-----Ursprungligt meddelande----- Från: ebou colly <[log in to unmask]> Till: [log in to unmask] <[log in to unmask]> Datum: den 30 juli 2001 05:35 Ämne: COUP IN GAMBIA ELEVEN >COUP IN THE GAMBIA ELEVEN >My program for this week and next is so tight that I >almost cancelled this posting. But on a second >thought, and especially not to disappoint my readers I >decided to come up with a short one. > However there are some comments I like to make on two >special issues; i.e., the opposition's great boost to >finally boot the Yaya dictatorship out of power in >October, in the wake of the death of Decree 89 and the >role the armed forces is expected to play in the >campaign, voting and final declaration of the end of >the APRC government. >To start with there is no doubt in my mind that the >repealing of the decree added more firepower to the >arsenals of the opposition force. With or without the >decree, I was positive that the Gambia had had enough >with "Yaya Bokassa Jammeh" the second dictator in the >history of modern African politics to order the >massacre of armless school children on ordinary >demonstration. That crime alone, forgetting all the >other heinous crimes committed by Yaya during his >reign of terror is enough to see him gone for good. >And I know for sure that the Gambian people as a >result would not allow him to remain another minute >that day in October when the people's votes show it >clear and indisputable to the whole world. >What the Gambian electorate should brace up for is the >possible futile resistance Yaya would attempt to put >up to stay in power by force. General Guai of Ivory >Coast tried it; Milosovic also tried it; but as >typical of dictators in their last moments, they >always end up being victims of the very forces they >built to protect them. For instance, in the cases of >Ivory Coast and Yugoslavia, the tyrants became wimps >when the security forces realized that the future of >the nation far outweighed the interest of one person >whose record as their leader merely brought them >embarrassment, horror and death. So they turned the >cannons on their master and stood by the popular >voices of the people. >To think that Yaya abrogated this decree out of >logical analysis and politically-fair conclusion, and >that he deserved to be commended for it is at best a >seriously misplaced judgement. Yaya's decision on this >one came out of a no-other-choice option. Anything >otherwise would have pitted him against the wrath of >the Gambian opposition forces and the international >community at large. He was aware of the intolerance of >everybody towards his intransigence on this decree. He >had "bilahi and walahi" the world on numerous public >forums swearing never to compromise the decree or >allow the banned politicians to participate actively >again. He had also threatened them with more verbal >terror, with his notorious six-feet-deep warning. But >when he realized that the likes of Mr. Omar Jallow ( >O.J.) were no longer intimidated by his childish >threat, coupled with the fact that the international >community was no longer prepared to accept his >stonewalling attitude in this issue, the dictator >bowed down in fear. Yes, it was nothing but fear that >drove him to such a decision. For that reason I >believe all commendations should be saved for the >international-pressure forces and those dynamic >opposing elements that kept up the heat on Yaya to the >end. >O.J. was awesome in this battle for reasons genuinely >justifiable. Despite his total innocence of any given >crime other than being a former minister in the former >PPP government-if that was a crime at all- like Buba >Baldeh was, O. J. on numerous occasions was arrested, >tortured, incarcerated and humiliated in every way >imaginable. But like Mr. Lamin Waa Juwara, every ill >treatment they received from the hands of the bandits >merely galvanized their fortitude and determination to >fight harder for their holy course. These are the men >who deserve the special commendation. For Yaya, he was >like a wanted psychopath on an evasive trail until >cornered at a dead end and given an ultimatum to >either surrendering or faced the risk of being smoked >out with lethal gas (a classic fate of a fat "dirmo" >with a relentless hunter). The guy therefore should at >most be laughed at and classified as nothing but the >coward he is. >It was also funny to learn that the six-feet-deep >threat was repeated at the time of his unhappy >abrogation statement to those opposition elements >affected. Well, that was a good tactic to reassure his >blind followers and give them the hope that he was >still the same tough idol they should continue to >worship. That was the child in him entertaining his >hopeless ego. >As I said earlier, I was left with no doubt that, come >October, the Gambians will get rid of Yaya even with >Decree 89 in place; but now that the moron has been >forced to abrogate it, I would say that the die is >finally cast. Yaya has put the last nail on his >coffin. >My warning to him now is to be mindful of his last >days. They are as dangerous as things were in the >beginning when treachery, betrayal and individual >interest characterized the actions of those very close >to him. It would be a costly mistake if he tries to >use the armed forces against the popular desire of the >Gambian people. So the easier he tries to leave the >scene with minimal trouble the better for him and of >course for those blindly loyal to him who could be >dragged along with him to the abyss of doom. >Come October, the majority of the soldiers will not be >part of any