Hi! The recent coalition victories in Jarra and Bakau, coupled with the recent announcements by Yaya Jammeh stating that no opposition will win against him and that developments slated for the next ten years will be greater than developments seen in the last, have made me think about the political situation in Gambia and the possibilities for the coalition in the 2006 elections. Whilst the momentum gathered by the coalition these past few months might give a feeling of invincibility, can one truly conclude that the few victories can be used to gauge their possibilities come 2006? Can the opposition win the 2006 elections? In order to answer this question, one needs to look at various factors. The first set of factors will look at the APRC's possibilities and advantages that might hamper the coalition's efforts. It is important to look at the APRC as a viable force to be reckoned with and not just a party on its way to losing the 2006 elections. Many people have the tendency to conclude that just because Gambia is going through tough times, the days are numbered for the APRC. Whilst this might be a consoling sentiment, it is not rooted in reality. What is rooted in reality is that the APRC, despite all its failings is still a powerful force in Gambian politics privileged with many resources. In looking at the advantages of the APRC, one needs to first of all look at the party's position as a party in power and all the benefits incumbency entails especially in African politics. One of the most important benefits is control of the media. Even if the government does not deliberately try to manipulate or tilt television, radio and newspaper coverage in its favour, the mere fact that government ministers, officials or the president himself, carrying out their normal public functions, get more media coverage, disadvantages the coalition. This will give them the opportunity to sell their platform and achievements especially if there are projects that are launched or finished around election time. Things will get worse regarding the media if the government decides to manipulate the public media in its favour. This will give it the lion's share of television, radio and to a large extent print media. The coalition's ability to spread its programs will thus suffer. Another important advantage the APRC has as a party in power is the vast resources of the state at its disposal. This includes both financial and material resources. Whilst it is in the letter of the law not allowed to take money from national coffers to finance the election campaign of any individual party, the APRC included, what is to stop the inclusion of such financing being entered as miscellaneous expenditure in some ministry or parastatal somewhere? What is to stop heads of parastatals from making "donations" as was done for the tenth anniversary of the A(F)PRC ? Money aside, the other resources of the state such as transportation, fuel etc. can be used to a great advantage. Whilst the coalition will need to hire transport and stand for the cost unless supporters provide such, the APRC has the advantage of using public transportation to transport its supporters around the country to attend rallies and beef up support. Private individuals and corporations that have a vested interest in seeing the continued control of the APRC are also a source of revenue and resources for the ruling party. These individuals or corporations might in some way want to preserve the status quo to protect their investments or might want to get contracts and other opportunities. They might then reason that being seen to be supporters and contributors will increase their chances or protect their investments. The APRC can also engage in less subtle activities to increase its chances. It can use the law and security services to hamper the coalition's efforts. One of the most devastating of such tactics would be to stage a security scare such as a coup attempt, declare a state of emergency and postpone the elections. This has been done several times in other African countries. Another tactic would be use the law to disqualify certain individual politicians. Yet another tactic would be gerrymandering where constituency boundaries would be redrawn to suit the APRC and increase its chances of getting more favourable results. Raw harassment of and brutality against candidates and supporters and the rejection of permits for rallies by the coalition can also be used with devastating consequences for the coalition. Given the homogeneous nature of the Senegambia people and the porous border, unqualified voters from Senegal (especially Casamance) can be furnished with Gambian papers and used as a tipping block wherever the APRC feels threatened. This was lamented over during the previous elections when the opposition charged that residents of Casamance were smuggled into the country to vote despite the fact that they were not citizens. Yet another tactic would be to annul the election results if the opposition is seen to have won on election day or just afterwards. This has happened in such places as Algeria where the military stepped in to cancel the results when it became obvious that Islamic candidates were on the verge of winning the elections. This has however tragically led to a civil war with devastating consequences. All these methods and many more, at the hands of the APRC prove that it will be foolhardy to think that the APRC can be easily defeated. With so much to lose, the party will predictably fight tooth and nail to stay in power. Having looked at the factors surrounding the APRC as a viable player in the 2006 elections, let us now look at the coalition. Despite the fact that the coalition is the underdog in terms of resources and finance, many realities on the ground favour it. The deteriorating economic situation, the level of insecurity and the general sense of apathy can, if properly harnessed, bring about positive results. It is worth pointing out however that just taking these things for granted can result in a terrible shock for the coalition. This is because the same situation was prevalent in the previous elections but due to among other things, the opposition's failure to make practical use of it, the result was disappointment for them. ***********************************TO BE CONTINUED********************** ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ To Search in the Gambia-L archives, go to: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/CGI/wa.exe?S1=gambia-l To contact the List Management, please send an e-mail to: [log in to unmask] To unsubscribe/subscribe or view archives of postings, go to the Gambia-L Web interface at: http://maelstrom.stjohns.edu/archives/gambia-l.html ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~