> CONFERENCE OF INTELLECTUALS > FROM AFRICA AND THE DIASPORA > Dakar, 6 - 9 October 2004 > > > The Diaspora and Africanity > by > Archie Mafeje > > > The Diaspora and Africanity > > These two terms have come into greater currency recently than ever before. > The reason is not too far to find. Due to a continuing crisis on the > continent over the last 20 years or so and growing Afro-pessimism > internationally, Africans have felt called upon to reconsider their > position > and to assert their Africanity. In a changing world this requires a great > deal of rethinking and reorganisation. Judging by the manifest responses > of > the Africans, the immediate problem is external imposition and otherness > under globalisation. Globalisation seeks to homogenise everything while > maintaining huge structural differentials among regions and nations. This > gives rise to resentment and strong nationalistic feelings among those who > are on the receiving end. On the African continent this is evidenced by > the > persistent call for indigenisation of knowledge and greater political and > economic integration that finds concrete expression in organisations such > as > the African Union (AU), sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS, SADC, > and > high-profile initiatives such as NEPAD. Whether or not one agrees with the > different perspectives adopted by these various organisations, the > important > point is that they represent a new Pan-Africanist perspective that is not > yet fully theorised. > > The first question that has forced itself into the foreground is who are > the > Africans. Is it a racial definition, a cultural identity, or a purely > geographical specification? This has given rise to all sorts of > controversies. There are those who like Achille Mbembe, the former > Executive Secretary of CODESRIA, maintain that Africans are not black. The > obvious implication here is that the term "African" has no racial > connotations. On the face of it, this would seem to be true because we > have, among others, North Africans who are of Arab origin and are not > necessarily black. We could add to this other groups such as people of > Indian descent who settled in Africa, especially in East Africa. All this > notwithstanding, what appears to be the most pervasive dividing line is > between people of European origin, variously known as whites or settlers, > and indigenous black Africans who are by and large sub-Saharan. In the > last > so many decades after independence in Africa this division has been thrown > into sharp relief by the bitter struggles between blacks and whites in > southern Africa. Expressions of solidarity from pan-Africanist > organisations such as the OAU, the National Liberation Committee, and the > Frontline States made the division even more stark. > > To make things worse, expressions of solidarity are not > geographically-bound. The British, the white Americans, and the Germans > unabashedly took sides with the white settlers in southern Africa. It is > possible that in doing so they confirmed the view that whites in Africa > were > anything but African. This view was certainly shared by the Africans in > the > diaspora, mainly in the Americas. But, as one would expect, white racism > would inevitably draw a sympathetic reaction from those who are similarly > affected by northern or white domination. This would expand the canvass > to > the Third World in general, without invoking any Africanity. The areas > that > are susceptible to Africanist sentiments are the Americas that were the > destination of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. This is where the > so-called > African diaspora is to be found and it is here that claims to Africanity > have been strongest outside the African continent. It is no mere > coincidence that the black Americans insist on being recognised as > "Afro-Americans". The terminology might be new but the claim itself goes > as > far back as the middle of the 19th century when the "back to Africa" > movement started. However, the intellectual rationalisation of this > aspiration did not come until the end of the century. These appeared in > the > works of such well-known figures as Edward Blyden, Marcus Garvey, Jean > Price-Mars, Aime Cesaire, George Padmore and others. These are people who > are credited with having started the Pan-Africanist movement. If so, > theirs > was more than an expression of solidarity with continental Africans. They > were committed participants in the Africanist struggles against > colonialism. > In other words, they were Africans in the diaspora in the strict sense. > > Since then things have changed and we now have a vaguer category called > the > African diaspora. This has become an ontological category and not a > historical category i.e. it refers to people of African descent, > irrespective of who they are, of their ideological and political > commitment, > and their self-identification in the New World. Such an approach is too > mechanical and too sentimental to make it possible for us as Africans to > know who are our allies and who are enemies, irrespective of their > descent. > It would be very difficult under conditions of rampant American > imperialism > to convince any African that black Americans such as Gondolize Rice and > Collin Powell belong to the fold or are part of us. Such a claim would > defy > any serious political and historical analysis. A great number of blacks > in > the so-called African diaspora know which side their bread is buttered and > have come to share the same condescending attitudes towards Africa This > should not be surprising because by and large people's consciousness is > determined by their objective material conditions. It was