On the face of it, all serious and genuine members of the opposition to the tyranny back home ought to rejoice at the message sent by the people of Sami to the Dictatorship. Or ought we so? As ever, I remain an unreconstructed sceptic. I believe the Sami election results should be taken with a pinch of salt. Here is why….

I have a conspiracy theory. Supposing, the relaxation of APRC thuggery, intimidation and indeed, the easy manner in which the opposition rode to victory – remember no major outbreak of political intimidation or thuggery has been reported in the local media, enough to arguably conclude that at any rate the election, and in lieu of the current antagonistic political atmosphere, was relatively less intimidating than we have come to expect from elections administered under the APRC appendage, the IEC – is after all some red-herring? Let me be more explicit: Couldn’t it be the case that to cast away doubts about the fairness of the electoral process and most crucially, the integrity of the IEC, a conspiracy is concocted such that the will of the people is allowed to be expressed relatively unhindered in a not-so-important election like Sami? The opposition is allowed a rather smooth sailing to victory and everyone is suckered into believing that the IEC has muscle and integrity after all; that the IEC is not another appendage of the incumbent APRC and that the APRC would respect any verdict reached by the electorate and administered by the IEC. So complacently and with our guards lowered, we go along with such myths until like a thunderbolt from the blue the IEC shows its true colours in the election that matters the most – the 2001 presidential and general elections. The opposition and else cry foul but hey weren’t they suckered into the scam that elections administered by the IEC are free and fair? After all Sami demonstrated that much. Why was the opposition willing to accept results like Sami but ready to cry foul soon as they lost an election? The APRC didn’t cry foul when it lost Sami, it accepted the results in good faith. So if the 2001 votes were fouled up, it would be hard for the opposition to make a case since they have accepted the integrity of the IEC to arbitrate fairly and have from that very arbitration won an election. So why can’t the opposition accept defeat in good faith as the APRC did in Sami? With such a case, the APRC will have a point: If from the very outset, you agree on the ground rules, then surely, you should accept whatever results ensue from such and not pillory the ground rules because they suddenly don’t favour you. Al Gore found himself similar morass. During the final days of the campaign, he was asked whether he would abide by the verdicts of the Electoral College flawed as they are on the face of it, and he affirmed his commitment to system as it is – confident of victory. Yet, when it was becoming clear that the electoral colleges would hand over the presidency to Bush inspite of Gore winning the popular vote, suddenly his Liberal friends in the media and even insiders within the Gore camp – albeit subtly - are questioning a system that favours a ridiculous devise like the electoral college over the popular vote. But can Gore publicly back away from his pre-election position on the American electoral colleges when he was willing to abide by whatever results it produces? You now with me? A similar situation could crop up come 2001 and the opposition will find it hard to sell their story as will happen to Gore if he goes public with his misgivings. Then it begins to dawn on us all that Sami was after all a red herring.

Two past experiences in 1995 and 1996 are enough to give this theory muscle to stand up to reason. Let me be more illustrative. When the erstwhile AFPRC instituted the National Consultative Committee [NCC] to review its controversial timetable to civilian democratic rule, it painted them in a very favourable light; soldiers with a difference if you like – the idea began to permeate amongst sceptics that after all these guys are genuine and well-meaning in their pledges to return the country back to civilian democratic rule. Most surprising of all, however, was how the AFPRC accepted virtually all of the NCC’s recommendations that really were a very radical dilution of the AFPRC’s timetable and programmes. From there things could only get better for the AFPRC. Crucially, it swung public opinion on their side and some certain self-appointed public intellectuals began shamelessly supplying feelers and intellectual muscle to what has become known as the Gambia’s own transition. As it turned out, what on the on face of it was a rolling back of the AFPRC’s political ambitions and legitimisation of genuine democratic reforms turned out to be a red-herring. Gambians and crucially many so-called public intellectuals were suckered into a flawed process that had only one purpose from the outset: legitimising the AFPRC in the sights of the international community. With historical hindsight, we can claim, without distorting the facts, that the concessions made by the AFPRC on their timetable were largely a stunt to weather public and international opinion to work for them as they battle to insidiously work at hoodwinking the Gambian public on the transition process. There is no doubt that in the very end Gambians were the losers and the AFPRC the winners as they legitimised themselves in the freak elections of 26 September 1996. Arguably, and with hindsight, the concessions made by the AFPRC on their timetable and programmes were nothing but a red-herring.

