Mori ----- Original Message ----- From: Mori Kebba Jammeh <[log in to unmask]> To: <[log in to unmask]> Sent: Tuesday, May 08, 2001 7:15 PM Subject: Re: COUP IN GAMBIA THREE > Ebou, > Thank you very much for your excellent narration. It was very disheartening > that people who can call themselves Muslims could have done such a gruesome > act in the Gambia in 1994. Thanks to God there are people alive who can > narrate the series of events that happened in the coup. > > Reading through this peace, I felt so much emotional and I can't imagine how > they could have done what they did. That was why butchering school children last > year was not hard for them either, but whoever participated in those > atrocities must realize one thing and that is NO CONDITION IS PERMANENT. > > > Mori > ----- Original Message ----- > From: ebou colly <[log in to unmask]> > To: <[log in to unmask]> > Sent: Sunday, May 06, 2001 9:05 PM > Subject: COUP IN GAMBIA THREE > > > > COUP IN > > GAMBIA THREE > > KB Dampha, I am pleased but equally saddened that you > > asked about Gibril Saye or Lieutenant Saye. Pleased in > > the sense that his case needs to be told which I shall > > attempt to do the way I understand it. But am also > > quite sad to remember every thing about this fine > > soldier who was too good to die the way he did. > > Everything you mentioned about this soldier, > > especially his devotion and love to promote sports in > > the GNA-had a keen hand in football, basketball, > > volleyball and everything-made him more so a victim to > > be mourned and wept for until that day when his body > > is exhumed from that toilet pit and given a decent > > burial. We can classify Saye as the real soldier with > > difference. He was nice, respectable and highly > > competent. But above everything, the young man was > > soft hearted, couldn't hurt a fly when it comes to > > killer instincts that we saw among the ranks of the > > army since 1994. The guy had conscience and would > > rather die than see the truth twisted and remain > > indifferent to it like so many APRC lackeys we see > > today. One of the reasons I later learnt for the > > AFPRC's decision to eliminate him was among other > > things his constant challenge to all of them over our > > detention at the central prisons without any credible > > reason or explanation for it. I understand he had > > openly and constantly protested to the council members > > to try us if they had anything against us or set us > > free. But death row at Mile Two prisons was not, as > > far as he was concerned, a place for good officers > > like us. He had even gone against all odds one day by > > coming to the prisons to see us with encouraging words > > to the effect that they were working hard for our > > freedom. He had brought us provisions and toilet > > articles as well. It was shocking to learn few days > > later that Saye was dead. > > So you were right Dampha in stating that the 11th > > November event found me in jail. About thirty-five of > > us were detained for nothing we did. But I can still > > remember how devastated Saye's family was over the > > death of the man who solely provided for them. They > > even had to send a secret inquirer at Mile-Two prison > > to find out whether Saye was detained with us. His > > father cannot still get over what he new was a murder > > of his son, because he saw his son when he was leaving > > for work the morning after the so-called abortive > > counter coup. Soldiers who were present at the camp > > that day also took the trouble to go to the family > > house and explained to them what happened at Yundum > > that weekend afternoon. > > I personally conducted my private investigation over > > the case and came out with the concrete evidence that > > these men were murdered when they least expected it > > from these cowards. A man like Saye would have never > > dreamt about Sana Sabally taking a direct role in his > > slaughtering. They were very close job associates, > > sharing the same office where Saye was his deputy in > > the heavy-weapons platoon. They were always together > > in their small office by the fuel storeroom. Before > > the coup one would easily mistaken them for brothers > > given the way they used to hang closely together. > > On the flip side however I think that was the reason > > why Sabally freaked out after the 11th November > > massacre. Killing a human being out of no justifiable > > reason could be psychologically very traumatic to the > > mind of the killer but when the relationship between > > the killer and the victim was bonded by that human > > factor bordering on friendship and love, the tragedy > > turns into a clinical nightmare. > > Anyway, that's another trivial story that I may come > > back to in later discussions. > > But as I said I started my investigation about 11th > > November in the jail with special interest in Saye's > > case. The first opportunity I had to know what exactly > > happened was when in February surviving soldiers > > arrested and accused of complicity in the counter coup > > were brought to Mile-Two prisons under heavy armed > > guard. The