Well done Mr Colly. Your piece has thrown much light on the anatomy of the July 1994 coup. Jammeh certainly did not seem clever enough to lead a coup. He was however wily/crafty enough to steal the show. Sad. However, my question is: How and why was Sana Sabally and Sadibou Hydara arrested? Thanks. >From: ebou colly <[log in to unmask]> >Reply-To: The Gambia and related-issues mailing list ><[log in to unmask]> >To: [log in to unmask] >Subject: COUP IN GAMBIA ONE >Date: Sun, 22 Apr 2001 17:28:34 -0700 > > COUP IN GAMBIA ONE > >A British military officer I once met in San Remo >Italy asked me to put the reason why there was a coup >in The Gambia in two words. >"Command breakdown and government complacency," I gave >it to him in five. >The British officer who was very interested in the >military history of The Gambia had been for the weeks >we worked together curiously firing me all sorts of >questions about what made it possible for the junior >officers of the GNA to seized power in 1994. >The story I explained to that gentleman is the one I >wish to share with the G-L readers in this series >entitled COUP IN GAMBIA. It is a story I intend to >tell in the simplest form based on my personal >experience of the coup in The Gambia on the 22nd July >1994, the accidental role I played in it and most >important of all the facts according to what exactly >happened. I may also in this exercise attempt to >periodically express my views or opinion about the >special situations encountered. Hearing about the >general misconception developed by Gambians and >non-Gambians alike, in the country or outside about >the 1994 coup, coupled with the absolute silence from >those who actually know the facts, compounded by >mainly the lies Yaya and his lackeys have been >peddling about the event, the coup in the final >analysis has now been reduced to one shameless BIG >lie. Those who should have been termed the actual >heroes in that mutinous and criminal operation have >long since been killed or reduced to subservient >nonentities while the cowards who should have been >permanently locked up behinds bars for their >traitorous actions stole the center stage, supported >by intellectual criminals and defended by armed >bandits. However regardless of how strong or deep they >may anchor their vessel of deceit in the divine sea of >life, the wind of truth will someday blow away these >floating evil doers to the shore of reality where the >crew will be exposed in their naked images. Those >thinking that they could disguise themselves in this >doom-bound vessel enjoying the loot of the >bloodthirsty pirates, encouraging them to shed more >blood for bigger treasure and then disappearing >unnoticed at the final day of reckoning ought to think >twice about that ungodly fate. If Gambians should >think that they could get away with killing innocent >armless children for anything in this world and then >turn it into a political issue, manipulating the laws >to exonerate the guilty murderers, some of them being >so sick to make it a laughing matter in the heart of >the nation then Gambians could as well exempt the >existence of god and the dynamic laws of nature from >life. These knuckleheads cannot learn from the common >saying that no condition is constant except change >itself. >Lets remember Samuel Doe, Emperor Bukasa, Mengistu >Haili Mariam, Edi Amin and Mobutu with their doomed >followers. These leaders blatantly flouted all kinds >of rules, secular and divine, with powers far greater >than the ordinary or with powers which Yayas will >never dream to acquire in this world; leaders who >thought they could get away with any crimes, lies and >deceit perpetrated towards their innocent subjects >until the day of divine intervention dawned on them. >Days that come without warning and often when things >are at their sweetest. Days when the predators are >caught happily licking their blood-dripping fingers >from devouring the flesh of their unfortunate preys. >Day that found them in festive moods when they the >least suspected that the judgement day is indeed here. >That day in the Gambia will soon come. The day Yaya >and his callous follows will know that children in the >kingdom of god are after all real angels and that no >hoodlum would get away with killing them out of share >madness. Call it the big time day of reckoning. >Having said that, I will now turn to my new topic, >thanks to loony Paul. Evidently, if Gambians had >developed the special tradition of recording and >referring to their history as time and events unfold >before us from period to another, we would have >realized that the same situation that led to the >abortive coup of 1981 more or less recurred in 1994. >And perhaps that would have helped in averting the >1994 calamity. >For instance by the time Kukoi lured the Field Force >into his nightmarish coup in 1981, it could be >remembered that there was a total breakdown of command >and control in Depot, Fajara Barracks. The late Eku >Mahony was strangely shot and killed by the late >constable Mustapha Danso the previous year 1980; also >the late Commander Bojang was suspected of complicity >in what was thought to be a deadly factional conflict >among their subordinates leading to one of his men >killing his command counterpart. Bojang was retired