----- Original Message ----- From: African Viewpoint To: [log in to unmask] Sent: Friday, January 17, 2003 10:16 AM Subject: [Network Africa Sweden] fwd: Profile:Patrice Lumumba The Passing of Patrice Lumumba > >By John Henrik Clarke (1961) > >(John Henrik Clarke was United Nations Correspondent >on African Affairs, World Mutual Exchange, and >International News Features.) > >The life of Patrice Lumumba proved that he was a >product of the best and worst of Belgian colonial >rule. In more favorable circumstances, he might have >become one of the most astute national leaders of the >twentieth century. He was cut down long before he had >time to develop into the more stable leader that he >was obviously capable of being. When the Congo emerged >clearly in the light of modern history he was its >bright star. > >His hero was Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, and the model for his >state was Ghana. "In a young state," he had said, >paraphrasing a similar statement made by Dr. Nkrumah, >"you must have strong and visible powers." > > >At the beginning of his political career he was >pro-Western in his outlook. "Mistakes have been made >in Africa in the past, but we are ready to work with >the powers which have been in Africa to create a >powerful new bloc," he said at the beginning of 1960. >"If this effort fails, it will be through the fault of >the West." > >As a reformer he was somewhat of a republican in his >approach. "Our need is to democratize all our >institutions," he had said on another occasion. "We >must separate the Church from the State. We must take >away all power from the traditional chiefs and remove >all privileges. We must adapt socialism to African >realities. Amelioration of the conditions of life is >the only true meaning independence can have." > > His resentment of Belgian authority was unyielding in >most cases. Mostly because he believed that >paternalism was at the base of this authority. This >by-product of colonialism never failed to stir a rage >within him. On the other hand, his reaction to the >Belgian Missionary attempt to enforce Christianity on >the Congo was one of indifference. He had been >subjected to both Catholic and Protestant mission >influence, without showing any particular affection >for either. His parents were devout Catholics. Being >neither an atheist nor anti-Christian, he yet >considered submission to a religion to be a curb to >his ambitions. Rebellion was more rewarding and less >wounding to his pride. During his long and lonely rise >from obscurity to the Congo's first Prime Minister, he >taught himself never to completely trust power in the >hands of others. This attitude is reflected in the >suspicion that developed between him and the UN Forces >in the Congo. > >His conflicts with the other Congo politicians was due >mainly to his unyielding belief in the unitary state, >and partly to his lack of experience in explaining, >organizing and administering such a state. >Nevertheless, he was the only Congolese leader with >anything like a national following; a point too often >overlooked. His greatest achievement in the early >difficult months of Congo independence was in >maintaining, with only a few defections, the >solidarity of his widely disparate coalition >government. > >Lumumba belonged to the company of Kwame Nkruman, >Julius Nyerere in Tanganyika, Tom Mboya in Kenya, and >Sékou Touré. These leaders believe that the only way >to build an effective modern state free from t he >shackles of narrow tribal loyalties is to create a >single, strong central government. This firm stand >joined the issues in the Congo and created both the >supporters and the opposition to Lumumba. > >He argued his case at the Round Table Conference that >gave the Congo its independence in 1960. He laid it >before the electorate in June 1960, and won an >indecisive victory. Finally he tried to force it on >his Federalist opponents when he took control of the >first independent government. Most of Lumumba's >critics considered this to be his greatest error. He >tried to cast the Congo into the tight mould of Ghana, >rather than into the larger, more accommodating mould >of Nigeria. The argument is interesting though useless >now. > >Patrice Lumumba's body now lies a-mouldering in some >unmarked and inglorious Congo grave.both his truth and >spirit go marching on, much to the discomfort of his >murderers. > >No other personality in African history has leaped so >suddenly from death to martyrdom. In death he might >have already made a greater contribution to the >liberation and understanding of Africa than he could >have make had he lived. In his short lifetime the >stamp of his personality was pressed firmly into the >African continent. He was purely an African of the >mid-twentieth century. No other place and no other set >of circumstances could have charged his life and >caused his death in the same unique and tragic way. In >death, he cast forth a spirit that will roam the >African land for many years to come. > >For a long time the Congo appeared to be a peaceful >island untouched by African anticolonialism. In the >twelve