>From: Daddy Sang <[log in to unmask]> >Reply-To: [log in to unmask] >To: [log in to unmask] >Subject: Re: TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE!! >Date: Wed, 29 Aug 2001 19:49:57 -0700 > >Doc this a well reasoned account and I would asked; what promises were >made?, If the coalition emerge victorious, who among the PPP would be >second to Darboe? or would Darboe be a caretaker for whomever? Yes I agree >with your assessment of the under handedness with which the meeting was >conceived and held It begs the question who's fooling who? >Keep Up The Good Work > >Daddy Sang > > > > [Original Message] > > From: Abdoulaye Saine <[log in to unmask]> > > To: <[log in to unmask]> > > Date: 8/28/2001 7:50:43 PM > > Subject: TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE!! > > > > To: All Leaders of Political Parties in The Gambia; > > Editor, Point Newspaper; > > Editor, The Independent; > > Editor, The Observer > > > > > > The impending 2001 presidential election: An Editorial Comment > > > > On July 22, 2001, Jammeh was forced to lift the ban on political >activity, political parties and politicians > > in preparation for the October 2001 presidential election. Again, just >like the two-year timetable back to > > "civilian" rule, combined international and domestic pressure compelled >the incumbent president to partially > > open the political process. This, to enable pre-coup, and other parties, >formed shortly before the > > presidential election of 1996, to contest the election. The process, >however, still remains managed with the > > help of an Electoral Commission whose hand picked leader(s), except for >the recently fired Chairman, Johnson, > > dance to Jammeh’s tunes. Predictably, a level playing field does not >exist as the conditions are stacked > > against the opposition. > > > > Jammeh, meanwhile, continues to have monopoly over the television, and >national radio stations. With state, > > and other ill begotten wealth, Jammeh’s war chest is indeed formidable. >Consequently, he has used it, to > > dish out gifts to students, given tickets to pilgrims to perform the hajj >in Mecca, and seeks to buy the > > loyalty of those who oppose him. He boasts of being the wealthiest >person in The Gambia, enjoys the services > > of a personal airplane and is alleged to own mansions in Morocco and >Lybia. In addition, he built a second > > State House in his birth village of Kaninlai, where provisions are in >abundance and sold at discounted > > prices. > > > > Jammeh remains convinced that he can win the next elections, even in the >face of an alliance of the former > > ruling PPP/UDP and support of GPP's leader. Despite the fact that the >UDP, and PPP represent the two > > largest opposition parties and enjoy widespread popular support, four >smaller opposition parties have so far > > declined to join the UDP/ PPP alliance. The NCP leader, suspicious of >the UDP/PPP alliance walked out of a > > meeting at which an alliance of the two was being announced. A splinter >party of the PPP, NCP fears of a PPP > > comeback are not entirely baseless, as it has been suggested since the >alliance that the UDP is but a front > > for the PPP. These allegations, however, appear less convincing today >than they were in the last > > presidential election of 1996. > > > > Today, the UDP leader, and presidential candidate of the UDP/PPP >alliance, Ousainou Darboe, has emerged as a > > national leader with considerable support capable of beating Jammeh under >free and fair elections. In fact, > > many believe that Jammeh stole the 1996 presidential election from >Darboe. PDOIS, a socialist leaning party > > would join an opposition coalition only on condition that the prospective >coalition presidential candidate be > > chosen outside of the existing political parties. In addition with a >mandate to preside over a one year > > transition program and put in place other mechanisms for free and fair >elections. > > > > But perhaps the most nettlesome issue about the UDP/PPP alliance remains >what appears to many as a sweetheart > > deal between the two parties, especially at a time when the leader of NRP >was out of the country, and PDOIS > > not invited to the meeting. It appears that the alliance was hastily >concluded when many matters were > > unresolved. Many wondered why a meeting was held when the NRP leader was >out of the country, and why the > > request for a delay by PDOIS was politely rejected. It again raised the >lingering impression that the PPP is > > likely to come back to power riding on the coattails of the UDP. > > > > The fear over a PPP return to power has to do with the politics of >patronage, corruption and its relatively > > mixed performance of thirty years. Many Gambians, not withstanding the >alliance’s popular support, may not > > wish to see a return of the PPP to power and that the sweetheart deal was >underhanded at best. This is > > because the PPP delegates were perceived as too eager to win Darboe the >nomination. In the end, the long > > hoped for opposition coalition did not materialize to the disappointment >of many. It is felt that only a > > united opposition of all opposition parties stands the best opportunity >of unseating Jammeh and that the