----- Original Message ----- From: "Lisa Toro" <[log in to unmask]> To: <[log in to unmask]> Sent: Wednesday, November 12, 2003 8:44 AM Subject: Fw: [Mwananchi] Re: Museveni, Kabila Settle Out of Court/Democracy in Africa: No Time to Forsake > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: Chifu <[log in to unmask]> > To: <[log in to unmask]> > Sent: Wednesday, November 12, 2003 5:15 AM > Subject: [Mwananchi] Re: Museveni, Kabila Settle Out of Court/Democracy in > Africa: No Time to Forsake > > > > --- In [log in to unmask], "Edward Mulindwa" <mulindwa@l...> > > wrote: > > > People > > > > > > This is how much influence Western countries have on Africa and > > like wise they must be held responsible for the deaths we have in > > Africa. Surely Uganda invaded Congo, surely we have lost more than 4 > > million people in Congo, surely Uganda Government officials have > > looted minerals from Congo. And the only right thing we had to do was > > to take Uganda Government to the court, at least for the sake of > > those who died. But Museveni and Kabila spend a week in Washington, > > and the case get with drawn from the court, what exactly happened > > between the administration and Museveni and Kabila? And what about > > those who lost their lives? For the best we would have got from their > > lives is to find out if any body was wrong and we change that system. > > Today we can not do it, thanks to Washington, And you wonder why Kony > > is in the Bush? > > > > ********* > > > > Em, > > > > Don't you think that it is better to settle or let peace prevail then > > innocent being killed? your arguments weak. I got the forwarded > > article below and I am sharing it with you. Food for thoughts... > > > > Democracy in Africa: No Time to Forsake It > > > > by Joel D. Barkan and David F. Gordon > > Reprinted with permission from Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No.4 > > (July/August 1998). > > > > Africa's mixed record of democratization, including the emergence of a > > large number of hybrid regimes committed to effective governance and > > real economic development but not Western-style democracy, has led > > some analysts and foreign policymakers to question the wisdom of > > promoting democracy as a core theme of U.S. Africa policy. Lately, > > the focus has been on the leaders who have come to power in Central > > Africa and the Horn--Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, Isaias Afwerki of > > Eritrea, Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Paul Kagame of Rwanda, and > > Laurent Kabila of the former Zaire (Dan Connell and Frank > > Smyth, "Africa's New Bloc," March/April 1998). > > > > Attention has focused on these five because upon taking power all > > inherited economic basket cases, and some the legacy of civil war. > > What sets this group apart is not their newness or cohesiveness as a > > bloc, but what they are against. All are committed to sweeping away > > the failures of the past, including the political class associated > > with those failures. All want to assert African control of the > > continent's destiny, and thus reject a deferential attitude toward > > outsiders and their advice. All are also impatient with leaders of > > neighboring states who do not share these objectives and whose > > regimes threaten their own. The conventional wisdom about the new > > leaders is that all have embraced economic reform, reestablished > > political stability, and reduced human rights abuses, but > > have resisted multiparty democracy--a strategy that has achieved > > dramatic results. In this view they deserve, and indeed have > > received, the support of the international community because they are > > committed to putting their own houses in order. > > > > Not So New > > > > On closer inspection, one finds considerable variation among the > > chosen five. The so-called "new" leaders of Africa are not all new. > > Museveni has been in office for more than a decade; Meles and Isaias > > are approaching seven years. None plans to retire anytime soon. With > > respect to economic reform and the establishment of a strong free- > > market economy, all are pragmatic and have given up most of their > > earlier commitments to Marxism. Only Museveni, however, has delivered > > a comprehensiveset of economic reforms. The others still distrust > > capitalists. > > > > Are these regimes really stable? Only Isaias governs a truly stable > > country with broad-based political support. While Meles and Museveni > > have brought peace to their countries, they have not yet secured > > legitimacy among large sections of the population. Kagame rules a > > country that remains at war. Kabila has yet to reestablish a national > > political system for Congo, and there are doubts about whether he has > > the ability or the inclination to do so. Ethiopia and Uganda have set > > up decentralized structures of governance to manage ethnic conflict > > more effectively, but whether power will devolve to subnational > > governments remains to be seen. The new leaders' attitudes toward > > democracy also differ. Uganda has held free and fair elections-- > > although the candidates could not run as representatives