ill-conceived plan to force the APRC >government onto the Gambian people. It is now evident >to most of them that Yaya's administration is for the >benefit of few but not the majority of them. Those few >ones would however try few tricks that they would live >to regret in the end. In the end, those soldiers with >the positive thought of taking the Gambia forward >would prevail. >As for those of you who think that Yaya is a >dependable ally, just stop for a moment and reflect on >those who had once committed their lives to protecting >him with blind zealotry, and the way he rewarded them >in the end. Take for instance the case of the late >Almamo Manneh who used to say that for anyone had >intended to hurt Yaya that person must step over his >dead body first before reaching "Boss". Remember the >special and close relationship that had existed >between Landing Sanneh and Yaya. They were like blood >brothers. Sanneh would have done anything to keep Yaya >in power. Now Sanneh is facing charges of treason in a >kangaroo court martial while Almamo was sent six-foot >deep. Consider the number of soldiers murdered under >Yaya's rule without serious evidence to motivate the >killing. If these men had been a little more cautious >in their actions to satisfy his whims, perhaps Yaya >would have also been careful in the manner he >eliminated them. But because he had given them bad >names by manipulating them into committing all kinds >of political and social crimes, he relied on their >unpopularity and delivered them his killer blows >When Yaya ordered the shooting of the school children >last year, he came back from Cuba pretending not to >know how it happened. When Koro Ceesay was murdered in >1995, Yaya as usual, tried to give the impression to >the Ceesay family that he had had nothing to do with >it. >When most of your colleagues were cold-bloodedly >executed in November 11th 1994 on his orders and >dumped latrines pits, Yaya later claimed innocent of >that crime. In most of the crimes committed under >Yaya's directive, it had always been the ordinary >soldier who had been blamed for them. >In October, however all crimes committed by Yaya would >be brought to the open, and there would be competent >judges to look at each case one by one. >Take it from me. The forces that have now been >assembled to get rid of Yaya this time could destroy >his equals ten times and more. The need to dismantle >the fabric of the APRC is of both national and >international concern now. It will therefore be done >either from the inside or outside. But October would >not miss. You could bet on that statement. >Going back to my usual narrative of the events of the >July 1994 coup, I remember the end of my last piece on >the torturous night of that September night. It was >one of the most frightening incidents we experienced >in jail. Anyway after the police C.I.D. took our >statements for possible submission to the reviewing >board, we became fairly faithful that there would be >something done about our detention situation after >all. >At the end of September, for reasons we really could >not understand, word came from the army headquarters >letting us know that our monthly salaries were still >being paid, and that we could withdraw the money >anytime we wanted it. How that decision was made was >anybody's guess. It was a life-saving gesture with a >positive boost to our images in the eyes of the prison >authorities that showed total dismay over the matter. >They could not understand the logic in our cases >anymore. As a matter of fact, a good number of them >began to genuinely sympathize with us. They started >talking to us about their personal problems laden with >financial burden and career disorientation. As prison >guards, most of them thought they were harder workers >than the police who earned more than they did; yet >they had greater preference to military career than >any security work available in the country. >So with money in our hands we began to buy favors from >them. With D5.00, we could keep forks and knives to >eat with instead of the only acceptable bare hands. >For D25.00 we could write letters to our family >members which they would deliver, bring back replies >and smuggle in the daily newspapers. With D2.50, they >would be willing to take any letters to the post >office and mail them to any part of the world without >asking a question, even if it was boldly addressed to >the BBC, Focus on Africa or the editor of the Daily >Observer. From that time on up to the time I was set >free in 1995, we kept constantly writing to every news >media we thought could help by making our helpless >position known to the world. Ebou Colly was our pen >name. We wrote some foreign embassies in The Gambia >asking for their help. Interestingly, some time >later, the American Ambassador Andrew Winters secured >a permit with his aid, Mr. Knight and paid us a visit >in jail. By then the rules were so relaxed that we >were allowed to read books openly without fear of >having it confiscated and or destroyed. So the >Americans, after their visit, sent us sufficient >reading materials that reduced our boredom >tremendously. Anyway they were very upset with the >government's action to keep us where they found us >without charges or trial. They just could not >understand why, but they left us with encouraging >words that the whole world was watching our cases, and >that they had been warning the AFPRC government over >our final fate. >In October, we began for the first time to enjoy >having visitors from our family members. Those who >wanted to visit us were to get their permission