G-L Community: I am pleased to share with you an abridged version of a 34 page-long paper on "The October 2001 presidential election in The Gambia." I thank you all for the lively debates and the numerous newspaper clippings from all the relevant newswires posted on G-L. I have in some instances used quotes from postings by some individuals, but did not refer to them in name in order to protect their anonimity. All the views, errors and coclusions in the paper, I take full reponsibility. As usual, your comments, criticisms and suggestions are welcome. Abdoulaye THE OCTOBER 2001 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN THE GAMBIA On October 18, 2001, The Gambia held a second presidential election following the 1994 coup d’etat. The first, in 1996, was declared not “free and fair” by the international community. Since then, a soldier-turned-president has ruled the country. BACKGROUND The Gambia, a former British colony, is a tiny West African country of 1.2 million people almost surrounded by Senegal. Since gaining independence in February 1965, it remained one of four democracies in Africa, until the coup d’etat of July 22, 1994. The coup, therefore, effectively ended the longest continuously surviving multiparty “democracy” in Africa and the reign of Sir Dawda Jawara, who at the time was the longest serving head of state in Africa. With the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC) in place, the constitution was suspended, politicians and political parties were banned and all semblance of the rule of law ended. Rule by decree became the mode of governance with predictable arbitrary arrests, detentions, torture, disappearances, killings and other flagrant abuse of fundamental human rights. Combined international economic sanctions and domestic protests, however, led to a two-year timetable back to “civilian rule.” This culminated in presidential and national assembly elections in 1996 and 1997, respectively. The presidential election was, however, neither free nor fair because the electoral process was engineered from the very beginning to enable the incumbent military-turned-civilian leader to win. Consequently, the results were widely disputed and condemned by the Commonwealth. In fact, the results continue to be contested to this day by the leaders of the United Democratic Party (UDP). Despite The Gambia’s return to “civilian” rule under the Alliance for Patriotic Re-orientation and Construction (APRC) party in 1996, the country continues to be headed by a “civilianized” military government. In fact, human rights deteriorated further leading to the deaths of many citizens, including the tragic deaths of 14 students who were killed while peacefully protesting government policy in April 2000. The National Intelligence Agency (NIA), the official repressive arm of the regime engages in torture of dissidents and those perceived as threats to the regime. Predictably, the justice system and the courts are not generally regarded as independent and serve the primary purpose of enforcing draconian laws and decrees. Accordingly, the press remains severely constrained by military decrees and journalists are sometimes subjected to severe beatings and torture. The regime prides itself, however, with the numerous schools, hospitals, clinics and roads it constructed since coming to power in 1994. It is true that the regime also refurbished the national airport and government owned radio station, in addition to building the country’s first university and only television station. This is a remarkable achievement for which many Gambians take pride. On this score, the regime’s performance is relatively better than that of the civilian regime it replaced. Not withstanding these improvements, however, the economy remains sluggish, in part, because of a cessation of aid from the country’s major European donors. The primary consequence has been deepening poverty for the bulk of The Gambia’s 1.2 million people. At a United Nations sponsored conference held in The Gambia on November 28, Gambia’s vice-president, Isatou Njie-Saidy admitted to the country’s worsening poverty (allAfrica.com, November 29, 2001). It is against this backdrop of state sponsored repression, violence, intimidation of political opponents and increasing poverty that the October 2001 presidential election must be situated and analyzed. On July 22, 2001president Jammeh was forced to lift the ban on the major pre-coup political parties and politicians imposed shortly before the 1996 presidential election (Reuters, July 22, 2001). Again, it took the combined efforts of domestic and international pressures to force Jammeh to partially open the political process. Widely condemned by the Commonwealth, Decree 89 was imposed on August 12, shortly before the September 1996 presidential election to strengthen an earlier ban following the 1994 coup d’etat. Under the provision, the three major political parties: the Peoples Progressive Party (PPP), The National Convention Party (NCP) and the Gambia Peoples Party (GPP) led by self-exiled ex-president Jawara, Sheriff Mustapha Dibba and Assan Musa Cammara, respectively, were banned together with most ex-ministers of the previous government from all political activity. The ban was imposed for periods ranging from five to twenty years (The Point, 12 August 1996). While the lifting of Decree 89 elicited mixed reactions, from one of jubilation and condemnation, it