Colley Marvelous piece again.I can't wait to see your next article. Once again,God saved you to tell the true colors of the "Alibaba and the six thieves" Peace!!!! >From: ebou colly <[log in to unmask]> >Reply-To: The Gambia and related-issues mailing list ><[log in to unmask]> >To: [log in to unmask] >Subject: COUP IN GAMBIA EIGHT >Date: Sun, 24 Jun 2001 19:27:56 -0700 > >COUP IN GAMBIA EIGHT >In my last piece I explained how after two days of >confusion at the State House following the immediate >takeover that the so-called coup organizers finally >came together and formed a ruling military council >with Yaya given the leadership role as the most senior >officer among them. Still guided by their order of >seniority Sabally, as I said, got the number two >position, followed by Haidara, then Singhateh and >Yankuba in that order. >However, for those of us within, there was no question >about who was really in charge. Singhateh was no doubt >the man calling the shots with unprecedented >arrogance. Of course there was crazy Sana battling for >equal recognition or rights, acting on his erratic >whims, though with a dangerous bond with the new >defense minister. Most of the arrests and detentions >of officers to Mile Two Central Prisons were >orchestrated by Singhateh and Sabally, although the >physical apprehension of those detainees was largely >carried out by the "Mighty Sabally" aided by Haidara >and their guards. Sabally in addition showed little >respect for Yaya, just as Singhateh at that initial >moment demonstrated none at all to their new chairman >either. As for Sabally he had maintained his >disrespect for Yaya for the entire six months he had >served as vice-chairman of the AFPRC or up to the day >he was arrested on the 27th January 1995. >It did not however take Yaya too long to realize that >potential enemies surrounded him. For a while it >appeared as if he was lost in survival plans. But >then, the US ambassador Mr. Andrew Winters came asking >for the coup leader to speak to Sir Dawda by phone. It >was the very day Yaya got elected as chairman of the >AFPRC. Mr. Winters did not specifically ask for >Singhateh, but the head of the military government. >Yaya as a result was certain that he was the person >the Ambassador wanted to talk to Sir Dawda until >Singhateh told him to forget about going and left with >Mr. Winters. >This particular incident in the development of the >whole coup episode told a lot about how the success of >those clowns in seizing power was merely luck and >nothing of the sort of great leadership they later >tried to sell to the gullible Gambian masses. Nothing >was properly planned or executed. >Anyhow, it was after this embarrassing encounter with >Singhateh that Yaya started to forge his personal >defense scheme. Yaya was definitely not pleased with >that treatment. So no sooner had Singhateh left with >the ambassador to speak to Sir Dawda than Yaya began >to surround himself with guards he trusted. And it was >interesting to note that he got the bulk of these men >from his former gendermarie colleagues. The men they >were suppose to fight were suddenly turned into >dependable allies within Yaya's inner security circle. >Soon he put it to his new guards that soldiers >carrying weapons were not to be allowed near him >especially around his room upstairs. (After his >appointment, he immediately moved upstairs and >occupied Sir Dawda's main bedroom). His guards, now >headed by Musa Jammeh strictly enforced the order from >Yaya on every armed soldier except on Singhateh and >Sabally. >Anyway in their presence, Yaya was still very cautious >in the manner he dealt with them. Perhaps he was aware >of the intentions of these key players in the coup to >have most of the officers executed later. I'll get to >that later. >Before forgetting this important point, I thought it >historically necessary to mention the special role >played by Major Malick Njie (Army Doctor) at those >first critical days of the coup. Although he was just >from course in Nigeria and was on his leave, he >managed to respond to the invitation to the State >House. For two days he also stayed around to see how >he could help stabilize the situation. With his >medical background therefore he was assigned with the >special task of ensuring that the Royal Victoria >Hospital was fully operational plus all the medical >centers affected by the coup outside Banjul. For three >days he tirelessly moved from one affected medical >facility to the other until everyone of them was back >to full operation. On the fifth day, when he came to >give the council members a situation report on his >achievements, Sabally and Haidara arrested him and >took him straight to death row. It was a very cowardly >and treacherous act. >However by the 25th of July, things started to look >hopefully stable. The soldiers' uncontrolled and >dangerous driving in the city had considerably >dwindled. There were negligible problems here and >there which in the final analysis made the coup a >relatively peaceful event. One sergeant was arrested >for robbing a Mauritanian shopkeeper in Brikama at >gunpoint. Another corporal was also arrested for >trying to steal the engine of a Mercedes Benz parked >at the former Secretary General's residence at Fajara. >There was also a civilian arrested wearing military >uniform pretending to be a soldier and extorting money >from commercial drivers around Soma. He was a seasoned >criminal who had traveled all over the world and could >speak all kinds of languages, local and foreign. A >weapon in his hands would have been too deadly. And >finally there was one soldier who out of excitement or >whatever, accidentally shot him self on the foot. It >was not very serious anyway. Apart from those isolated >incidents, the