After 7 years of shambolic rule by the APRC, Gambians are faring worst than before. More than 60% of her people are living in poverty, not to mention the 50% who are in abject squalor. Yet the APRC and their Cyber intellectuals want us to believe that they are a blessing to our country. All they can come up with are the silly little projects they kept repeating to us.
I hope these intellectual drones understand that the majority of Gambians are not as infected with the ALES Syndrome as they are.
Gambians deserve better than whatever these rogues can ever deliver. Now Yahya's 98% electrification of the country is known to be a fallacy, he is fooling himself again that this promise will be fulfilled come September/October.
It is load of crap.
God Help us.
Mboge
>From: Jungle Sunrise <[log in to unmask]> >Reply-To: The Gambia and related-issues mailing list <[log in to unmask]> >To: [log in to unmask] >Subject: From the Jammeh 2001 website. >Date: Wed, 1 Aug 2001 09:26:16 +0000 > >Poverty Alleviation as a National Priority in the Gambia’s Economic >Development > >Compiled by the Finance Department of the APRC Government > >Background > >The year 1985/86 is a watershed in the Gambia's economic history. It >witnessed the launching of the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) which >sought >to reverse the declining trend in the economy in the 1970s, a period >characterized by declining terms of trade, oil price hikes, >inappropriate >economic policies, and excessive domestic absorption. > >These factors resulted in a consistent decline in the Gross Domestic >Product >(GDP), debt crisis, shortage of foreign exchange, galloping >inflation, and >increase in the deficit GDP ratio. The Government of the Gambia, >therefore, >embarked on an Economic Recovery Program in 1985/86 entailing the >elimination of exchange rate and other price distortions, assigning >a >greater role for the private sector, rolling back the frontiers of >the state >and creating a conducive environment for the long term growth of the >private >sector and elimination of subsidies. > >As a result of these policy measures, economic performance improved. >The >Gross Domestic Product grew by an average of 4.4% per annum, the >overall >deficit declined from 17% of GDP in 1987/88 to 4% in 1991/92, >inflation >declined from a record high of 70% in 1985/86 to 5% in 1990/91. > >In addition, the Program for Sustained Development (PSD) was >introduced in >1990 with the objective of consolidating the gains of the adjustment >process. The main thrust of this program constituted the following: > >-Promotion of the private sector as the engine of growth; > >-Divestiture of public enterprises; > >-Rationalization of custom tariffs; and, > >-Streamlining of the tax system. > >The Transition Era > >The Gambian economy has been affected by three major shocks in the >first >half of the 1990s, namely the border closure to the re-export trade, >the >devaluation of the CFA and the military take-over of 1994. The first >development resulted in the loss of revenue from the re-export trade >while >the second had the effect of loosing the Gambia's comparative >advantage in >the re-export trade. The take-over brought about the suspension of >and >balance of payment support, the withdrawal of development assistance >(by >50%), a downturn in the tourism sector (by 70%) and contraction of >private >sector activity. These unforeseen developments impacted adversely on >the >economy with GDP declining by about a low of 2.15 in 1994/95 and >inflation >surging at 7%. > >Economic Developments in The New (Second) Republic > >It was against this background that the government began to improve >the >governance environment during the transition period, 1994-1996 with >the >holding of several polling activities, including a referendum on the >draft >constitution and presidential and parliamentary elections in >September 1996 >and January 1997 respectively. Thereafter, confidence from both >foreign and >domestic investors resumed culminating in the resumption of >development >assistance. > >The IMF, for example resumed its Article IV consultations with a >view to >engaging in policy dialogue thus setting the pace for other >multilateral and >bilateral development partners. Subsequently, the Government of the >Gambia, >in collaboration with the IMF, adopted a Medium-term Strategy and >Program >for the period 1998-2000. This culminated in the provision in June >1998 of >an Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) amounting to $27 >million >in support of the government's economic program. In addition, the >government >was able to mobilize the support and endorsement of the development >partners >of its macroeconomic framework and program for the Social Sectors at >a Round >Table Conference in Geneva in July 1998. This medium term strategy >sought to >re-establish macroeconomic stability and consolidate government >finances by >further reducing government deficit > >The basic economic objectives for 1998-2000 are: > > >To achieve real GDP growth of 5 percent a year, > > >Keep annual inflation around 3 percent, > > >Reduce the external current account deficit (excluding official >transfers) >to less than 10 percent of GDP by 2000, and > > >Keep gross official reserves above the equivalent to five months of >imports. > >The fiscal program aims at reducing the overall budget deficit >(excluding >grants) to 4 percent of GDP in 1998 to 2 percent by 2000. The >monetary >program will continue to be tight, consistent with keeping the >annual rate >of inflation at about 3 percent, with the continued reliance on the >use of >indirect monetary instruments. The enhanced structural adjustment >facility >has now been re-orientated to a poverty reduction growth facility, >shifting >emphasis from mere structural adjustment to more social sector and >poverty >reduction strategy. > >The measures implemented under the medium term strategy yielded >positive >results. For the period 1995-1999, average GDP growth was 5% per >annum. In >1998, the economy registered a growth rate of 4.9% compared to 4.4% >in 1999 >and it is projected to grow by 5% in 2000. > >THE GAMBIA’S HIPC DEBT RELIEF STATUS > >The focus of policy reform in recent years has been to restore >macroeconomic >stability, and implement broad-based structural reforms in support >of the >country’s Strategy for Poverty Alleviation (SPA). The Gambia is >currently a >PRGF-eligible and IDA-only country, with a per capita GDP of about >US$315 in >1999. It is one of the poorest countries in the world, ranking 161st >(out of >174 countries) in terms of the United Nations Development Program’s >2000 >Human Development Index. On the basis of the 1998 household survey, >69 >percent of the Gambia population lives in poverty and 51 percent in >extreme >poverty. Poverty is more prevalent in the rural areas and especially >among >groundnut growers. Women in the Gambia are a particularly vulnerable >group. >Projections indicate that The Gambia’s per capita GDP would increase >to only >about US$500 by 2019. Therefore, The Gambia will continue to need >substantial international concessional assistance and is likely to >remain a >PRGF-eligible and IDA-only country in the foreseeable future. > >HIPC Qualification: > >The Gambia qualified for US$66.6 million worth of debt relief >assistance, >equivalent to 27.2 percent reduction in the country’s outstanding >stock of >debt at end 1999 after full use of traditional debt relief >mechanisms. The >Country reached its decision point in December 1999, and is expected >to >reach its completion point by 2003 by fulfilling the following >conditions; >Preparation and implementation of a full PRSP for at least one year; >and >improvement of the poverty database and monitoring capacity, as >evidenced by >progress in restructuring capacity building of the Central >Statistics >Department; > >The Gambia has now confirm getting Interim Relief from three of our >Multilateral Creditors, namely; The World Bank, IMF and ADB in the >form of >debt service forgiveness until we reach completion point in 2003. >For the >rest of our creditors, we have yet to confirm their share of debt >relief. > >The Gambia’s debt has the following characteristics; > > >Paris Club Bilateral debt with Austria, Netherlands, Norway & France > > >Non-Paris Club Bilateral with Taiwan PRC, China ROC, Kuwait Fund & >Saudi >Fund > > >Multilateral debt with IMF, WD, IDB, ADF, IFAD, BADEA & OPEC > >These are further divided into; > > >Paris Club Pre-cut-off/Post-cut-off Debts (any debt prior to 1986) > > >Non-Paris Club Pre-cut-off/Post-cut-off Debts (any debt after 1986) > > >Multilateral Post-cut-off > >One major characteristic of Gambia’s Paris-Club debt is that its >mostly >post-cut-off debt and therefore not subjects to traditional Paris >Club debt >relief mechanism. The Gambia currently has four Paris Club bilateral >creditors and the proportion of their outstanding debt represents >28.2 