Kudos Ebou, That was a well described and calculated piece again. I can't wait to see the next segment. Hey,Just out of curiosity,what was your RANK at the army prior to your departure. Thanks meen!!! Ous. >From: ebou colly <[log in to unmask]> >Reply-To: The Gambia and related-issues mailing list ><[log in to unmask]> >To: [log in to unmask] >Subject: COUP IN GAMBIA SIX >Date: Sun, 3 Jun 2001 19:05:14 -0700 > > COUP IN GAMBIA SIX >Well Saul, I am going to open the sixth segment of my >narrative with a brief discussion aimed at >enlightening your interesting friend who made that >remark about Ndow Njie's command and its >"Banjulian"-favored legacy. >But before all that I would like to add the names of >two GNA officers that I left out in my last issue >where I tabulated the names, ranks and positions of >all the officers on active duty at the time of the >coup. Captain P. Sanneh and Lieutenant F. Joof were >serving as contingent commander, ECOMOG, Liberia and >AHQ officer respectively. I missed them altogether, >which I sincerely apologize for, especially to the >officers. >Coming back to our man Saul, because you called him a >friend, I would also attempt to treat him as a friend, >but as a very dangerous one indeed. I am however glad >that he was talking to you, a person who has >transcended that primitive mentality where Africans or >Gambians are easily manipulated into believing that >our differences, in nothing other than the languages >we speak, should be a cause for irrationality enmity. >These are the dangerous cynics found in the continent >fueling crisis among brothers, friends, families and >all kinds of good-willed groups. > Unfortunately however, Gambians like our friend are >usually played down as mere bigots with serious >limitations; nonetheless, their occasional remarks, >uttered here and there especially in the company of >their weak-minded targets often cause devastating harm >to social harmony. And we don't need to fool >ourselves, there are many Gambians like him who think, >talk, see and feel the world purely from such >retrogressive senses. I am even surprised that our >friend did not say it in the exact way I have heard >his kinds talked about this so-called Ndow Njie-bias >syndrome. But there is no doubt in my mind that our >friend was speaking from the same deplorable premise >that Ndow Njie's administration was only in favor of >Wollofs to the detriment of other ethnic groups in the >GNA. Yes, when Banjulians are mentioned in this >context it is usually the Wollofs under scrutiny. And >most of the time these critics don't give concrete >evidences or they usually overlook the facts or worst, >are too dogmatic to make an objective analysis of >their dangerous thoughts. These are people for >instance who would hear someone's last name being >called Jobe, Njie, Ceesay or Touray and dogmatically >conclude that the person belonged to a particular >ethnic group or another, not prepared to understand >that these family names are found in most major ethnic >groups. But the most dangerous ones are those who >consciously use these baseless stigmata for their >selfish interest, be it economic, political, religious >or social. >In the case of our friend, I believe he was >politically attempting to feel your soft spot. If you >had fallen for his cheap stuff, I bet the next time >you hear from him he would be telling you that he does >not like the UDP party because it is a Mandinka party >bent on reviving the Mandinka empire destroyed by >Jammeh. You ask him how or why, and he would say >nothing to substantiate his statement. >But refer him to Yaya's pathetic leadership profile >and he would swear to you that he does not necessarily >support him only that he doesn't like Ousainou Darbo, >Sidia Jatta or Hamat Bah. Mere deception and >dishonesty! Anyway, next time when you run into people >like this, my advice is that regardless of how >convincing they may sound about not being Yaya >sympathizers just try to remind them all those >ethnic-bias actions of Yaya's government and challenge >them to bring anything close in similarity to it. In >the past. Remind them how Yaya's government introduced >the prejudicial policy of harassing, arresting and >deporting Northern Senegalese from The Gambia while >those from Southern Senegal/Cassamance are registered >and allocated with Gambian I.D.Cards. Was that a >lesser crime than that of Ndow Njie's? I don't think >so. These are the APRC hidden supporters appearing in >different colors and modes but too timid or sneaky to >face the world in their true selves. >Last week I ran into two of them at the Gambian hall >in the Bronx where Mr. Ousainou Dardo and Mr. Halifa >Sallah had been speaking about the political situation >at home. I was amazed to see these two guys pretending >to