inevitable that > some blacks would make it in the New World. If so, what would make them > take an interest in anything African? This is made worse by the fact that > Africans are universally perceived as nay-do-wells. Indeed, Africa is at > the bottom of the global pile and there is no indication that it is going > to > extricate itself from this position soon. Instead, over the last forty > years things have moved from bad to worse. Over the last two decades or > so > this socio-economic malaise has bred amongst many what is referred to as > "Afro-pessimism". This is especially so among non-Africans. Here, it is > well to remember that peoples are judged by their performance and that in > the usual social classifications nobody wants to be associated or > identified > with those who hold a low social status. Why would the African diaspora > be > any different? > > Sociologists would argue that social identities are socially and > culturally > determined but could not argue that they are immutable. In the case of > the > African diaspora it can be shown that physical separation and different > historical experience could give rise to different identities or > self-perception. In Africa the returned slaves in Liberia, Sierra Leone, > and the Gambia saw themselves as different from the indigenous Africans. > This continues and, as is known, has given rise to serious political > problems that cannot be ignored. In the New World the African diaspora > has > got so differentiated, socially and culturally, that no single assumption > can be made about them. For that matter, the term "diaspora" cannot be > used > as a generic term because historically it has come to connote more than > one > thing. Nor can the implicit conceptual problem be resolved by resorting > to > the use of analogies. For instance, reference is often made to the role > that the Chinese "diaspora" played in the development of Mainland China, > Honk Hong, and Taiwan. First of all, it is worth bearing in mind that the > Chinese migrated to other parts of the world as economic migrants, except > perhaps as indentured labour in South Africa after the Anglo-Boer war. > This > enabled them to maintain continuing ties with their original communities > and > lineages. Their remittances played an important role in primary > accumulation in their respective communities of origin and so did their > capital investments in the countries with which they identify back in > Asia. > Here, the organic link is not in doubt. What is in doubt is whether or > not > the Chinese emigrants anywhere outside Asia could legitimately be referred > to as a "diaspora". Who or what was responsible for their dispersion, and > what form did it take? The Indonesian pattern of emigration took a very > similar form to the Chinese one. Although it could be argued that most of > it was a response to Dutch liberal neo-colonialism, the important point is > that it did not amount to an involuntary dispersion. In Holland the > Indonesians were allowed to reconstitute themselves as a community and > maintain strong ties with their families back home. They were free to > establish business networks with their family members in Indonesia, in > Holland, and as far afield as the United States. Of course, during the > Cold > War they were used to fight Surkano's communism in support of Suharto's > Oriental-style capitalism. But did all this amount to a dispersal of the > Indonesians or a diaspora? While still in Asia, it is interesting to note > that we never hear of an Indian diaspora, despite the advent of the Indian > indentured labour in the sugar plantations in Natal and who got completely > uprooted. Apart from the South African case, is there an Indian diaspora > in > East Africa? This is a conceptual question that we will leave to others > or > to those affected to answer. > > It is apparent by now that the term "diaspora" means more than one thing > and > that in some cases it is a false claim or an unjustified claim to > solidarity > by virtue of common descent, irrespective of intervening historical > factors > and acquired new identities in different countries of settlement. For > instance, it is obvious that the political elites in the Caribbean like to > think of themselves as more British than African and in sexual selection > consciously try to breed out their African physical heritage, especially > complexion. In America, while not unduly worried about their complexion, > those blacks who have it made into the white establishment could not care > two hoots about Africa or about their supposed brethren on the other side > of > the Atlantic. Nevertheless, a case could be made in their favour. During > the trans-Atlantic slavery Africans were truly dispersed. They were > uprooted from their communities and wrenched away from their families or > lineages and shipped away to the Americas in their millions. They were > sold > as individual chattels to the highest bidder. There cannot be a worse > form > of degradation of human beings. However, what is germane to our subject > is > the fact that in the New World the African slaves had no community > existence > and had lost all ties with their families and communities back in Africa. > When they were freed, they had absolutely no way of reconstituting these. > Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the only motto known to them was > "everybody for him [her] self and God for us all". They had been > successfully dispersed. The only alternative left for them, individually > or > collectively, was to "cast your bucket where you are". This became the > raison d'etre of their survival and produced different choices and > identities that were not determined by African descent and ultimately