brief years between 1946 and 1958, the Belgians >began to lose what had appeared to be an impregnable >position. Some important events occurred in Africa and >the rest of the world, and broke up the trinity in >Belgium's alleged "perfect colony." A change of >political direction in Brussels and mounting >nationalist pressure coming from within Africa helped >to end the illusion that all was well and would stay >well in the Congo. At last the Belgians began to have >some second thoughts about their policy in the Congo. >The missionary-trained evolved, the supposedly >emancipated, Westernized middle class had found their >voices. > >Certain fundamental problems formed the core of the >colonial dilemma in Africa; although Belgian colonists >chose to ignore this fact. The same problems existed >in the Congo as elsewhere in Africa. Freedom, >self-determination, hatred of racial discrimination, >and white settlement without assimilation made the >Congo people feel unwanted in their own country, >except as servants for white people. > >It was within this order of ideas that the Belgian >Socialist Party attempted to change the trend of >Belgium's colonial policy and devise a more humane >approach to the problems of the Congo people. The >accelerated economic development in the Congo during >the war and after the war had changed the structure of >the Congolese community. The black population of >Leopoldville rose from 46,900 to 191,000 between 1940 >and 1950. By 1955, the black population of >Leopoldville had reached some 300,000. The mass exodus >of Congolese from rural areas and their concentration >in urban centers created new problems. The >detribalized workers did not return to their >respective villages when the city no longer afforded >them employment. > >It was incumbent upon the Belgium Socialist Party to >define its position in relation to the Congo. As far >as basic premises were concerned, the party did >recognize "the primacy of native interests; and the >aim of its activity will be to prepare the indigenous >population gradually to take charge of its own >political, economic, and social affairs, within the >framework of a democratic society." Further, the Party >expressed its "uncompromising opposition to any kind >of racial discrimination" and advised a raise in the >standard of living of the people of the Congo. Only >those whites who are prepared to work for the >realization of these aims and who constitute the >administrative personnel of the indigenous population >are to enjoy the support of the government. This >preparation for self-government presupposes the >political organization of the Congo, i.e., the >initiation of the native into citizenship. With this >proposal the Belgian Socialist Party admitted that the >Congolese were not accepted as citizens in their own >country. This fact had been the cause of a broadening >dissatisfaction among the Congolese since the early >part of the twentieth century. With the relaxing of >political restrictions this dissatisfaction began to >manifest itself in a form of embryo nationalism. The >future Congolese leaders had already begun to gather >their first followers. All of the early political >parties in the Congo were the outgrowth of regional >and tribal associations. Patrice Lumumba was the only >Congolese leader who, from the very beginning of his >career, attempted to build a Congo-wide political >organization. > >During his short-lived career Patrice Lumumba was the >first popularly elected Congolese Government Prime >Minister. Like a few men before him, he became a >near-legend in his own lifetime. The influence of this >legend extended to the young militant nationalists far >beyond the borders of the Congo, and it is still >spreading. > >Of all the leaders who suffered imprisonment at the >hands of the Belgians before 1960, Lumumba had the >largest number of followers among the Congolese >masses, mainly because he had more of the qualities of >character with which they liked to identify. As a >speaker he was equally effective in French, Ki-Swahili >or Lingola. The devotion of the rank and file of his >party. Movement National Congolais (MNC) to Patrice >Lumumba was not a unique phenomenon. What is more >significant is the fact that he was able to attract >the strongly expressed loyalties of a >tribally-heterogeneous body of the Congolese. This >made him the only national political leader. While >other politicians tended to take advantage of their >respective associations as the path to power, Lumumba >took the broader and more nationalistic approach and >involved himself in other movements only indirectly >related to politics. > >In 1951, he joined the Association des Evolves de >Stanleyville, one of the most active and numerically >important of all the clubs in Orientale Province. He >was in the same year appointed Secretary-General of >the Association des Postiers de la Province >Orientale-a professional organization consisting >mostly of postal workers. Two years later he became >Vice-Chairman of an Alumni Association consisting of >former mission students. In 1956 he founded the Amicle >Liberale de Stanleyville. > >Patrice