be Mr. Sallah's sympathizers when in reality they >were far from that. I don't remember how I first met >them last year, but for a while we were close. We used >to call each other regularly and even had visited each >other's apartments. Then one day a woman named Absa >called me from their apartment. She said she was >working for the NIA at state house but had decided to >visit America and wanted to seize the opportunity to >desert and seek political asylum here. She asked for >my help in the form of writing a testimonial for her >for the INS. Her reason for leaving, she said, was >that she was afraid for her personal security in the >wake of the next presidential election. She was afraid >there would be serious political trouble that could be >dangerous to those of them working too close to the >president. >One of the gentlemen said that the lady was his >sister. >They came to my apartment next. Without doubt I could >recognize her face as one of Yaya's aides. She was >fond of wearing white veil. I think she was a born >again Muslim. Anyway I did not know that she was >called Absa and had never spoken to her before. >I told her the implications of the process of seeking >for asylum-the need to justify her fears of being >persecuted if she should go back to The Gambia and the >advantage of getting an immigration lawyer to do the >process for her. She agreed to all my proposals, but >that was it. The next thing I was told was that she >had taken employment at a restaurant. If it was true I >am sure she must have been illegally employed. Anyway >I kept on monitoring her with my friends at a safe >distance. >Then a month or so later, Yaya came to America. It was >that last visit he made here when the NY Gambian >movement gave him the hell he deserved. During that >period however, I was able to get some inside >information about the activities of this Absa with the >Yaya entourage. It was confirmed to me that she was >always with them, sometimes accompanied by her >brothers. I was most of the time their subject of >discussion and the members of the movement who were >behind the embarrassing demonstration against Yaya. So >at one point, James Kujabi even assured them that I >was marked for execution the moment I stepped my foot >in The Gambia. >Anyway these were the two old friends I saw at the >meeting cheering Mr. Halifa Sallah especially when the >PDOI spokesman said anything that seemed to challenge >Mr. Darbo's position. >I think it was the panel moderator Mr. Saul Mbenga who >raised the critical subject of the much desired >opposition coalition to hear the opinion of Mr. Darbo >and Mr. Sallah. According to Mr. Darbo who first >responded, he had seen no problem about it and that he >strongly believed that the three parties coming >together would give them a better chance of winning >Yaya. Mr. Sallah also expressed his positive hopes in >a united front but went on to argue that it is >normally explored in the second rounds of presidential >elections. He quoted Senegal and Ghana as typical >examples. > Mr. Darbo however observed that given their limited >resources at this moment when a first round funding >was still inadequate it would not be too easy to >finance two rounds anyway. Mr. Darbo explained that >together, they could mobilize all their resources and >their followers to defeat the APRC. >Then Mr. Sallah questioned the criteria of choosing >the leader. >Here I saw my two friends cheering with fanatical >enthusiasm. >Mr. Darbo replied by saying that the parties could >discuss the question of who should be the leader after >agreeing to come together. >The audience gave a round of applause. >That's when Mr. Sallah came up with the big one. As I >heard it, the PDOI party believes in a >state-controlled economic system or socialism, which >is in total conflict with what, the other parties >believe in. He even quoted a statement he said was >said by Mr. Hamat Bah about his party's commitment to >capitalism. >My friends cheered again. >I felt hopeless. >When Mr. Darbo took the floor, he also made it clear >that his party honestly believes in private-sector >oriented economic system. >That made the whole issue a difference in fundamental >principles. To me, perhaps the UDP might be able to >make it with the NRP, but as for the PDOI party, I >could not see how it would be possible even in a >second round situation. Socialism and Capitalism in >their pure form don't mix. It's like mixing >combustible gas with pure oxygen. >I think it would be good for interested Gambians to >try and purchase the video clip of that meeting to get >the first hand picture of what transpired. It is also >of great importance for us to discuss this matter >especially the fund-raising activities and how the >various parties should benefit from it if