Similarly, but far more illustrative and important was the role of the Provisional Independent Electoral Commission [PIEC] in the 1996 elections. In his inaugural speech at the party’s maiden meeting at Fitzgerald Street, the UDP leader, Mr. Ousainou Dabo, waxed indignant and eloquent on the excesses of the AFPRC from the murder of Koro Ceesay to the 11th November 1994 so-called coup attempt by Lt. Barrow in which many innocent soldiers lost their lives under very despicable circumstances. In reaction to the aforementioned, the APRC lodged formal complaints with the PIEC about the inflammatory "allegations" inherent in the UDP leader’s speech and how it contravenes the electoral codes of conduct. As it happened, the PIEC ruled in favour of the UDP: That Dabo’s maiden speech was neither inflammatory nor does it contravene the electoral codes of conduct. This was hailed as signs of the PIEC’s independence. Subsequently, Dabo made another address this time on TV taking the onslaught further than the Fitzgerald Street one. Soon after this address, the APRC leader, Jammeh, in an interview with GRTS, said if the opposition calls all AFPRC projects as waste, then they shouldn’t use the TV to send their messages across. From there, the sluice gate of executive heavy-handedness on curtailing opposition activism came into being. The UDP and the NRP [who were not shy in their critiques of the AFPRC record] were banned from using the public media. Things rapidly began to deteriorate rapidly as the playing field became more rugged and increasingly favouring the APRC. And so how did the PIEC respond to these new developments? As it happened, the PIEC, for the first time showed its real character: a muscle-less appendage of the military administration. The PIEC, literally did nothing stop this deterioration of the playing field. The UDP and the NRP were never allowed back on public media until the general elections of January 1997 by then the damage was already done. It was clear right from then that the PIEC would not intervene on issues that are inherently inimical to the interest of the AFPRC/APRC, but where the issues were either minuscule or trivially anecdotal, the PIEC would seemingly look to be independent or having integrity. Soon after the presidential elections, the UDP, during a press conference, said the PIEC was not independent and muscle-less hence the invalidity of the presidential elections. This was greeted with loud outcries from Cheyassin Secka [on behalf of the APRC] and the columns of FOROYAA. Indeed, they excoriated the UDP for double standards and for being outright ridiculous about their claims. Wasn’t it the case that UDP was happy to go along with the PIEC arrangements so long as it ruled in their favour? Didn’t the PIEC rule in favour of the UDP when the APRC lodged an official complaint? Why didn’t the PIEC’s independence and impartiality become an issue way back then? Should it become an issue now only because the UDP has lost the elections and very convenient to lay blames on the arbitrator’s door steps? Shouldn’t the UDP accept results of an election whose ground rules they tacitly acknowledged as level and equipped enough to reflect the will of people? In typical FOROYAA condescending mocking tones - you will largely expect from a gov’t paper having a go at the opposition – the over-wrought editors of that paper concluded they were happy to be an outlet for the UDP to vent out their frustrations. Explicitly, stating here that it is the UDP that is frustrated with the PIEC and enough of a conclusion that they are comfortable with the PIEC’s perceived independence and integrity. Of course, critics of the UDP have a point about the UDP’s sudden distrust of the PIEC. That, however, doesn’t make the UDP claims baseless. The UDP were very right that the lack thereof of any arbitration on the part of the PIEC when they [the UDP] were thrown off the public media by another PLAYER [the APRC] renders the elections invalid. The UDP were if anything blinded by their haste to get on with it to the effect that they didn’t forensically scrutinise the PIEC. Take the head of the PIEC – Mr Gabriel Roberts. Roberts publicly made it known that he does sympathise with the AFPRC cause in his revelatory Gambia College speech. So it is not surprising that any obnoxious commission set up these days can only feature Roberts. Not only that, the members of the PIEC were hand picked by Jammeh himself and the rules laid down by Jammeh. You can bet your last dime on the fact that Jammeh vetted these members for allegiances and sympathies and whatever rules govern their conduct would not contradict the ambitions of the AFPRC. Effectively, casting clouds of doubt on the PIEC’s composition and their impartiality or independence of its membership.