notorious Staff Sergeant Kanyi was part of > > the guards. They had to be transferred from the Yundum > > cells to death row at Mile Two. They were WO-2 A > > Trawelleh, Sgt. N kabareh, Sgt. S. Manjang Cpl. > > A.Jallow, Cpl. M. Saidykhan, L/CPL M.O. Njie, L/CPL K. > > Kamara and PTE. B. Manneh. > > When they were first brought in, they were so much > > convinced of being lesser criminals than we were that > > for a while they refused to say anything pertaining to > > what bought them there. Every one of them thought his > > arrest or detention was a mistake because, as far as > > they were concerned, they did not have a clue about > > any organized counter coup as such. As a result they > > all thought sooner rather than later they were going > > to go home. > > Then on the22nd February, 1995, each of them received > > a letter from Baboucarr Jatta's office (then army > > commander) warning them to brace up for a general > > court martial scheduled to start on 25th February > > 1995. That was to say that they had barely thirty > > hours to face a court martial on charges of treason. > > For their defense, they were not allowed to have any > > representation from professional legal officers or > > practitioners. The following officers' names were > > forwarded to them as the only available persons they > > could choose their legal representatives from: Captain > > M.B. Sarr, Captain S. Fofana, Captain JP Jasseh and > > Lt. Seckan. These were men who were big time legal > > illiterates. For the prosecution however, Justice B. > > Akamba a Ghanaian solicitor was the head of the team. > > It was clear to all the accused that it was after all > > a kangaroo court martial that awaited them and they > > also knew that Baboucarr Jatta was a genius at it. It > > was a lost course to all of them. > > That was the time they really started talking. By the > > time they were hastily tried, found guilty and all > > sentenced to nine years imprisonment with hard labor, > > they had told us everything they witnessed and knew > > about the murder of their colleagues. > > Most of them were arrested after Barrow, Faal and > > Nyang were killed but well before Saye was arrested. > > They were in the Yundum cells when Saye reported for > > work the following morning and was placed under arrest > > by the military police. Every clothes he was wearing > > (he was in working uniform) was taken off him and was > > left with only his underwear before the military > > police forced him to join them in the cells. He was > > stunned and tried to ask for explanation but was > > simply told that the orders came from the council > > members of the government. Who were they? Of course > > the cowards: Yaya Jammeh, Sana Sabally, Edward > > Singhateh, Sadibou Haidara and Yankuba Touray. > > Anyway like all of them who were detained Saye had > > felt that the error would be corrected and that he > > would soon be set free. > > Then the next day while Major Frazer Joof, commander > > of the military police unit was taking their > > statements at the military police office, they > > received orders to stop the investigation and send > > them back to the cells. They were informed that the > > council members were at the officer's mess discussing > > their fate. It was lunchtime, so they decided to have > > their meals. Half way in their eating they heard some > > strange movements out side. Then a voice they could > > not recognized started calling for all those officers > > arrested to come out now. Sorting out the officers > > from the other ranks was, according to them, very > > scary. > > All the officers were handcuffed the moment they > > stepped outside. Then they loaded them like sheep in > > the back of an army Land Rover and covered them with > > tarpaulin. > > The windows of the cells at Yundum were not quite > > high, so those in the cells could clearly view the > > activities going on outside. It was from there that > > they saw the convoy of council members departing with > > the officers including Saye. Baboucarr Jatta was with > > them too. > > For two to three hours they sat in silence praying and > > hoping that things were not really what they thought > > they were, until they heard the convoy roaring back > > into the camp with the green tarpaulins all soaked in > > blood. They drove them back to the toilet area where > > they stayed for another twenty to thirty minutes. Then > > they came back and called for Sgt. E.M. Ceesay and > > Sgt. Basiru Camara to follow them to the back. Few > > minutes later they heard burst of automatic gunfire > > twice. They were the last two to be murdered. It was a > > nightmare of unprecedented proportion that shocked > > every person with human emotion that evening. > > The second part of my investigation, which filled in > > the blank spaces left by the accused men, was > > completed when I was freed from detention after ten > > months. After being released and reinstated back to > > the army, I eventually became very close to Baboucarr > > Jatta who in his non-stop effort to clear himself of > > any wrong doing that day told me the missing details. > > Anyhow