>From: Jabou Joh <[log in to unmask]> >Reply-To: The Gambia and related-issues mailing list <[log in to unmask]> >To: [log in to unmask] >Subject: Fwd: Why was Richard Perle meeting with Adnan Khashoggi? >Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2003 13:39:12 EST > >American Muslim Council >--------------------------------------------------- >The following article apears in the current issue >of The New Yorker. >--------------------------------------------------- >LUNCH WITH THE CHAIRMAN >by SEYMOUR M. HERSH >Why was Richard Perle meeting with Adnan Khashoggi? >Issue of 2003-03-17 (The New Yorker) >Posted 2003-03-10 >At the peak of his deal-making activities, in the >nineteen-seventies, the Saudi-born businessman Adnan >Khashoggi brokered billions of dollars in arms and >aircraft sales for the Saudi royal family, earning >hundreds of millions in commissions and fees. Though >never convicted of wrongdoing, he was repeatedly >involved in disputes with federal prosecutors and with >the Securities and Exchange Commission, and in recent >years he has been in litigation in Thailand and Los >Angeles, among other places, concerning allegations >of stock manipulation and fraud. During the Reagan >Administration, Khashoggi was one of the middlemen >between Oliver North, in the White House, and the >mullahs in Iran in what became known as the Iran-Contra >scandal. Khashoggi subsequently claimed that he lost >ten million dollars that he had put up to obtain >embargoed weapons for Iran which were to be bartered >(with Presidential approval) for American hostages. >The scandals of those times seemed to feed off each >other: a congressional investigation revealed that >Khashoggi had borrowed much of the money for the weapons >from the Bank of Credit and Commerce International >(B.C.C.I.), whose collapse, in 1991, defrauded thousands >of depositors and led to years of inquiry and litigation. > >Khashoggi is still brokering. In January of this >year, he arranged a private lunch, in France, to >bring together Harb Saleh al-Zuhair, a Saudi >industrialist whose family fortune includes extensive >holdings in construction, electronics, and engineering >companies throughout the Middle East, and >Richard N. Perle, the chairman of the Defense Policy >Board, who is one of the most outspoken and influential >American advocates of war with Iraq. > >The Defense Policy Board is a Defense Department advisory >group composed primarily of highly respected former >government officials, retired military officers, and >academics. Its members, who serve without pay, include >former national-security advisers, Secretaries of Defense, >and heads of the C.I.A. The board meets several times a >year at the Pentagon to review and assess the country’s >strategic defense policies. > >Perle is also a managing partner in a venture-capital >company called Trireme Partners L.P., which was >registered in November, 2001, in Delaware. Trireme’s >main business, according to a two-page letter that one >of its representatives sent to Khashoggi last November, >is to invest in companies dealing in technology, goods, >and services that are of value to homeland security and >defense. The letter argued that the fear of terrorism >would increase the demand for such products in Europe >and in countries like Saudi Arabia and Singapore. > >The letter mentioned the firm’s government connections >prominently: “Three of Trireme’s Management Group members >currently advise the U.S. Secretary of Defense by serving >on the U.S. Defense Policy Board, and one of Trireme’s >principals, Richard Perle, is chairman of that Board.” >The two other policy-board members associated with Trireme >are Henry Kissinger, the former Secretary of State >(who is, in fact, only a member of Trireme’s advisory >group and is not involved in its management), and >Gerald Hillman, an investor and a close business >associate of Perle’s who handles matters in Trireme’s >New York office. The letter said that forty-five million >dollars had already been raised, including twenty million >dollars from Boeing; the purpose, clearly, was to attract >more investors, such as Khashoggi and Zuhair. > > > >Perle served as a foreign-policy adviser in George W. >Bush’s Presidential campaign—he had been an Assistant >Secretary of Defense under Ronald Reagan—but he chose >not to take a senior position in the Administration. In >mid-2001, however, he accepted an offer from Secretary of >Defense Donald Rumsfeld to chair the Defense Policy Board, >a then obscure group that had been created by the Defense >Department in 1985. Its members (there are around thirty >of them) may be outside the government, but they have >access to classified information and to senior policymakers, >and give advice not only on strategic policy but also on >such matters as weapons procurement. Most of the board’s >proceedings are confidential. > >As chairman of the board, Perle is considered to be a >special government employee and therefore subject to a >federal Code of Conduct. Those rules bar a special >employee from participating in an official capacity in >any matter in which he has a financial interest. “One of >the general rules is that you don’t take advantage of your >federal position to help yourself financially in any way,” >a former government attorney who helped