or >weeded from the force but had refused to vacate his >official residence when asked to do so by government. >The atmosphere was as a result charged with heavy >gossip of a coup planning at the depot, yet government >by its actions showed little concern about the >potential explosion facing the nation. Nothing was >more important at that critical time in government's >agenda than the security crisis in the Depot that >required immediate and total attention. Whether there >was even a national security crisis management organ >in the country for such unexpected emergencies was >another thing we may never know. However if there was >one, I don't think it was official or effective or >even known to the Gambians. Historians may one day >have to help us with this one. Anyway I still think >that the government was rather complacent with the >situation until Kukoi stuck, surprised and shocked the >whole world. A civilian taking command of the county's >major security force using its personnel in a coup >attempt was unimaginable and disgraceful. Thank god >there was foreign intervention to stop Kukoi; >otherwise the crisis that had erupted could have >pretty well degenerated into full-blown civil war. And >I still firmly believe that what The Gambia escaped in >Kukoi 's failure in 1981 was the exact leadership we >got in Yaya's success in 1994. In other words, I think >Kukoi in 1981 was going to be what we got in Yaya in >1994. But it was still possible that Kukoi might have >been a little more genuine. Nothing could be like >Yaya. >Another critical factor often neglected but very >important in command stability but was and is still >lacking in The Gambia's security institutions is the >personality and caliber of persons recruited and >entrusted with the defense of the nation. The >westerners that introduced modern military concepts in >The Gambia built their own forces from men and women >committed to the fundamental course of defending their >national sovereignty because of the stake they have in >the society. They are generally well cultured, >properly educated and tested to meet the set >standards; they have self-esteem and definitely >understand that the country equally belong to them in >the very way it belongs to any president. None of >these virtues prevailed in the Field Force where the >service men were literally social outcasts in terms of >origin, education, social status, family background >and self-esteem.. So instead of having fine warriors >prepared to lay their lives for the defense of their >nation, we ended up grooming angry jealous armed men >full of hate and destructive tendencies ready to >follow any deviant or criminal into a path of national >destruction. Rebellious soldiers in uniform or >civilian bandits, whose ultimate target is to destroy >rather than construct, often are the organizers of >coups. The Field Force behind Kukoi was without doubt >armed men madly inclined to help destroy The Gambia >they had no stake in building or protecting. >A similar situation was re-created in the GNA in 1994. >There was a command break down when the late General >Abubacarr Dada was sent a successor from Nigeria >Colonel Gwadebeh to command the Gambia Army and the >former refused to hand over the seat to the latter. >That conflict was what actually undermined all the >credibility and respects the GNA officers had for >their Nigerian mentors. The Nigerians who came and >started an impressive and very good work in the >beginning, making all of us to believe that their army >and serving men were superior to us in every way of a >military establishment suddenly started acting like >desperate men ready to go after each others jugular >veins in order to stay in The Gambia rather than go >back home. Everything they taught us about ethical >standards, moral values, esprit de corps, decency, >integrity and military courage were violated one after >the order by the feuding commanders and their divided >allies with no regards to its effect on those of us >looking up to them as role models. >The situation was so hopeless that in the end one >could sense the irreparable damage the Nigerians had >done to their command and control powers over the GNA >officers. Even if there had been no coup, the >Nigerians would not have had it the easy way they did >with the GNA officers before. >The actual problem started around March or April 1994 >when the Point News paper (always the Point) quoted a >Nigerian newspaper that had published an identified >successor for General Dada. It was stated that the >late General Sani Abacha had already chosen the man. >Dada was very furious about the Point's publication >demanding that government should punish the Point >publishers for the wrong information they published. >By General Dada who was appointed by General Babangida >when the latter was still in power, his contract made >appointment permanent commander of the GNA. >Furthermore, he had believed that the men he brought >along to run the Gambia Army, about eighty of them, >were directly under his charge, meaning that he could >change or even recommend their dismissal whenever he >wanted. But for him, he was untouchable and should >only leave the Gambia Army after the Nigeria-Gambia >contract to train the GNA was over. It was a two-year >contract that