The lesson of that period is simple: The PIEC ruling on the UDP leader’s Fitzgerald Street speech was not a sign of it’s impartiality or independence. Rather a red herring to plant complacency in the minds of the opposition to rest on their laurels and most importantly to act as future reference of the PIEC’s independence and impartiality. Similarly, the Sami elections might eerily come to be the same red herring. This is why it is crucial we take results with a pinch of salt. There is a sense of déjà vu in which it could become the reference point of the IEC and apologists [open or closet] of Jammeh, as signs of the IEC’s independence and impartiality.

Our dose of cynicism should also extend to the obnoxious ground rules of the Sami elections. The rules might in fact be a good means of damage limitation in that if all candidates are independents campaigning independently of any political party structure, then the winner and losers would not be assigned officially to any party political grouping even though their allegiances are public knowledge. What better way to redress the wounds of the APRC’s loss? It is interesting that I read from The Point online that our Socialist comrades in the PDOIS were suckered into this bait - hook, sinker and line. I’m not surprised the least. If there are any incorrigible suckers around this end for IEC scams, they always outshine else. Equally, we must question whether it is simply a matter of coincidence that whilst it attempts to play the generous democrat in Sami, the APRC is making further illegal attempts to soil a tailored constitution like the 1997 by pretending to amend its flaws?

It would be remiss of me to end this without highlighting the positive factors in the Sami elections, which are primarily two:

  1. At any rate, Sami has proven the point that under free and fair elections, Jammeh would be history sooner than anyone realises.
  2. As of now, I have yet to see or hear of the official figures in the Sami elections. But I think tentatively, one can conclude without any fear of exaggeration that public and voter disgust with Jammeh runs really deep. One must recall that the constituency of Sami is/was an APRC safe seat in both the presidential and general election. The fact that it had fallen to the opposition surely must suffice for us reach conclusions that electorally, the APRC do not stand a second chance come the next presidential and general elections of 2001.

I’m glad I ended this on a very high note of optimism and not on pessimism/cynicism many ascribe to me. I’m taking some 6 months off from active engagement on the List – things are really piling on my plate. I hope to be a Peeping Tom once in a while for I have an unquenchable curiosity especially on the future of the Gambia. Offline we are committed to the struggle and would contribute wherever the chance presents itself. Wishing everyone well from this end.

Hamjatta - Kanteh

On the face of it, all serious and genuine members of the opposition to the tyranny back home ought to rejoice at the message sent by the people of Sami to the Dictatorship. Or ought we so? As ever, I remain an unreconstructed sceptic. I believe the Sami election results should be taken with a pinch of salt. Here is why….

I have a conspiracy theory. Supposing, the relaxation of APRC thuggery, intimidation and indeed, the easy manner in which the opposition rode to victory – remember no major outbreak of political intimidation or thuggery has been reported in the local media, enough to arguably conclude that at any rate the election, and in lieu of the current antagonistic political atmosphere, was relatively less intimidating than we have come to expect from elections administered under the APRC appendage, the IEC – is after all some red-herring? Let me be more explicit: Couldn’t it be the case that to cast away doubts about the fairness of the electoral process and most crucially, the integrity of the IEC, a conspiracy is concocted such that the will of the people is allowed to be expressed relatively unhindered in a not-so-important election like Sami? The opposition is allowed a rather smooth sailing to victory and everyone is suckered into believing that the IEC has muscle and integrity after all; that the IEC is not another appendage of the incumbent APRC and that the APRC would respect any verdict reached by the electorate and administered by the IEC. So complacently and with our guards lowered, we go along with such myths until like a thunderbolt from the blue the IEC shows its true colours in the election that matters the most – the 2001 presidential and general elections. The opposition and else cry foul but hey weren’t they suckered into the scam that elections administered by the IEC are free and fair? After all Sami demonstrated that much. Why was the opposition willing to accept results like Sami but ready to cry foul soon as they lost an election? The APRC didn’t cry foul when it lost Sami, it accepted the results in good faith. So if the 2001 votes were fouled up, it would be hard for the opposition to make a case since they have accepted the integrity of the IEC to arbitrate fairly and have from that very arbitration won an election. So why can’t the opposition accept defeat in good faith as the APRC did in Sami? With such a case, the APRC will have a point: If from the very outset, you agree on the ground rules, then surely, you should accept whatever results ensue from such and not pillory the ground rules because they suddenly don’t favour you. Al Gore found himself similar morass. During the final days of the campaign, he was asked whether he would abide by the verdicts of the Electoral College flawed as they are on the face of it, and he affirmed his commitment to system as it is – confident of victory. Yet, when it was becoming clear that the electoral colleges would hand over the presidency to Bush inspite of Gore winning the popular vote, suddenly his Liberal friends in the media and even insiders within the Gore camp – albeit subtly - are questioning a system that favours a ridiculous devise like the electoral college over the popular vote. But can Gore publicly back away from his pre-election position on the American electoral colleges when he was willing to abide by whatever results it produces? You now with me? A similar situation could crop up come 2001 and the opposition will find it hard to sell their story as will happen to Gore if he goes public with his misgivings. Then it begins to dawn on us all that Sami was after all a red herring.