formulate the Code >of Conduct told me. The point, the attorney added, is to >“protect government processes from actual or apparent >conflicts.” > >Advisory groups like the Defense Policy Board enable >knowledgeable people outside government to bring their >skills and expertise to bear, in confidence, on key policy >issues. Because such experts are often tied to the defense >industry, however, there are inevitable conflicts. One >board member told me that most members are active in finance >and business, and on at least one occasion a member has >left a meeting when a military or an intelligence product >in which he has an active interest has come under discussion. > >Four members of the Defense Policy Board told me that the >board, which met most recently on February 27th and 28th, >had not been informed of Perle’s involvement in Trireme. >One board member, upon being told of Trireme and Perle’s >meeting with Khashoggi, exclaimed, “Oh, get out of here. >He’s the chairman! If you had a story about me setting up >a company for homeland security, and I’ve put people on the >board with whom I’m doing that business, I’d be had”—a >reference to Gerald Hillman, who had almost no senior policy >or military experience in government before being offered a >post on the policy board. “Seems to me this is at the edge >of or off the ethical charts. I think it would stink to high >heaven.” > >Hillman, a former McKinsey consultant, stunned at least >one board member at the February meeting when he raised >questions about the validity of Iraq’s existing oil contracts. >“Hillman said the old contracts are bad news; he said we >should kick out the Russians and the French,” the board member >told me. “This was a serious conversation. We’d become the >brokers. Then we’d be selling futures in the Iraqi oil company. >I said to myself, ‘Oh, man. Don’t go down that road.’” Hillman >denies making such statements at the meeting. > >Larry Noble, the executive director of the Washington-based >Center for Responsive Politics, a nonprofit research >organization, said of Perle’s Trireme involvement, “It’s not >illegal, but it presents an appearance of a conflict. It’s >enough to raise questions about the advice he’s giving to the >Pentagon and why people in business are dealing with him.” >Noble added, “The question is whether he’s trading off his >advisory-committee relationship. If it’s a selling point for >the firm he’s involved with, that means he’s a closer—the guy >you bring in who doesn’t have to talk about money, but he’s >the reason you’re doing the deal.” > >Perle’s association with Trireme was not his first exposure >to the link between high finance and high-level politics. He >was born in New York City, graduated from the University of >Southern California in 1964, and spent a decade in >Senate-staff jobs before leaving government in 1980, to work >for a military-consulting firm. The next year, he was back >in government, as Assistant Secretary of Defense. In 1983, >he was the subject of a New York Times investigation into an >allegation that he recommended that the Army buy weapons from >an Israeli company from whose owners he had, two years earlier, >accepted a fifty-thousand-dollar fee. Perle later acknowledged >that he had accepted the fee, but vigorously denied any >wrongdoing. He had not recused himself in the matter, he >explained, because the fee was for work he had done before he >took the Defense Department job. He added, “The ultimate issue, >of course, was a question of procurement, and I am not a >procurement officer.” He was never officially accused of any >ethical violations in the matter. Perle served in the Pentagon >until 1987 and then became deeply involved in the lobbying >and business worlds. Among other corporate commitments, he >now serves as a director of a company doing business with the >federal government: the Autonomy Corporation, a British firm >that recently won a major federal contract in homeland security. >When I asked him about that contract, Perle told me that there >was no possible conflict, because the contract was obtained >through competitive bidding, and “I never talked to anybody >about it.” > > > >Under Perle’s leadership, the policy board has become >increasingly influential. He has used it as a bully pulpit, >from which to advocate the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and >the use of preëmptive military action to combat terrorism. >Perle had many allies for this approach, such as Paul Wolfowitz, >the Deputy Secretary of Defense, but there was intense resistance >throughout the bureaucracy—most notably at the State Department. >Preëmption has since emerged as the overriding idea behind the >Administration’s foreign policy. One former high-level >intelligence official spoke with awe of Perle’s ability to >“radically change government policy” even though he is a private >citizen. “It’s an impressive achievement that an outsider can >have so much influence, and has even been given an institutional >base for his influence.” > >Perle’s authority in the Bush Administration is buttressed by >close association, politically and personally, with many >important Administration figures, including Wolfowitz and >Douglas Feith, the Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy, who >is the Pentagon’s third-ranking