Lumumbe is a member of the Beteteta tribe, a >Mongo subgroup. He was born on July 2, 1925, in >Katako-Kombe in the Sunkuru district of the Kasai >Province. In growing up he only received a primary >education. Very early in life he learned to push >himself beyond the formal limits of his education. He >made frequent contributions to local newspapers such >as Stanleyvillois and the more widely read >publications, Vois du Conlais and Croix du Congo. >Unlike the vast majority of Congolese writers of the >period who placed major emphasis on the cultural >heritage of their own tribes, Lumumba's early writings >emphasized-within the limits of Belgian official >restrictions-problems of racial, social, and economic >discrimination. > >On July 1, 1956, the career of Patrice Lumumba was >temporarily interrupted when he was arrested on the >charge of embezzling 126,000 franc ($2,200) from the >post office funds. He was sentenced to serve a >two-year prison term. On June13, 1957, the sentence >was commuted on appeal to eighteen months, and finally >to 12 months after the Wolves of Stanleyville >reimbursed the sum in question. Subsequently, Lumumba >left Stanleyville and found employment in Leopoldville >as the sale director of the Bracongo (polar beer) >Brewery. > >Leopoldville became a good vantage point for Lumumba's >Congo-wide activities. He had now entered into the >crucial phase of his political career. In 1958, while >combining the functions of vice-chairman of a liberal >friendship society, the Circle Liberal d'Etudes et >d'Agreement, with those of the president of the >Association dis Batelela, of Leopoldville, he joined a >Christian Democratic Study Group, the Centre d'Etudes >et de Recherches Sociales, created in 1955 by the >Secretary General of the Jeunesses Ouvieres >Christiennes, Jacques Meert. Among the more prominent >members of this organization were Joseph Ileo (now >[early sixties] Prime Minister in the Kasavubu >government) and Joseph Ngalula. > >Joseph Ileo was editor-in-chief of the bi-monthly >Conscience Africaine. He had already acquired a wide >reputation among Congolese when he decided, in July of >1956, to publish a nationalist inspired manifesto >which contained a daring 30-year plan of emancipation >for the Congo. > >Both Ileo and Ngalyla were Anxious to broaden the >basis of the Movement National Congolais, a moderate >nationalist organization created in 1956. Patrice >Lumumba, then regarded as one of the eminent spokesmen >of liberal ideas, joined the MNC. > >Once affiliated with this and other groups, Lumumba >readily asserted himself and became the dominant >figure. Shortly after proclaiming himself chairman of >MNC's Central Committee, he formally announced on >October 10, 1058, the foundation of a "national >movement" dedicated to the goal of "national >liberation." His action at this moment was prompted by >two important developments affecting the Congo. One >was the forthcoming visit of a parliamentary committee >appointed by the former Minister of the Congo, Mr. >Patillon, for the purpose of "conducting an inquiry >concerning the administrative and political evolution >of the country." Another was the creation of a >Movement Pour le Progres National Congolais in late >November, 1958, by the Congolese delegates to the >Brussels Exposition. Lumumba moved in and around these >groups and quickly projected himself into the role of >a dynamic and radical nationalist leader. > >A high point in his political development came in >1958, when he was permitted to attend the Pan African >Conference in Accra, Ghana. Here he became a member of >the Permanent Directing Committee. Patrice Lumumba had >now projected himself upon a political stage of >international importance. In addition to whatever >personal counsel he might have received from Ghana's >Prime Minister, Nkrumah, there is little doubt that >the Accra Conference was an important factor in >shaping Lumumba's long-range objectives and further >sensitizing him to the philosophy of Pan-Africanism. > >When he returned home, the emancipation of the Congo >from Belgium's tutelage assumed first priority among >his activities. In March, 1959, when Belgium had >already announced its intention to lead the Congo >"without fatal procrastination and without undue >haste" toward self-government, Lumumba went to >Brussels where he delivered several lectures under the >auspices of Présence Congolese, a Belgian organization >dedicated to the promotion of African culture. On this >occasion, Lumumba indiscreetly turned on his host and >sponsors and deplored the "bastardization and >destruction of Negro-African art," and "the >depersonalization of Africa." He reaffirmed his >Party's determination to put an end to the >"camouflaged slavery of Belgian colonization" and >elect an independent government in 1961. With this act >of boldness, Patrice Lumumba had set the stage for >most of his future troubles and probably his future >death. > >After the target-date for independence had been >approved by the Movement National Congolais, new >troubles began for Lumumba and his supporters. Now >that the contestants for