from >Sana Sabally, at his office in Banjul. >At the end of October, the AFPRC government released >the following officers: >1. Captain Momodou Sonko >2. Captain Alieu Ndure >3. Lieutenant Sonko (former presidential guard >commander) >4. Second Lieutenant Alagie Kanteh >5. Second Lieutenant Alpha Kinteh >6. Second Lieutenant Yankuba Drammeh >Captain Sonko and Lieutenant Sonko were retired from >the armed forces while the rest were reinstated back >to their jobs. None of them had to face any review >committee or anything to determine their eligibility >for freedom. >Sabally was interviewed over BBC about the first >release and he said that those remaining under >detention could be released soon. The prison guards >misunderstood the statement and came telling us that >Sabally had said that we were to go home by next week >or so. And most of us believed it. The guards became >super friendly and started to address some of us with >compliments like sir and boss. Anyway in most cases >their politeness or friendliness was indirectly wired >to the Dalasis in our pockets. >Hopes of gaining our freedom soon kept us in a highly >euphoric mood. We thought our release was going to be >done in an eventful manner, most probably by the >second week of November, exactly on Remembrance Day. >Our hopes were short lived. In the early hours of >November 11th, 1994, the unusual voices of men in a >state of what sounded like serious distress woke some >of us up. I think it was Lieutenant Gomez who called >my attention to the voices outside. It reminded us of >the 6th of September. But after what seemed to be a >short but heated argument among the mysterious voices, >they boarded a vehicle and drove away towards the >Kombos. >The quietness that followed plus the relief that it >was after all nothing to do with us seemed to have >sedated me into a very deep sleep. >The sermon for dawn prayer that always came from the >main yard where the common criminals lived added some >element of assurance to my hope that things were as >normal as ever. >However at 8:00 a.m., the guards failed to show up for >their routine morning duties. That included opening >the main door to the block to check for everyone's >presence and later let us out to have our morning >showers and do other cleaning and washing. But that >morning the guards arrived very late. And when they >arrived they stayed outside talking to themselves and >refused to talk to us. >Soon the whispers began to circulate about the >presence of heavily armed guards in large numbers >mounting the four watchtowers above the prison >facility. The guards were identified as State Guard >personnel-Yaya's guards. It was a state of full alert >until Sana Sabally passed with his irritating siren >from the Kombos towards Banjul. That was around 9.30 >a.m. >Shortly after, the guards climbed down and went back >to duty at State House. We were finally allowed few >minutes each to do all our cleaning , took our showers >and returned to our cells. Nothing like going out >under the sun to feel its heat and breathe the fresh >air was allowed. >There was an absolute conspiracy of silence among the >guards about what had happened. Evidently the >atmosphere was charged with an eerie tension full of >doubt and fear. As financially needy as they were the >guards soon started talking when we paid for the >information. With D15.00, they narrated the story they >witnessed the previous night. >According to the guards who strongly believed that the >soldiers had attempted an abortive coup, all of those >arrested were brought over to the prisons and >remanded. The late Lt. Barrow, Lt. Faal et al were all >there. But shortly after they were locked up, the >council members met among themselves and argued for a >moment. Then they made a telephone call to the State >House before asking them to get the men out again and >hand them over. They did as they were told, and they >left with them back from where they came. Lt. Barrow >and Faal were killed upon their arrival at Fajara >Barracks. Some escaped to Cassamance and the rest were >summarily executed during the next two days. Lt. Saye >was among the ones killed on Sunday the 13th of >November. >We were at first told that Captain Sonko was among >those who took part in the abortive coup and that he >was arrested somewhere. The information killed our >spirits for a good whole day until a second report >reached us that none of the released detainees from us >was involved. As to when we were going to be set free >again, the hope of it being soon died in our minds. We >simply began to pray that the monsters would not one >day get bloodthirsty and come for us again. The >feeling that the GNA soldiers had for the first time >slaughtered one another in such a barbaric manner gave >us the final wake-up call about the animals we were >dealing with. I can't remember who it was but one of >us put it this way: "The GNA has now lost its >innocence". >As for Sana Sabally, that was the time he started >showing signs of losing his mental stability up to >when the AFPRC members decided to frame and >incarcerate him with his most trusted comrade, the >Late Sadibou Haidara. >I will deal with the arrest and detention of these two >men next time. I spent four months with them in jail. >The torture they were subjected to was unacceptable, >regardless of what. It definitely contributed to the >death of Haidara. > > >Ebou Colly > > > > >__________________________________________________ >Do You Yahoo!? >Make international calls for as low as $.04/minute with Yahoo! 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