Two past experiences in 1995 and 1996 are enough to give this theory muscle to stand up to reason. Let me be more illustrative. When the erstwhile AFPRC instituted the National Consultative Committee [NCC] to review its controversial timetable to civilian democratic rule, it painted them in a very favourable light; soldiers with a difference if you like – the idea began to permeate amongst sceptics that after all these guys are genuine and well-meaning in their pledges to return the country back to civilian democratic rule. Most surprising of all, however, was how the AFPRC accepted virtually all of the NCC’s recommendations that really were a very radical dilution of the AFPRC’s timetable and programmes. From there things could only get better for the AFPRC. Crucially, it swung public opinion on their side and some certain self-appointed public intellectuals began shamelessly supplying feelers and intellectual muscle to what has become known as the Gambia’s own transition. As it turned out, what on the on face of it was a rolling back of the AFPRC’s political ambitions and legitimisation of genuine democratic reforms turned out to be a red-herring. Gambians and crucially many so-called public intellectuals were suckered into a flawed process that had only one purpose from the outset: legitimising the AFPRC in the sights of the international community. With historical hindsight, we can claim, without distorting the facts, that the concessions made by the AFPRC on their timetable were largely a stunt to weather public and international opinion to work for them as they battle to insidiously work at hoodwinking the Gambian public on the transition process. There is no doubt that in the very end Gambians were the losers and the AFPRC the winners as they legitimised themselves in the freak elections of 26 September 1996. Arguably, and with hindsight, the concessions made by the AFPRC on their timetable and programmes were nothing but a red-herring.

Similarly, but far more illustrative and important was the role of the Provisional Independent Electoral Commission [PIEC] in the 1996 elections. In his inaugural speech at the party’s maiden meeting at Fitzgerald Street, the UDP leader, Mr. Ousainou Dabo, waxed indignant and eloquent on the excesses of the AFPRC from the murder of Koro Ceesay to the 11th November 1994 so-called coup attempt by Lt. Barrow in which many innocent soldiers lost their lives under very despicable circumstances. In reaction to the aforementioned, the APRC lodged formal complaints with the PIEC about the inflammatory "allegations" inherent in the UDP leader’s speech and how it contravenes the electoral codes of conduct. As it happened, the PIEC ruled in favour of the UDP: That Dabo’s maiden speech was neither inflammatory nor does it contravene the electoral codes of conduct. This was hailed as signs of the PIEC’s independence. Subsequently, Dabo made another address this time on TV taking the onslaught further than the Fitzgerald Street one. Soon after this address, the APRC leader, Jammeh, in an interview with GRTS, said if the opposition calls all AFPRC projects as waste, then they shouldn’t use the TV to send their messages across. From there, the sluice gate of executive heavy-handedness on curtailing opposition activism came into being. The UDP and the NRP [who were not shy in their critiques of the AFPRC record] were banned from using the public media. Things rapidly began to deteriorate rapidly as the playing field became more rugged and increasingly favouring the APRC. And so how did the PIEC respond to these new developments? As it happened, the PIEC, for the first time showed its real character: a muscle-less appendage of the military administration. The PIEC, literally did nothing stop this deterioration of the playing field. The UDP and the NRP were never allowed back on public media until the general elections of January 1997 by then the damage was already done. It was clear right from then that the PIEC would not intervene on issues that are inherently inimical to the interest of the AFPRC/APRC, but where the issues were either minuscule or trivially anecdotal, the PIEC would seemingly look to be independent or having integrity. Soon after the presidential elections, the UDP, during a press conference, said the PIEC was not independent and muscle-less hence the invalidity of the presidential elections. This was greeted with loud outcries from Cheyassin Secka [on behalf of the APRC] and the columns of FOROYAA. Indeed, they excoriated the UDP for double standards and for being outright ridiculous about their claims. Wasn’t it the case that UDP was happy to go along with the PIEC arrangements so long as it ruled in their favour? Didn’t the PIEC rule in favour of the UDP when the APRC lodged an official complaint? Why didn’t the PIEC’s independence and impartiality become an issue way back then? Should it become an issue now only because the UDP has lost the elections and very convenient to lay blames on the arbitrator’s door steps? Shouldn’t the UDP accept results of an election whose ground rules they tacitly acknowledged as level and equipped enough to reflect the will of people? In typical FOROYAA condescending mocking tones - you will largely expect from a gov’t paper having a go at the opposition – the over-wrought editors of that paper concluded they were happy to be an outlet for the UDP to vent out their frustrations. Explicitly, stating here that it is the UDP that is frustrated with the PIEC and enough of a conclusion that they are comfortable with the PIEC’s perceived independence and integrity. Of course, critics of the UDP have a point about the UDP’s sudden distrust of the PIEC. That, however, doesn’t make the UDP claims baseless. The UDP were very right that the lack thereof of any arbitration on the part of the PIEC when they [the UDP] were thrown off the public media by another PLAYER [the APRC] renders the elections invalid. The UDP were if anything blinded by their haste to get on with it to the effect that they didn’t forensically scrutinise the PIEC. Take the head of the PIEC – Mr Gabriel Roberts. Roberts publicly made it known that he does sympathise with the AFPRC cause in his revelatory Gambia College speech. So it is not surprising that any obnoxious commission set up these days can only feature Roberts. Not only that, the members of the PIEC were hand picked by Jammeh himself and the rules laid down by Jammeh. You can bet your last dime on the fact that Jammeh vetted these members for allegiances and sympathies and whatever rules govern their conduct would not contradict the ambitions of the AFPRC. Effectively, casting clouds of doubt on the PIEC’s composition and their impartiality or independence of its membership.