power were close to their >goal the competition between them became fiercer. >Delegates to the Luluabourg Congress, in April 1959, >ran against the demands of other nationalist groups >anxious to put themselves forward as the >standard-bearers of independence. Several of Lumumba's >earlier supporters withdrew from the MNC and formed >their own parties. With the date for Congo >independence practically rushing upon him, Lumumba set >out to rebuild the Movement National Congolais. He >involved himself in every phase of his party's >activists, organizing local sections of the MNC and >recruiting new supporters. > >On November 1, 1959, a few days after his wing of the >MNC held its congress in Stanleyville, Lumumba was >arrested for the second time and charged with having >made seditious statements. He was sentenced to six >months in jail. After serving nearly three months of >his sentence he was released when a delegation of >officials from the MNC notified the Belgian government >that they would not participate in the Brussels >Roundtable Conference unless Lumumba was set free. >Soon after his release, Lumumba's party was victorious >in the December elections. As expected, Stanleyville >proved to be the main Lumumba stronghold in the Congo. >In Stanleyville his party won ninety per cent of the >votes. > > > > Lumumba's status and influence continued to rise. As >a representative of Orientale Province, he was >appointed to the General Executive College, an interim >executive body established after the Brussels >Roundtable Conference. Trouble continued to brew >within the ranks of his party. Victor Nendaka, >vice-chairman of the MNC, broke with Lumumba for what >he termed the "extreme left wing tendencies" of the >party leader. In 1960, he organized his own party. >Once more Lumumba reshuffled the party personnel and >strengthened his position. The MNC emerged from the >next electoral struggle as the strongest in the House >of Representatives, with 34 out of 137 seats. In the >Provincial Assembly of Orientale, Lumumba's party held >58 out of 70 seats. In the assemblies of Kivu and >Kasai Provinces, 17 out of 25 seats were secured. > >Lumumba employed several techniques to mobilize his >support and activate the rural masses. First there was >the careful selection of party officials and >propagandists at the Lodja Congress, held March 9-12, >1960. These delegates of the Bakutshu and Batetela >tribes agreed that they would entrust the defense of >their interests to the political party which held a >dominant position in the region. Namely, that was >Lumumba's party, the MNC. The party's success among >the Bakutshu and Batetela tribal associations was >mainly due to Lumumba's tribal origin and the >anti-Belgian orientation acquired by these tribes in >resisting the penetration of Western rule. > >Lumumba and the MNC improved their techniques of >building up functional organizations, in order to >unify the political actions of the MNC. These >organizational networks embraced a variety of interest >groups and cut across tribal lines. Through a tactical >alliance with minor parties, Lumumba tried to >transform the MNC into an integrating structure where >both sectional and national interests would be >represented. This program received its formal sanction >at the extraordinary congress of the MNC, held in >Luluabourg, April 3-4, 1960. This was a major landmark >in the history of Lumumba's party. Once more he had >proven to be the most able of all Congolese leaders. > >As the Congo crossed the threshold of independence, >new troubles developed within the ranks of the MNC. >Communication between Lumumba and some of the leaders >of the party broke down. The Congo's most vital >instrument of stability, the Force Publique, >collapsed. The number and complexities of the issues >now confronting Lumumba absorbed most of the time he >formerly devoted to party activities. Now that the >pomp and ceremony of the Belgian's handing over power >to elected Congolese leaders was over, one struggle >for Lumumba was over, but a new and bitter one was >beginning. > >His devotion to the idea of a united Congo was now >more firm. He was one of the few Congolese politicians >who had any conception of the Congo as a strong >centralized state. Tshombe thought first of carving >himself out a state in Katanga where he could be the >boss, with Belgian help. Kasavubu cherished the dream >of restoring the ancient empire of Bakongo. Other >Congolese politicians were still involved in their >tribal ideals and hostilities. > >Lumumba was neither kind nor cautious toward the >Belgians during the independence ceremony. This might >have been one of his greatest mistakes. He announced >too many of his future plans; which included not only >the uniting of the Congo by giving assistance to the >nations around him (especially Angola) who were still >under European rule. Whoever made the decision to kill >Lumumba probably made it this very day. He had crossed >the path of the unseen power manipulators who wanted >to control the Congo economically even if they were >willing to let Lumumba control it politically. Instead >of