time > > had come for the opposition politicians to put aside their philosophical >and ideological differences to send > > Jammeh packing. > > > > Predictably, opposition coalitions as Ghana’s 1992 presidential election >showed are difficult to build, and > > maintain. While there could exist an overarching interest in ousting the >incumbent, party modalities, > > interests, and personalities may in fact, conflict. This led some >observers to term the lifting of the ban > > on political activity, “ as a blessing in disguise” for Jammeh, who >expects that the time left for > > campaigning may not be enough for the opposition parties to resolve their >differences, and in time, to mount > > an effective challenge against his rule. The prospect for another five >years of Jammeh, therefore, looms > > large in the minds of opposition party leaders, and dissidents. > > > > Yet, the alliance’s popular support in major urban centers, coupled with >the regime’s perceived unpopularity > > could avert this outcome. This is because the alliance, under Darboe, >could in all likelihood win the > > presidency, with or without the support of the other opposition parties, >but only if the election is free, > > and fair with “on the spot counting.” Failing this, the ballot boxes >would be stuffed as was alleged in > > 1996. As of now, Jammeh is vehemently opposed to “on the spot counting” >and perhaps for good reasons. And > > while it is desirable for all the opposition parties to be on a single >ticket backing Darboe, or whoever else > > is decided upon, the absence of PDOIS, NCP and NRP endorsement may not in >the end make or break the alliance > > at the polls. PDOIS and the NRP are relatively small parties with weak >though growing support bases, yet not > > essential to a UDP/PPP alliance victory. > > > > The NCP could have given a major boost to the alliance, however, because >it had a larger support base than > > either PDOIS or NRP. This support base was eroded during the seven-year >ban when many of its supporters > > joined the ranks of the UDP. Yet, despite Dibba’s astuteness and >political appeal as a founding father of > > the PPP and The Gambia as a nation, his political hiatus from the >political scene in the last seven years, > > leaves him unelectable and vulnerable to charges of grandstanding and >opportunism. It is also unlikely that > > PDOIS, NRP and NCP supporters would rally to Jammeh just because their >party leaders do not support the > > UDP/PPPalliance. If they vote at all, the majority is more likely to >support the alliance, not Jammeh. > > > > This may, in fact, account for the UDP/PPP presidential candidate’s >failure, so far, to reconvene another > > meeting or try to bring these parties to his camp. Trying to win without >the support, and goodwill of PDOIS, > > NRP and NCP could have high costs, however, and could be downright risky. >Yet, as in other places, politics > > is risky business and revolves around alliances, coalition building, deal >making and the art of compromise. > > Not to be left out of the loop, it is important that those parties >outside the alliance be courted and > > included. Darboe must take the initiative and be the presidential >candidate to be reckoned with come October > > 2001. > > > > PDOIS must also show flexibility for its preconditions for joining the >alliance, in that the task of civic > > education is not a one shot deal, but an ongoing historical process that >could, under the best of > > circumstances, take years if not decades to accomplish. Similarly, >choosing a presidential candidate outside > > the existing political parties could and is indeed perceived in some >circles, as unnecessary, perhaps a tacit > > endorsement of Jammeh and a cry of sour grapes. That is, if PDOIS’ >chosen candidate, politician or civilian, > > does not head the coalition ticket, then no current politicians are >worthy of and qualified to head that > > ticket. If PDOIS insists on this precondition, it may very well remain >outside on the sidelines of the > > alliance for sometime to come. > > > > Regarding the NRP, and NCP leaders, there still remains an opening for >them to join the coalition. Dibba has > > not, in fact, shut the door completely for compromise and NRP’s Hamat Bah >could be induced into joining the > > coalition. It will take flexibility, and perhaps another meeting to have >all the parties come on board. > > This is the challenge that Darboe must rise up to. And Time is of the >Essence! > > > > Abdoulaye Saine > > Oxford, OH, U.S.A. > > > > >---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L > > Web interface at: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/gambia-l.html > > You may also send subscription requests to >[log in to unmask] > > if you have problems accessing the > >---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > >To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L >Web interface at: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/gambia-l.html >You may also send subscription requests to [log in to unmask] >if you have problems accessing the web interface and remember to write your full name and e-mail address. >----------------------------------------------------------------------------