taking stock of what Jatta had in mind could be > > extremely elusive. Sometimes he would echo as if Lt. > > Barrow had really planned a coup; but at other time it > > is as if, the AFPRC government, in order to eliminate > > the officers and soldiers who felt they betrayed the > > nation and the army, framed everybody. For example > > when Lt. Barrow was arrested that night, Jatta's > > explanation was that he had found him surrounded by > > Sabally and his guards after he was severely beaten > > up. He said that Sabally showed him a list of names of > > government officials Barrow and his partners had > > planned to execute if they had succeeded. His name > > Jatta was on top of the list. > > But he said upon scrutinizing the paper he had > > discovered that the list was forged to justify their > > desire to execute them. As a matter of fact, he > > confirmed the forgery in the paper when he noticed > > that his own name on top was quickly scribbled in > > pencil while the whole list was in ink. He said he > > took the list from Sabally and walked up to Barrow and > > asked him why he wanted to kill him. But as soon as > > Barrow started swearing that he did not mean to kill > > anybody, Sabally turned around and hit him on the > > mouth with the wooden butt of his AK47 rifle, breaking > > all his front teeth. > > "The torture they subjected Barrow and Faal to", Jatta > > had said, "even if they were not shot and killed > > finally, they would have most likely died from their > > injuries". > > Jatta also explained how all those arrested were later > > taken to Mile-Two prisons first and then to Fajara > > Barracks that night for execution during which a good > > number of them took the risk and ran away into the > > dark. Almost all of them escaped to Cassamance > > including Lt. Minteh, Lt. Jarju Lt. Bah Lt. L.F. > > Jammeh, Sgt Jadama, Sgt. Joof and others. The dash for > > freedom happened when the captives were forced in line > > at the middle of the field and then ordering some > > selected soldiers to open fire on them in a typical > > military execution style. Three times the order was > > given, and three time the soldiers aimed and fired > > above the heads of the victims. Then Edward Singhateh > > soon got frustrated with the firing team, walked up to > > where Barrow was standing, held him by the wrist, > > pulled him away from everyone and then fired two shots > > at him. One bullet hit Barrow on the leg and the fatal > > one went through his ribs. He fell down on the ground > > kicking and moaning until his whole body was reduced > > to weak involuntary twitching of his muscles here and > > there. > > "It was then that everybody woke up to the reality > > that they were dealing with real killers", said Jatta. > > > > There was total chaos. Some running for their lives > > others dumb founded by Singhateh's action while most > > of the soldiers suffered total shock. However, Faal > > was unable to move because of the injuries he had > > sustained that crippled him altogether. The bullet > > that finished him was fired from the late Sadibou > > Haidara's handgun. After that Staff Sergeant Kanyi was > > left with his sadistic pleasure of pumping more brass > > into poor Faal's body. > > However let us not forget that in the heat of all this > > commotion, Lt. Gibril Saye was at home perhaps helping > > his wife nurse the three-week old son they just had. > > So to even say that he was seen that night around > > anywhere the coup was staged was ridiculous much more > > being killed in a firefight that night as the cowards > > tried to sell to the world. With the number of > > soldiers supposedly killed in that single incident > > that night, it is practically impossible or mind > > boggling to imagine that it was a fire fight where all > > the enemies were shot and killed while no one in the > > friendly forces got a scratch on him. That must have > > been the cause of the bitterness from Saye's family > > members especially from his dad. > > It should have also been a wake up call to the entire > > Gambian population that the so-called soldiers of > > difference were nothing but sadists with death. But as > > Dampha rightly put it the civilian population in most > > cases hardly show any interest in what happens in the > > army or have little sympathy to the soldiers in active > > service. The general concept is that they are all the > > same, so whatever may happen among them good or bad is > > their own business. On the contrary, most soldiers are > > ordinary people, the typical Gambian type who sees his > > work as a source of earning income. Although the > > salary is very limited, the majority work hard to > > manage their lives with it, get married, raise and > > support good families hoping to survive the danger of > > being killed in the job or avoid the evil of killing > > unnecessarily until such time when they finish their > > signed contracts and leave for something better. > > However, talking about the summarily execution at > > Yundum in which Saye was murdered Jatta had explained > > it all in the way he experienced it. As it was > > weekend, he