they cannot >come together. >Anyway Saul I don't want us to lose track of our >theme. What I was saying was that the APRC >sympathizers have to be watched. Most of them could >sense that Yaya's government has no future so they >take the clandestine path, which allows them the >periodical latitude to even condemn Yaya if the heat >is too much on them. >To conclude this discussion on NdowNjie's critics I >want to refer everybody to the role of the British >Army Training Team (BATT) in the army. I don't know >how people tend to forget that it was BATT that was >contracted by the government to establish the GNA in >1984, and that until 1992 when the Nigerians took over >that responsibility from them, they were still calling >the shots. But when things started falling apart, >everybody decided to trivialize the role of the >"toubabs" and heaped the blame on Ndow Njie. >The British could have put the proper standards in >place, especially in the officer corps. Everyone was >aware of their presence and how the Gambians depended >on them to build the army with little or no Senegalese >interference. It would be another long story to talk >about the BATT. But their role was as much critical. >Have you ever heard about Colonel Jim Shaw the last >BATT commander? >Let me now answer Dampha's last questions. About >whether there was any confrontation between the GNA >soldiers and the TSG guards at Denton Bridge when the >former were crossing, that's a big no. After Chongan >left for Banjul, Captain Swareh took charge. He >quietly allowed them to cross without any squabble. >There was no problem whatsoever. Dampha also wanted to >know how Yaya did in that GNA officers' test conducted >by the Nigerians. He was sill at the TSG then. He >transferred over to the GNA after. >Yundun Barracks was my last stop. We arrived there >between 3:00pm to 400:pm. The camp showed the evidence >of how disorganized the coup was in nature. In a >well-organized military operation, the norm is to have >your rear-operation base fully equipped and manned to >coordinate the efforts of those in the front line. I >thought I was going to find some officers in control >of the camp giving out the necessary orders and the >logistic supplies. Nothing close to that existed at >the barracks. >The first things that drew my attention were the >officers locked up in the soldier's cells. Major Davis >the number two man in the battalion, Lt. S. Gomez, the >adjutant and Lt. O Mbye were all in the cells. I went >to speak to them. I did not see Major Davis whom I >understood was sitting on the floor, but I spoke to >both lieutenants. >Lt. O. Mbye could not understand why he was singled >out among all the platoon commanders that morning and >arrested and thrown in the cells. >As for the adjutant Lt. S. Gomez, he told me his >harrowing confrontation with 2Lt Singhateh that >morning to get him surrender the keys of the armory. >Singhateh had almost killed him with a shot he fired >very close to him. > As the adjutant he was always entrusted with the safe >keeping of the weapon-store keys. However, according >to the lieutenant, the keys were in the safe in his >office. He told Singhateh where they were but he would >not believe him. He tore apart his brief case and >fired a shot from his rifle after forcing him to kneel >on the ground. He was then ordered into the cell, >Mr. Gomez could not understand why. The two >lieutenants asked me to see whether I could get >someone to let them out of the cells and at least >allow them to stay in the officers mess. >I went into the camp toward the main admin office. >There was a lot of commotion at the soldier's >television hall. I found out that it was full of >arrested TSG guards. Lt. Dibba was one of them. I >spoke to him briefly to find out who brought them >there but he could not explain anything. >In the adjutant's office however I was a bit relieved >to find Captain M. Badjie and Lt. B. Barrow. Despite >being the only officers in the barracks, it did not >take me long to know that they were not in control of >anything. But they did not want to say so. They could >not tell me why there were three officers in the >soldier's cells, or why they could not be released >immediately since there was no problem in the coup >operation. I thought they could be out to help >stabilize the situation better. Moreover, I discussed >with them the urgent need to start planning what to >tell the Gambian people, since the government had been >overthrown. It was apparent that the longer the >situation remained uncertain, the more likely it was >for troublemakers to exploit it. It was therefore >important to at least make a radio announcement >explaining what had happened and to assure the >population that everything was under control. Every >one of them agreed about