The lesson of that period is simple: The PIEC ruling on the UDP leader’s Fitzgerald Street speech was not a sign of it’s impartiality or independence. Rather a red herring to plant complacency in the minds of the opposition to rest on their laurels and most importantly to act as future reference of the PIEC’s independence and impartiality. Similarly, the Sami elections might eerily come to be the same red herring. This is why it is crucial we take results with a pinch of salt. There is a sense of déjà vu in which it could become the reference point of the IEC and apologists [open or closet] of Jammeh, as signs of the IEC’s independence and impartiality.

Our dose of cynicism should also extend to the obnoxious ground rules of the Sami elections. The rules might in fact be a good means of damage limitation in that if all candidates are independents campaigning independently of any political party structure, then the winner and losers would not be assigned officially to any party political grouping even though their allegiances are public knowledge. What better way to redress the wounds of the APRC’s loss? It is interesting that I read from The Point online that our Socialist comrades in the PDOIS were suckered into this bait - hook, sinker and line. I’m not surprised the least. If there are any incorrigible suckers around this end for IEC scams, they always outshine else. Equally, we must question whether it is simply a matter of coincidence that whilst it attempts to play the generous democrat in Sami, the APRC is making further illegal attempts to soil a tailored constitution like the 1997 by pretending to amend its flaws?

It would be remiss of me to end this without highlighting the positive factors in the Sami elections, which are primarily two:

  1. At any rate, Sami has proven the point that under free and fair elections, Jammeh would be history sooner than anyone realises.
  2. As of now, I have yet to see or hear of the official figures in the Sami elections. But I think tentatively, one can conclude without any fear of exaggeration that public and voter disgust with Jammeh runs really deep. One must recall that the constituency of Sami is/was an APRC safe seat in both the presidential and general election. The fact that it had fallen to the opposition surely must suffice for us reach conclusions that electorally, the APRC do not stand a second chance come the next presidential and general elections of 2001.

I’m glad I ended this on a very high note of optimism and not on the pessimism/cynicism many ascribe to me. I’m taking some 6 months off from active engagement on the List – things are really piling on my plate. I hope to be a Peeping Tom once in a while for I have an unquenchable curiosity especially on the future of the Gambia. Offline we are committed to the struggle and would contribute wherever the chance presents itself. Wishing everyone well from this end.

Hamjatta - Kanteh


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