said he was at home when he received a > > call from an officer at Yundum Barracks reporting the > > presence of the council members at the officers' mess. > > And the way things appeared they did not seem to mean > > any good towards the arrested officers and soldiers in > > the cells. He immediately drove to the camp and found > > them in the mess as reported. When he entered, they > > instantly stopped talking. But after a short while > > they informed him of their decision to execute > > everybody in the cells for their role in trying to > > overthrow their government. > > According to Jatta, he tried to talk them against the > > idea in every way to no avail. At one time he said he > > almost got Sabally, the vice-chairman then, to > > understand, but Singhateh called Yaya at the state > > house to inform him about the situation. When > > Singhateh returned from making the call at an office > > close to the mess, he said that Yaya's decision was > > final-death for all the officers. > > That was when everybody moved out to get the officers > > from the cells. It was lunchtime just like the > > survivors inside the cells explained it later at Mile > > Two. > > Anyway everything was the same except that those in > > the cells missed what happened in the killing process. > > When the officers were handcuffed and covered with > > tarpaulin in the back of the Land Rover, Staff > > Sergeant Kanyi was ordered to ride with them at the > > back. > > By the time they arrived at the execution ground > > behind Njamby Forest, Kanyi had severely hurt most of > > them with bayonet stabs all over their bodies. He was > > that instruction to Kanyi originated from Singhateh. > > Jatta had claimed to have followed them all the way to > > the killing field to put more pressure on them and to > > still try to talk them out of it. Well, he must have > > done a perfectly disgusting job in convincing them not > > to kill, anyway. > > The officers were as soon as they arrived at the > > ground lined up in a firing-squad formation to be > > shot. It was another tense moment where it appeared as > > if everyone was waiting for the other person to > > commence the shooting. Then as if it was an accidental > > discharge from Kanyi's weapon who was standing very > > close to Singhateh, he fired straight at the officers > > hitting Saye and killing him instantly. After that, it > > was a matter of finishing the rest since one had > > already died. It was the final green light for the > > butchering orgy to start. > > Jatta went on to explain how confused the council > > members felt when the killing was all over. They were > > altogether confused with what to do with the bodies. > > They finally arrived at the stupid decision to have > > their guards bury the corpse in the bushes somewhere. > > Jatta said he talked them against that for fear that > > people will soon find the bodies. That was how they > > were eventually taken to Yundum Barracks, to the > > toilets. > > He talked about how Sgt. E.M.Ceesay and Sgt. Basirou > > Camara were also killed that day. He could > > particularly remember Lance Corporal Batch Jallow, > > Singhateh's driver at the time pulling the trigger on > > those two. > > He further gave the gruesome details of how Saye's > > long legs (he was about 6ft. 8ins. tall) could not fit > > in the ditch together with the others and how Kanyi > > and co used a machete to cut off his legs before > > force-fitting the body in the mass grave. It was the > > mother of all evil that I know the culprits will > > account for someday. It is hard to comprehend how > > brutal these demons were on people who did not hurt > > anyone in their existence. Why was it impossible for > > anyone among them to stand up and say that this must > > stop, for it is all-wrong? Where was god in the hearts > > of these GAMBIANS? > > Jatta said Saye's father made a final attempt to know > > about the fate of his son after Sana Sabally and > > Sadibou Haidara fell victims of their own creation on > > the 27th of January 1995. He had gone to the ministry > > of defense to ask Singhateh but the old man was > > referred to his office at the army headquarters. All > > that the father wanted to know was whether his son was > > dead or alive. He said he frankly told him to give it > > up in ever seeing his son alive again because he was > > really dead. > > The old man, he said, thanked him for the information > > and left with high emotions. > > Now back to where I stopped in my last piece COUP IN > > GAMBIA. > > For a brief flashback, I was part of the team of the > > American guests visiting the vice president's office > > when a GNA officer at the state house told me about > > the soldiers at Yundum Barracks on their way to Banjul > > to overthrow the PPP government. However, because of > > my duty that day to escort the guests upstairs to Mr. > > Sahou Sabally's office, I tried to calmly perform it > > without raising any alarms. Yet I was very worried. > > The whole thing was really scary. > > Upstairs, Mr. Sabally welcomed the team in few nice > > words and then said. "Gentlemen, I am afraid to inform > > you