nonetheless, set high public expectations for a total coalition of all the opposition parties in a bid to defeat Jammeh. Yet, a rift among political leaders was rumored. The rumor of a rift in the proposed coalition was confirmed when Dibba of the NCP refused to endorse Darboe’s presidential candidacy under a limited coalition between the UDP/PPP/GPP. Ultimately, for a combination of reasons, personal ambition, irreconcilable ideological and personality differences or otherwise, the opposition leaders could not overlook these differences and rally around the overarching principle of defeating Jammeh. Meanwhile, Jammeh had all the advantages of a sitting president, abundant personal finances, state resources and monopoly over state owned media. In the end, there were five presidential candidates: incumbent president, Yaha Jammeh (APRC), Ousainou Darboe (UDP/PPP/GPP coalition), Hamat Bah (NRP), Sheriff Mustapha Dibba (NCP) and Sidia Jatta (PDOIS). For Bah, Dibba and Jatta, however, the UDP/PPP/GPP limited coalition appeared to be controlled by the PPP, thus their reluctance to joining it. CAMPAIGN and ISSUES Jammeh, the incumbent president, ran a vigorous campaign that was hinged concretely on his seven-year development record in The Gambia. He dismissed the limited UDP/PPP/GPP coalition leadership as a sinister front for the deposed PPP government bent on returning ex-president Jawara to power. Jawara’s leadership of thirty-two years, he charged, brought nothing to the Gambian people but poverty. This he contrasted with his development of roads, hospitals, better access to education and medical care, especially for the disadvantaged and rural poor. Jammeh vowed that his reelection would usher in more development and prosperity. Like the 1996 presidential campaign, Jammeh again accused Darboe of seeking to restore years of institutional corruption and poor performance. While Darboe countered with charges of more corruption, murder and lack of transparency and accountability under Jammeh’s tenure, he could not successfully break out of the definition or box into which he was trapped. The appearance of a sweetheart deal between the UDP and the PPP in Darboe’s election as the limited coalition’s presidential candidate was not lost to Jammeh and the electorate. The limited coalition under Darboe ran a relatively strong campaign but not strong enough to overcome these negative public perceptions. Darboe focused on the April 10 and 11 slaughter of peacefully demonstrating students, a sagging economy characterized by growing misery and a plummeting currency, human rights abuses and a bleak future under an APRC led government. Darboe promised that under his leadership farmers would be paid a fair price for their groundnuts, unlike the useless promissory notes Jammeh gave to them as payment. But more important, Darboe promised that his tenure would be one based on the rule of law, unlike Jammeh’s. Yet, in spite of “these philosophical pronouncements and overview of their intentions, the coalition fell short in coming up with specific solutions where the APRC government was found wanting (The Point, October 9, 2001). A major development leading to the election was Gabriel Roberts’ reappointment to the Chairmanship of the Electoral Commission (EC). Jammeh dismissed Roberts for reasons of alleged incompetence after the 1996 elections. Many, however, reasoned that Roberts was in large measure instrumental in Jammeh’s tainted victory in 1996. It was widely felt, therefore, that his reappointment as EC Chairman could make it possible for Roberts and Jammeh to reengineer the 2001 presidential election. A more nettlesome issue leading to the polls had to do with those entitled to vote on election day. On the eve of polling, the opposition scored a victory when the EC Chairman accepted a demand that only people whose names appeared on the main voter registers would vote. The previous regulation allowed voters to only show their identity cards (BBC World Service Africa/news/, October 18, 2001). The decision by Roberts to rescind this decision on election day, allowing voters to show only an identification card to vote, confirmed to many Roberts’ resolve to see Jammeh reelected. The concern over the issue of who should vote in the election is important. This is because there were allegations of “extra-registration and voting on election day of some thirty to forty thousand Senegalese from the neighboring Casamance region of Senegal. To this number was added thousands of refugees and other foreigners from the sub-region. It was alleged that the campus of Gambia College harbored some thirty to forty thousand of Jammeh’s Jola kin from Casamance. Also troubling during the campaign leading to the presidential election were the rising political tensions that resulted in two deaths and the arson attack by UDP supporters on the house of an APRC member of the national assembly (BBC World Service News, October 16, 2001). Earlier arson attacks believed to be carried out by APRC militants on houses of UDP supporters and a pro-democracy private radio station added to on going tensions. Gambians abroad played a more active role in the 2001 presidential election compared to 1996. Several conferences were held in London, Washington, D.C., Atlanta and Raleigh, North Carolina and other parts of Europe to which party leaders or their representatives were invited. At these meetings, political parties presented their platforms