of political > > parties--in which Museveni was returned to power and a new parliament > > was elected. Elections in Ethiopia have not been free, while > > Eritrea is for practical purposes a one-party state. > > > > Democracy: It Works The new leaders do believe, as conventional wisdom > > has it, that economic development must precede democracy. They reject > > the view that democratization and development are mutually > > supportive. Yet the African countries with the highest long-term > > growth rates have been Botswana and Mauritius, which also have the > > longest records of democratic rule. More recently, positive growth > > has returned to Benin, Ghana, Mozambique, and South Africa, where the > > resurgence of democracy has been strongest. Growth is also positive > > in C=F4te d'Ivoire, Tanzania, and Malawi, where democratic > > transitions are still at an early stage. Africa's worst performers > > during the 1990s--Kenya, Nigeria, and the former Zaire--are cases not > > of failed democratization but failed authoritarian rule. The views of > > the new leaders not withstanding, the clear lesson from Africa is > > that economic renewal and democratization go hand in hand. > > > > For U.S. policy, the implication of this relationship is that > > countries in different stages of democratic transition must be > > treated differently. African regimes can be divided into four > > categories. First are a handful of states with strong and potentially > > enduring commitments to both free-market economies and democratic > > governance but that are not yet consolidated democracies. In this > > category are Benin, Botswana, Mali, Madagascar, Mauritius, Namibia, > > and South Africa. Second are those that have demonstrated a modest to > > strong commitment to macroeconomic reform and have embarked on > > democratic transitions by holding multiparty elections or have > > carried out a significant degree of political liberalization. > > Included in this group are Burkina Faso, C=F4te d'Ivoire, > > Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. > > Third are those that have embraced macroeconomic reform but seek to > > promote development without democracy. In this group are Burundi, > > Ethiopia, Eritrea, Gabon, Gambia, Niger, and Rwanda. Fourth are those > > that either resist both economic reform and democratic rule or are > > unable to exercise authority across their territory due to civil war > > or state collapse. In this group are Angola, Cameroon, Congo, > > Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan. The challenge for the > > United States is to maintain a clear and consistent commitment to its > > foreign policy goals in Africa while calibrating them for each > > category of states. These goals, as articulated during President > > Bill Clinton's trip to Africa earlier this year, are essentially > > three: economic reform and sustainable development via Africa's > > integration into the global economy, improvement on human rights and > > progress on democratic transition, and reestablishment of political > > stability and effective governance in war-torn states, particularly > > in Central Africa. > > > > The challenge is particularly difficult via-=E0-vis the hybrid > > regimes in the second and third categories because of their diverse > > mix of policies. Virtually all of these countries are better off > > economically and politically than they were at the beginning of the > > 1990s. Several, including Ethiopia and Uganda, have had dramatic > > improvement in their growth rates. None, however, is a consolidated > > democracy, and in some progress toward building democratic > > institutions has been painfully slow. > > > > > > These hybrid regimes are brittle because few have established strong > > institutions to sustain their economy or polity. They will either > > evolve into more democratic regimes or slip back into the > > authoritarian rule that characterized Africa throughout the 1980s. > > Such a return to authoritarianism would risk state collapse and civil > > war. > > > > Challenges of Consolidation > > > > Consider these realities in the hybrid states of the Great Lakes and > > the Horn, which are high priorities for the Clinton administration. > > With the northern third of Uganda fertile ground for rebellions, > > Museveni must incorporate the people of the region into the nation in > > the same way he reached out to the Baganda by restoring the kingdom > > of the country's largest ethnic group to consolidate his regime in > > the south. After nearly 12 years in power, he must also build > > institutions that will facilitate a smooth transfer of power to a > > successor. > > > > In Ethiopia, Meles must likewise craft appropriate mechanisms--perhaps > > via that country's nascent federal structures--to bring the alienated > > Amhara and Oromo, the country's two largest ethnic groups, back into > > the political process if long-term stability is to reign. > > > > In Rwanda, prospects for stability turn on whether Kagame's Tutsi- > > based minority regime can deal with the Hutu majority politically > > rather than militarily. After the genocide, the rural areas are now > > nearly 95 percent Hutu, which