that we just received a report that the soldiers > > at Yundum Barracks were on a rampage again". > > He had sounded as if the matter was a familiar thing > > that may die out soon. It was pretty much possible > > that Mr. Sabally had thought that it was one of those > > demonstrations from Yundum again which the TSG could > > stop like they did before. Whether Mr. Sabally > > understood the imbalance of power between the two > > forces caused by the Nigerians lately could be > > anyone's guess. Whatever he was thinking at that > > moment, he appeared very calm about the matter. > > Anyway Mr. Winters the ambassador before stepping into > > the office immediately asked whether it was not better > > for them to go back to the ship until the situation > > was under control then they come back. The vice > > president insisted that there was no need for that. He > > told them to stay indicating that it was possible that > > their help may be needed. While they stepped into the > > office, I took permission to go and find out what was > > going on. It was granted. > > Downstairs, the same officer who first announced the > > trouble at Yundum was still at the spot I left him. I > > wanted him to tell me more about what he had heard and > > whether it was not mistaken for the exercise rehearsal > > the GNA was supposed to hold with the American marines > > that morning. > > It was not a rehearsal or anything like that. The way > > they got the report, the soldiers had broken into the > > armory sharing all the weapons among them and were > > coming down to Banjul. Asked whether names of any > > leaders were mention in the report, he said no. I did > > not know whether it was only the other ranks again > > like the past two demonstrations before or whether the > > officers were part it this time. > > I looked at the state house environment again > > especially the security situation and felt very > > insecure there. I had my office there and had been > > working there for almost two years but the officers > > and other ranks of the presidential guards were like > > clowns. These people never trained, did not understand > > section, company or battalion battle drills. They did > > not know the difference between camouflage and > > concealment in the language of battlefield tactic. > > Combat fitness did not exist in their vocabulary. They > > were overfed, better paid than all the security forces > > in the country, spoiled and generally very rude > > towards GNA officers. Their only reserved powers were > > linked to the crazy "jujus" they carried in abundance > > making think that they were bulletproof charms. The > > charms were only for bluffing, because if they had > > strongly believed in those powers the majority would > > not have thrown their weapons at the last minute and > > jumped over the tall state house fence and disappeared > > into Banjul. Those who remained, Musa Jammeh and > > others, simply opened the gates and surrendered. But > > how could we blame them if their main commander who > > should have taken charge of the critical situation > > Captain Lamin Kaba Bajo chose to abandon the camp and > > joined former president Jawara on board the USS Lamour > > County? What was there to protect in a president who > > had lost his nation? Perhaps if he had stayed the > > majority of his men would not have had the nerve to > > run away with their tails between their legs. What > > else would you expect from such men, anyway? I knew > > that staying with the state guard was unwise or even > > suicidal. Beside, they only had AK47 rifles and most > > of them hardly used their weapons for training or > > anything. > > If it was true that the soldiers had actually broken > > into the armory, I thought, and were bent on taking > > the country by force, there was no force that could > > challenge them in the country. The GNA armory was jam > > packed with super deadly weapons such as the RPG-7s, > > AAMGs, 81MM and 60MM mortars that excluded the medium > > range machine guns and the Chinese-type LMGs. > > Truthfully the GNA was not quite trained on how to > > employ these weapons in combat, but I know by merely > > firing them at the direction of any enemy force not > > exposed to even the sound that comes out of their > > barrels was enough to chase them away or make them > > surrender. > > I therefore told the officer what I believed could > > have been a possible way of pulling something. The > > Gambia Marine, commanded by Major Antouman Saho had > > new 50 Caliber machine guns delivered by the Americans > > that very morning for the patrol boat. The firepower > > of those weapons were enough to make the soldiers from > > Yundum to listen if fired back to them out of > > necessity. The ballistics of their projectiles has the > > capability of piercing six inches of homogeneous steel > > and was meant to kill armor in battlefields. They are > > so deadly that there in an international law > > forbidding anyone from shooting it directly at humans. > > With the men at the Gambia Marine who had some pretty > > good experience with similar weapons of the Chinese > > type mounted