saying, "Thanks very much for our independence. We >appreciate [what] all you Belgians have done for our >country," Lumumba said in effect, "It's about time, >too! And it's a pity that in a half-century you didn't >see fit to build more hospitals and schools. You could >have made much better use of your time." > >Lastly, when the Force Publique revolted in the first >days of July, Lumumba tried earnestly to be equal to >this and other emergencies exploding around him. He >faced the risks of his high position with real >courage. Frantically, he moved over his large country >trying to restore order. Several times he escaped >death by inches. Once he was saved by a Ghanaian >officer. Once his car was stoned by a mob. This did >not keep him from trying to restore order to his >troubled country. In the middle of July when the >structure of order in his country was deteriorating >into chaos, Lumumba flew off for a grandiose tour of >the United States, Canada, North, and West Africa. >This was another one of his unfortunate mistakes. In >his absence confusion became worse. > >In his dealings with the United Nations he never knew >exactly what he wanted; showing no steady policy >toward the UN, he confused both his friends and >enemies who grew impatient with his erratic behavior. >When the disintegration within his country reached >dangerous proportions he asked for military from the >United Nations. Within about three days the UN troops >were on the spot. When Lumumba found that the UN >troops could not be used as a private army to put down >his political opponents he became disenchanted with >their presence in his country. > >By now Lumumba had quarreled with nearly every leading >politician in the Congo. His continued erratic action >shook the confidence of the outside world and of many >of the African leaders who had wished him well and >hoped that he could restore order rapidly. A power >struggle had erupted in the Congo. Concurrent with >this struggle Belgians were working behind the scenes >to reconquer the Congo economically; their Congolese >puppets, bought and paid for in advance, were deeply >engrossed in their self-seeking venture. > >In the last weeks of his life, when he was being >dragged around with a rope around his neck, while his >captors yanked up his head for the benefit of newsreel >cameras, he still carried himself with great dignity >as well as courage. When he was beaten up on the plane >which carried him to be handed over to his arch enemy, >Tshombe, he did not cry out nor plead for mercy. When >Tshombe's troops beat him again, in the Elizabethville >airport, he asked no one for help or pity. He was >carried off by Tshombe's troops and their Belgian >officers on a journey from which he was certain never >to return alive. Lumumba's conduct in the midst of >these scenes will always stand to his credit in >history. These traits of independence and courage in >his personality went into the making of his >martyrdom-a strange and dangerous martyrdom that makes >Lumumba a more effective Africa nationalist in death >than he was in life. > >Some of the people who are now most vocal in their >praise of the dead Lumumba include many who in the >past criticized some of his actions and speeches most >savagely while he was still alive. Patrice Lumumba was >pulled from power mostly by his own people, who were >being manipulated by forces of change and power alien >to their understanding. > >In the killing of Lumumba, white neo-colonialists and >their black African puppets frustrated the southward >spread of independence movements. Lumumba had pledged >to give assistance to the African nations to the east >and the south of the Congo who are still struggling to >attain independence, particularly Angola. Lumumba was >a true son of Africa, and in his short unhappy >lifetime he was accepted as belonging to all of >Africa, not just the Congo. > >The important point in the Lumumba story, briefly >related, is this: He proved that legitimacy of a >postcolonial regime in Africa, relates mainly to its >legal mandate; but even more, legitimacy relates to >the regime's credentials as a representative of a >genuine nationalism fighting against the intrigues of >new-colonialism. This is why Lumumba was and is still >being extolled this "best son of Africa," this >"Lincoln of the Congo," this "Black Messiah," whose >struggle was made noble by his unswerving demand for >centralism against all forms of Balkanization and >rendered heroic by his unyielding resistance to the >forces of neo-colonialism which finally killed his >body, but not his spirit. This man who now emerges as >a strange combination of statesman, sage, and martyr, >wrote his name on the scroll of African history during >his short and unhappy lifetime. > >-------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Help STOP SPAM: Try the new MSN 8 and get 2 months FREE* Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ADVERTISEMENT To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: [log in to unmask] Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to the Yahoo! 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