and solicited funds. These meetings were indeed historic and important campaign venues for various political parties. But not only did political campaigning transcend the spatial confines of The Gambia into North America and Europe, it was also extended into cyberspace. The UDP, PDOIS and APRC leaders or their representatives were able to reach and discuss their party platforms with Gambians on-line and through party and other web sites on the Internet. Gambia-L, (G-L) a cyberspace mailing list based in the U.S. but with members throughout the world and devoted to the discussion and debate of issues relevant to The Gambia, was also a forum used by all the political parties and their representatives to reach Gambians in the Diaspora. THE RESULTS Contrary to public fears in The Gambia and abroad, the presidential election was peaceful. With a voter turnout of approximately 80%, Gambians lined up under a scorching sun to vote for their next president. Jammeh’s APRC won 52.96 percent of the vote, (55.76 percent in 1996) as opposed to the coalition’s 33.67 percent in 2001, and (the United Democratic Party’s 35.84 percent) in 1996. Hamat Bah (NRP) polled 8%, Sheriff Dibba (NCP) 4%, and Sidia Jatta (PDOIS) polled 3% of the total vote (The Point, October 20, 2001) Table 1. Voting results 2001 presidential election Candidate(s) Party Votes % Yahya Jammeh (APRC) 242,302 (52.96 %) Ousainou Darboe (UDP/PPP/GPP) 149,448 (33.67 %) Hamat Bah (NRP) 35,678 ( 7.80 %) Sheriff Dibba (NCP) 17,271 ( 3.78 %) Sidia Jatta (PDOIS) 13,841 ( 2. 86 %) _____________________________________________________ Total 458,540 (80%) ________________________________________________________ Source: national press International observers declared the elections “free and fair” and Darboe later conceded defeat to president-elect, Jammeh. The voting pattern indicated that Jammeh won forty-one of the forty-eight constituencies nationwide, including former opposition strongholds of Jarra East, West and Central, Kiang East and Kiang Central and Darboe’s home constituency of Upper Fulladu West. Of the seven remaining constituencies, Darboe won six and Bah (NRP) won one, his home constituency of Upper Saloum, the only presidential candidate to do so. Jammeh also defeated Dibba (NCP) and Jatta (PDOIS) in their home constituencies. Equally significant, is that Jammeh also swept the constituencies of Banjul South, North and Central, once opposition strongholds. Many expected that the vote against Jammeh would be overwhelming in these constituencies, in part, because of increased urban hardships and high youth unemployment. The voting pattern also suggests that Jammeh’s support was broad based, especially in the rural areas. Here, it was expected that Jammeh would not do well because of dissatisfaction over the government’s poor handling of a bumper groundnut harvest and rocketing food prices. While Darboe won Bakau and Basse, two major towns, Jammeh won the more densely populated urban centers of Serrekunda and Brikama. Jammeh’s victory would, however, be tainted by accusations of cross-border voting and allegations of inflated voter registers, despite commendations from the Commonwealth Observer Group. Less than a week after conceding defeat, Darboe strongly attacked the EC and its Chairman for what he called “inept and corrupt” handling of voter registration in which non-Gambians were issued voter cards (The Observer, October 25, 2001). As proof, Darboe presented a Senegalese national to the press who possessed both a Senegalese ID card and a Gambian voter’s card. The data also indicate a discrepancy in the number of registered voters and votes cast in Niani Constituency on election day. The EC published results show a total of 7877 votes cast against a total number 7464 registered votes. This, Darboe contends, is proof that the EC actually carried out “extra registration of non-Gambian voters who were then sent to various constituencies throughout the country to vote. This gave the APRC an unfair advantage over the opposition parties” (The Observer, October 25, 2001). Kemeseng Jammeh, (no relation to president) the national assembly’s minority leader, similarly accused EC Chairman Roberts of issuing voter cards to non-Gambians. Jammeh cited the dramatic change in the total number of votes cast in Karantaba and Soma. In Karantaba, specifically, 459 people cast votes in 1996 compared to 1331 in 2001. In Soma, a growing urban center and residence to many citizens of Senegal, Guinea, Mali and Guinea-Bissau, according to Jammeh, was also a site for “extra-registration.” Here, Jammeh contends that there were only two polling stations in 1996 with a total vote of 1408. In 2001, by contrast, Soma had four polling stations with a total of 3,254 votes. Jammeh also alleged similar electoral irregularities in Jenoi, Pakalinding and Toniataba (The Independent, November 12, 2001). While the limited proof shown by Darboe and allegations by Jammeh, the minority leader, of “extra-registration” and non-Gambian participation in the 2001 presidential elections raise serious doubts about the “free and fair” conclusion of international observers, the accuracy of the 40,000 alleged voters is difficult to substantiate, empirically. It is true, that returning Senegalese from The Gambia, following the elections were arrested and their Gambian voter cards confiscated. But the numbers of reported cases appear negligible, as of now. Post-Election