had > nothing to do with Africa. > > Therefore, the notion of the African diaspora, as is currently used, is > sociologically and historically unsound. It is populist/sentimental and > evades a number of hard political questions that can be raised at this > historical juncture, irrespective of race or colour. It is fair to admit > that there is black nationalism that goes beyond the borders of the > African > continent. But our argument is that not all blacks in the so-called > diaspora are allied with the Africans. Alliances are made on political > and > ideological grounds. Therefore, thinking and progressive Africans cannot > embrace all and sundry simply because they are black or originally came > from > Africa. Critical choices have to be made. The onus rests on the members > of > the diaspora to stake their claim on Africa. It is only then that we can > hope for a dialogue between them and the continental Africans. Otherwise, > we run the risk of opening the door to all kinds of opportunists and > wolves > in sheepskins. It is interesting that when the President of South Africa, > Thabo Mbeki, rushed to express solidarity with Haitian on their 200th > anniversary, his delegation was fired upon. When Aristide fled to the > Central African Republic, he did not know where he was and he was not > welcome. He was aware of this and wished that he could go back to his > home > region. The Americans would have none of it. But the one who made the > announcement was none other than Aristide's fellow-black, Collin Powell. > Eventually, when the South African government was persuaded to grant him > asylum, it found it expedient to hide him away from the people. So, we do > not know how the black community view the whole thing and what reception > they would have given to Aristide, if things had been otherwise. If the > notion of a black community that stretches across the seas is taken > seriously, then it would be emptied of its meaning, if it became a matter > for officialdom to the exclusion of the popular masses. Solidarity and a > common struggle imply a popular movement, as happened in the > Pan-Africanist > movement earlier on. So far, there is no evidence of such in the current > diasporian effusions. At the conference on Racism in Durban we saw > glimpses > of what we are referring to and, interestingly enough, governments > (including the post-Apartheid South African Government) did everything > possible to distance themselves from such diasporic manifestations of > solidarity. The point here is not to castigate anybody but simply to draw > the attention of those concerned to the fact that social differentiation > among the blacks here and abroad is making it increasingly difficult to > think of the brethren of the "fellow-oppressed" purely on the basis of > colour. Critical choices are being made according to the class interests > and political agendas of different categories of blacks in Africa and in > the > diaspora. This is to be expected since social heterogeneity is true of > all > human populations, however defined. > > What seems to matter most here is how social and political choices are > made > and particular identities are forged or constructed. For instance, if we > as > progressive African intellectuals are interested in anti-imperialist > blacks > in the diaspora, then let that be clear. There is nothing strange about > this choice because we use the same yardstick here within the continent. > All > that one has to do is to look at the composition of voluntary > organisations > formed by progressive African intellectuals in pursuit of their goal to > liberate Africa. Foremost among these are CODESRIA, AAPS, OSSREA, and > SAPEM. > This is not inconsistent with the aspirations of the founders of > Pan-Africanism. The founders of Pan-Africanism were progressive insofar > as > they were anti-colonialist and actually staked their claim on Africa. > Nobody could have denied them that right. In their case there was no risk > of continental Africans finding themselves in bed with CIA agents. Could > we > vouch for the same concerning the succeeding generations of Africans in > the > diaspora, without qualification? This is an issue that has to be > confronted, without sentiment or favour. > > It is not as if these questions have not been raised before. The issue > that > has come to the fore most forcefully in recent years is Africanity. What > is > it to be African? The original formulation by Leopold Senghor was "being > black in the world". That was a colonial world that had been created by > whites. In that world black identity and self-determination were denied. > Hence, it became a necessity that blacks free themselves. It did not > matter > where they were for all had nothing to lose but their chains. They had > had > the same point of reference, namely, the liberation of people of African > descent. Here, there was unison that made it possible for writers such as > Senghor and Nkrumah to think in ontological terms such as "negritude" or > "African personality". That is all gone now. Since the abolition of > slavery and decolonisation in general blacks have got highly > differentiated > socially and economically. For instance, as was indicated earlier, blacks > in > the New World regard themselves as a little cut above their brethren on > the > continent. Within the continent the division between the oppressors and > the > oppressed has grown greater over the last 40 years or so. Therefore, > being > black does not automatically unify them. There are other over-riding > interests that should be taken into consideration. For instance, > political > relations among states in Africa and between the ruling elites in the > diaspora and their continental counterparts