country quickly began to return to >normalcy by the 25th of July. >At that moment Captain Mamat Cham was so pleased with >General Dada's assistance that he recommended for the >Nigerian General to be invited to the State House for >more help. The idea was communicated to the general, >which he readily accepted but requested for a vehicle >to be sent to get him. But at the last minute when >Captain Cham was about to dispatch a vehicle to get >him from Fajara, Singhateh vetoed the idea. >Anyhow, later that day, Captain Cham had a bigger >responsibility of helping the council members choose >civilian ministers for the new cabinet. Apart from Mr. >Bakary Darbo who was selected out of sincere respect >and confidence most of the AFPRC members had for the >former Finance Minister, I really didn't know the >criteria used to select the others including my very >self. >All I knew was that a special meeting to select the >ministers was again conducted upstairs by the room >occupied by Yaya. Captain Cham was present. And I was >made to understand that he, Captain Cham recommended >the appointment of Fafa Mbye as minister of justice >and also Mr. Mawdo Touray as chief protocol officer. >Like previous missions outside, Captain Cham was the >officer who went to meet most or all the prospective >ministers at their home to seek their consent for >their formal appointment. On his return he reported >everyone's acceptance of the appointments except that >of the candidate from the PDOIS party. They rejected >the offer on the basis that the coup was undemocratic >and was against the principles of their party >doctrine. >However, it was Singhateh who informed me of my >appointment as minister for trade and industry. He >told me that the decision to give me that position was >derived from their strong confidence in my ability to >offer a valuable contribution to the course. >Up to that moment nothing of serious importance could >be attributed to the reason why the PPP government was >overthrown. And that was evident in the manner the >former top executive members of that government were >treated in comparison to how the GNA senior officers >in particular suffered the misdirected stupidity and >anger of the fools. There was nothing logical in >arresting the officers who had nothing to do with >their success or failure or their purpose of >overthrowing the government. Speaking to Yaya about >trying to stop Sana was useless. He would express his >dissatisfaction with Sabally's actions in the absence >of the vice-chairman, but as soon as Sana surfaced >with more names of officers he just arrested, Yaya >would commend him for a job well done. It was hard to >understand when the whole madness would end. Some of >us were however hoping that by the time the new >government became fully operational; they would put >Sana in his place and allow civility to prevail. We >did not know that Sabally after all had gotten into >something too much for his midget head and that only >by applying his maddening rules of the game against >him would he be finally tamed. It was done on the 27th >of January 1995. That was the day Yaya and Singhateh >came together at last and dragged Sabally and his >friend Haidara by the tails straight to death row as >well. We gave them a warm welcome that day. >Anyway, as the general situation indicated in the >beginning, there was nothing of significance that the >AFPRC government could say were the serious crimes >committed by the PPP government towards the Gambian >people to warrant the coup. And until those kangaroo >courts were created as commissions of enquiry boards >to implicate the Gambians they simply hated, there was >still little for them to say. In the process, the >crude oil saga was dug out giving them their first >anti-PPP ammunition that boosted their public image. >With 420 million Dalasi said to have been involved in >what the commission reported as "embezzlement of >public funds", Yaya started calling Sir Dawda and his >government "Dirmos…! Dirmos…! Dirmos…! (Well, time has >proven to all of us that when looking for the biggest >Dirmo of the century, missing Doctor Dirmo Yaya Jammeh >leaves you with nobody better qualified for the >crown). The fact that he was caught red handed on a >crude oil corruption saga coupled with all kind of >racketeering-blood diamond, arms trafficking >etceteras- not in Dalasi but millions of dollars was >enough to drag him out of State House straight to >death row. >Anyhow, the fact of the matter was that we were poorly >armed with good reasons for the coup. Yet we were >appointed ministers and expected by all means to >justify our positions or actions to the Gambian >public. >The following day however, the other ministerial >positions were formally announced over Radio Gambia. >That evening, I did not stay too late at the state >house. For the first time since the coup I decided to >go home and spend the night with my family. Before >leaving I spoke to Yaya at the balcony by his room. He >even asked me to make sure that I reported for duty >early the next morning since it was supposed to be the >day for the swearing in of the newly appointed >civilian ministers. We were very close indeed, >providing us with the opportunity to talk about a lot >of things. He treated me with respect and I thought he >was a genuine good person. We even discussed the >urgency for him to look into getting a wife since he >was without one at the time. He agreed that it would >be his top priority before long. And he definitely had >someone in mind around Brikama. >Oh, by the way, I think the 26th of July was the day >IGP Pa Sallah Jagne returned from Dakar. He was among >those who joined the America vessel with Sir Dawda and >his family. Upon his arrival, Sabally and Haidara >arrested and