civilian official. In 1989, >Feith created International Advisors Incorporated, a lobbying >firm whose main client was the government of Turkey. The firm >retained Perle as an adviser between 1989 and 1994. Feith got >his current position, according to a former high-level Defense >Department official, only after Perle personally intervened >with Rumsfeld, who was skeptical about him. Feith was directly >involved in the strategic planning and conduct of the military >operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan; he now runs >various aspects of the planning of the Iraqi war and its aftermath. >He and Perle share the same views on many foreign-policy issues. >Both have been calling for Saddam Hussein’s removal for years, >long before September 11th. They also worked together, in 1996, >to prepare a list of policy initiatives for Benjamin Netanyahu, >shortly after his election as the Israeli Prime Minister. The >suggestions included working toward regime change in Iraq. Feith >and Perle were energetic supporters of Ahmad Chalabi, the >controversial leader of the anti-Saddam Iraqi National Congress, >and have struggled with officials at the State Department and >the C.I.A. about the future of Iraq. > >Perle has also been an outspoken critic of the Saudi government, >and Americans who are in its pay. He has often publicly rebuked >former American government officials who are connected to >research centers and foundations that are funded by the Saudis, >and told the National Review last summer, “I think it’s a >disgrace. They’re the people who appear on television, they >write op-ed pieces. The Saudis are a major source of the problem >we face with terrorism. That would be far more obvious to >people if it weren’t for this community of former diplomats >effectively working for this foreign government.” In August, >the Saudi government was dismayed when the Washington Post >revealed that the Defense Policy Board had received a briefing >on July 10th from a Rand Corporation analyst named Laurent >Murawiec, who depicted Saudi Arabia as an enemy of the United >States, and recommended that the Bush Administration give the >Saudi government an ultimatum to stop backing terrorism or face >seizure of its financial assets in the United States and its >oil fields. Murawiec, it was later found, is a former editor >of the Executive Intelligence Review, a magazine controlled by >Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., the perennial Presidential candidate, >conspiracy theorist, and felon. According to Time, it was Perle >himself who had invited Murawiec to make his presentation. > > > >Perle’s hostility to the politics of the Saudi government did >not stop him from meeting with potential Saudi investors for >Trireme. Khashoggi and Zuhair told me that they understood that >one of Trireme’s objectives was to seek the help of influential >Saudis to win homeland-security contracts with the Saudi royal >family for the businesses it financed. The profits for such >contracts could be substantial. Saudi Arabia has spent nearly >a billion dollars to survey and demarcate its >eight-hundred-and-fifty-mile border with Yemen, and the second >stage of that process will require billions more. Trireme >apparently turned to Adnan Khashoggi for help. > >Last month, I spoke with Khashoggi, who is sixty-seven and is >recovering from open-heart surgery, at his penthouse apartment, >overlooking the Mediterranean in Cannes. “I was the intermediary,” >he said. According to Khashoggi, he was first approached by a >Trireme official named Christopher Harriman. Khashoggi said that >Harriman, an American businessman whom he knew from his jet-set >days, when both men were fixtures on the European social scene, >sent him the Trireme pitch letter. (Harriman has not answered >my calls.) Khashoggi explained that before Christmas he and Harb >Zuhair, the Saudi industrialist, had met with Harriman and >Gerald Hillman in Paris and had discussed the possibility of a >large investment in Trireme. > >Zuhair was interested in more than the financial side; he also >wanted to share his views on war and peace with someone who had >influence with the Bush Administration. Though a Saudi, he had >been born in Iraq, and he hoped that a negotiated, “step by step” >solution could be found to avoid war. Zuhair recalls telling >Harriman and Hillman, “If we have peace, it would be easy to >raise a hundred million. We will bring development to the region.” >Zuhair’s hope, Khashoggi told me, was to combine opportunities >for peace with opportunities for investment. According to Khashoggi, >Hillman and Harriman said that such a meeting could be arranged. >Perle emerged, by virtue of his position on the policy board, as >a natural catch; he was “the hook,” Khashoggi said, for obtaining >the investment from Zuhair. Khashoggi said that he agreed to try >to assemble potential investors for a private lunch with Perle. > > > >The lunch took place on January 3rd at a seaside restaurant in >Marseilles. (Perle has a vacation home in the South of France.) >Those who attended the lunch differ about its purpose. According >to both Khashoggi and Zuhair, there were two items on the agenda. >The first was to give Zuhair a chance to propose a peaceful >alternative to war with Iraq; Khashoggi said that