the urgency of the moment and >the danger of a protracted silence. But as for the >officers in the cells they finally told me to try and >see Sergeant Major Ebrima Bah. He was said to be at >the "B" or "C" Company office. On my way out of the >office, I noticed two civilians in the adjacent >office. It was the office of Major Davis. They were >the permanent secretary ministry of defense Mr. B Jack >and Mr. Kebba Ceesay director general NSS. Both were >arrested and brought to the camp. They asked me to >help them to go home to their families. I told them >that I was not part of the coup and had nothing to do >with their arrest but that I was going to see the >person said to be responsible. They did not seem to >believe that I was not part of the conspiracy. >I met the sergeant major and he complimented me >accordingly but would not cooperate with me on the >issue of releasing the arrested officers and two >civilians. He said he could not release anyone unless >he was given orders from the right persons. He would >not tell me who the right persons were either. >I went back to the cells and explained to the officers >the problem I was facing to obtain their release. I >promised them that I would keep on trying. >It was outside that building where I met Sergeant >Major Gibril Saye. When I asked him what happened, he >cleared himself of any involvement in the mutiny. He >told me how he resisted it until he was locked up in >the cells too. But when they realized that they could >not assemble the heavy weapons without him, they later >brought him out and begged him to cooperate. It was >the same Saye who was later commissioned as lieutenant >and murdered. >I went back to the main office and explained to Mr. >Jack and Mr. Ceesay what happened. They were >devastated. >Surprisingly, when I returned to the adjutant's office >Captain Sonko and Lieutenant Barrow had left Banjul. >Captain Badjie was alone in the office. >I asked him how I could get a weapon. He called one of >the NCOs to get me one from the armory. He brought me >one AK47 rifle and two magazines full of ammo. It was >really reassuring to be armed. I could not tell what >was going to happen, but the air of trouble was >looming thick in the atmosphere. >It was not long when a corporal came to tell us that >all officers were required to report to the state >house for a general meeting. The corporal had a stolen >van and certainly had no driver's license. But he >drove us to the state house. >On the way at around Westfield Clinic, we heard the >first radio announcement made by Lt. Barrow and Capt. >Sonko at Radio 1 F.M. On the whole that was where they >had gone to after they left us at Yundum. >We also found Sabally and Haidara mounting a >checkpoint by the JIMPEX junction. He stopped our >vehicle and began to ask stupid questions. We told him >that we were told to report to the state house. He was >noticeably hyperactive and incoherent. After stopping >two or three more vehicles driven by over excited >soldiers he finally told us to go. >The state house was chaotic. Soldiers were driving in >and out of the place in different kinds of vehicles, >most of them seized from their owners or government >departments. There was no speed limit. Some of the >soldiers were carrying officer's ranks as high as >lieutenants. >The first officer we met when we walked into the main >building where the meeting was scheduled to take place >was 2Lt. Singhateh. He spoke to me in an upset tone >about why I told them that the Americans had planned >to intervene when it was not so. He said he asked >Major McClain but the American defense attaché denied >any involvement of US troops. >I asked him what the fuss was all about when their >objective was achieved without any complication. He >mumbled some words in anger and walked away. >By 6:00pm, most of the officers in large numbers, GNA >and TSG arrived at the state house. The meeting room >was a fairly wide space on the ground level of the >state house building. >To name a few of those present we had Major Malick >Njie (Doctor), Major Antouman Saho, Major Sheriff Mbye >(TSG), Captain Mamat Cham, Captain Ndure (TSG) Captain >S. Sarr, Captain M. Sonko, Captain M. Badjie, Lt. Yaya >Jammeh, 2Lt. Singhateh, Lieutenant Barrow, 2lt Bajinka >(TSG) and many more officers. The hall was almost >full. >Yaya and Singhateh were sitting beside each other >facing the crowd. It seemed like we were waiting for >Sabally and Haidara to arrive. For a while everyone >was just sitting quietly waiting to hear from the >first speaker. Then suddenly Yaya got up on his feet >drawing everyone's attention. However to everybody's >surprise and shock, he started using abusive language >swearing to all of us to know that that it was not a >monkey-work-baboon- eat thing. He swore