are of very little relevance > to > the ordinary black people on both sides of the Atlantic. Therefore, when > the African elites talk of the diaspora that should be treated with a > certain amount of scepticism. Why would they remember black people out > there across the Atlantic while they have forgotten about those who are in > their midst here on the African soil? In the NEPAD document there is > absolutely no reference to African people but only to African states in > "partnership" with European states and Canada? What does this signify? > > This means that new class alliances are being made under the banner of the > new neo-liberalism. This in itself does not imply the defeat of African > nationalism. There is a new and growing sense of Pan-Africanism among > modern Africans. The formation of organisations such as the AU, the > African > Parliament, and the drive towards regional integration are symptomatic of > this felt need. What is not yet clear is which forces are going to be > determinant in this reconstruction. African governments are by and large > undemocratic, if not out-rightly reactionary, and have so far universally > failed to resolve the National Question. Owing to this, they are inclined > to look for alliances from outside. Yet, the forces of globalisation or > the > new imperialism throws them back to their own. There must be a reason why > a > leader like President Thabo Mbeki would find it necessary to write, "I am > an > African". In saying so what constituency was he appealing to? It is > obvious that the African revolution or liberation remains unfinished and > nobody is going to fulfil this historical role, except the Africans > themselves. However, they need not do this in isolation. But what has > emerged very strongly since the lost decade of the 1980s and the ensuing > democratisation pressures since the beginning of the 1990s is that charity > begins at home. > > If the above has not yet dawned on the African leaders, leading African > intellectuals are acutely aware of it. This has taken several forms. One > is > the insistence on Afrocentric forms of knowledge, instead of the usual > extraverted forms of knowledge. Look at this way, Afrocentrism is nothing > more than a legitimate demand that African scholars study their societies > from inside and cease to be purveyors of an alienated intellectual > discourse. The underlying conviction here is that this is the only way > authentic representations can be made on the continent. Indeed, it is only > logical to suppose that when Africans speak for themselves and about > themselves, the world will hear the authentic voice and will be forced to > come to terms with it in the long-run. In one of his publications Kwesi > Prah has argued that if we are adequately Afrocentric, the international > implications will not be lost to those who are genuinely interested. This > could apply to the African diaspora as well. To drive home his point, he > invoked Mao Tsedong's words of wisdom regarding internationalism: "If what > we say and do has relevance for our humanity, its international relevance > is > guaranteed". This does not by any means rule out international solidarity. > It simply re-iterates the same basic principle that charity begins at > home. > We have seen unapologetic expressions of this in works such as "Our > Continent, Our Future" (1999). Of course, emphatic representations take > place at different levels. For instance, there are those who put an > emphasis on African culture, arguing that culture is the rock-bed of any > development on the continent. This goes against the suppositions of > globalisation advocates who believe that development could lead to only > terminal i.e. western cultural patterns and values. This is usually based > on superficial indices such as adoption of western consumption patterns > e.g. > a flare for jeans and revealing clothes, junk food, night clubs, and > public > sexuality. In reality this is a passing phase exhibited by the youth who, > as > they grow older, revert to traditional values such as husbands not wanting > their wives or daughters to behave like westerners; or their sons to > forsake > patriarchal values. After so many years of colonial indoctrination this > is > observable everywhere in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. This argument > is not meant to condone conservatism or traditionalism but to underscore > the > fact that other cultures have withstood colonial brainwashing and imperial > processes of homogenisation. As such, they offer the best natural point > of > resistance against a monocentric world order. Let it be noted here that > this > is not an abstracted notion because it is the people who make culture and > not the intellectuals or politicians. In other words, they are the > custodians of national culture. Intellectuals and politicians can only > learn from them in order to resolve the National Question successfully. > > Since the onslaught of globalisation there has been a great deal of talk > about a dialogue between cultures. Up to the time of the Fall of > Constantinople in the 15th century there had always been a dialogue among > different cultures, as is witnessed by the rise of the western > civilisation. > What effectively put an end to these open-ended exchanges was western > imperialism for it sought to reproduce the whole world in its own image. > Let the westerners deny this and then explain what colonial imposition was > about. The issue was not simply capitalism since the civilisations that > were being over-run could have developed their own capitalism, especially > in > Asia. Global domination, politically, economically, culturally, and > intellectually, was the major objective. This