he and Perle >knew that such an alternative was far-fetched, but Zuhair had >recently returned from a visit to Baghdad, and was eager to talk >about it. The second, more important item, according to Khashoggi >and Zuhair, was to pave the way for Zuhair to put together a >group of ten Saudi businessmen who would invest ten million >dollars each in Trireme. > >“It was normal for us to see Perle,” Khashoggi told me. “We in >the Middle East are accustomed to politicians who use their >offices for whatever business they want. I organized the lunch >for the purpose of Harb Zuhair to put his language to Perle. >Perle politely listened, and the lunch was over.” Zuhair, in a >telephone conversation with me, recalled that Perle had made it >clear at the lunch that “he was above the money. He said he was >more involved in politics, and the business is through the >company”—Trireme. Perle, throughout the lunch, “stuck to his >idea that ‘we have to get rid of Saddam,’” Zuhair said. As of >early March, to the knowledge of Zuhair, no Saudi money had yet >been invested in Trireme. > >In my first telephone conversation with Gerald Hillman, in >mid-February, before I knew of the involvement of Khashoggi and >Zuhair, he assured me that Trireme had “nothing to do” with the >Saudis. “I don’t know what you can do with them,” he said. “What >we saw on September 11th was a grotesque manifestation of their >ideology. Americans believe that the Saudis are supporting >terrorism. We have no investment from them, or with them.” >(Last week, he acknowledged that he had met with Khashoggi and >Zuhair, but said that the meeting had been arranged by Harriman >and that he hadn’t known that Zuhair would be there.) Perle, >he insisted in February, “is not a financial creature. He doesn’t >have any desire for financial gain.” > >Perle, in a series of telephone interviews, acknowledged that >he had met with two Saudis at the lunch in Marseilles, but he >did not divulge their identities. (At that time, I still didn’t >know who they were.) “There were two Saudis there,” he said. >“But there was no discussion of Trireme. It was never mentioned >and never discussed.” He firmly stated, “The lunch was not about >money. It just would never have occurred to me to discuss >investments, given the circumstances.” Perle added that one of >the Saudis had information that Saddam was ready to surrender. >“His message was a plea to negotiate with Saddam.” > >When I asked Perle whether the Saudi businessmen at the lunch >were being considered as possible investors in Trireme, he >replied, “I don’t want Saudis as such, but the fund is open to >any investor, and our European partners said that, through >investment banks, they had had Saudis as investors.” Both Perle >and Hillman stated categorically that there were currently no >Saudi investments. > > >Khashoggi professes to be amused by the activities of Perle >and Hillman as members of the policy board. As Khashoggi saw >it, Trireme’s business potential depended on a war in Iraq >taking place. “If there is no war,” he told me, “why is there a >need for security? If there is a war, of course, billions of >dollars will have to be spent.” He commented, “You Americans >blind yourself with your high integrity and your democratic >morality against peddling influence, but they were peddling >influence.” > > > >When Perle’s lunch with Khashoggi and Zuhair, and his >connection to Trireme, became known to a few ranking members >of the Saudi royal family, they reacted with anger and >astonishment. The meeting in Marseilles left Perle, one of the >kingdom’s most vehement critics, exposed to a ferocious >counterattack. > >Prince Bandar bin Sultan, who has served as the Saudi Ambassador >to the United States for twenty years, told me that he had got >wind of Perle’s involvement with Trireme and the lunch in >Marseilles. Bandar, who is in his early fifties, is a prominent >member of the royal family (his father is the defense minister). >He said that he was told that the contacts between Perle and >Trireme and the Saudis were purely business, on all sides. After >the 1991 Gulf War, Bandar told me, Perle had been involved in >an unsuccessful attempt to sell security systems to the Saudi >government, “and this company does security systems.” (Perle >confirmed that he had been on the board of a company that >attempted to make such a sale but said he was not directly >involved in the project.) > >“There is a split personality to Perle,” Bandar said. “Here >he is, on the one hand, trying to make a hundred-million-dollar >deal, and, on the other hand, there were elements of the >appearance of blackmail—‘If we get in business, he’ll back off >on Saudi Arabia’—as I have been informed by participants in >the meeting.” > >As for Perle’s meeting with Khashoggi and Zuhair, and the >assertion that its purpose was to discuss politics, Bandar said, >“There has to be deniability, and a cover story—a possible peace >initiative in Iraq—is needed. I believe the Iraqi events are >irrelevant. A business meeting took place.” > > > >Zuhair, however, was apparently convinced that, thanks to his >discussions with Trireme, he would have a chance to enter into >a serious discussion with Perle about peace. A few days after >the meeting in Paris, Hillman had sent Khashoggi a twelve-point >memorandum, dated December 26, 2002, setting the conditions >that Iraq would have to meet. “It is my belief,” the memorandum >stated, “that if the United States obtained the following >results it would not go to war against Iraq.” Saddam would have >to admit that “Iraq has developed, and possesses, weapons of >mass destruction.” He then would be allowed to resign and leave >Iraq immediately, with his sons and some of his ministers. > >Hillman sent Khashoggi a second memorandum a week later, the >day before the lunch with Perle in Marseilles. “Following our >recent discussions,” it said, “we have been thinking about an >immediate test to ascertain that Iraq is sincere in its desire >to surrender.” Five more steps were outlined, and an ambitious >final request was made: that Khashoggi and Zuhair arrange a >meeting with Prince Nawaf Abdul Aziz, the Saudi intelligence >chief, “so that we can assist in Washington.” > >Both Khashoggi and Zuhair were skeptical of the memorandums. >Zuhair found them “absurd,” and Khashoggi told me that he thought >they were amusing, and almost silly. “This was their thinking?” >he recalled asking himself. “There was nothing to react to. While >Harb was lobbying for Iraq, they were lobbying for Perle.” > >In my initial conversation with Hillman, he said, “Richard had >nothing to do with the writing of those letters. I informed him >of it afterward, and he never said one word, even after I sent >them to him. I thought my ideas were pretty clear, but I didn’t >think Saddam would resign and I didn’t think he’d go into exile. >I’m positive Richard does not believe that any of those things >would happen.” Hillman said that he had drafted the memorandums >with the help of his daughter, a college student. Perle, for his >part, told me, “I didn’t write them and didn’t supply any content >to them. I didn’t know about them until after they were drafted.” > >The views set forth in the memorandums were, indeed, very >different from those held by Perle, who has said publicly that >Saddam will leave office only if he is forced out, and from >those of his fellow hard-liners in the Bush Administration. Given >Perle’s importance in American decision-making, and the risks of >relying on a deal-maker with Adnan Khashoggi’s history, questions >remain about Hillman’s drafting of such an amateurish peace >proposal for Zuhair. Prince Bandar’s assertion—that the talk of >peace was merely a pretext for some hard selling—is difficult to >dismiss. > >Hillman’s proposals, meanwhile, took on an unlikely life of their >own. A month after the lunch, the proposals made their way to Al >Hayat, a Saudi-owned newspaper published in London. If Perle had >ever intended to dissociate himself from them, he did not succeed. >The newspaper, in a dispatch headlined “washington offers to avert >war in return for an international agreement to exile saddam,” >characterized Hillman’s memorandums as “American” documents and said >that the new proposals bore Perle’s imprimatur. The paper said that >Perle and others had attended a series of “secret meetings” in an >effort to avoid the pending war with Iraq, and “a scenario was >discussed whereby Saddam Hussein would personally admit that his >country was attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction and >he would agree to stop trying to acquire these weapons while he >awaits exile.” > >A few days later, the Beirut daily Al Safir published Arabic >translations of the memorandums themselves, attributing them >to Richard Perle. The proposals were said to have been submitted >by Perle, and to “outline Washington’s future visions of Iraq.” >Perle’s lunch with two Saudi businessmen was now elevated by Al >Safir to a series of “recent American-Saudi negotiations” in >which “the American side was represented by Richard Perle.” The >newspaper added, “Publishing these documents is important because >they shed light on the story of how war could have been avoided.” >The documents, of course, did nothing of the kind. > >When Perle was asked whether his dealings with Trireme might >present the appearance of a conflict of interest, he said that >anyone who saw such a conflict would be thinking “maliciously.” >But Perle, in crisscrossing between the public and the private >sectors, has put himself in a difficult position—one not uncommon >to public men. He is credited with being the intellectual force >behind a war that not everyone wants and that many suspect, however >unfairly, of being driven by American business interests. There is >no question that Perle believes that removing Saddam from power is >the right thing to do. At the same time, he has set up a company >that may gain from a war. In doing so, he has given ammunition not >only to the Saudis but to his other ideological opponents as well. >http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/?030317fa_fact > >~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ >To Search in the Gambia-L archives, go to: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/CGI/wa.exe?S1=gambia-l >To contact the List Management, please send an e-mail to: >[log in to unmask] > >To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L Web interface >at: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/gambia-l.html > >~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~