makes successful counterinsurgency > > operations almost impossible without an effective political > > component. This may ultimately require the country's partition into > > regions designated for each ethnic group. But if the minority regime > > continues to rely on a purely military option, it will result in more > > carnage and, ultimately, collapse. > > > > Similarly, in Congo, Laurent Kabila may have filled a vacuum at the > > center, but his regime must either reach an accommodation with > > regional political elites who command extensive followings in Kivu, > > Kasai, and Katanga or become the victims of its own hubris. Indeed, > > many observers have already concluded that this will be Kabila's fate > > and no longer include him in the "new leader" group. > > > > The bottom line is that in none of these cases is long-term stability > > or prosperity likely without a more liberal and inclusive politics, > > in which diverse interests bargain for, share, and possibly alternate > > power with each other. Democratization, in short, is in the self- > > interest of those in power. > > > > The Rawlings Precedent The question, then, is whether the United > > States should continue to urge democratization for the good of these > > nations and leaders, or whether it should ease up in order to > > maintain harmonious short-term bilateral relations. While broadly > > cooperating with these regimes, the United States should still > > maintain a dialogue about the need to deepen the democratization > > process. Consistent with the Joint Declaration of Principles signed > > in Entebbe in March by President Clinton, Meles, Museveni, and > > Kabila, the issues to be addressed might include strengthening the > > rule of law, increasing government transparency and accountability, > > making decentralization meaningful, developing an independent media > > and civil society, and ensuring genuine electoral competition no > > matter what the political framework. > > > > In looking at how to approach the new leaders in the Great Lakes and > > the Horn, U.S. policymakers should review their experience in dealing > > with a similar figure in West Africa, Ghana's Jerry Rawlings. In the > > late 1980s, Rawlings, who came to power through a military coup in > > 1981, undertook a tough economic reform program with the support of > > the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The United States > > strongly supported this effort but continued to encourage the > > Rawlings regime to move to a more open and broad-based political > > system, echoing the views of Ghana's strongly democratic middle > > class. In the early 1990s, Rawlings established a multiparty system, > > but the first elections, held in 1992, were not seen as legitimate by > > large segments of the population. In response, the United States, > > while continuing to back Rawlings, began to explore means of bringing > > the Ghanaian opposition back into the political process. This led to > > a large multiyear effort by the Agency for machinery in Ghana, > > which held its second elections in 1996. While the results were quite > > similar to the first, the elections achieved broad legitimacy and led > > to the active participation of the opposition in parliament and a > > broad and open political debate. By maintaining a steady policy of > > engagement with a dynamic new leader but not losing sight of the > > importance of political reform in sustaining economic policy reforms, > > the United States played a positive role in Ghana's evolution. > > > > Critics of U.S. efforts to promote democracy abroad argue that the > > U.S. national interest is not served when foreign policy objectives > > are defined in moralistic terms rather than on the basis of concrete > > interests. Yet in the post-Cold War world, the main U.S. interest in > > Africa is the peaceful development of African states so that they are > > no longer islands of instability and poverty that require U.S. > > assistance or intervention, but partners in trade and full members of > > the international community. Achieving these goals depends on the > > continued promotion of democracy as a core element in U.S. Africa > > policy. > > > > Joel D. Barkan is Professor of Political Science at the University of > > Iowa and a Senior Fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace. > > David F. Gordon, until this summer, was Senior Fellow at the Overseas > > Development Council. > > > > > > ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~--> > > Buy Ink Cartridges or Refill Kits for your HP, Epson, Canon or Lexmark > > Printer at MyInks.com. Free s/h on orders $50 or more to the US & Canada. > > http://www.c1tracking.com/l.asp?cid=5511 > > http://us.click.yahoo.com/mOAaAA/3exGAA/qnsNAA/XgSolB/TM > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------~-> > > > > The Mwananchi Group welcomes your opinion on diverse issues affecting us > Africans. > > > > To join us click http://www.yahoogroups.com/group/mwananchi > > > > Visit Aids-Africa at > > http://www.yahoogroups.com/group/aids-africa > > on hiv/aids related discussions. > > > > > > > > > > Your use of Yahoo! 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