continues to be the case in > practice but it is couched in different terms such as the "New World > Order" > after the fall of the Berlin Wall, "globalisation" after the > universalisation of the "Structural Adjustment " policies by the IMF and > the > World Bank, and "free trade" after the foistering of the World Trade > Organisation on Third World countries by the developed countries. The > most > pernicious of these is "defence of democracy and our values", which is a > justification for the new American militarism that recognises no national > boundaries or sovereignty of different nations. It transpires, therefore, > that "globalisation" is not a self-imposing world phenomenon that is > driven > by blind forces. > > The corollary of this is that, if globalisation is a one-sided affair that > is favoured by those nations that seek to establish a monocentric world > system, then we should expect resistance from those who are on the > receiving > end. Everywhere, there is evidence of this. We have already referred to > the new Pan-Africanism in Africa, the insistence on Afrocentric > intellectual > perspectives, and on home-grown solutions. Regional integration has > emerged > as one of the most important building blocks in the effort to withstand > critical external forces such as globalisation or vertical integration. > Implicit in this trajectory is a pan-African nationalism that does not see > individual nations as a point of departure as well as of return. > Collective > representations are beginning to be perceived as pivotal in the struggle > against the unilateralism or monocentrism of the West. In theory nobody > disagrees, as is shown by the various declarations of the AU. But as far > as > strategy and orientation are concerned, certain differences are > discernable > among African leaders. These are reminiscent of the division between the > Monrovia Group and the Casablanca Group in the early 1960s. This was > apparent in the AU meeting in Durban. Particularly, divisive was the idea > of a "Peer Review Group" that was going to be mandated to pronounce on > matters of "democracy and good governance" on the continent. For their > own > reasons the Western powers strongly endorsed this principle with the hope > that they would influence the selection of the members of the "Peer Review > Group". This was not a vain hope since it was their confidence in the > latter that would guarantee any funding from them for NEPAD. They were so > blatant in their desire that they were outraged when it seemed that due to > internal pressures the so-called pariah states such as Libya and others > would be included in the "Peer Review Group". Of course, things have > changed dramatically after the capitulation by Libya in the wake of the > invasion of Iraq by the Americans. There is no doubt that we all cherish > genuine democracy. But the issue is: who is to say? African peoples who > are fighting their own petty dictators at home had no say in the > proceedings > neither in Addis Ababa nor in Durban. In the circumstances why should > anybody believe in any talk about "democracy" and "good governance" by the > AU/NEPAD and their western mentors? > > In the years leading up to the formation of the OAU in 1963 the battle > lines > were drawn between radical nationalists and those who believed in the > empire > and aspired to being junior partners under the new dispensation. It is > interesting that those from the African diaspora, most eminent amongst > them > Franz Fanon and George Padmore, identified with the radical nationalists. > Would the same be expected under the present conditions? That would > probably be an illusion. Notwithstanding the fact that nobody came out > unscathed from neo-colonialism, what is most relevant at this historical > juncture is that the radical nationalists lost out in the battle and could > not deliver. In defence of their beleaguered regimes they degenerated > into > petty dictators. Here, one is thinking of great African leaders such as > Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Toure, Modiba Keita, Abdel Gamal Nasser, and even > Julius Nyerere, according to some accounts. It would be a folly to blame > history on individuals. What we are faced with here is a situation > wherein > African philosopher kings were turned into defensive petty dictators. > Under > neo-colonialism the advocates of what was called "African socialism" were > greeted with great hostility from the West for obvious reasons. > Inevitably, > their political enterprise failed, despite the support some received from > the Soviet Union. The socialist rhetoric and association with the > Communist > Bloc appealed to the worst prejudices of the West, including the > brainwashed > African diaspora in the West. The failures of the "African socialists" > were > explained purely in ideological terms. The fact that so many neo-colonial > states also failed dismally in the last 40 years did nothing to show that > Africans were probably all in the same boat. The question then is: would > Afrocentric development help to change the situation and to correct > mistakes > of the past? > > Radical African scholars are convinced that another development is > possible > in Africa. A group of them held a symposium in Bamako on exactly that > topic > under the auspices of ENDA and the Third World Forum (Africa region). The > right questions were raised but strangely enough were never followed > through, as far as I am aware. Consequently, as of now no clear > conceptual > framework has emerged that indicates what would be the modalities of this > possibility. In the meantime, as is revealed by the NEPAD trajectory, it > is > without doubt that the African neo-liberals in alliance with their