chained him to Mile Two Prisons. >A week or two later Lamin Kaba Bajo also returned from >Dakar. Within weeks he was appointed Commissioner >Western Division. Too hard to reason out! >I slept at home that night but Captain Cham spent the >night at his usual room at the state house. > The following morning I drove myself from my house to >the State House. I did not have any driver or guards. >Few soldiers had come to me asking for whether they >could become my guards but I turned their offers down. >I did not feel the need for guards anyway. >It was about 8:00 a.m. when I drove into State House. >There were a lot of soldiers standing around with a >hand full of officers as well. The most senior officer >was Lieutenant Ebrima Cambi. >Interestingly, Lt. Cambi was one person Yaya wanted to >see arrested They had had personal problems before >regarding an army vehicle that Lt. Cambi forced Yaya >to ground on the orders of Colonel Akogie. When I >first heard him talking about arresting Lt. Cambi I >was lucky to talk him out of it. After that I called >Lt. Cambi and warned him to be careful of his >activities before he was arrested. Anyhow by the >morning of the 27th of July all arrests plans for the >lieutenant seemed to have been forgotten. Weeks after >he was nailed down. He was the last officer to be >arrested around the middle of August. >As expected when I alighted, Lt. Cambi called every >person on the ground to attention before he saluted >me. I saluted back and told him to stand everybody at >ease and carry on. Typical military rituals! >I walked into the building, took the stairs straight >up to Yaya's room. The area was unusually quiet. There >was only one guard around, Corporal Mballo Saidykhan. >He was a former member of the presidential guard. I >was really surprised to hear from the corporal that >Yaya was still sleeping since he went to bed last >night. After being so particular about timing that >morning for the swearing in ceremony of the new >cabinet ministers, it was surprising that he was still >in bed. I later added one and one and figured the >whole thing out. Yaya just did not want to meet me >because of the conspiracy they had hatched against us >the previous night. >I walked across the corridor and ran into Singhateh. >When I spoke to him, I noted some degree of arrogance >and rudeness in his voice. He walked away from me. > Down the hallway there was the room occupied by >Sabally and Haidara. They were in a cheerful mood >until they saw me walking in. I even tried to joke >with them but by their reaction they showed me that I >was not at all funny to them. I took a seat on one of >the chairs in the room; they both got up and left the >room. It was now clear to me that something had >seriously gone wrong. >Captain Mamat Cham was in the next room. I was >slightly relieved when I saw him. He was nice and >spoke to me just like before, although I found him >talking to some civilians about the current situation. >Among them was Mr. Bolong Sonko who was the chosen >minister of external affairs. >There were also officials from the Gambia Ports >Authority with reports of emergency international >monetary transactions that were to be attended to >ASAP. >Anyway I was able to get Captain Cham to talk to me >one to one at the back of the room. I asked him what >had happened the previous night after explaining to >him my strange encounters in the last ten to fifteen >minutes. At first he insisted that nothing unusual >happened but when I pressed him further to think about >everything that had happened last night, he talked >about Singhateh's rude behavior. >According to the Captain at around 3.00 a.m., >Singhateh woke him up from his sleep and told him to >vacate the room and go to a smaller one because, by >appointment he was his senior as the minister of >defense. Asked what he did, Cham said that he accepted >without argument and moved to the other room. After a >short while, Singhateh came back to him and informed >him to go back to the room he was asked to leave. He >went back, and that was the last time he saw or spoke >to him. >"Do you know that Yaya is still in bed?" I asked cham. >He did not know and was equally struck by the unusual >lateness.. >It was barely five minutes later when a soldier walked >in, saluted me and asked me to answer the >Vice-Chairman downstairs. That was very unusual again. >Whatever Sana had wanted to tell me out of the >ordinary he could have said it when I met him with >Haidara minutes ago. >I left Captain Cham to attend to his civilian guests >and went down the stairs to the lower floor. Sana was >outside the building waiting for me. He asked for >Captain Cham. >"He is upstairs", I said. >The same soldier was sent back up to get him. >In the meantime I asked Sabally what was going on. >"Nothing serious', he said. " I just want to show you >and Captain Cham something". >When the captain came down, Sana offered to ride with >me in his vehicle while Cham joined Haidara. >As the convoy was about to Leave State House, Dr. >Malick Njie arrived to give his report about the job >he had been doing in the hospitals and clinics. Anyway >he was asked to join us in one of the vehicles behind' >Driving through Independence Drive in a state of >deafening silence in the vehicle I soon noticed >something that further bothered me. Ahead of us I >noticed an overloaded pickup vehicle with soldiers >armed to the teeth. It was trouble staring at me >directly in the face. >For a moment I thought we were going to Yundum until >the convoy branched off to Mile Two Prisons. The >vehicles came to a screeching stop at the center of >the yard, by the admin office. Within seconds we were >surrounded by soldiers pointing their rifles at us as >Sabally said the words: "SIR, YOU ARE UNDER ARREST". >"For