Violence, Intimidation and Job Dismissal Jammeh’s victory celebrations were suddenly dampened by arrests, beating of opposition members and dismissal of civil servants perceived to be opposed to his rule. There appeared to be an organized attack on the opposition and the NIA arrested, detained and tortured dissidents and some members of the opposition. (The Observer, October 25, 2001; BBC World Service/Africa/news, October 29, 2001; The Independent, December 3, 2001). The violence visited on the opposition by the regime or its militants was also accompanied by dismissals and retirements of senior and junior civil servants thought to be disloyal or unsympathetic to Jammeh’s government or bid for reelection. His attempt to purge the civil service of his opponents, however, is rationalized along lines of “professionalism.” If one is deemed “unprofessional,” often analogous to being a non-supporter, it could mean being dismissed. Jammeh’s frequent “hire and fire policy” is nothing new but represents a pillar in his repertoire to keep himself in power. In this regard, an average of one secretary of state is dismissed every six months. He has since coming to power in 1994, fired, changed, or redeployed fifty-nine secretaries of state to other ministries (The Independent, July 24, 2001). One died under mysterious circumstances and another while in prison for alleged complications arising from hypertension. The latter’s widow denied that her husband had hypertension. Foday Makalo, an opposition politician, disappeared more than three years ago and is presumed dead by his family. All dismissals, however, have not been over political disloyalty and some that were dismissed earlier have since been reemployed (The Point, November 30, 2001). ANALYSIS It appears that the limited coalition under Darboe and the other political parties were doomed from the very start in their bid to defeat Jammeh. In fact, it seems, even if the opposition parties managed to form a single opposition party they would have still lost to Jammeh. Yet, the fact that EC Chairman changed the rules of the game in mid-stream, in effect, undermined the legitimacy and ultimately called into question the “fairness” of the presidential election. But even if the vote itself was properly conducted, some domestic observers contend, “The election could not be described as free and fair. Apart from the fact that Jammeh does have some support, his victory is largely a result of his carrots and stick policy. The widespread dishing out of money to voters throughout the country, combined with his threats of exclusion from development programs for those opposed to his presidency must have given him the vote” (allAfrica.com, October 19, 2001). Jammeh is reported to have spent over two million Dalasis ($122,000) on his campaign (allAfrica.com, October 19, 2001). Predictably, a level playing field did not exist as the rules of the game and a political atmosphere and campaign marred by violence and intimidation worked in tandem to favor Jammeh and oddly against the opposition parties. A political observer noted, the “political atmosphere is threatening the peace, stability and even the foundations of our nation. Our society is becoming dangerously over-polarized” (The Independent, August 6, 2001). The deployment of heavy anti-craft weaponry, visible police support and presence at APRC rallies, in addition to the brandishing of machetes by Darboe supporters added to an already charged pre-election political atmosphere (BBC World Service News, October 17, 2001). Therefore, even under the best circumstances of a total coalition of opposition parties, the battle for the presidency would be uphill and especially daunting for a splintered opposition. The concern over “extra-registration and cross-border voting also severely tainted the “fairness” of the election. The confiscation of voter cards and arrest by Senegal’s border police of returning Senegalese two days after the Gambian presidential polls raised serious problems about the election itself. It made “Jammeh the first truly elected president of Senegambia,” noted an observer. Many Gambians reasoned in 1996 and perhaps in 2001 that Jammeh would not step down and concede defeat peacefully were he to loose to Darboe. Fear of escalating violence and instability forced many to vote for Jammeh. An astute political observer noted, “ indeed in a political culture such as The Gambia’s, where politicians with power like Jammeh can use the resources at their disposal-both coercive and persuasive with reckless abandon, it is not a great feat to win elections.” Dibba, NCP’s presidential candidate, by contrast, saw the elections as the “freest and fairest since independence” and observed that it had contributed to the “strengthening of the democratic process in The Gambia” (Gambia Radio & TV News, November 25, 2001). These comments were made in the aftermath of a meeting with Jammeh at the State House in which Dibba left open the prospect of allying with Jammeh or other political parties in the forthcoming national assembly elections in February 2002 (The Daily Observer, November 26, 2001). To his detractors, Dibba’s comments are self-serving. But some of his supporters contend that it reflects his pragmatic approach to politics and desire to serve the nation. But more fatal to Darboe’s bid for the presidency was not Dibba’s refusal to join the coalition but his failure to focus concretely on the issues