<<www.sundaytimes.co.za/2002/07/07/insight/in01.asp>> Holding hands, wielding a stick The challenge for the African Union will be to unite the continent while censuring undemocratic members, writes Eddy Maloka The inauguration of the African Union is an important landmark in the continent's postcolonial history. There are, however, lessons to be learnt and challenges that the new institution will have to face. The development of the AU is a product of two processes. The first was the realisation across the continent that the mandate and institutional orientation of the Organisation of African Unity needed to be transformed in the light of post-Cold War challenges. It is common knowledge that the OAU was essentially a vehicle for pan-African unity and the coordination of the struggle against colonialism. At the same time, the OAU charter put excessive emphasis on the security and sovereignty of states, as well as the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. Partly as a result of this, the OAU was incapable of tackling the proliferation of coups and authoritarian rule on the continent. Equally important is that the OAU is institutionally not best positioned to tackle decisively the challenges of peace and security, development and the promotion of democracy and respect for human rights. The AU, however, will be founded on the pan-African principle of unity, but will be different from the OAU in its strong emphasis on popular participation and human security, as opposed to security of states. Not only will the "condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments" be one of the principles of the AU, it will also be informed by a nuanced notion of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. The union will have the right "to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the assembly [of heads of state and government] in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity". Member states will be able "to request intervention from the union in order to restore peace and security". The envisaged Peace and Security Council will be the mechanism to implement these provisions. The second process that led to the development of the AU was the review of elements of the 1991 treaty establishing the African Economic Community, popularly known as the Abuja Treaty. It envisaged the creation of an African Economic Community through six phases, over a period of 34 years. However, the treaty was informed by the European Union's economic model of integration; political organs such as the Pan-African Parliament were to be established towards the end of the six-phase process. It was at the OAU Extraordinary Summit of 1999 in Sirte, Libya, that this model was revisited, and more emphasis was placed on the political dimension of Africa's integration exercise. Thus the treaty's six-phase schedule and the timetable for the establishment of the AU's political organs were revised. The adoption of the AU Constitutive Act at the OAU summit in Togo in 2000 was the culmination of this process. But what are the challenges the AU will have to confront? First of all, it will have to create an institutional environment for the promotion of its objectives and principles as outlined in the AU Constitutive Act. The new organisation, and understandably so, has inherited the OAU's principle of inclusivity. All countries on the continent, with the exception of Morocco, are members - and this includes states whose governance record and practices are inconsistent with the objectives and principles of the AU. The dilemma here is whether such member states should be excluded from the union, as is the case with the New Partnership for Africa's Development process, or if there should be a window period during which such member states can institute necessary reforms that will align their countries with the provisions of the AU Constitutive Act to which they are signatories. Compliance with the objectives and principles of the AU will require not only political will on the part of leaders, but also the cooperation of all member states, especially those whose records and practices are incompatible with the provisions of the AU Constitutive Act. Indeed, according to the latter, "any member state that fails to comply with the decisions and policies of the union may be subjected to other sanctions, such as the denial of transport and communications links with other member states, and other measures of a political and economic nature to be determined by the assembly". The second challenge that the AU will have to confront is to put into operation oversight organs provided for in the Act. The decision of the Lusaka summit of 2001 included identifying the establishment of executive organs ( the assembly, executive council, permanent representatives' committee and the commission) as a priority, and this is understandable. However, the speedy establishment of the Pan-African Parliament, the Court of Justice, and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (for civil society representation) will give more substance and political weight to the union. The African Commission on Human and People's Rights will also need to be incorporated into the AU without delay. With these oversight organs in place, the union will be more rooted and probably better positioned to ensure compliance with the objectives, principles and decisions of the organisation. Civil society and African MPs will have to play an active role in strengthening the proposed peer-review mechanism and compliance with the code of conduct that African leaders are committing themselves to within the Nepad framework. Finally, the AU will have to be resourced adequately with finances and personnel. Far more than the OAU's budget of $30-million (about R300- million) will be required. This means that all member states must pay their dues to the union or face the consequences of the Constitutive Act. The union is a comprehensive institutional response to what the continent will need to do if the realisation of the African century is to become a reality. As with all institutions, political will and mass participation will give it the subjective edge that will be required for success. Maloka is the chief executive officer of the Africa Institute ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L Web interface at: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/gambia-l.html To contact the List Management, please send an e-mail to: [log in to unmask] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~