what?" I asked. >"You are just under arrest sir"; he repeated the same >words. >I turned around and saw that we were four in number: >Major Malick Njie, Captain Cham, ASP Aboubacarr Jeng >(police officer who was helping in the documentation >of our activities since day two of the coup) and >myself. >I told Sabally to inform my family about the arrest >and detention. He would not even talk back. He simply >waved at us with his weapon to move into the prison >enclosure-death row to be more precise. >It was unimaginable but more reasonable than trying >anything foolish just be shot by that imbecile for >nothing. >As for the prison officers who received and searched >us, they took everything they considered illegal to >keep in the cells; they behaved as if we were serial >killers already sentenced to die within few hours. >They took everything from me from my wristwatch to my >belt and even my shoelaces. >Then they put us in cell rooms about nine feet long >and five feet wide. It had one wooden bed placed on >concrete slabs with one dirty blanket spread on it. >There was a small window opening to the outside at the >upper part of the wall. Call it the superhighway for >the all the mosquitoes in that swampy area. Not a >single documentation of our names, the time we came in >or why we were there was done. There were no >cautionary statements from anybody. We were just like >bunch of animals herded into a slaughterhouse. >Beside the extremely bad food served, we were for >almost two weeks not allowed to leave the cells for >anything, showering or even breathing fresh air >outside. We were locked up 24/7. >When some detainees later got sick, and Haidara whose >ministry was in charge of the prisons, was asked about >taking them to the RVH, he made this statement: >"Anyone who is sick should never be taken to any >hospital, and if he died he would happily take the >responsibility of burying that person.". >Well what goes around comes around. When he got sick >after being tortured for two weeks, the doctors begged >Singhateh to let him be evacuated to the RVH but the >then Vice-Chairman vetoed it without sympathy or >remorse. He died that same week. >It was the darkest period in the political history of >the Gambia and I hope and pray that the appearance of >these monsters would be the last ever seen in the >Gambia. >You see, in the GNA, we were simply ordinary Gambians. >We had had our differences, argued among ourselves and >sometimes even threatened each other. But that was all >about it. We did not for once imagine that smiling >colleagues in our midst were capable of even >considering hurting us let alone murdering us in cold >blood. Some Gambians attribute great importance to >peoples' names. So the name Haidara was after all very >much respected and often honored as originating from >good Muslims background ( the Sheriffs) who would >rather save lives than waste them for no good reasons. >Perhaps that was the reason why God did not wait for >too long to stop this man whose actions were ungodly >and too inhuman for the Gambia. >As for Sana, his crazy life has though crumbled; >nonetheless I still think we are yet to see this >devil's last deplorable end. >I still wonder what would have happened if I had spent >the night of the 26th of July at State House and how I >would have reacted to Singhateh if he had treated me >in the manner he rudely treated Captain Cham. I was >throughout with the impression that Edward was a nice >simple gentleman, respectable and could never consider >hurting any person much more his fellow officers in >the GNA. He was so likable that I believe I was among >those who gave him the name high speed. >Anyway after our arrest and detention 2Lt Alagie >Kanteh was briefly appointed spokesman of the council. >Few weeks after his appointment, he was arrested. He >was the first person who warned us in the jail about >Singhateh's serious intention to have all detainees >executed. According to Kanteh, since Singhateh visited >Sierra Leone where he had a special meeting with >Captain Valentine Strasser, he had been going around >with the strong commitment that the best solution to >our cases was to put us before a firing squad and kill >us all. >With all that, some of us were still doubtful about >the ability of such a nice-looking person to even >think of that evil thought. >But on the 6th of September 1994 at about 2:00 a.m. >the entire AFPRC members paid us a horrible visit at >the prisons; it as the day we saw Singhateh's true >colors. >I will deal with that next time. >However thank god that we all survived the evil >intentions of those devils. After all if we were >executed some Gambians may have pretty well tried to >justify it in every way. > > >Ebou Colly. > > > >__________________________________________________ >Do You Yahoo!? >Get personalized email addresses from Yahoo! Mail >http://personal.mail.yahoo.com/ > >---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > >To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L >Web interface at: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/gambia-l.html >You may also send subscription requests to >[log in to unmask] >if you have problems accessing the web interface and remember to write your >full name and e-mail address. >---------------------------------------------------------------------------- _________________________________________________________________ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L Web interface at: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/gambia-l.html You may also send subscription requests to [log in to unmask] if you have problems accessing the web interface and remember to write your full name and e-mail address. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------