and/or respond pointedly to Jammeh’s charges. More importantly, Darboe failed to disassociate himself with the perception in the public mind of being a front for the PPP. It is this lingering public perception dating back to the 1996 presidential election that primarily doomed Darboe’s race for the State House. Also, the fact that the issues in the campaign generally focused on Jawara and defense of his thirty-two year record by ex-PPP ministers in the coalition did not win him much public confidence. It appeared, in fact, that Darboe’s campaign was unwittingly eclipsed, perhaps dominated, by PPP elements in the coalition who used it as a platform to vindicate themselves and their party. This did not help Darboe, as it appeared to confirm public perceptions of him. But perhaps the most daunting challenge that dogged the limited coalition from the very start was its limited financial resources. While Darboe and other party leaders, except Jammeh and Dibba made several overseas campaign trip to Europe and North America and raise funds for their candidacy, the funds were not enough to make any lasting effect. The fact that the coalition did not include all the opposition parties coupled with the perception by many in the Diaspora that Darboe’s presidency could be a comeback for the PPP and ex-president Jawara, led many to withhold financial support. Furthermore, Sheriff Dibba’s presidential candidature split what little money that was raised in the US into several donations, the largest share going to Darboe. Yet, Dibba’s candidature appeared doomed from the start by his seven-year absence from the political scene, public perceptions of him as being power hungry and allegations of being financially sponsored by Jammeh. PDOIS’ Sidia Jatta, a dedicated and principled politician, failed to engage in usual campaign techniques. This limited his appeal, considerably. Of all the opposition candidates, however, it seems that Hamat Bah of the NRP emerged as the clear winner, even if trailing Darboe. He retained his constituency unlike Darboe and Jatta. Why then did Darboe acknowledge defeat? Perhaps the single most important reason for Darboe’s acknowledgement of defeat has to do with concerns over his own security, his supporters and The Gambia’s. It is also conceivable that upon a few days of reflection on the process and outcome of the elections that Darboe saw the bigger picture and then decided to contest the legitimacy of the outcome. It seems, however, that even in the face of electoral malpractices, it is not clear whether electoral discrepancies were as widespread as alleged. This is because Jammeh’s support appeared broad based, defeating all but one presidential candidate in their home constituencies. Of these, there were few reports of inflated voter rolls or participation of non-Gambians. Could Jammeh have won without all these advantages? This is the fundamental question. It is likely that Jammeh would have won the elections all things being equal. But all things are seldom equal in elections. Incumbents the world over have added advantages and resources at their disposal. In addition, he launched an effective campaign centered on Jawara, development successes under his rule and promises of a better future, even when Gambians were poorer under his rule, paradoxically. Yet, if the allegations and Darboe’s evidence are accepted as proof of non-Gambian participation and “extra-registration” a conservative reduction of approximately 30, 000 votes from Jammeh’s 242, 302 total would not have earned him the required 50 % of the electoral vote. Thus, assuming that Jammeh received a total of 2012, 302 (minus 30,000) votes against the combined total of 216, 231 for the opposition, there would have been a run-off between Jammeh and Darboe. If this were to obtain, Darboe would have most likely defeated Jammeh. CONCLUSION The October 2001 presidential election in The Gambia was riddled with several irregularities and problems, ranging from a short campaign period, which favored the incumbent, to instances of intimidation and violence against the political opposition. In addition, a hand picked EC Chairman, not only appeared to collude with the ruling president but also reversed an important ruling made earlier. The ruling favored Jammeh and contributed significant to the incumbent’s victory. Instances of “extra-registration,” a 105% voter turnout in Niani and instances of cross-border voting undermined the very essence of the presidential election and raised serious doubts about its “fairness.” REFERENCES A. Saine, (1996) “The Coup d’etat in The Gambia, 1994: The End of The First Republic,” Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 23 A. Saine, (December, 1997) “The 1996/1997 Presidential and National Assembly Elections in The Gambia,” Electoral Studies, Vol. 16, No. 4, A. Saine, (Winter 1998) “The Military’s Managed Transition to “Civilian Rule” in The Gambia,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Vol. 26, No.2 A. Saine, (2000) “ The Soldier-Turned-Presidential Candidate,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Vol. 28 <<//\\>>//\\<<//\\>>//\\<<//\\>>//\\<<//\\>>//\\<<//\\>> To view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L Web interface at: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/gambia-l.html To contact the List Management, please send an e-mail to: [log in to unmask] <<//\\>>//\\<<//\\>>//\\<<//\\>>//\\<<//\\>>//\\<<//\\>>