on some of their other patrol boats, it > > was possible to assemble a counter force that could > > challenge the soldiers from Yundum. > > The gentleman agreed with my analogy; hence I took off > > to the Marine Unit base. > > Major Saho was there, but he would not buy my idea. He > > was in his office and was fully aware of what was > > going on but had put it to me that he did not even > > want his men to know about the coup situation because > > he did not trust them. " I don't want to have > > anything to do with this trouble", he had continued. > > "Was it not the Nigerians who were being paid fat > > salaries to defend the country? Let's leave things > > with them to solve." > > Nothing was going to make him involve himself in the > > problem or his men or weapons for that matter. > > Anyway when I heard him talking to the concerned > > citizens calling him from various offices in the > > country asking to know what was going on, and he kept > > on assuring them that special plans were underway to > > arrest the situation, then I realized that I was at > > the wrong place. Banjul was an island and the last > > thing I wanted was to be cornered in the city in an > > armed conflict. After all most of our family members > > were at the other side of the bridge. I decided to > > drive alone via Bond Road towards Yundum. I had had no > > reason to fear any soldier from there. As for the > > officers, leaving the Nigerians out, there were Major > > Davis, second in command of the battalion, Captain > > Badjie (now colonel) commanding "C" company, Captain > > Sonko Commanding "B" company, Captain Johnson, AHQ > > Camp, Captain Dibba Band, the late Captain Baldeh > > Band, Lt. Ndure Cham (now major) engineering section, > > late Lt. Barrow MT section, Lt. Sheriff Gomez, > > battalion adjutant, Lt. Yaya Jammeh MP commander, Lt. > > Mbye platoon commander, 2LT Haidara platoon commander > > and 2lt Singhateh, platoon commander. 2Lt Sabally was > > supposed to be at Farafenni at his new parent unit. > > Going by anything in the past present or even future, > > I could not see what I could have done wrong to any > > soldiers or officers for me to be treated otherwise > > than with respect and understanding. Terrible thinking > > in a coup situation, as I learnt later. > > In the first place, I was later made to understand > > that Major Antouman Saho had reported me to all the > > council members that I went to the marine unit to get > > his weapons to counter the coup but that he drove me > > away because the coup was an absolute necessity. That, > > I suspect, contributed to my arrest and detention four > > days later. Betrayal by people you trust is another > > coup malady. So in trying to draw some basic > > principles for any soldier caught in a coup situation, > > my first ones will include this one: NEVER TRUST ANY > > PERSON IN UNIFORM AROUND YOU. > > However, my trip to Yundum stopped at Denton Bridge, > > where the TSG commanded on the ground by Majors > > Chongan and Swareh were making frantic efforts to > > prevent the soldiers from crossing over. > > I will deal with that crucial encounter next week. > > In the mean time I want to commend all of you in the > > struggle for your tireless efforts to liberate the > > Gambia. This is a fight for freedom, and I know that > > we are winning one battle after another but the war is > > yet to be finished. Dampha, Saul, Kujabi, Hamjatta, > > Jabou, Conteh, Joe, Ebrima, edrissa, Jobe, the > > Movements in NY and Uk and all those combatants in the > > front line, I salute you for your diligence and > > endurance to sustain the struggle. I also want to take > > a special moment to welcome an impressive new member, > > abdou touray, whose contribution is so far fantastic. > > Keep up the great work. We shall win. > > > > Ebou Colly > > > > > > > > > > > > __________________________________________________ > > Do You Yahoo!? > > Yahoo! Auctions - buy the things you want at great prices > > http://auctions.yahoo.com/ > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > > > > To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L > > Web interface at: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/gambia-l.html > > You may also send subscription requests to > [log in to unmask] > > if you have problems accessing the web interface and remember to write > your full name and e-mail address. > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- > > To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L > Web interface at: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/gambia-l.html > You may also send subscription requests to [log in to unmask] > if you have problems accessing the web interface and remember to write your full name and e-mail address. > -------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L Web interface at: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/gambia-l.html You may also send subscription requests to [log in to unmask] if you have problems accessing the web interface and remember to write your full name and e-mail address. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------