should have been completed in 1994, >although the Nigerians had succeeded in convincing the >government that the officers in the army were too >incompetent to be handed over the command after two >years only. It was another story most of us could not >understand. >Anyhow when government put it to Dada that they were >not aware of any successor identified in Nigeria but >that they could not do anything to the Point >Publishers either because they were private or >committed nothing illegally, Dada relented but would >not forget. >In May, the official letter from Nigeria for the >replacement of General Dada by Colonel Gwadebeh >arrived at the ministry of defense. Dada could not >understand it and expected the Gambia government to >stand by his side and disallow the colonel from >replacing him. But government made it clear to him >that the changes effected from Nigeria was beyond >their means to alter. Dada felt betrayed by the >government for their indifference to his problem. He >also realized that his most trusted men brought to the >Gambia to help him, men he painstakingly picked from >the Nigerian armed forces and provided them with pay >ten or more times than their earnings at home had also >shifted their loyalty to the new commander. >Colonel Gwadebe came anyway. >Devastated altogether, Dada partially accepted defeat >but insisted that he would not leave the Gambia until >he had audience with former President Jawara. That was >more or less refusing to hand over to Gwadebe unless >he was allowed to meet the president. >Government officials especially at the ministry of >defense felt Dada should not be allowed to meet the >president when the vice president who was the minister >of defense was available. Dada would not settle for >anything other than what he wanted-meet the president. >Gwadebe on the other hand was lodged at Kairaba Hotel >waiting for Dada to hand over before he could assume >the command position. That is standard army procedure. >One could not succeed another person under normal >circumstances without a formal handing and taking over >process completed. >By the middle of May however, it was clear to all GNA >officers and most other ranks that the Nigerian >command fabric had crumbled and the government did not >seem to take its danger very seriously. >Like in the past, it should have been the most >important issue in the government national agenda, >needing immediate and total attention. But I think Sir >Dawda at the heat of things took his annual leave and >left for Britain to spend about a month there. >Dada decided to wait for his return. There was no >serious commander anymore. >In the mean time however, the Nigerians, were still >trying to make things appear as much normal as they >could make the situation look in the army. An exercise >was organized at Kudang area, code named operation >"Nying Doekuo". The whole army was involved in an >exercise of tactical planning and operation of various >combat missions. >It was there that the junior officers first met to >discuss the need to get rid of the Nigerians from the >country. Yes it was all about organizing a >demonstration against the Nigerians to leave and go >back home. >Those present at that meeting were the late Lieutenant >Basiru Barrow, Captain Alagie Kanteh (second >lieutenant then), Captain Alpha Kinteh (second >lieutenant then) Captain Edward Singhateh (second >lieutenant then) and Captain Sana Sabally (second >lieutenant then). Anyway before the meeting ended, >Alagie Kanteh came up with the proposal of a coup >instead of a demonstration. They all agreed, electing >Barrow to be the leader. Both Kanteh and Singhateh had >told this story to several soldiers after the coup. >Captain Singhateh in fact put it to all the men >present at state house on the 22nd July that these >five men were the actual planners of the coup and that >even Yaya and Sadibou Haidara were not part of it, but >were invited to join them when three of the original >conspirators withdrew their membership at the last >minutes. These three were Barrow, Kanteh and Kinteh. >According to the original plan, former president >Jawara was to be arrested with his cabinet ministers >at Yundum Airport on the day he was to return from his >leave in England. Army officers of the rank of captain >and above were all to be arrested and executed by >firing squad together with all government ministers. >That may have been the reason why the first team >cracked. Barrow, Kinteh and Kanteh perhaps were not >prepared to go that extreme. Anyway according to >Barrow who explained himself after Singhateh accused >the three of them of betraying the course, he had >given his reason of withdrawal as being inadequate >timing. Barrow said he wanted more time for better >planning preferably January 1995 instead of July 1994. > >However the bottom line is that Edward Singhateh and >Sana Sabally actually spearheaded the coup from start >to end. They were also the operational leaders, Sana >taking Bravo Company from Captain Sonko who was forced >to join Charlie Company and Singhateh taking the >leadership of that unit-Charlie Company. Colonel >Badjie was the company commander of Charlie Company, >although when they took it from him they spared him >the trauma and ordeal they subjected Captain Sonko in >throughout