
use the weasel-word "cooperatives" but they see nothing wrong with voluntary
and spontaneous civil cooperation or association between individuals in a
market place or social entity. Liberals only object when the association or
cooperation is State/gov't contrived as opposed to being a spontaneous and
voluntary civil association between individuals. Lets now closely examine the
above passage i just quoted from you. If this passage is not an exact replica
of what the PPP had in place before the privatisation zealotry of the late
1980s, then by God its wording is eerily close. Let me first make an ethical
point and all good things shall follow. Good, avuncular or benevolent
intentions by themselves alone don't make good business entities or lift the
poor out of poverty. If the normative and economic dispositions of an entity
does not square with its structural and consequential dispositions, no amount
of avuncular benevolence can save the day. This ethical point is precisely
what will eventually handicap a PDOIS led gov't as it did the PPP and most
certainly the meeting point of the two very different political parties with
two totally different agendas.

Another fundamental flaw of the PDOIS Economic Programme is one of
supposition. Because the Gambia's current provincial or rural populace is
larger than that of its urban one and because agriculture still employs far
more than any other sector of the Gambian economy, PDOIS supposes that in
lieu of this, its economic programme should be primordially be representative
of this. In short, PDOIS' Economic Programme was formulated as if the Gambia
is ruralising or the rural populace is growing or static. The reality,
however, is that the Gambia has a rural populace that is increasingly
dwindling and urbanising at a very fast rate. Maybe as a transitionary phase,
making rural economics the centre piece of your economic programme is mooted.
Yet, as a long-term strategy, there is no doubt that it will inevitably head
for the rocks. To make the point clearer, let us examine how the Gambia's
demographic disposition has been developing. According to the UN's World
Development Indicators 2000, the Gambia's demographic disposition from
1980-1998 looked like this:

Urban Population:
20% in 1980
31% in 1998

Rural Population:
80% in 1980
69% in 1998

The evidence exhibited above, shows a country that is exponentially
urbanising. That is not the end of the matter. In a recent conversation with
a development economist, this gentleman told me that by his estimation - and
indeed that of most of his colleagues - more than half of sub Saharan
Africa's population would by 2015 be urbanised. This is a very conservative
estimation; it could well turn out to be more than that. My hunch is that
given the exponential rate of the urbanisation, it would not be far-fetched
to suggest something like 65% of the population being urbanised by 2020. The
estimation well within reason. Herein, the evidence is that the Gambia is on
the threshold of urbanisation and not ruralisation - as the PDOIS' Economic
Programme tacitly seemed to suppose and responding to. Since PDOIS' Economic
Programme has not factored this development, it is understandable why the
central plank of its economic policy is not reflective of these changes.
Rather, it chose to centrally focus on what couldn't possibly - in the long
run - be the main engine of the Gambian economy: rural economics.

Economic orthodoxy suggests that the logical concomitant of urbanisation is
industrialisationcommercialisation on a scale befitting a nation on the
threshold of urbanisation. What does PDOIS' Economic Programme has to say
about industrial and commercial policy? I'm all ears. Certainly, it would be
very fair to surmise here that industrialisation and commercialisation - the
key to resuscitating an increasingly urbanised country - remain low-key, if
not totally mute, in the top priorities of the PDOIS' Economic Programme. If
all PDOIS can come up with to manage an economy - that has an increasingly
urbanised populace - is to believe in "cooperatives to enhance personal
income and promote community development", PDOIS might as well believe in
squaring round holes.

In my opinion, agriculture in the Gambia is not becoming a less attractive
vocation because farmers are not producing enough. Indeed, the evidence is
that agricultural productivity has been registering some useful gains - even
if we are obliged to call it modest gains. That productivity, i hasten to
add, doesn't corrode the fact that with the right environment and motivation,
productivity would definitely be more than what it currently is. And whatever
it takes to increase productivity, we should strive to that end. No, the
crucial problem here is not lack of productivity. The problem is, however,
one of chronic structural and marketing impediments that stymie the
potentials of farmers to earn more to expand their productive bases.

The first thing a liberal gov't ought to do herein is to adopt a
multi-pronged approach to the deal with the agricultural problem. The first
of such would be a major assessment of the impediments that shackle not only
the marketability of the country's agricultural yields but what structures
ought to be in place in order to plan ultimately the liberalisation of
marketing the country's agricultural yields. This assessment would be gov't,
farmers and interested private investor led. Whilst this assessment is in
place or taking its course, the liberal gov't ought to, as an interim
measure, take over direct responsibility of the marketing of agricultural
yields with the view that as the agricultural environment ripens for market
liberalisation, the gov't will totally relinquish such a role and take more
or less backstage role in agricultural marketing. There is absolutely no need
to create another publicly financed bogey corporation like GPMB or
Cooperative Union to make this transition work. Because of its temporary
nature, a Competition Commission can simply, as an interim measure, assume
full responsibility for such a task. When the time is ripe to liberalise the
marketing of agricultural yields, the Competition Commission can be given a
new lease on life by being mandated with the task of regulating the free
market that assume its former role. Under these arrangements, the Competition
Commission would be decoupled completely from the gov't and would eventually
assume the role of an independent regulator of business; with the clout of an
heavy-weight public body ready to impartially take on any entity that
undermines competitive capitalism. The Competition Commission would be
empowered with anti-trust laws to ensure that no one corporation or
individual investor can wilfully or deliberately frustrate the 'spontaneous
order' of the free market.

Finally, and in lieu of the aforesaid, the State's or gov't's gradual retreat
from the direct marketing of agricultural produce would definitely mean
delineating a new role for it. Liberalisation doesn't mean the State or gov't
is left impotent with nothing to do. Gov't's role would primarily be an
informed, cautious and empirically determined subsidisation of agricultural
inputs and infrastructures; and facilitating a conducive environment for
agriculture to create a middle income rural economy. Most importantly, gov't
would ensure that the Rule of Law is respected by all parties and the lines
between the private and public sphere in agriculture are clearly demarcated.
Where it would not fatally damage free trade and competition, the gov't can
invest in rural structures that are crucial for the sustenance of modern
agriculture. Hereupon, gov't shall ultimately retain primacy in all policy
areas associated with agriculture - even if it entails consulting all
participants in agriculture. In the very end, the new powers conferred on the
State/gov't would be limited to the extent to which it can be an efficient
enabler and facilitator in agriculture without becoming directly involved
with its daily nitty gritties or raking its grubby hands in the marketing of
agricultural produce.

This, in my humble opinion, is how a liberal gov't can help help Gambian
farmers become middle income earners and make rural life attractive again to
dissuade the rural-urban migration.

I hope you had a successful party convention/conference. Looking forward to
hearing from you.

All the best,

Hamjatta Kanteh

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