western > counterparts are on the offensive. Worst still, it is apparent that > development, as is presently conceived, is going to the business of a club > of self-appointed states, most of which are patently undemocratic. Unlike > the Lagos Plan of Action that involved all sections of society > (particularly > the intellectuals) and gave every indication that its proposed development > strategy was going to be people-centred, NEPAD is divorced from the people > and its leaders are more concerned about pleasing the donor countries than > their local constituencies. Be it remembered that the Lagos Plan of > Action > was vetoed by the Americans (cf the Berg Report, 1981) precisely because > it > espoused African economic nationalism. Some of the African intellectuals > who attended the Bamako workshop on "Another Development is Possible in > Africa" were part of this move. > > Now that the African renaissance is in vogue, it may be opportune to > revisit > some of these issues. Primary among these is the question of autonomous > economic development. Of necessity, this requires regional integration > since individual African countries are too weak to go it alone. One dares > not say too poor because more value goes out of Africa than comes in, > despite the vaunted foreign aid. This is an economic syndrome that > African > leaders would rather not talk about because they themselves are deeply > implicated. They plunder national revenues and salt them away into > foreign > banks. Yet, under any economic nationalism their primary responsibility > would have been retention of domestic income, instead of going begging for > foreign aid that never comes in sufficient amounts to make any difference. > Economic nationalism would presuppose that any help from outside is > supplementary rather than determinant. It is true that African countries > are not equally endowed and so are the members of the EU. But the latter, > having decided on their own brand of economic nationalism so as to > withstand > critical pressures from the Americans and the Asians, were willing to pay > the necessary political price. As everybody knows, it was not all > free-sailing. Certain sacrifices had to be made by the stronger to pull > up > the weaker. The opposite is true of the African countries. In regional > organisations the stronger do their best to take advantage of the weaker > and > hence regional integration has become a receding goal. Apart from empty > rhetoric, African leaders have not yet said what is going to be the basis > for their regional integration and the ideological underpinnings that > would > make it possible. Unlike the founders of the OAU, they avoid this issue > like plague and are happy to indulge in diplomatic pleasantries and > bureaucratic manoeuvres. > > It is true that on the political front the issue of democracy and "good > governance" had been raised in the context of NEPAD and not so much in the > AU itself. Indeed, it would have been strange for a club of mainly > undemocratic states could have raised with any seriousness the question of > democracy in Africa. It is obvious that there cannot be democracy on the > continent, without popular participation. The movement for independence > was > successful precisely because it enjoyed the support of the majority of the > people. Likewise, it can be argued that there cannot be any political > revival in Africa, without popular participation. When it comes down to > it, > who is going to do the necessary work for development? Surely, not the > bureaucrats in Addis Ababa. Renaissance implies a certain euphoria about > something new with which the general populace identifies. We saw glimpses > of this when the democratisation movement was at its height at the end of > the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. That will is still there, as is > shown by the turn of events in countries such as Zambia and Kenya. This > has > to be transformed into a Pan-African movement. This is a political > question > and not simply a bureaucratic one. The way in which this issue was raised > in the context of NEPAD was thoroughly perverse. First, it was presumed > that the same representatives of undemocratic African states would sit in > judgement of which states are democratic and practise "good governance" > and > which do not qualify. Politically, this was extremely divisive and could > not have forced the African leaders to face themselves and say exactly > what > they meant by "democracy" and "good governance". These terms were being > prescribed for them by the western leaders and provided grounds for > conditionality. How democratic is George Bush or Tony Blair? We know > that > they excel in "good governance", if by that is meant technocratic and > bureaucratic manipulation of the governed. This is why progressive > African > intellectuals make a distinction between "good governance" and democratic > governance. "Good governance", as originally defined by the World Bank > and > the IMF, could be an excuse for authoritarianism and marginalisation of > the > demos. We saw that happening during the Structural Adjustment era. The > second perversion is that, social philosophically, African leaders had not > been given an opportunity to say what they meant by "democracy" in the > context of their proclaimed African renaissance. Yet, some work had been > done on this topic by some African scholars such Claude Ake and Wamba dia > Wamba, and some polemics raged on the pages of the Codesria Bulletin some > years ago concerning democracy and development in Africa. It is possible > that African politicians regard such debates, if they are aware of them at > all, as esoteric. But they do not adopt the same attitude towards western > concepts, which they accept as given as is revealed in the NEPAD document. > Here, we are treading on treacherous ground since cultural and historical > differences could be used as an excuse for denying certain freedoms in the > modern era e.g. women's right to equality. So, qualitatively what would > distinguish the African concept of democracy from, say, the western notion > of democracy that the authors of NEPAD have so uncritically embraced? > > Implicit in the debate about democracy, and "good governance" versus > "democratic governance" are certain cultural connotations that both Claude > Ake and Wamba dia Wamba hinted at very heavily. While white racists, > especially in Southern Africa, believe that universally there was no > democracy in traditional African societies, anthropologically this is > unfounded. For the greater part traditional African societies worked > through councils and general assemblies. This is not to deny the fact > that > as part of that political landscape were autocratic kingdoms, which > European > colonisers approvingly referred to as "centralised governments" through > which they practised what became known as Indirect Rule. As is known, > Indirect Rule was undemocratic and it is interesting that modern African > "Presidents for Life" have chosen the autocratic model to justify > establishing for themselves royal republics. For the ordinary citizens > these are forbidden grounds and hence the general crisis of democracy in > Africa. > > If in the post-independence era ordinary citizens in Africa have been > politically expropriated, this does not mean that they have lost their > Africanity. Whenever possible, this asserts itself. For instance, we saw > this bursting forth during the inauguration of Nelson Mandela as the > President of the new South Africa after more than three centuries of > suppression. This is a measure of the resilience of indigenous cultures. > Correctly understood, this is the people's last line of defence and an > indelible source of their identity. No amount of western theories about > "westernisation", "acculturation", or "globalisation" will change this. > Cultures can only learn from one another and not seek to be substitutes > for > one another. That is a fundamental anthropological principle for culture > is > what characterises the human species and at the same time is what > distinguishes between different peoples. Any attempt to deny this can > only > lead to disaster, as the naïve American monocentrists are about to find > out. > During the holy month of Ramadan in the Middle East it is unthinkable > that > you could bring your sniffer-dogs to sniff at individuals and any > extension > of their persons. For that matter, what is the difference between > beheading > an "infidel" and simply shooting him? This does not mean that at any > given > time there is no critique of culture. In the Middle East political Islam > is > an issue that is being hotly debated among Moslems of different > persuasions. > Nonetheless, the point remains that culture is an inalienable right of > the > people and is not susceptible to appropriation even by "Presidents for > life" > or latter-day imperialists. In Africa, whilst the politicians have been > far > from being creative, the people have been most creative in culture. Here, > one is referring to music, visual and plastic arts, literary works, > theatre > and cinema. African artists have actually won numerous awards > internationally and one wonders if African leaders, with a few exceptions, > had even noticed. From a socio-cultural point of view, these are the > beginnings of an African renaissance. As is known in history during > periods > of disillusionment or decadence artists are usually inspired to look for > alternative meanings. Whether or not all artists are progressive i.e. > look > to the future by making negations of present existence apparent, this does > not detract from the general observation that the search for alternative > meanings creates space for cultural action where other avenues for > self-expression and self-realisation are denied. This puts into question > extraverted or abstracted discourse such as is exemplified by the NEPAD > project. > > This brings us face to face with the question of what we mean by authentic > intellectual and cultural representations on the African continent. > Without > answering this question, we cannot even begin to talk about the "African > Renaissance". This requires reflective as well as reflexive thinking, a > séance that will throw into relief all the major problems that face the > continent and make it possible to exorcise all the attendant evil spirits. > Only the Africans can do this for themselves. Authentic representations, > political, intellectual, and cultural can only come from them. Here, we > are > not talking about speculative history or ontological definitions conceived > in another universe. As we said before, charity begins at home. This > raises very sharply the question of the role of the African Diaspora in > the > African intellectual, political, cultural, and economic renaissance. > Objectively-speaking and in this era of globalisation, it seems that the > African diaspora, however defined, are not in a position to appropriate > the > African continent. The most the faithful amongst them can do is to > maintain > the usual ties of solidarity and nothing more. > > _________________________________________________________________ > MSN Motor: Köp & sälj din bil här http://carview.msn.se/bilsok/ > > > > ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> > Make a clean sweep of pop-up ads. Yahoo! Companion Toolbar. > Now with Pop-Up Blocker. 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