the operation. >Yaya did not mean much to them, the very naivete in >Sana and Singhateh that allowed Jammeh to join them >and eventually stole the show from their hands They >probably felt that Jammeh the Gendarmerie officer >entrusted by the Nigerians to police the army as the >head of the military police wing was nothing but a >boastful wimp. Jammeh was never seen firing a shot as >a soldier, never seen running in any exercise, was >below average in written and verbal communication, did >not know how to write or interpret operation orders >and lacked everything that characterized a true >officer or soldier. All that could be associate with >Yaya in uniform was the pistol he always carried (and >most certainly could not use it properly) and his >endurance to carry various horns, roots cowries and >animal skins all over his body in the name of "jujus". >(I think I once explained to you that Yaya shamelessly >decorated himself at McCarthy Square Banjul with >ECOMOG medals as if he had served in Liberia's >peacekeeping mission. Some of us startled by the >ceremony thought the joke was accepting the medal as >an honorary award until he appeared on GAMTV in >Kaninlai explaining to some school children his >peacekeeping role in Liberia. The guy is so sick in >fabricating lies that sometimes I see his metal >maturity as that of a six-year old.) >The fact that he was the head of the military police >and the young officers planned the coup without >serious regards to his unit or presence was indicative >of how much they disrespected him. It was a matter of >telling him to join them or get his butt whipped. He >knew better. >I don't know what he had lied to the Nigerians to >accept his transfer from the Gendemarie to the GNA in >1992, but they must have selected the wrong person to >police the army for them. It was a major mistake from >Dada. >However that same disrespect they had for Yaya was >what led Sana and Singhateh to vote him as their >leader on the 24th July 1994 in the presence of >Captain Mamat Cham. Again they thought he could be put >there as a ceremonial leader while they run the show >in the background. As for Sana, up the day he was >framed and bundled up to jail with Haidara, he had >treated Yaya with contempt and less importance. >But with tact and treachery, the rule of the game at >the time, Yaya played the two heavy weights against >each other allying with Edward to destroy Sana and >Haidara. That catapulted Edward from the number four >positions to the vice-chairman's seat. He did not know >that the master of treachery was on his tail next. >I hope my readers are also evaluating the >personalities in the drama. While doing so please >consider the Field Force and the characters in the >Depot- men with low self-esteem, dehumanized by >poverty and greed and transformed into treacherous and >destructiveness souls. >Anyway by the time the transition was over, Yaya had >disintegrated the foundation of the original coup team >except in the case of Singhateh. But Singhateh's turn >was in the making. >It was Landing Sanneh and the late Almamo Manneh who >one day challenged Edward at the state house on Yaya's >orders to shoot him if he tried to enter the building >again armed. The vice chairman could not understand it >but soon realized that it was the final signal to show >him that the game of playing equals with Yaya was >over. He knew better. Before long the high-speed >champion of the coup was reduced to a nodding follower >of Yaya endorsing his lies, ignoring his faults, >treating him like the saint who led them, the lost >souls, into the coup crusade and all what not. >Almamo Manneh is now lying six feet deep thanks to >Yaya. Landing Sanneh is still in jail waiting to be >tried for almost a year now after being accused of >coup attempt with Almamo Manneh. >The current survivors are ordinary followers, praise >singers and boot-lickers sometimes claiming to be the >warriors in 1994. Sir Dawda Jawara's closest >bodyguards like Musa Jammeh are today Yaya's worst hit >men. The vicious circle of dogs eating dogs continue >to prevail. That's coup in the Gambia parts one. > >We will look at part two next week. > > >Ebou Colly > > >__________________________________________________ >Do You Yahoo!? >Yahoo! Auctions - buy the things you want at great prices >http://auctions.yahoo.com/ > >---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > >To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L >Web interface at: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/gambia-l.html >You may also send subscription requests to >[log in to unmask] >if you have problems accessing the web interface and remember to write your >full name and e-mail address. >---------------------------------------------------------------------------- _________________________________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free E-mail from MSN Hotmail at http://www.hotmail.com. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L Web interface at: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/gambia-l.html You may also send subscription requests to [log in to unmask] if you have problems accessing the web interface and remember to write your full name and e-mail address. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------