per >cent of the Gambia’s total debt in net present value terms. The bulk >of >these are owed to Austria and France whose debts constitute 7.9 per >cent and >5.9 per cent respectively of the total debt owed to the Paris Club. >The main >objective of The Gambia by approaching these creditors will be to >achieve >some kind of relief for this kind of debt. > >The Gambia’s outstanding debt with the Non-OECD bilateral creditors >stood at >US$53.8 million in net present value terms as at the end of 1999, >representing 21 per cent of our outstanding debt. The bulk of these >loans >(11 percent) are owed to Taiwan, Republic of China. > >The Gambia currently has nine multilateral creditors. Our >multilateral debt >constitutes the bulk of our external debt stock with 71% in net >present >value terms. Our two biggest multilateral creditors are the World >Bank and >African Development Bank with 46.5% and 28.3% respectively of the >total >multilateral debt. > >POVERTY ALLEVIATION PROGRAM > >Through out its post-independent development period, The Government >of The >Gambia has constantly sought to reduce Poverty. The main objective >of a >succession of Development plans has been to enhance the income of >the >farming community (the largest in The Gambia) and to provide basic >social >services to rural areas that comprised 80-85% of the population. The >oil >rises of the seventies and the ensuing dept rises of the 80s not >only >mollified the macaque achievements of these efforts but also put a >considerable stain on Government efforts to continue providing these >support >services. > >Structural adjustment downsizing considerably reduced public sector >investment in social services, leaving the poor and destitute >helpless. > >Against this background, following an assessment of the Poverty >situation in >1992, The GOTG formulated a Strategy for Poverty Alleviation. >Although SPA >received an encouraging welcome at the Geneva Roundtable in 1994, >Donor >support failed to follow suit due to the military take-over of the >22nd July >of that year. > >Consequently, on assessment of the SPA, it was clear that Poverty >(measured >by both income and non-income indicators) has risen from 31% of the >population to 62% between 1991 and 1998. Rural Urban Migration led >to the >over use of resources and services in urban areas resulting in urban >poverty >improved also. > >With renewed vigour in the fight against poverty, The Gambia >developed an >interim PRSP, which received acclaim, once again, from the Donor >Community. >Within the content of debt relief, new hopes have emerged to >resolute a >decisive action to reduce poverty. > > >PRSP to be finalised by September 2001 > >In the meantime, thirty-two interventions in the form of programs, >projects >and mainstream actions are on going to reduce poverty. This is >indicative of >an excellent rate of implemented for poverty reduction in general, >and a >high absorptive rate in particular. > >A number of other interventions are still pending, covering the need >to >finalise SPA II / PRSP and expanding the scope of poverty reduction >programs. > >Three programs appear critical for a smooth transition to SPA II, >implementing these programs at this stage will have a positive >impact both >on poverty reduction and the efficiency in the use of HIPC >resources: > >Most of the Gambia’s multilateral creditors, including IDA, IMF, >AfDB, IFAD, >OPEC Fund, ISDB, EU, and BADEA, have agreed to participate in the >enhanced >HIPC Initiative. The decision-making bodies of multilateral >creditors will >take specific decisions on the delivery of assistance to The Gambia >once the >Boards of the Bank and the Fund have discussed the decision point >document. >Along with Paris Club, which discussed The Gambia’s situation in >November, >these creditors represent more than 80 percent of the debt relief to >be >provided to The Gambia. > >The Gambia wants maximum debt relief from all of our multilateral >creditors >to give us debt service to exports ratio of 15% during the interim >period. > >Impact of Enhanced HIPC Debt Relief > >The above-enhanced HIPC assistance would enable The Gambia to >maintain >sustainable external debt level and release resources for the social >program. On the basis of the above assumptions, the total interim >HIPC debt >service relief would amount to an average of about US$4.4 million >(about 4¾ >percent of government revenue and 0.9 percent of GDP) a year for the >next >two years. Beyond the assumed