that they were >not going to allow any "bastard to come and enjoy this >with us when they had not played any part in the >struggle." >He was on his feet for almost five minutes virtually >insulting everyone, repeating the same phrase of "not >a monkey work baboon eat thing." >I could not take it after a while. I challenged him >for his rudeness and told him to spare us his >primitive ideas and tell us what we could do in that >volatile confusion. I asked him what he had specially >done after all to claim this so-called big victory >when by all indication, the TSG that was supposed to >resist made it so easy for them. It was clear that >they both played equal roles in bring it to a peaceful >end. So all we expected of them was to tell us what >they had planned next and not some monkey and baboon >story. >After I was arrested the police CID wanted to build a >case against me from that confrontation with Yaya. A >senior police officer Jatta Baldeh asked me at the >board reviewing the case of the detainees why I was >rude to the chairman of the council at the state house >on the 22nd July. It was simple to answer. I told him >that at time he was nothing. There was no chairman >until two days later. >Anyway we all had our rifles in hand fully loaded, >cocked and saved. >At that point, Singhateh got up and held Yaya back >while Majors Njie and Saho held me back too. >"Listen to me gentlemen to tell you the background of >this coup", said Singhateh after talking Yaya to sit >down. >He told us that the coup was originally organized by >five of them: he, Lieutenant Barrow, 2Lt. Kanteh, 2Lt. >Kinteh and 2Lt. Sabally. "Lieutenant Jammeh was not >even part of it", he went on. >"But we were betrayed by Barrow, Kinteh and Kinteh', >he said. >I looked at Barrow where he was sitting beside Capt. >Sonko, but he was well composed and very quiet. >Singhateh explained further how the two of them alone, >he and Sabally, pursued the course to the end and that >it was in the last days when they invited in Jammeh >and Haidara. >Yaya said nothing. >In conclusion, Singhateh said that he even did not >think that a meeting about what they should do next >should be held in the absence of Sabally and Haidara. >Major Saho turned around to me and said, "you heard >that my brother? It is clear that the show belongs to >the young officers, so we should allow them to finish >their business." >That statement froze all my spirit into a brick of >ice. >Lt. B. Barrow was the next to speak. He accepted being >part of those who planned the coup in the beginning >but disagreed with the statement that he betrayed the >group. He said he was just not too comfortable with >the timing. >He however appealed to Singhateh to please let Capt. >Mamat Cham and myself stay around to help forge ahead >because of our experience and knowledge. It was >endorsed by all. >Just before the officers dispersed, Sabally arrived >threatening to start a fight for having a meeting in >his absence. He was yelling and screaming asking why >there was a meeting in his absence. >I think it was Singhateh who finally calmed him down. >Before going home to see my family and change into a >proper outfit for the operation, I had a brief meeting >with Capt. Cham. In the end we decided that we were >not going to fool ourselves. We did not have any idea >about coups or what to do after. So we decided that >General Dada who was still at his official residence >angry with the government should be consulted to >advice us. >Anyway, I spent the night at the state house with all >the monkeys and baboons. >The following day, Sabally and Haidara started the >wave of arrests and detention of officers. No reason >was given for the madness. >Till next time! > >Ebou Colly > > > > > >__________________________________________________ >Do You Yahoo!? >Get personalized email addresses from Yahoo! Mail - only $35 >a year! http://personal.mail.yahoo.com/ > >---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > >To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L >Web interface at: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/gambia-l.html >You may also send subscription requests to >[log in to unmask] >if you have problems accessing the web interface and remember to write your >full name and e-mail address. >---------------------------------------------------------------------------- _________________________________________________________________ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L Web interface at: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/gambia-l.html You may also send subscription requests to [log in to unmask] if you have problems accessing the web interface and remember to write your full name and e-mail address. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------