completion point, the HIPC debt >service relief >would amount to about US$9.2 million a year for the ten-year period >beginning 2003 equivalent to an average reduction of 1.4 percent of >GDP a >year. The debt service ratio would be reduced on average by about 22 >percentage points during the interim period and 40 percentage points >during >the ten-year period following the anticipated completion point. > > >After debt relief under the enhanced HIPC Initiative, The Gambia’s >external >debt at end-1999 would be reduced from US$244.9 (after traditional >debt >relief) to US$178.2 million. The amount of assistance under the >Initiative >would amount to US$66.6 million equivalent to US$90 million in >nominal >terms. Several Paris Club creditors have indicated possible debt >relief >beyond their assistance under the HIPC Initiative, through >forgiveness of >ODA loans. This could amount to an additional US$ 2 million in NPV >terms >(see Figure 1). > > >The downside scenario in the context of enhanced HIPC assistance. >The Gambia >remains vulnerable to adverse shocks even with HIPC assistance; to >simulate >these impacts, the following were considered: lower re-export growth >(0.5 >percentage lower than under the baseline scenario) and lower tourist >arrivals (½ of a percentage point lower than under the baseline >scenario). >The strongest impact would result from a lower growth rate in >tourist >arrivals in which case the NPV value of debt after HIPC assistance >would not >fall below 150 percent before 2011, while debt sustainability would >be >reached already in 2002 under the lower re-export growth scenario >Debt >service savings arising from the enhanced HIPC assistance will be >used to >expand the economy’s productive capacity in order to diversify the >sources >of income for the poor; improve the poorest access to social >services; and >strengthen institutional capacity to enable local communities to >participate >and influence developments affecting their environment. The >government has >identified a number of key sectors that would benefit from the >enhanced HIPC >assistance and be funded through a contingency budget for 2001. >Three >sectors that would have the strongest impact on poverty (education, >health, >and rural development) would absorb over 60 percent of the enhanced >HIPC >assistance. The specific activities to be financed under each are as >follows: > > >In the education sector, activities identified under the TESP would >be >implemented including the funding of girls’ education trust fund, >the >construction of classrooms, and the training of teachers. These >activities >are expected to absorb 22 percent of the enhanced HIPC assistance; > > >In the health sector, focus will be on the elements of primary >health care >that are the target of the PHPNP such as vaccines, drug supplies, >and the >upgrading of the ambulance fleet. This is expected to absorb 18 >percent of >the enhanced HIPC assistance; and > > >Rural development would benefit from initiatives in irrigation, >research in >crop diversification, inland fishing (a potential source of >employment), >well drilling, and forest conservation and replenishment (a >potential source >of income for the poor). This sector would account for 20 percent of >enhanced HIPC assistance. > >Maintaining a stable macroeconomic environment as evidenced by >satisfactory >performance under a program supported by IMF-supervised Poverty >Reduction >and growth Facility (PRGF) arrangement; > >Making progress in strengthening public expenditure management as >evidenced >by issuance of annual public reports on the overall budget execution >and >semi-annual reports on the use of interim HIPC Initiative debt >relief; > >Establishing a functional multi-sector regulatory agency, and >bringing to >the point of sale the two major public groundnut processing plants; > >Making progress in the implementation of sector strategies in >education and >health. > >It’s the central objective of The Government of the Gambia to use >the >proceeds of debt and general donor assistance to boost investments >in >health, education, infrastructure, energy and social protection. > > > > >>From: Mr Makaveli <[log in to unmask]> >>Reply-To: The Gambia and related-issues mailing list >><[log in to unmask]> >>To: [log in to unmask] >>Subject: Jammeh's Bizzarre 7 Years Ago Speech: Rated R >>Date: Wed, 1 Aug 2001 03:14:38 -0500 >> >>Folks, >>I don't know about you all but what I saw and heard from this moron >>is just >>4^